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ABSTRACT
This dissertation charts the persistence of the traditional political
elite in the state of Minas Gerais, Brazil, through the twentieth
century, focusing primarily on the period of authoritarian rule from
1964 to 1982. Contrary to interpretations of Brazilian politics which
claim that regional oligarchies were ousted from national and state
ruling coalitions by the military and their places taken by technocrats
and native and foreign capitalists, this work suggests they retained
power. The persistence of this elite during a period of explosive
industrial growth and in a regime ostensibly committed to promoting
technical competence in government and dispensing with them is explained
by the nature of the political relationships which emanate from a state
capitalist economy. Traditional elites shifted their power base from
land into the state, transforming themselves into a political class
whose political dominance rested on their manipulation of state
resources.
Industrialization fueled by state and foreign investment is demonstrated
to have had little impact on the structure of state power. The local
bourgeoisie was weak and largely uninvolved in dynamic growth sectors.
The organization of the economy along state capitalist lines privileged
state elites and enhanced the state's resource base for its
clientelistic operations. State-based political clientelism thus became
the dominant form of political organization in Brazil. A growing
segment of the population left behind in the "economic miracle" were
represented by territorially-based politicians whose access to state
resources and political networks enabled them deliver state benefits to
state clients and marshall support for the authoritarian regime.
The persistent grip of traditional political elites on state politics in
Minas Gerais is demonstrated through an analysis of elite office holding
from 1956 to 1982. Political elites were supplanted in the executive
branch of the state by technocrats after 1964 only briefly, most notably
in economic ministries, and oligarchs who occupied powerful public
office before the 1964 coup d'etat largely succeeded in attaining high
posts after it.
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Political centralization and the monopoly of power associated with
bureaucratic-authoritarianism precluded a rival elite from supplanting
traditional political elites in the state. The appointment of executive
positions and the formation of a hegemonic government party organized by
the traditional elite confined political competition to oligarchical
ranks. A network of political alliances among traditional local and
state factions upheld the oligarchical political system.
Finally, the implications of traditional elite persistence for Brazilian
democratization is discussed. The traditional political elite of Minas
Gerais has survived the transition from an authoritarian to a quasi-open
'democratic' regime. How political competition will affect the
prospects for oligarchical survival will depend upon the extent to which
this elite can shape the new regime.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Suzanne Berger
Title: Ford Professor of Political Science
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
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Traditional Elites in Industrial Society
Students of development, virtually without exception, have regarded
urbanization and industrialization as processes that erode the
foundations of traditional political domination and undermine the power
of the landed aristocracy. In the course of industrialization, industry
is expected to supplant agriculture as a national economic priority and
generator of wealth, new industrial classes--bourgeois, middle class,
and workers--to arise and put forth a democratic political project, and
peasant laborers to be offered the opportunity to leave the land and
become urban, industrial workers, thereby severing their dependence on
their former landlords. Once this process is underway, traditional
elites will inevitably disappear as a political force, or at best retain
a mere vestige of their former power as the lords of remote corners of
backward regions. As their geographical and sectoral domains shrink,
so, too, will their residual power. All roads lead, sooner or later, to
an inevitable eclipse. Such a formulation has a powerful,
commonsensical appeal: agrarian rural politics are conservative, and
urban, industrial politics are "modern" and democratic. With the shift
of power to the cities, therefore, the defeat of traditional elites is
only a matter of time. Indeed, unlimited empirical evidence can be
marshalled to demonstrate the conservatism of rural areas relative to
urban in national elections. Were this not true, it would be
incomprehensible why traditional elites have stacked the electoral
systems in favor of the rural areas in virtually all countries of the
modern world in which elections are held.
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To demonstrate that ruralism and an agrarian economy are props of
the traditional order does not, however, prove that the onset of
urbanization and industrialization will automatically displace
traditional elites. To the contrary, in several countries, economic
modernization has not neatly translated into a parallel political
modernization. Yet, curiously, the premise that traditional elites will
inevitably be eclipsed has never been questioned. The evidence
marshalled by Alexander Gerschenkron (1943: vii) attests to the
"surprising ability to survive" of the Junkers, who were able to "turn
any new situation, grave crises, and threatening adversities to their
advantage". Yet, were it not for the redrawing of Germany's borders
with Poland and the land reform carried out by the Soviet occupation
forces, it is not clear what would have happened to the Prussian
aristocracy. Nor does Barrington Moore, Jr. (1966), who traces the role
of agrarian lords in establishing modern societies, question this basic
premise. That Moore so readily dismisses plantation aristocrats as
"defeated" in the United States after the Civil War is surprising in
light of the evidence contained in his own discussion that after
Reconstruction, southern aristocrats were returned their primary
instruments of power: land and the political repression of the black
population. Accepting defeat in their contest for control of the
central government, and the lost opportunity for westward expansion,
they were handed undisputed control of their own states, achieved
through the disenfranchisement of southern blacks and the introduction
of sharecropping and other coercive forms of labor relations reminiscent
of the "second serfdom" east of the Elbe. Indeed, writing in 1949, V.O.
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Key, Jr. (1984: 19) rediscovered the dominance of these planter families
in the southern states. Ha found politics in Virginia, for example, to
exhibit "characteristics akin to those of England at about the time of
the Reform Bill" and classified it as a "political museum piece".
The evidence most damaging to the belief that economic
modernization automatically produces changes in the class composition of
the elite, however, comes not from the historical examples of
1
"traditional" societies which modernized with "faults", but from those
which are presumed to have made the transition smoothly. As Bendix
(1970: 302) notes,
The changes of social stratification in the course
of industrialization do not present the simple
picture of a declining aristocracy and a rising
bourgeoisie. In most European countries the social
and political preeminence of pre-industrial ruling
groups continued even when their economic fortunes
declined, and the subordinate social and political
role of the "middle classes" continued even when
their economic fortunes rose.
Economic processes take longer to play themselves out than believed.
The onset of industrialization did not suddenly transform the economy,
let alone completely penetrate national territories and politics. In
the first industrializers, traditional elites held up "bourgeois
democracy" for decades, indeed centuries, after industrialization was
well underway. Accounts of "conquering bourgeoisies" have little
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foundation in fact. Marx and Engels (1972: 339), in the Communist
Manifesto (1848), described a "one hundred year rule" of a bourgeoisie
which in its most advanced state, England, had been enfranchised only 16
years earlier, and which had won its first important political battle--
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the abolition of the Corn Laws--a mere two years before. Mayer (1981)
provides a strong case that the aristocracy remained in place and in
power throughout Europe until World War I. Most remarkable, even today,
the aristocracy in Britain has by no means been routed, but enjoys an
important representation in the British cabinet and Parliament.
This is a study of the resilience of one set of oligarchs, the
traditional political elite in the state of Minas Gerais, Brazil, from
1964 to 1982. The traditional Mineiro elite retained its dominance
amidst the highest rates of industrial growth in the developing world.
Brazil, by the measure of its gross product, is the most "developed" of
Latin American countries, and much of its "economic miracle" of the
early 1970s was centered in Minas Gerais. This elite survived,
moreover, in a regime ostensibly committed to restoring economic and
political order by promoting technical competence in government and
dispensing with "the politicians of the past". Its survival challenges
us to explain the tenacity of this class and the persistence of
traditional domination.
Any study which addresses itself to the composition of the elite
must answer why men, rather than institutions or processes, merit
investigation. If one set of elites is replaced by another, is this
important for organization of the political system? Why should it
matter if traditional political elites, professional administrators and
technical experts, new middle class professionals, or businessmen,
occupy appointed or elective office, if they do so under the same
conditions of popular ratification?
The argument underpinning this study is that traditional political
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elites perpetuate "traditional politics", that is, a pattern of politics
in which power is narrowly concentrated, access to decision-making
restricted, channels of political representation hierarchically
organized, and levels of permissible political competition strictly
regulated. In political systems in which traditional elites figure
prominently, political parties are more likely to be vehicles of
oligarchical control than genuine transmission belts of non-elite
interests, and the prevalent form of political representation is apt to
be a variant of the patron-client relationship. Elites themselves block
the processes which could transform political institutions and
arrangements in a democratic direction. Even if new, middle class
politicians are incorporated into office-holding, if still under the
hegemony of traditional political elites, there is no reason to believe
new elites can or will dismantle the oligarchical system.
As the Brazilian political system inches toward democracy, special
attention should be paid to the role of the traditional political elite.
Its political strength has to date acted as a brake upon a genuine
opening of the political system in Brazil as well as in other Latin
American countries. If traditional elites can continue to dominate
their political systems, then even if current attempts to advance
political democratization are successful and democracy formally
established, the vast majority of the population will reap neither its
political nor material fruits. In Brazil and other contemporary
industrializing countries, the fate of traditional elites remains on the
agenda of politics.
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The Traditional Political Elite
The concept "traditional political elite" identifies a class of
dominant elites which does not occupy a single position in the
productive structure and whose power does not derive uniquely from
economic resources, which may be quite heterogeneous. The diversity of
its members cannot be captured by such terms as agrarian elite or
agrarian bourgeoisie, nor do such terms illuminate what is common to
them. "Agrarian bourgeoisie" may accurately describe a class which
controls large land tracts, employs a wage laboring population, has at
its disposal at least moderately sophisticated technology, and orients
production toward large domestic and foreign markets, but cannot
satisfactorily include a lawyer, whose family lands lie fallow, with
investments in little more than short-term, savings bank deposits. If
this lawyer is a prominent member of the political elite and is
descended from a great line of landowner-governors, to view him as a
middle class liberal professional would be to overlook the full scope of
his power resources, his probable path to local, state, or national
prominence, and the ends of his public activity. The entrance of
lawyers and other professionals into government does not necessarily
imply the replacement of one (agrarian elite) class by another (liberal
professional). Members of professional classes, especially lawyers, may
be traditional elites, depending primarily on their social origins,
family background, and sources of domination,
In this study, the traditional elite is defined as a primarily
political class whose power is transmitted through family lineage and
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rooted in such sources of traditional domination as landholding and
clientelistic networks. Traditional elites may no longer be landed,
though all once were. What makes them traditional, even if they divest
of landholdings, is the manner in which they exercise dominance: unlike
"modern" elites who exploit subordinate classes through the market,
"traditional" elites dominate dependent classes outside of the market,
usually where the market has not penetrated, where it has been
distorted, or where it has malfunctioned. These traditional political
elites are "oligarchies" for their numbers are relatively small, their
ranks relatively closed, and their power concentrated in the hands of a
limited number of families. They dominate political systems in which
liberal political rights, plural political representation, programmatic
political parties, and open political competition are circumscribed --
systems which could not satisfy any reasonable definition.of "modern
politics".
For traditional political elites to maintain their grip on their
political systems, must they share some political vision or ideological
world view? In authoritarian Brazil, traditional political elites
infiltrated the ranks of the opposition as well as government backers,
and in the interior of Minas Gerais, party label often mattered, and
still matters, little. Most old elites in the opposition were as apt to
behave in "traditional" ways as did their counterparts who formally
supported the regime. But there were and still are cases in which an
opposition deputy, or even higher politician, is a genuine democrat, and
of oligarchical descent. Are those "traditional political elites"
actively committed to defeating the traditional order, then,
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"traditional"? If so, does the concept retain any political
significance? One premise of this thesis is that this latter group is
sufficiently small that no qualifications need be placed on our
definition.
The blurry lines of "traditional political elites" has doubtless
led many scholars, anxious for a neater categorization, to redraw the
limits of this group, and thus define as important elites subsets of our
elite which may or may not intersect with non-traditional political
elites. Yet, if social scientists have difficulty in identifying
"traditional elites", Brazilian society does not. The "traditional
families" (famIlias tradicionais), "old leaderships" (velhas
liderangas), and "conservative classes" (classes conservadoras) are
known to all, and remain part of the Brazilian daily lexicon. The task
of social science is to explain systematically who they are, why they
survive, and how they continue to monopolize power.
The Problem of Traditional Elite Survival
How is it possible for traditional elites to remain in power even
while a society is industrializing? One set of explanations attributes
the persistence of political power to its grip on economic power. The
first basis for such a claim is to demonstrate the proportion of the
population employed in agriculture, or the size of landed estates and
their importance in the national product or international trade. In
this genre, Mayer (1981) argues in a piece of revisionist history that
the aristocracy, and agriculture, were more important economically in
England, and for a longer time, than commonly believed and described by
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Hobsbawn (1969: 106-107). He also argues that the bourgeoisie appeared
on the scene later than presumed. While the 'first' industrial
revolution took place from roughly 1760 to 1848 in the early
industrializers, England and France, it did not really produce a
bourgeoisie, nor a modern industrial society. Industry consisted of
principally small, single firm, family-owned cottage industries
producing such consumer goods as textiles and foods: in Mayer's view,
the owners of these firms could hardly be considered bourgeois. Rather,
this class emerges only in the 'second' industrial revolution, which
commences around 1870, during the stage of the developmeat of what he
calls producer industries--iron and steel, railroads, and chemicals--but
which are better known as intermediate, capital goods, and consumer
durables. Even if the bourgeoisie emerged later than initially
believed, we still must account for the continued presence of
traditional elites in power long after industrialization "should have"
displaced them.
A variant of this explanation, frequently offered for the
resilience of the Prussian Junkers, begins to address this problem.
Gerschenkron in Bread and Democracy in Germany (1943) demonstrates that
the Prussian agrarian elite was able to maintain its dominance by
perpetuating the economic strength of traditional agriculture relative
to a rapidly expanding industrial sector. It did so by using its power
to win pro-agrarian state policies which protected the vitality and
profitability of agriculture. While sophisticated analyses such as
Gerschenkron's thus reject economically deterministic answers to this
question, they nonetheless continue to attribute the longevity of
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traditional elites to their landholdings.
A third conception of this theme suggests that a transformation, a
"modernization", of the economic power base of old elites might keep
them in place and in power. A primary reason usually offered for the
retention of power by the English aristocracy, after agriculture had
waned, was its turn to commerce and other modern sector economic
activities. A similar pattern of divestment accounts for the
persistence of traditional elites in Chile, where Zeitlin and Ratcliff
(1975) found the agrarian elite to be virtually indistinguishable from
the industrial elite.
Ultimately the validity of this category of explanation is largely
an empirical question, and certainly one worth pursuing. Yet, it cannot
constitute an adequate frame for exploring the general problem of the
resilience of traditional elites. It implies that old elites can retain
power for only as long as they can postpone a shift of national priority
to industry or even unprotected capitalist agriculture, or until they
transform themselves into modern sector elites. Yet, what we are
compelled to explain is how such traditional elites as the Minas
oligarchy flourished, without agricultural protection, in the midst of
an industrial explosion without a homogeneous modern sector economic
base.
Few conceptual tools are available to help solve this puzzle. The
survival of pre-industrial elites in industrial society is often
explained as the temporary result of a "lag" between the bourgeoisie's
ascendence as a class and the time it supplants the aristocracy in
government. Depending on the measures of elite transformation employed,
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this "long and theoretically significant lag" (Putnam, 1976: 179) can
3
endure up to 100 years. A far more serious affair than a metaphysical
generation gap, this "lag" represents no less than a disjuncture between
economic and political power, or in the Argentine sociologist Jorge
Graciarena's terms (1972: 48-49), the difference between "real power",
or the power deriving from the position of a class in the productive
structure, and "effective power", or that which accrues to individuals
or groups occupying positions of political significance in society.
To explain this lag requires a focus on political variables. The
timing of changes in the composition of the elite in transitions from
agrarian to industrial societf appears to depend on political change,
and is only loosely related to the timing of economic change. The
extension of suffrage, the organization of political parties as new
vehicles of mass representation, and the birth of new regimes by war or
revolution, all can be viewed as motors of historical elite change (cf.
Putnam, 1976). Left exclusively to economic forces, change would come
slowly, if at all. In Britain, which suffered a notoriously long lag,
the aristocracy remained in the cabinet long after industrialization was
underway because in large part the political system did not change: the
middle class rose in an aristocratic system which it did not transform.
Various historical studies (Matthews, 1954: 43-45; Putnam, 1976: 180ff)
have highlighted the importance in delaying elite transformation of
peculiar traits of the British political system, such as the
'apprenticeship' an MP served as a "back-bencher" and junior minister
before becoming a member of the cabinet, and too small parliamentary
salaries to support a member until he had some other source of income,
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preventing many politically ambitious men from standing for Parliament
until too late in life to acquire the necessary experience to gain
4
cabinet rank. Where political change was sharper, as in Germany from
the Imperial to the Weimar periods, so too was the difference in the
composition of the cabinet, and this change took place in a briefer time
span: the social origins of the Imperial cabinet members were
overwhelmingly aristocratic, while under the Weimar Republic, they were
almost exclusively middle class, with a small number of laborers
(Matthews, 1954: 49). Thus there is nothing inevitable about a lag: a
delay in the rise of new classes to political power depends upon the
political system within which political office or political power are
contested and under which industrialization and economic development
proceed. If the political system can hasten or impede elite
transformation, then this creates the possibility that traditional
elites might use the political system to actively defend their political
dominance as well as their wealth.
Traditional elites retained power in twentieth century Brazil
through just such a manipulation of a political system which they
themselves crafted. The Brazilian oligarchies had their origins in the
class of commercially-oriented agrarian and mining elites whose exports
5
supplied the world market under Portuguese colonial rule. Organized on
a regional basis, they dominated national politics from the time of
independence to the Great Depression. Unlike the nobilities of Europe,
Brazilian traditional elites, at the pinnacle of their power, were
neither sponsored by the Crown, as were the French, Austrian, Prussian,
6
and Russian aristocracies, nor was the army commanded by their sons.
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Rather, after the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of the
Republic, the Brazilian oligarchy accumulated more power than it had
7
enjoyed while the emperor exercised the Poder Moderador. Like the
surge in strength exhibited by the landed aristocracy in England after
the beheading of Charles I, the regional oligarchs profited from the
establishment of a Republic in Brazil which conceded substantial
political and fiscal autonomy to the states. The decentralization of
power inherent in Brazilian federalism was favorable to the exercise of
oligarchical domination and was fashioned specifically to maximize the
power of the strongest regional elites. These oligarchies outlived the
Old Republic (1889-1930), the "crisis of oligarchical hegemony"
precipitated by the collapse of export markets, and the quasi-
Bonapartist Vargas dictatorship (1937-1945). They also survived the
8
populist era (1945-1964), a "democratic" interlude during which there
was a reasonably wide franchise, a variety of political parties, and a
degree of open political competition.
The specific political factors often highlighted in studies of
elite transformation to account for lagged elite transformation do not
explain why traditional elites retain power under quasi-democratic
conditions. One potentially important answer is provided by Graciarena
(1972: 52-53), who in attempting to explain "the greatest paradox of
power in Latin America", that is, why the effective power of
oligarchical groups in Latin America should be much greater than their
real power, identified two pillars of oligarchical domination, which, at
least in Argentina, propped up traditional elites after they had entered
into unmistakable economic decline: the expedient of military
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intervention, and the politics of patronage, whereby non-oligarchical
9
groups could be given a stake in upholding the oligarchical system.
Graciarena's analysis represents a giant step toward understanding the
nature of traditional elite perseverence alongside "modernization". In
a departure from the usual assumption that oligarchies flourish where
10
states are weak, he squarely located the primary defenses of the
oligarchy within the state apparatus.
In Brazil, traditional elites dominated the state during the Old
Republic, qua agrarian elites. By the change of regime in 1964,
however, they had, in many parts of Brazil, become state elites. This
transformation occurred much sooner in Minas Gerais than elsewhere.
Their defining characteristic was political; the most important material
resources in establishing class dominance were not their fixed assets,
which were becoming ever more heterogeneous, but their manipulation of
public resources. Through their control of the state apparatus
traditional elites developed their most important power base, acquiring
the allegiance of local political bosses--the coroneis--in exchange for
the dispensation of the public resources at their command. The more
secure their state power base, the more prominently they figured in
national political power.
Traditional Elites in Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes
In 1964, when traditional elites perceived a threat to their
hegemony, they helped to bring about a military coup. The regime which
came into power, however, was not unambiguously favorable to the
33
interests of the traditional political elite. The military did, as
hoped, quickly dismantle the populist coalition which had supported the
deposed President Goulart, but rather than handing power back to
civilian elites, it implanted a "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regime, a
term coined by Guillermo O'Donnell (1973) to describe those military
regimes which sprang up in the southern cone of South America beginning
in the mid-1960s to "normalize the economy" b:t "deactivating" the
"popular sectors", or lower and lower-middle classes, and depoliticizing
important policy areas through an emphasis on technical roles and
technical solutions. The first, prototypic, bureaucratic-authoritarian
regime was established in Brazil.
The antecedents of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime lie in the
change in the military's perception of society. The military in
bureaucratic-authoritarianism departed from its previous role in
politics, a role captured by Anderson (1967: 96-97):
With the possible exception of Per6n, political
intervention by the military in Latin America does
not seem to have the effect of overhauling the power
system of the society. Rather, under military
governments in Latin America, holders of important
power capabilities in the society are assured that
their position in the society will not be
endangered, and are permitted some participation in
the political process. Certainly, military
governments may brutally restrict entrance of other
new power contenders into the political arena, and
in some nations they are supported by other power
contenders for just this reason.
Whether directly serving the oligarchy, or assuming temporary total
11
control in the hands of a single military figure, a caudillo, old
12
style military intervention did not attempt to restructure politics.
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In bureaucratic-authoritarianism, the military was understood to be a
different political animal. Disgusted with the lack of material
progress under the rule of politicians (Skidmore, 1973), military
intervention could no longer be assumed to be an expedient for
oligarchical domination. Striking out on its own, the military sought
to stimulate economic development by revamping the state bureaucracy
which entailed placing competent, technically-qualified and experienced
personnel in high positions. Thus, not only did it intervene in
politics (if one can speak in terms of 'intervention' on the part of a
group which was intimately engaged in politics long prior to 1964) to
remove the most recent "power-contenders"--the popular classes, and
especially the organized working class--but also, it sought to
accumulate power unto itself in such a way that "endangered" the
position of older power elites. Stabilizing the economy to pave the way
for future growth entailed placing technical experts in the state
(O'Donnell, 1978: 6). These experts, who are most commonly referred to
by their term of opprobrium, technocrats, first implemented
stabilization policies, then exercised important economic decision-
making power centralized in planning and finance ministries.
For traditional elites, the transition to industrial society under
the auspices of bureaucratic-authoritarianism represented a dual threat:
they had to face not only the continued shrinking of their economic base
and a challenge from new sources of wealth, but also the concentration
of power and authority in the hands of the national executive. In such
regimes, major decision-making took place outside the political
institutions which are believed to serve not only citizens in a
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democratic polity, but also traditional political elites in an
oligarchical system. In Brazil, the transfer of fiscal authority and
economic decision-making to technical elites posed a potential threat to
the operation of the oligarchical patronage system. This threat was not
lost on several prominent observers (Cardoso, 1973, 1975; Evans, 1974,
1979; McDonough, 1981a, 1981b; Bresser Pereira, 1984). The military
appeared to these scholars, at least in the first decade of the
bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, to promote a pro-foreign capital,
developmental alliance to the detriment of the traditional oligarchy.
State Capitalism and Traditional Political Elites
In fact, traditional political elites responded successfully to the
challenges posed by a modernizing, centralizing military dictatorship,
and continued to figure prominently in the Brazilian political system.
What accounts for the survival of traditional political elites amidst an
industrial explosion, and the centralization of political power and
fiscal authority which apparently made this development possible? This
study suggests the answer is to be sought in the nature of the political
relationships which emanate from a state-dominated economy. Brazil
since 1964 is an example par excellence of state capitalism: the
state's fiscal, financial and productive roles in the economy have
grown, eclipsing the private sector, since the change of regime. The
extensive state presence in the economy has changed the landscape of the
nation's political economy. Private elites do not exercise public
authority on the periphery, as they once did when Brazil was more
strictly an agrarian society; the state has penetrated most national
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territory, and state agents have recovered political authority. But
neither is politics separable from the market, as it would be if Brazil
had evolved into a liberal capitalist society. As the state economy has
grown, it has pervaded social relations. Economic relationships which
were once confined to the private realm now intrude into the public,
political sphere, politicizing the economy and changing the nature of
politics itself. The public economy has become a focal point of
political activity: political demands tend to cluster around what the
public economy has to offer, and political success depends upon access
to state resources.
The opportunities presented by state capitalist development for a
political elite rooted in the state are considerable. State positions
in such circumstances are not merely honorific, but coveted, and
contested, sources of economic and political power. In liberal
capitalist societies, the state is one, but not the only or the most
13
important, locus of power in society. In contrast, in state
capitalism the state's productive and distributional resources advantage
its elites vis-a-vis their weaker private sector counterparts. Private
elites are ill-equipped to compete for power in a state-dominated
system. Decision-making, moreover, is highly centralized within state
structures; citizens bring their interests to secretaries and
undersecretaries of state over a much wider range of issues than in
liberal capitalist society. The concentration and centralization of
economic resources and decision-making power in the public sphere and
the higher echelons of the state makes traditional elites, as the
occupants of state office, important formal and informal power holders
37
14
in the political system.
Beyond decision-making on issues of national economic importance,
state capitalism, and the politicized economy it engenders, also
structures relations of production, and organizes the political system
along hierarchical, centralized lines. In Brazil, a modern, state-based
political clientelism became the dominant form of political organization
and representation for a growing segment of the population left behind
in the economic "miracle". These state clients looked to the public
economy and the elites who controlled the distributional arm of the
state to deliver the state benefits upon which they came to depend.
Traditional elites employed this resource base as a source of dominance
and power.
Once a form of economic organization such as state capitalism
engenders a particular pattern of political organization, political
relations assume an independence from economic constraints which enables
them to be shaped by, and respond to, political determinants. These
relations though brought into being by economic factors can be
reproduced politically, even after economic circumstances change. Thus,
as the stakes in controlling state power rise, gaining state office
becomes dependent upon political resources drawn from both within and
outside the state. The central task of analyzing the survival of an
oligarchy in a state capitalist system is to identify the political
resources which underlie its power and the nature of the integration of
political relationships into the state political economy.
Where to begin our investigation? A natural inclination to
ascertain who is powerful and why, especially in a centralizing economy
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and polity, is to focus on the national executive and bureaucracy, and
the bridges between the state and such national political and corporate
bodies as political parties and industrial associations. Such a focus,
however, is inappropriate for observing the indicators of change or
sources of continuity in traditional, oligarchical political systems.
It presumes the hypothesized shift in power from decentralized points of
the system to a single national center has already taken place.
The dynamic center of oligarchical politics is found on the
periphery: traditional political elites ruled Brazil from the states.
It is at this level where any study of oligarchical politics must begin.
But it cannot end here. An exclusive state-level focus would obscure
how meaningful regional power is in a centralizing regime. If "real
power" were centralized within the federal state apparatus and
concentrated in a few ministries, then the enduring dominance of
traditional elites in the states would be largely symbolic and
irrelevant for the major decisions governing Brazilian society. With
the centralization of power and finance complete, regional elites might
be mere pawns of a more powerful bourgeoisie or military, and permitted
to rule in their states in exchange for supporting the national regime,
in much the same vein as the Byrds of West Virginia and the Longs of
Louisiana (cf. Key, 1984). Only by inserting the analysis in a national
context, and studying state-national linkages, is it possible to
determine whether traditional elites were thus weakened.
At the same time, a pitfall of focusing exclusively upon the higher
levels of government is that important, incremental changes in the
foundation of the oligarchical system could go unnoticed. The power
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base of the regional oligarchies lay in the state political machines
which were predicated upon the control of local politics. Traditional
Brazilian politics was founded on a brand of political clientelism known
as coronelismo. The fiscal dependence of impoverished municipalities on
state and federal governments left local elites, and their subjects,
little alternative but to support the existing order. Federal funds
were appropriated by the more powerful regional oligarchies who, in
turn, bolstered the rule of loyal municipal elites with state aid. The
coronel, or local political boss, who normally achieved his position by
virtue of being an important landowner, gained state benefits for his
fiscally-dependent municipality and the delegation of power for himself,
in exchange for delivering the votes of his 'herds' to the party or
party faction of his political superiors. As Soares (1973: 98)
explains:
Even though states do not depend on any one
municipality in the same way that the municipalities
depend on them ... traditional politics,
characteristic of many Brazilian states, resides in
oligarchical municipal politics ... and cannot be
understood without reference to it. It was
precisely the existence of oligarchical politics in
tens or hundreds of municlpios that made possible
the supremacy of traditional politics on the state
level, in detriment to a modern politics, based on
class interest. The politics of many Brazilian
states would be fundamentally different if municipal
politics were characterized by a full electoral-
political participation of less favored social
sectors, if there were not domination by traditional
families, and if the political parties represented
the interests of different social classes and not
the different oligarchical and traditional families.
In Brazil, given the critical importance of local politics to the power
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base of non-industrial elites, such transformation or its absence is
particularly significant. A regime which changes only at the top does
not change.
Thus a local focus is necessary to understand the mechanisms which
constitute traditional politics. It is also important to discern the
impact of socio-economic change. To study the effects of industrialism
when the processes unleashed by industrialization have yet to come to
fruition represents a considerable methodological challenge. Yet, we
can scarcely afford to wait for 40 to 100 years for these processes to
play themselves out before we investigate the direction of change. If
an elite transformation is likely to take place as a result of
industrialization, even if it takes decades for this change to filter up
through the various levels of the political system to the national
cabinet, the independent effects of socio-economic. change should be
visible on the local level. Various studies conc:ur that since elite
change originates at the local level, it is at this level of the
political system that the early indicators of elite transformation can
15
and should be sought (Putnam, 1976: 181; Frey, 1965: 282).
To understand the socio-economic origins of clientelistic politics,
to trace the impact of industrialization on the structure of power, and
to reconstruct the network of alliances and transactions which uphold
the oligarchical political system requires an analysis which bridges the
levels of territorial politics. Given the complexity of traditional,
territorial Brazilian politics, too many important connections would be
lost were this study to focus on a single level of government. Yet, in
Brazil, the sheer size of the physical territory, the proliferation of
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administrative units, and the nation's economic, political, and cultural
diversity pose considerable difficulties for designing research. A
regional level comparison permits the testing of only one independent
variable and presumes the existence of at least two comparable
oligarchies for research. A more promising approach to test the effects
of industrialization and political centralization on traditional
political elites appears to be to focus on one regional oligarchy, and
make use of controlled comparisons of local politics, state-local
linkages, and state-national fiscal and political relations.
This study focuses on the politics of the state of Minas Gerais.
Minas borders, and serves as a bridge between, the underdeveloped
Northeast and the industrialized and Europeanized South (Figure I-i).
The northern part of its state is by convention and by statute included
in Brazil's Northeast. Its southern residents read Sao Paulo newspapers
and root for Paulista futbol teams. The Minas state political elite
stands out as an excellent case for study. It has always been a class
more powerful nationally than its economic resources would suggest.
During the Old Republic (1889-1930), it negotiated a powersharing
agreement known as "governors' politics" with its Sao Paulo counterpart
by which the governors of the two states in alternate election years
"chose" the president of the Republic. Sao Paulo initiated this
agreement to protect its coffee production; its coffee riches and infant
industry accorded it economic hegemony. Minas, an economic weakling,
was able to enter this bargain on equal terms because of its political
strength (Wirth, 1977; Schwartzman, 1975). The support of the Minas
delegation in the congress, at that time the lrgest in Brazil, was
42
Figure I-1
Brazil's States
RN
PB
PE
LL
AC - Acre
AL - Alagoas
AM - Amazonas
AP - Amapi
BA - Bahia
CE - Ceara
ES - EspIrito Santo
GO - Goias
MA - Maranhao
MG - MINAS GERAIS
MS - Mato Grosso do Sul
MT - Mato Grosso
PA - Para
PB - Paralba
PE - Pernambuco
PI - Piaui
PR - Parana
RJ - Rio de Janeiro
RN - Rio Grande do Norte
RO - Rond6nia
RR - Roraima
RS - Rio Grande do Sul
SC - Santa Catarina
SE - Sergipe
SP - Sao Paulo
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essential to enact any program. Minas' leverage was enhanced by its
unity; its representatives voted as a bloc. This unity was achieved
through tight oligarchical control of state politics. Like the Prussian
Junkers, the southern Italian agrarian elites and the southern United
States plantation owners, the Minas oligarchy persisted in power long
after their economic power "should have" permitted them to do so. But
16
unlike other historical relics in the "living museums" of Latin
America, southern Italy, and the southern United States, the Minas
political elite was not forced to cede national power in order to
17
preserve local power. The Minas elite continued to exercise national
power in the Brazilian political system out of proportion to its
economic strength.
Because of its historic political strength, the Minas elite
represents in a sense the "most likely" oligarchy to survive such
centralization and as such raises possible problems for
18
generalization. Nonetheless it appears to be the best case to test
the effects of state capitalist development and political centralization
on regional oligarchies. It makes little sense to study the potential
for survival of state oligarchies that are presumed to remain in place
in their home states because of a lack of development. In the backlands
of the 11 states comprising the Northeast of Brazil, old elites rule as
they did in the classic formulation of Nunes Leal (1977), and as
popularized in novels. These oligarchies are also poor test cases for
the effects of political centralization under bureaucratic-
authoritarianism because of their historic weakness: they were by and
large already subordinate to the central government (in Brazil called
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the Union) well before the 1964 coup. Thus we require the presence of
industry and a state elite sufficiently strong to have been powerful at
the time of the regime change. The other nationally powerful state
elite, that of Sao Paulo, however, is inappropriate for study because
its political power may be indistinguishable from its economic strength.
This "coffee nobility" remained an economic elite, protecting its power
during industrialization at the turn of this century by diversifying
from strictly coffee into modern sector commerce and industry. In
short, the dominant state elite in Sao Paulo is not "traditional".
The timing and nature of Minas' economic development also suggests
Minas' suitability for our study. Unlike Brazil's two most
industrialized states, Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, Minas experienced
extremely rapid industrial growth following the regime change in 1964.
Mirroring events on the national level, albeit it a bit belatedly, a
state technocracy who came to power in the late 1960s and early 1970s
engineered a superlative economic recovery from decades of stagnation.
The local miracle produced the highest industrial growth rates of Brazil
during the 1970s, approximately an annual average of 16 percent, and
made Minas the country's third most industrialized state.
Minas' industrialization serves as a quintessential example of
dependent development as defined by Cardoso (1972, 1973), Evans (1979),
and others, evidenced by the prominent role of state and foreign
capital, the economic sectors which concentrated investment, and the
technocracy in the upper echelons of state economic policy-making. In
contrast to the industrialization of Sao Paulo, which might be and has
been described as "spontaneous" (Cardoso, 1965), effected largely by
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private sector capitalists, that of Minas, even from its origins in the
pre-coup period, seemed neatly contrived, stimulated by select state
interventions. Beginning in the late 1960s, growth was unambiguously
state-directed; Minas Gerais in 1980 had more state enterprises than any
other Brazilian state (IBGE, 1980c: xxxvi). It represents the purest
case of "state capitalist" development in Brazil. Grossi (1977) has
called Minas' growth a "replica" of the larger Brazilian model of
industrialization. Paralleling interpretations of the effects of this
development on national politics as well, some observers claimed that
the regime and its technocracy swept aside "traditional" politicians in
Minas (Grossi, 1977: 262-263; Cintra, 1979; L. Andrade, 1980).
To investigate the effects of industry on politics, this study
focuses on a sample of local communities receiving new industry. Who
controlled state politics is examined through an analysis of elite
office holding in Minas from 1956 to 1982, with specific attention
devoted to the political fate of those elites who occupied powerful
public office before the 1964 coup d'etat, and the extent to which
oligarchs were supplanted in the executive branch of the state by
technocrats after tb,t 'Revolution' of 1964 and its aftermath.
Why traditional political elites appear and reappear in the higher
echelons of state government in Minas Gerais is first examined as the
product of the process and timing of industrialization, patterns which
created the possibility that traditional elites could retain their
political dominance despite economic modernization. In Minas Gerais, a
state-led and state- and foreign-financed industrialization did not
engender and nurture a bourgeoisie with the strength and interest to
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challenge the traditional political elite at any level of the political
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system. At the opposite end of the class spectrum, few industrial
employment opportunities were generated by a capital-intensive
industrialization, stunting the growth of an industrial working class.
Weak industrial classes almost ensured pre-industrial classes would
continue to assume great importance.
At the same time that land was becoming a less valuable asset in
terms of its overall economic contribution to domestic product, it was
also becoming a less significant political source of domination.
Mechanization, crop conversion, and new systems of labor relations led
to the expulsion of estate laborers and the shrinking of both the
dependent and independent, property-owning small peasant. Ex-peasants,
unable to find their way into the modern market, became a seasonally
employed agrarian wage labor force who resided in urban areas. They
joined other underemployed and undercompensated lower class groups who
were dependent in whole or in part on state employment, credit, direct
and indirect transfers, and benefits. In other words, they became
"state clients". The stakes in exercising control over public resources
escalated commensurately with the growth of this amorphous class,
together with the proliferation of the state sector relative to both
agriculture and private industry. Accompanying this development,
traditional elites shifted their power base from land into the state.
Had traditional elites been forced to compete for power with only
private assets concentrated in shrinking economic sectors in a dynamic,
purer market system, they might have long since been rendered
irrelevant. Having at their disposal state resources breathed new life
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into traditional political elites. Firmly entrenched in state positions
before the onset of rapid industrialization, they were well placed to
use the resources of their offices, enriched by the state's extensive
penetration of the economy, to preserve their foothold in the state.
State resources were distributed, especially for those in the state
client sector, on a territorial, not a functional basis. As territorial
representatives, traditional political elites could best operate state
distribution channels.
Presiding over the pro-government political party, and an extensive
network of political alliances which operated within it, afforded these
political elites a vehicle for dispensing state patronage. The party
was arguably the single most important channel of distribution of state
resources. It was also the conduit for regime support. As in the past,
high party officials acted as intermediaries between the state and its
citizens; in exchange for public works for municipalities and employment
for local residents, they secured the votes faithfully delivered by
local party branches. Politicians who could make the patronage system
work and deliver votes to the regime were as critically important,
indeed, more so, for the stability of the state capitalist regime as
these same elites, or their fathers, had been to the Old Republic and
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populist coalition government. In order to secure legitimacy for an
authoritarian regime in which popular sectors were dependent directly
upon the state, a state elite was needed who could build political
consensus through the public economy, converting the distribution of
state resources into political support.
How could a rival political elite, able to call upon the same
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skills and ability to operate a political party, not present a viable
alternative to traditional political elites? Had the state capitalist
regime not been authoritarian, such a development might have been
possible, and perhaps even likely. But in the authoritarian political
system, political centralization and the monopoly of power precluded
such a possibility: given the certain outcome of each "indirect"
election for national and state executive office, it made no sense for
an opposition to organize outside these state-society channels. Inter-
party competition became intra-oligarchical competition.
In the perspective suggested by this research, there is reason for
profound pessimism for the future of the Brazilian political system.
This in turn has implications for the 80 percent of the population for
whom economic growth has borne no fruit. The political opening holds
out the hope that their numbers might translate into a political weapon
with which to combat their misery. Yet, this study, however gloomy, is
an account of authoritarian Brazil. While its conclusions do not augur
well for Brazilian democratization, they can yet be revised by political
events.
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Notes
1. Dahrendorf (1969: 49ff) describes Germany's industrialization
as "more nationalistic than capitalistic", Germany's bourgeoisie as "a
bourgeoisie that was not really a bourgeoisie", and Germany's society as
"consistently determined by faults to such an extent that it must be
described as volcanic." For these reasons he argues Germany did not
follow the path set by the liberal democracies.
2. Does the bourgeoisie in fact "conquer"? Mayer (1981: 21) makes
the interesting claim that the bourgeoisie in nineteenth century Europe,
once formed, behaved more like an interest group pressing for state aid
and specific economic policies than like a class getting ready to take
its place in history.
3. Matthews' (1954: 42-43) study of Britain showed a lag of almost
a century between the time the middle class bourgeoisie became dominant
in the electorate and the time it became dominant in the cabinet. Even
after middle class members of Parliament became common, they still had
to wait 30 to 40 years before they were permitted entry in force into
the cabinet.
4. Matthews also places great weight on such cultural variables as
'the conservatism of the British electorate', that is, their propensity
to take some time before voting for their own kind; the 'responsible
rule of the aristocracy'; and the ability and willingness of the
aristocracy to absorb disparate elements.
5. In this sense, the Latin American aristocracy always had its
commercial components, and did not make the "turn" to commercial
agriculture that the English aristocracy did in the seventeenth century,
upon which Moore (1966) placed so much weight in his account of the
route to democratic society.
6. The military was not an aristocratic institution; it was
dominated by the middle class, and had strong roots in the state of Rio
Grande do Sul (Love, 1971). As time wore on, the military became even
more independent of other social classes, evolving into a near caste
(Stepan, 1971). The independent social origins of the military would
mean that it could not always be depended upon to do the bidding of
traditional elites.
7. Poder Moderador, or "moderating power", permitted the emperor
to be the "arbiter of the last instance" in all disputes of state.
8. There is a substantial literature on the populist coalitions,
and their implications for oligarchical hegemony. See especially
Weffort (1970), Cardoso (1978), Cardoso and Faletto (1979), and Laclau
(1979).
9. Graciarena (1972), in a line of argumentation anticipating the
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'overload' theorists of advanced industrial society, saw a threat to the
indefinite extension of this system posed by the finite resource base of
the state, which could not continue to buy off a growing number of
disenchanted subjects. This "patronage inflation" argument has been
critiqued convincingly by Chubb (1981, 1982). She demonstrates the
persistence of patronage politics amidst economic scarcity in Sicily.
10. Graciarena (1972: 60-61) himself subscribed to the premise
that Latin American oligarchies exercise power in systems in which
political decision-making is highly decentralized; the principal centers
of power are local and regional; parliament and the senate are dominant,
and power is principally concentrated away from the state. His typology
of oligarchical politics is based on the perception that agriculturally-
based oligarchies are politically dominant as private elites, more
powerful, in fact, than public authorities: they can easily summon
state resources and state support when needed. While perhaps true of an
earlier epoch in Latin America, this is no longer an accurate reflection
of reality, nor was it ever strictly true of Republican Brazil. The
regional oligarchies benefited from the delegation of power to the
states, but power was not decentralized within states, at least not
within those with the most powerful oligarchies--Minas Gerais and Sao
Paulo.
11. Though bearing some superficial resemblence, the military in
bureaucratic-authoritarianism departed from old caudillo politics, in
which a single general or a colonel imposed personal orders by decree,
in that it acted as an institution as such when assuming power, and did
so in order to restructure society and the state (Cardoso, 1979: 35-36).
In Cardoso's view, such a military posture became possible only
recently, because previously the armed forces' professional structure
was less fully developed, and because the civilian oligarchies were far
more powerful: they "needed only occasional military intervention in
order to exercise their dominance."
12. One exception which proves the rule is the Tenentismo movement
in Brazil in the 1920s. This group of reform-minded lieutenants who
attempted to overthrow the "Republic of the Landlords" were, however,
repressed by their superiors and their leaders sent into exile. They
enjoyed a brief moment of glory in the early years of the Vargas regime,
but were soon turned out of office.
13. Pluralist and elite/Marxist theory share the view of the
liberal capitalist state as a useful ally or pawn of some other, more
powerful, societal group. Because power is seen as being distributed
outside as well as within the state, how to study who holds power in
such a society has been a subject of long dispute. See Smith (1979:
317-318) for a summary of the reputational, decisional, and positional
methods of studying who governs, and their shortcomings. A recent
tradition of literature has stressed the degree of autonomy which
capitalist states enjoy, and called for the state to be used as an
independent variable in political analysis (Stepan, 1977; Hamilton,
1982; Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, 1985).
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14. Chalmers (1977: 31) makes the same argument for Latin American
states generally:
The control and manipulation of the state apparatus
are therefore a major element in the political
struggle. The effort to manipulate it in such a way
as to promote the power and goals of one group over
another is a major part of the political game.
Being "in power" is very important because it gives
the leader wide patronage and the authority to
establish government programs to benefit existing
supporters and attract new ones. He can rewrite
electoral laws and modify decision-making
institutions to favor government supporters more
than in institutionalized systems. The preeminence
of the role of the state makes these manipulations
more important because their social impact is great.
Chalmers, however, attributes the political importance of controlling
the state not to state capitalism, but to indigenous, political factors,
to what he refers as the "politicized" (as opposed to an
"institutionalized") state.
15. Frey describes the pattern of bottom-up changes in the Turkish
elite in the twentieth century as "capillary action": "the lowest
levels of formal power are affected first. If pressure continues,
middle leaders are then altered, and only after a noticeable time lag is
there a seepage into the highest levels of leadership and the cabinet."
This is consistent with Putnam's (1976) and Matthews' (1954) historical
studies of elite transformation in Britain (see note 3).
16. "Living museums" is the now classic term employed by Anderson
(1967: 104) to describe the Latin American political system: new "power
contenders may be added to the system, but old ones may not be
eliminated." The result is that contemporary Latin American politics is
something of a "living museum, in which all the forms of political
authority of the Western historic experience continue to exist and
operate, interacting one with another in a pageant that seems to violate
all the rules of sequence and hange involved in our understanding of
the growth of Western civilization."
17. Schwartzman (1975: 48) likens Minas' traditional politics to
that of the southern United States, with this one crucial exception:
The uniparty system, oligarchical control of the
state's political machine, limited popular
participation, large rural properties in a declining
economy, all these similarities with traditional
Minas Gerais are not pure coincidence. The
principal difference, naturally, was that the
Confederate states had been defeated by the
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industrialized North, whereas in Brazil, the
political hegemony of the industrialized center was
never clearly established.
18. See Eckstein (1975) for an excellent explanation of the
"crucial case" study method and its utility for theory building.
19. This argument has been made in one form or another by several
authors. Dahrendorf (1969), for instance, blamed the excessive
dependence of the German bourgeoisie on the state in large part for the
failure of German democracy (see note 1). Huntington (1985: 153)
applies this argument generally to the developing world: "The failure
of democracy to develop in Third World countries despite their economic
growth can, perhaps, be related to the nature of that growth. The
leading roles have been played by the state and by multinational
enterprises. As a result, economic development runs ahead of the
development of a bourgeoisie." It was perhaps most forcefully framed by
Moore (1966: 418): "No bourgeois, no democracy."
20. See Sarles (1982) for an account of the role political parties
played in maintaining political control for the regime.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE MINAS OLIGARCHY IN STATE AND NATION
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Introduction: The Tradition of Politics
When the Brazilian monarch was overthrown toward the close of the
last century, regional oligarchies of the strongest states fashioned a
federal political system to serve their needs and interests. The
"Republic of the Landlords" restricted real political participation to a
bare fraction of the population. Among participant groups, elites of
smaller states were as helpless as urban middle classes of the larger to
challenge the power of the regional oligarchies. Traditional,
authoritarian politics was buttressed by the nature and importance of
the agrarian, and especially the coffee, economy. Coffee had been made
the nation's leading source of foreign exchange and wealth largely as a
product of the political success of the "coffee barons" themselves.
The "oligarchical republic", in place for 40 years, ended abruptly
in 1930 amidst a crisis in the coffee economy with the "revolution"
which deposed the Paulista president and handed power to Getilio Vargas
of Rio Grande do Sul. Many observers see in the events leading to and
following the collapse of the Old Republic the end of the hegemony of
the regional oligarchies. Indeed, economic and political modernization,
the strengthening of the central state vis-a-vis the state oligarchies
through both centralization of existing government functions and the
expansion of the federal state into new areas, and the incorporation of
new, especially urban, classes and sectors into the political system all
appeared to signal the end of an oligarchical monopoly over state and
politics. It is taken for granted in the conventional wisdom about
Brazil that the regional oligarchies entered into a steady decline,
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though agrarian elites remained very important in the rural areas, as
evidenced by the fact that rural workers were still denied rights
accorded full citizens. With the "restoration" of "democracy" in 1945,
populism is believed to have reached its full expression in urban areas
and populist politicians to have gained in strength at the expense of
1
traditional political elites.
Whatever the merits of these arguments and interpretations for some
parts of Brazil, they do not hold true for Minas Gerais. The Minas
oligarchy at no point surrendered power. In circumstances of relatively
open competitive politics, modern party organizations, burgeoning cities
and industry, and "populist" politicians who courted and were committed
to platforms championing the causes of working class voters, the
traditional, regional oligarchy of Minas Gerais maintained its grip on
the state political system and its national influence. This chapter
traces the emergence and persistence of the Minas oligarchy as a
dominant political force. Our study begins with the rise of the Mineiro
elite in the Old Republic (1889-1930), the era in which the pattern of
oligarchical politics was established in Brazil. We need to focus on
the bases of the system under which traditional political elites
exercised power prior to 1930, a system which by and large survived the
Old Republic's fall, in order to explain how traditional political
elites survived after 1930.
The Minas oligarchy, more successfully than any other in Brazil,
superimposed a complex system of political domination over a grossly
unequal distribution of economic resources. While this elite was
wealthy, it consolidated its power in the public, not the private
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sphere, staking its longevity on its ability to dominate party and
state. In the state the traditional political elite found the material
resources and military protection to perpetuate its rule; in the
party, a vehicle for achieving and retaining state power. The Minas
oligarchy centralized state politics, and made local elites known as
coroneis, whose power resided in private, economic sources of
domination, entirely dependent upon them. This unequal alliance of
private, local bosses and public, higher level elites brought state
control to the far reaches of the territory. Political centralization,
and especially the elimination of competition, facilitated the exercise
of power on the part of this closed elite. When single party politics
was no longer feasible, it learned to organize competition within its
own ranks. As the century progressed and the form and name of the
Republic changed, the state-federal relationship varied, but
oligarchical control of state politics, the state-local relationship,
and the hierarchical avenues through which citizens approached the
state did not. In 'democratic politics', oligarchically-controlled
parties and clientelistic patterns of political representation
buttressed oligarchical rule just as surely as they did during the
oligarchy's heyday in the Old Republic.
The Minas state elite has clung to its "tradition of politics", a
tradition which has allowed it to rise above its declining economic
base to survive centralizing dictatorships and "democratic" politics.
Profoundly conservative, the Minas "political tradition" to this day
continues to reproduce elite-dominated politics. As such, the story of
the Mineiro elite who carries on this tradition is critical to
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understanding why modern Brazilian politics is closed, anti-democratic,
and, in a word, "traditional".
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Minas Gerais: Its Regions, Economy, and Elites
The imperial province of "Minas Gerais" took its name from the rich
2
mines which provided gold and other precious metals to Portugal. Its
elite was born of the gold rush of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries: bandeirantes, or settlers who came to Minas to seek fortune,
were awarded titles of nobility and large land tracts by the Crown.
Originally based in mining, this class ventured into agricultural and
commercial activities, and consolidated its power throughout the
provincial territory. By 1850, a landed and commercial elite of old
mining-based wealth together with cattle-ranchers and eventually coffee
barons was fully formed (Wirth, 1977: 69-72).
The traditional elite was organized into clan networks which formed
zonal power groups (Rebelo Horta, 1956: 59; Oliveira Vianna, 1974)
corresponding to quite distinct topographical, economic, and political
territories: in each area the particular economic strength of each
family differed. These zones are still widely used to refer to the
various regions of the state (Figure II-1). They demarcate the poor,
arid northern regions of the state, its more prosperous and fertile
southern zones, its western frontier areas, and its political and
economic center. Today the third largest industrial center in Brazil,
the Center zone was in the eighteenth century the heart of Brazil's gold
boom. The historical cities of the central region of the state--Ouro
Preto, today a United Nations-designated world historical landmark;
Sabari; Tiradentes; Diamantina; and So Joao del Rei--all have lavish
churches adorned with the gold extracted from the ores of the mineral-
rich state.
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The North and Northeast regions of Minas form part of Brazil's
3
desperately poor Northeast. The North's arid lands have been and
remain suitable for cattle-raising. To its immediate east lies the
Jequitinhonha Valley, the most backward part of the state. In the
Jequitinhonha Valley and to a lesser extent in the Rio Doce Valley to
its south, economic and social indicators closely approximate those of
the backlands of Brazil's Northeast.
To the southeast is located the Mata region, which takes its name
from the dense forest which once covered the area. In the nineteenth
century, the Mata, an extension of the fertile Paralba Valley where
coffee was introduced to Sao Paulo, was the site of the coffee frontier
in Minas. It was the state's most important center of economic activity
earlier in the century. Juiz de Fora, its most populous city and
economic hub, profited from its geographical proximity to Rio de
Janeiro. By the 1950s, the region's coffee growing potential had been
largely depleted, however. When its once prolific coffee trees were
spent, the region experienced an economic decline, and it became a net
exporter of people: it had the highest rates of out-migration in Brazil
from 1960 to 1970 (IBGE, 1979b: 17). Many who migrated from the region
ventured to the southern state of Parani, the new coffee frontier. Thus
the Mata, once prosperous, fell behind economically, and parts more
closely resembled the poverty-stricken areas to its immediate north.
The southern and western zones of the state provide a stark
contrast to its backward and declining areas. More integrated to Sao
Paulo than to the rest of Minas, the South, like the Mata, became a
coffee-growing region in the early part of this century. Today, its
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agriculture and industry prosper due in large part to its proximity to
the Sao Paulo market. The Western part of the state, known as the
Triangulo, today largely a dairy region, is also integrated into Sao
Paulo's orbit. To the northwest lies a spars;ly populated frontier
area which today enjoys the advantage of lying en route to the nation's
capital, Brasilia. In the early part of this century, it was
politically and economically inconsequential.
Minas' prosperity during the Empire was intimately linked to the
gold market. As with the other boom-bust products--sugar before it and
rubber after it (cf. Frank, 1969)--gold could not sustain the regional
economy indefinitely. By the second half of the eighteenth century,
with the near exhaustion of the mines, the population turned
increasingly to subsistence agriculture (Lage de Resende, 1982: 23).
The distance from the coast and the lack of transportation contributed
to a general stagnation until the second half of the nineteenth century.
Minas' fortunes improved when it turned to coffee. Until 1860, the
share of coffee exports in Minas' total export basket had been very
small. Coffee's importance, and the area devoted to coffee growing,
rose considerably from 1860 to 1890. Around 1870, first the Mata was
invaded and planted with coffee trees, and later, coffee growing areas
expanded into the South. In 1875, one-fourth of the province's total
receipts came from the four percent tax on coffee (Lage de Resende,
1982: 24). In the decade from 1870 to 1880, Minas Gerais was the second
most important Brazilian producer of coffee (behind the state of Rio de
Janeiro), accounting for one-fourth of the country's exports. Minas
surpassed Rio as a coffee producing state in 1896, but both were
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eclipsed by the rise of Sao Paulo as the leading state producer after
1889 (Lage de Resende, 1982: 25, 29).
In the course of the First Republic, Minas fell farther and farther
behind Sao Paulo economically. It neither declined sharply, as did many
northeastern states, nor did it prosper. Parts of the state produced a
respectable coffee crop; others turned to dairy and cattle raising, and
even some small, local industry was established (principally in the Mata
region). Despite these incremental advances, the state's economy, and
the economic strength of its elite, weakened.
The Minas political elite which emerged from the imperial period
was a cross between a modern, economic elite and a traditional, family-
based elite: a set of agrarian elites dominated local and regional
politics through a network of traditional families. Throughout the
First Republic, family ties were a crucial feature of the Minas
political elite. In his study of 177 top state elites, Wirth (1977:
142) found 41 percent of those for whom data were available were related
to at least one other member of the elite through first cousin,
4
directly, or by marriage (Table II-1). A more recent study (Martins,
1983: 4-6) based on a larger sample (n = 542) displays an even higher
percentage of family linkages among the elite: 51.7 percent. These
parentela ties were even more frequent at the higher echelons of this
elite. Of the 15 Old Republic governors, all but one had identifiable
clan ties within the state, and four (27 percent) were descended from
the imperial elite (senators, barons, or above). In his study of the
Minas oligarchy, Rebelo Horta (1956: 89) reveals that 80 percent of all
republican governors (up to the time of his study) were descended from
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Table II-1
The Minas Elite in the Old Republic*
Wirth Martins Fleischer
n=177 n=542 n=272
Pres. Vice Fed.
Pres. Dep.
(19) (12) (241)
Family Ties
("high elite")
Local Politics Experience
41% 51.7%
(77.8%)
73.7% 50.0% 32.8%
42.3
Principal Occupation:
Industry
Commerce
Agriculture
Lawyer
Judges
Professors
Other Professions**
Other Public Em-
ployees
Finance and Banking
17.8
5.6
16.7
67.9
17.3
32.2
48.6
n.d.
15.0
10.9
6.2
21.9
52.7
28.1
29.6
51.8
22.2
5.4
I5.3% 1.3
5.3 0.0
47.3
15.8
26.3
25.0
41.7
25.0
]8.6%
3.3
38.8
9.1
33.3
0.0 0.0 4.3
0.0 0.0 2.9
Region (Political Base):
Center (Metalirgica)
Mata
South
North
Jequitinhonha
Rio Doce (East) 
West
Triangulo
Outside State
53.5
19.2
11.1
6.1
19.0
14.4
21.4
34.32.5
6.1
1.5
10.9
22.2
22.2
38.9
0.0
0.0
5.6
11.1
0.0
10.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
0.0
31.0
25.0
19.8
7.8
3.9
3.0
6.9
2.1
*The three authors' sample size, time periods, and universe of posts
vary slightly. Martins' study covers the years from 1889-1930; Wirth's
from 1889-1937; and Fleischer's from 1890-1937. Wirth includes
governors, lieutenant governors, state cabinet secretaries, presidents
of state banks, members of the Executive Commission of the Republican
party, government leaders in the Legislative Assembly, and the
equivalent posts on the federal level. Martins has a wider universe,
expanding Wirth's elite positions to include deputies and senators as
well. Fleischer's data are sub-divided as indicated in the table.
**Encompasses engineers, journalists and physicians in Wirth's and
Martins' studies. This category is unspecified in Fleischer's data set.
Sources: Wirth, 1977: 147, 245; Martins, 1983; Fleischer, 1982: 48.
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27 "governing families" which date back to the Empire. Martins
also found that the group with intra-elite linkages had an extremely
high participation in "high level office" in proportion to their total
participation in the elite. Indeed, an astounding 77.8 percent of those
who reached federal executive and cabinet rank office had intra-elite
linkages (Table II-1). Not only were family connections an important
asset in climbing the political ladder, but they were also used as a
criterion for appointment to the state bureaucracy. Siqueira (1970:
178-79), who examined the surnames of public functionaries in Belo
Horizonte in the early years of the Old Republic, found that in 1900 38
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percent (226 of 584) belonged to 87 clans. In 1913, more than 21
percent (864 of 4096) belonged to these political families.
Whether this "oligarchy" was a landed aristocracy led by "coffee
barons" is ambiguous. Many students of Minas history have recently
discovered that known landowners represented a small portion of the
6
republican political elite. Wirth (1977: 145) positively identified 35
members (17 percent) of the Minas elite during the Old Republic as
fazendeiros, though he assumes that many, perhaps the majority, of the
Minas elite owned fazendas. Martins (1983: 3-4) found landowners to
represent a slightly higher percentage of the elite, 21.9 percent. He
calls the belief that landowners, especially a coffee elite, dominated
the Mineiro oligarchy a myth. Of the 108 landowners in his elite
sample, only 35 were born in the coffee-producing regions of the state,
and only 13 (2.5 percent) were specifically identified as coffee
planters: the rest consisted of cattle ranchers, producers of
foodstuffs, and owners of non-commercial farms.
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How these findings should be interpreted is an open question. If
landowners, and specifically coffee growers, were well represented in
the upper echelons of this elite, then overall percentages may be
politically insignificant. According to Martins' data (1983: 5-6), just
over 30 percent of the top elites (presidents, vice-presidents,
governors, and federal cabinet ministers) were from the "coffee
regions" (the Mata and the South). The landowners' contingent tended to
be concentrated in state and federal legislative positions; their
representation in high office--state executive and federal executive and
cabinet positions--was well below their total presence in the elite. On
this basis, he concludes: "the landowners and the politicians born in
the coffee regions were in fact less 'successful' in their careers (and
presumably had less political power) than the other members of the
elite". Wirth (1977: 143) argues precisely the opposite: "the apogee
of Mineiro power (1898-1929) was dominated by governors from the coffee
zones." During this slightly narrower period, two-thirds of the
governors were from the Mata and South. Fleischer's data (Table II-1)
appears to confirm Wirth's conclusions. Most higher politicians
represented the Mata and the South, both coffee growing regions, though
many who were born in the interior regions of the state moved their
political base of operations to the Center (Wirth, 1977: 147).
There are several other reasons to doubt that the republican Minas
elite was divorced from agrarian interests. First, there are serious
methodological problems in drawing such a conclusion. Wirth admits that
data on rural property ownership are poor: newspaper biographies and
obituaries, the richest data sources, usually focused on a man's
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educational and professional achievements rather than his assets,
including rural properties. Thus, they probably underreported
7
fazendeiros. Secondly, there arises the problem of multiple careers.
According to Wirth (1977: 145) two-thirds of the fazendeiros had two or
more careers, from manufacturer to banker to teacher and pharmacist.
Martins (1983: 5) found an average of 2.6 occupations for each
politician. On these grounds, Fleischer's data are suspect: in his
occupational profile of the elite, Fleischer (1982) cites only the
'principal' occupation of the elite member. To conclude that the
Mineiro elite was "bureaucratic" or "professional" is to overlook that a
practicing attorney or journalist enjoys the political benefit of family
lands.
Related by blood and attentive to landed interests, the Minas
traditional political elite was above all a political class. Especially
after 1900, the political experience of office holders increased
substantially. The new deputies elected in that year had more than two
times the number of political posts and their careers were more than
twice as long as the cohort they replaced, suggesting an increased
professionalization of political representation (Fleischer, 1982: 21).
Indeed, many students of Brazilian politics have claimed from this time
that the Minas political class was Brazil's political class -- its
professional politicians (e.g., Schwartzman, 1975). The Mineiros were
in fact more actively involved in politics than other Brazilian regional
elites. Less impressive economically than Sao Paulo and less impressive
militarily than Rio Grande do Sul, Minas was more dependent on the Union
and "had no choice but to play a central role in national affairs"
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(Wirth, 1977: 181).
Oligarchy and Federal Republic
In Brazil, independence from Portugal did not culminate in a change
of the political system. Brazil emerged as an independent nation still
8
ruled by an emperor--the Portugese emperor's young son. Through much
of the nineteenth century, the Crown maintained a slight advantage in
9
the balance of power with the imperial elite. After 1889, when the
emperor was overthrown and a Republic established, the power balance
tilted in favor of the regional oligarchies. For most of the life of
the First Republic (1889-1930), power was held by the regional
oligarchies of the strongest states, and their reign was sustained by a
pattern of authoritarian political organization.
The military and agrarian elites, the two imperial political actors
of consequence, withdrew their support for the emperor in the latter
stages of the Empire. Once they did, the emperor's fall was swift and
inevitable. While both opposed the Empire, they did not join forces,
nor did they share common goals. Planters first turned against the
emperor for his handling of the abolition of slavery, the backbone of
10
commercial agriculture. Acting separately, the military deposed the
emperor, and could have done so even without any civilian support, for
11
reasons pertaining to its interests as a corporate institution. The
military actually opposed the landowners, and believed overthrowing the
emperor would weaken the planters with whom, in its view, the emperor
was compromised (Reis, 1980: 102).
Of all the agrarian elites, the Sao Paulo coffee growers in
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particular were a prime actor in the establishment of the First
Republic. Many planters hastened to join the Sao Paulo Republican party
(PRP) after the passage of the Golden Law in 1888, the fourth in the
series of abolition laws which provided for the complete end to slavery
12
in Brazil. Especially disgruntled with the denial of indemnification
for freed slaves were the planters of the Paraiba Valley (Love, 1980:
108; Reis, 1980: 105). These planters converted to the republican cause
to register their displeasure with the emperor and the imperial parties
that passed the abolition-without-indemnification bill in parliament.
They also believed, falsely, that a new republican government might be
willing to provide some compensation for liberated slaves. Other
planters, principally from the frontier zones, supported the Republican
movement because they correctly surmised that a Republic would do what
the emperor was reluctant to: subsidize imported labor (Reis, 1980:
13
111-112). For the growers in these areas who had few slaves,
abolition had had little effect. Their central problem was not the loss
of slave labor but securing any labor to work the new coffee growing
areas. The support of both groups of the coffee elite made the Paulista
Republican party by far the best organized of the Republican parties.
As Love (1980: 102) has pointed out, "No other provincial Republican
organization could match the experience of the Partido Republicano
Paulista in the last two decades of the Empire."
The persistence of traditional political organization in Brazilian
politics has its origins in the way the Brazilian Republic was
constituted in the aftermath of the emperor's demise. The military
hoped to establish a strong central government committed to the
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positivist ideal of "order and progress" to replace the Empire. This
motto which the Brazilian flag still bears is, however, all that endured
of the military ideal after a few years. The elites of the economically
strongest states championed a federal state structure in order to
maximize regional autonomy (Cardoso Silva, 1982: 147; Cintra, 1979:
131). By 1891, these regional oligarchies had wrested control from the
military over the process of drafting a constitution and over the young
Republic itself. They framed a constitution which guaranteed such a
decentralized, federal republican structure. Brazilian federalism
accorded the states even wider latitude than did United States
federalism from which it drew its inspiration: each state was entitled
to draft its own constitution; negotiate commercial treaties with
foreign governments and borrow money from abroad; and levy taxes on
exports, rural and urban lands, property transfers, industrial
activities, and professional activities (Reis, 1980: 132). The Union,
in contrast, was entitled only to import and stamp taxes. Ominously,
and most importantly for the emerging pattern of territorial political
organization, the Constitution delegated to the states the authority to
regulate municipal rights.
Federalism resulted in the strengthening of the strongest states
and their oligarchies vis-a-vis the Union, and the progressive weakening
of the already weak. The leading state was clearly Sao Paulo. In 1894,
a Paulista planter was elected Brazil's first civilian president. A few
short years later, the Minas elite took its place alongside the
Paulistas. The two allies asserted their hegemony in a "Republic of
Landlords" (Reis, 1980). Given the "head start", superior organization,
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and large membership of its Republican party, as well as the economic
strength of its members, it is not surprising that the Paulistas should
have emerged in a dominant position in the aftermath of the overthrow of
the Empire. It is not at all obvious, however, why the Mineiros should
have gained political prominence within a decade after the establishment
of the Republic. The Minas elite was a latecomer to the Republican
14
movement: in Minas, Republican clubs were organized only in 1888.
The Mineiros--the "mainstay of the Braganga monarchy" (Wirth, 1977:
98)--were staunchly conservative, by and large as opposed to the
overthrow of the emperor as they were to the introduction of free labor.
The Republicans were few in number; they did not attract large coffee-
growers, as in Sao Paulo, and the movement's adherents were tied to it
more by the force of ideas than the defense of interests (Silva, 1982:
147). Given that its Republican movement was weak, the state economy in
decline, and its elite had no residual power from the days of the
15
Empire, it remains somewhat of a puzzle how the Minas elite rose in
the new order.
The Minas elite gained its first measure of national clout because
of its political utility to the hegemonic Paulista coffee elite. The
Sao Paulo oligarchy had originally reasoned that a federal system,
granting a considerable degree of state autonomy, would best suit the
coffee economy and its economic interests. It was soon forced to
rethink this localist strategy, however: national financial and
exchange policies, as well as the fulfillment of foreign commitments,
were crucial to its interests (Carone, 1978: 99-100). To assure the
profitability of coffee, the coffee barons would need central government
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support. This, in turn, was possible only with organized, political
support from other states in the national government, and especially in
congress.
The answer the Paulistas devised to this problem was an arrangement
known as the polltica dos governadores, the "politics of the governors".
In 1898, the newly elected Paulista president, Campos Salles, approached
the governor of Minas Gerais to enlist support for his monetary policy.
The political support of Minas was valuable because of the size of the
state. The most populous state in the Union, and with representation in
the national congress determined in direct proportion to population, it
had the largest single delegation in the Chamber of Deputies--37.
Salles was quick to realize the potential of a congressional alliance
between this delegation and his own Paulista bancada, with its 22
delegates. In exchange for Mineiro support for his legislative program,
Campos Salles promised a share in the control of the national executive.
Thus was born the power-sharing arrangement between the two most
powerful states of the Old Republic, Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais. This
coalition came to be known as the cafe com leite ("cafg-au-lait")
alliance, taking its name from the coffee-producing Sao Paulo and the
dairy-producing Minas Gerais. Bahia, a northeastern state and the third
largest with 22 congressmen, also participated in this coalition as a
junior partner.
Governors' politics solidified the rule of the Paulista and Mineiro
oligarchies. The federal executive, and the central government itself,
were placed under the control of the Sao Paulo and Minas elites. These
two states controlled the presidency for 28 of the 41 years of the Old
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Republic, and of the 36 years after civilians wrested control of the
state from the military in 1894. Only two times, in 1910-1914 and 1919-
1922, were the presidents not drawn from these two leading states, and
of those times, in only the first instance (1910-1914) did the winning
candidate (Marechal Hermes da Fonseca) not receive the official
endorsement of the "governors". On the other occasion, in 1919
following the sudden death of the Paulista president Rodrigues Alves,
the governors awarded the presidency to Epitacio Pessoa of the state of
Paralba.
Control of the presidency in alliance with the Paulistas brought
several advantages to the Minas oligarchy which became a self-
perpetuating source of power. First, the states participating in
governors' politics gained control over federal patronage (Wirth, 1977:
106). Secondly, Mineiros led the congress for most of the Old Republic.
They acceded to the posts of majority leader and president of the
Chamber of Deputies in 1899 (Wirth, 1977: 175). They did relinquish the
post of majority leader for an eleven year interval from 1904-1914, but
throughout they retained the position of president of the Chamber, and
after the fall of the powerful Pinheiro Machado of Rio Grande do Sul in
1914, they enjoyed a position of undisputed dominance in the Chamber
until 1926 (Wirth, 1977: 175). They were also well represented on
parliamentary commissions. In the legislature sworn in in 1903, Minas
representatives occupied three of nine seats on the important Budget
Committee alone (Resende, 1982: 213). Also, and most importantly, the
Minas oligarchy placed many more native sons in key ministries than any
other state after the "governors' politics" alliance was sealed in 1898:
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from 1898 to 1930, Mineiros held the important cabinet posts for 28
percent of the post-years; the state's nearest competitor was Rio Grande
do Sul--Gauchos controlled these same seats for 16 percent of the period
(Wirth, 1977: 106) (Table II-2). Governors' politics thus extended the
dominance of the Minas oligarchy. Weaker states were made fiscally
dependent upon the central government and subject to federal military
intervention. Since the "Union" was controlled by Sao Paulo and Minas
Gerais, the weaker member-states became dependent upon the ruling groups
of the stronger.
John Wirth (1977) has persuasively argued that the strength of
Minas elites in national politics derived from the unity the state
political machine was able to achieve in internal state politics.
Wirth's argument runs as follows: the state's main asset was neither
economic power, fiscal resources, nor military strength, but political
unity. United, Minas was well positioned to demand economic favors from
the federal government in return for offering political support. In
Wirth's words, "The Paulistas' search for allies to consolidate the
civilian regime after 1894 meant that the Mineiros, once united at home,
would inevitably become prominent in national affairs" (Wirth, 1977:
165). Such a formulation makes a great deal of sense: if the strength
of Minas lay in the size of its regional delegation in the federal
congress, then it would be necessary for the leadership of that
delegation to deliver its votes as a bloc. Were the delegation to
divide along ideological or issue-oriented lines, forging separate
alliances with factions from other states, then Minas' strength in the
legislature would have been totally undermined. Indeed, beginning in
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Table II-2
Ministerial Tenure by Phases, 1889-1930
(in percent)
State Finance Justice(a) Public Works Total(b)
I. Nov. 15, 1889 to Nov. 15, 1898: 9 years
Minas Gerais 0 25 22 16
Sao Paulo 53 11 15 25
Rio Grande do Sul 3 8 9 7
Pernambuco 4 24 9 13
Bahia 13 5 0 6
Rio de Janeiro 0 3 14 6
Total 73%
II. Nov. 15, 1898 to Oct. 3, 1930: 31.83 years
Minas Gerais 31 34 19 28
Sao Paulo 9 4 10 8
Rio Grande 18 21 9 16
Pernambuco 3 4 0 3
Bahia 0 13 16 9
Rio de Janeiro 9 0 7 5
Total 9 0 7 5
(a) The period covered for the Ministry of Justice is 11 years, which
includes two years in the Deodoro government when Justice and Interior
were separate (1889-1891); starting with Floriano Peixoto in 1891, they
became one ministry.
(b) Total ministerial years for the first period is 29 years, and for
the second period is 95.49 years.
Source: Wirth, 1977: 174.
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1900, all 37 members of the Minas delegation did vote as a bloc.
Wirth does not, however, illuminate how this unity was achieved. It
would appear that Minas' political strength during the Old Republic
rested exclusively upon the good fortune of a large population and the
willingness of its elite to submerge differences.
In fact, the Minas oligarchy actively created the conditions of its
own "unity". Imposing a hierarchical pattern of political organization
within its borders, it centralized state politics, concentrated power in
the executive (the governor); made local bosses entirely dependent on
state patrons by subordinating the municipality to the state; and
achieved oligarchical party control in a single party system. This
system was erected in the first decade after independence, and was
completed between 1898 and 1906, coinciding with the gubernatorial
administrations of Silviano Brandao (1898-1902) and Francisco Sales
(1902-1906). During the term of the former, the oligarchy seized
control of the Republican party through its Executive Commission and
turned it into an instrument of its leadership. During the
administration of Francisco Sales, a battery of legislation was
introduced to impose the will of this oligarchy upon state politics.
Once in place, this system survived for the duration of the Old Republic
16
- and beyond.
The Minas oligarchy consolidated its rule within the state first
through its control of the single political party. The oligarchical
faction led by Silviano Brandao and Francisco Bressane, the party
secretary, achieved leadership within the Minas Republican party (PRM)
through a network of alliances with local political bosses loyal to
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them. On the instructions of the oligarchy, these bosses oversaw the
organization of party branches in their municipalities. This maneuver
effectively circumvented the group's statewide opposition, leaving them
isolated and without a base of support in the interior. Securing the
proxy of the loyal municipalities for all important votes on the
Executive Commission, Bressane was able to nominate the chosen
candidates of the Brandao faction (Lage de Resende, 1982: 177-178).
Once in charge, this group proceeded to interpret and refashion party
rules at every opportunity in such a way to maximize its power and
eliminate its opposition, with remarkable success. Already by 1901,
electoral fraud, party purges, and other irregular practices had led
17
to the consolidation of the power of the oligarchy. The party
convention of that year has been called the "convention of unanimity"
(Lage de Resende, 1982: 182-84): the slates of nominees for congress
and the Executive Commission of the party were approved unanimously.
After this time, the Executive Commission assumed even more
prerogatives, such as drawing up party tickets, and its members selected
their own replacements on the Commission. The party convention became a
mere rubber-stamp of the decisions reached by the Executive Commission.
The Minas Republican party became a pillar of oligarchical
domination. All opposition was purged in the PRM in the decade from
1896 to 1906. By 1906 the party had been reduced to its Executive
Commission (Lage de Resende, 1982: 189) and the governor (at the time
referred to as the state president), who exercised an effective monopoly
of power. Witness the 'testimony' of a prominent Mineiro politician and
Executive Commission member (Coelho, 1957: 117-118):
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The president of the state [the governor] was always
heard in cases of choosing the name of a candidate
for his succession or names of candidates for
deputies, federal and state senators, and state
deputies. The Executive Commission would first meet
in the Palace with the president of the state. The
chief of the government, who was always from the
PRM, would suggest the name or names of the
candidates(s). Having chosen a list of names of
politically influential persons in the state, he
would be careful to organize a list of these names
and, in the meeting, analyze them one by one, taking
into consideration not merely their political worth,
but their fitness, level of education, moral
qualities, services lent and activities they
developed of genuine public benefit. The members of
the Comissao Diretora of the PRM would then retire
to party headquarters, where they proceeded to
undertake a careful appraisal of the nominees, and,
almost always, the candidates or president of the
state, vice-president, senators and deputies were
chosen unanimously.
Once lodged in the party, the state oligarchy achieved total
domination over local political elites, restructuring state-municipality
relations, and eliminating all opposition and potential opposition.
This was accomplished by bringing under executive control other branches
of the state which could be employed against a counterelite; modifying
the electoral system by rewriting electoral legislation and engaging in
fraudulent practices to guarantee victory for the ruling oligarchy; and
introducing new legislation which deprived municipalities of some rights
and powers which it enjoyed in the early years of the Republic in Minas.
Governor Silviano Brandao made branches of the state subordinate to
the oligarchy. He stripped both the police force and the judiciary of
their independence. The state police (Brigada Policial) was
reorganized, and placed under the supervision of the Secretary of the
Interior. It was used increasingly to intimidate opposition strongholds
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in the state (Lage de Resende, 1982: 193-194). Increasing
intervention on the part of the state government was justified by the
new "right" of the executive to intervene in municipalities in which the
possibility existed of a disturbance to public order. Previously, such
intervention was permitted only when actual outbreaks of violence had
occurred. Under the veil of this new disposition, there was constant
interference in the municipalities in order either to keep in place or
change the local group in power, depending upon the interest of the
state oligarchy (Lage de Resende, 1982: 196-97).
In a similar fashion, and with similar results, the judiciary was
subordinated to the oligarchy as well and made an instrument of its
designs. After 1903, district judges could be removed by a special
tribunal which included the president of the Senate (a member of the
Executive Commission of the PRM) and the Procurador-Geral, the
equivalent to the state's attorney general, who was a direct
representative of the governor (Lage de Resende, 1982: 198). This
measure reinforced the dependence of the judges on the executive; the
"concurso", or formal competition, was eliminated, and the governor
could now appoint freely whomever he wished to serve as these district
judges.
The greatest impact of the change in the system of judicial
accountability was in the electoral realm. The registration of voters
was brought under the jurisdiction of the district judges, allowing for
the elimination of registered voters from the rolls who were in the
19
opposition (Lage de Resende, 1982: 201). One notable practice was the
registration en masse of illiterates by the local political bosses, who
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then instructed them how to vote. While electoral fraud was hardly
new, it now was employed strictly to serve not local but state
interests.
The municipalities were formally deprived of powers and means with
the acquiesence, indeed the support, of local landowners. The interests
of this group converged with that of the state oligarchy, to the
detriment of local government. The landowners wished to see a reduction
of their local rural property tax. They were joined by merchants and
industrialists who also wished to see the powers of the municlpio to
levy taxes clipped: the Agricultural, Commercial, and Industrial
Congress of 1903 voted almost unanimously to trim the "exaggerated
autonomy" of the municipal camaras. Thus the local legislative bodies
lost their right to levy taxes on rural property and half their revenues
from the tax on property transfer (the state appropriated the other
half) (Lage de Resende, 1982: 199-200).
The same legislation governing the right to levy taxes also
withdrew another crucial prerogative from the municipality: the right
to demarcate municipal limits and create districts. This right was now
assumed by the state legislature. The manipulation of municipal borders
was commonplace, and motivated overwhelmingly by political
considerations. "Dismembering municIpios and creating new ones,
[Governor Silviano Brandao] destroyed opposition strongholds and
answered the calls of local bosses to be freed from the municipio to
which they belonged in exchange for unconditional loyalty. ... [The
law's] purpose was merely to satisfy local bosses for blatant electoral
purposes" (Lage de Resende, 1982: 196). Finally, also trimmed was the
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power of the municipality to elect an executive agent independent of its
chamber, as well as the abolition of the district councils.
The cumulative effect of emasculating municipal government was to
preclude the formation of local opposition groups, and to discipline
local political bosses to support the state oligarchy. This effect was
exacerbated, and the power of the state oligarchy enhanced, by the
subordination of the municipality to the state, a condition created
by the state oligarchy. The impoverished local governments, fiscally
dependent upon the states and subject at times to intervention by state
militias, found themselves to be at the mercy of the state oligarchies,
and as such, to their advantage to ally with the winning side in state
politics. This lack of municipal autonomy was a cornerstone of the
vertically organized, hierarchical system of domination which underlay
the power of the oligarchies--coronelismo. The other crucial element
making this system of political domination possible was the grossly
unequal distribution of material resources, and especially land, which
created the conditions for local, private elites to establish political
clienteles.
The coroneis, or the local political bosses, usually the largest
landowners in the area, were originally the local commanders in the
21
National Guard. Long after the Guard was disbanded (1831), these
local bosses, who were still usually landowners, but who could also be
22
pharmacists or other professionals in urban centers, retained their
titles. The coronel was the de facto power holder in his municipality;
his dominant role and the sources of his power were well captured by
Carone (1978: 253-254):
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He was the "head of the clan", which encompassed
not only the immediate family, but also the
"followers" who lived on his prestige, his
strength, and his money. For his dependents he
provided land to cultivate, release from jail, and
aid in illness; in return for these favors, he
demanded loyalty, services, indefinite residence
on his lands, and participation in his armed
groups. To relatives and friends he distributed
public employment, lent money, guaranteed credit;
he protected them from the police and judicial
authorities, and helped them to evade taxes. He
was the "judge", who heard complaints about land
disputes and even cases of seduction of single
girls. He was merchant as well as farmer. Not
only was he a producer, but he also acted as
intermediary between the small producer and the
market. With the greatest financial resources, he
represented the fundamental economic power of the
municlpio. He was a "man of faith", for he was the
one who promoted and gave an official character to
religious ceremonies.
What made these local bosses different from private elites
elsewhere was that as lords of their domains, the coroneis became
political figures of some importance to the state oligarchies when
voting became more important in the Old Republic. Coronelismo was not
confined to private, patron-client relations. It organized the entire
political system. It has been described as "the fundamental operative
principle of the whole oligarchical structure which characterized the
first Brazilian Republic" (Reis, 1980: 136). In Nunes Leal's (1977: 1)
classic formulation, coronelismo was a pact between public authority,
which was becoming stronger, and local bosses, whose power was
declining. As such, it was conceived as a transitional phase between a
quasi-feudalistic regime in which local private power holders,
designated representatives of central, public authority, exercised
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virtually independent power in their domains, and a more centralized one
in which public authority established its supremacy over private lords.
At the intersection of private and public, local and state, stood
the coronel, an exclusive mediator in this vertical system (Cintra,
1979: 128). The coronel's followers, dependent upon his land or other
material resources, or in need of his protection (he had his own
militias and controlled local judicial officials), readily voted as he
directed. The number of votes the coronel could marshall was a clear
signal of his worth to his state overlords; the more votes a local boss
commanded, the higher he could rise in state politics. Votes, an
exchange good, were a source of power. The coroneis were supported by
state oligarchies in their regions in exchange for the delivery of
votes. They secured public works, roads, employment, and other state
resources for their municipalities, and for themselves, they won the
exclusive right of appointment to all power posts in their
jurisdictions, which enhanced their power even more. They dominated
public employment and civil life.
Coronelismo, despite its basic underlying mechanism, cannot be
treated as a single type of political organization. The sources of
power of the coroneis, the possibility for local opposition, their
relationship to state government, and the ability of the state
oligarchies to unite, or even control, their territory all differed by
region. Where regional oligarchies were weak, as in the northeastern
states of Bahia and Ceara, state government did not even attempt to
control all the territory within its jurisdiction, relegating large
areas to the rule of local bosses (Reis, 1980: 143; Pang, 1973: 72-73).
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At times, coronel armies helped depose state elites. Once, the federal
government even signed a treaty with a coronelista faction in Bahia
(Pang, 1973: 74-75). In extreme cases, coronet armies could be employed
against the regional oligarchies in the Northeast at the instigation of
the federal government, when federal authorities and state elites were
enemies (Cintra, 1979: 136). In the Northeast, the coroneis were able
to sustain themselves in power, at least in the hinterlands, with or
without the support of the ruling state parties. As Pang (1973: 72-73)
explains, "Instead of becoming a permanent structural part of the ruling
coastal party, the coroneis of the Northeast developed a subtle
technique of bridging temporary alliances as such arrangements benefited
both groups." There was no incentive--indeed a disincentive--to
identify too closely with any one faction. Because of the high turnover
and short-lived party rule, "today's 'out' coronel often became
tomorrow's 'in' chieftain, and it was consequently more important for
him to bolster his position in the munic'pio than to consolidate his
relationship with the state party" (Pang, 1973: 76). Geographical
isolation in the hinterlands allowed the "out" coroneis to stay in power
in their localities.
In the Center-South, where state oligarchies were strong, a very
different pattern of coronelismo took hold. There, it was far more
important to remain in the favor of the state elite; the coronel had to
retain its confidence. To do so, he had to fend off all would-be
challengers. The preferences of state oligarchies were based on
pragmatic, not ideological considerations. They had little personal
loyalty to local bosses, supporting whomever would deliver the most
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votes. If a local challenger could demonstrate that on this basis he
was more "worthy" than the incumbent of state support, the state party
machine would often shift allegiance to the newcomer, and the old
coronel would lose his adherents to the new local boss. Under these
conditions, as Reis (1980: 139) points out, political disputes were
limited to competition among the coroneis. How much competition was
fostered or permitted suited the interest of the state oligarchy. In
Minas Gerais, such competition was severely limited, at this time, by
the need on the part of the oligarchy to maintain support and unity in
order to preserve its national position. The "counterelite" had no
permanent place in the municIpios of Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo as it
did in the Northeast. Coroneis in these states were well-disciplined
and obeyed the will of the state and its ruling party. In return, they
often reaped the benefits from public power and resources to improve
personal interests (Pang, 1973: 75). The worst possible position was to
be in opposition to the governor (Reis, 1980: 140-41): an opposition
coronel had no resources with which to implement local programs and
distribute the kinds of benefits which he needed to solidify his local
support.
Old Republic Mineiro politics reveals that while control over
scarce resources conferred power upon elites locally, political strength
appears to have been a prerequisite for consolidating state-wide
oligarchical power. The Mineiro elite, a more purely political class
than other regional elites and one which clung to its "traditional ways"
was able to share a dominant place in national politics in republican
Brazil. A comparison with the Paulista oligarchy, moreover, reveals
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that stereotypes which underscore the differences in the economic bases
of the two elites obscure the similarities in the patterns of politics
in the two states, similarities which are crucial to understanding the
mechanisms of traditional Brazilian politics.
The Paulistas were Brazil's economically dominant class,
unambiguously an agrarian elite through the fall of the Old Republic,
with a mingling of new industrialists. The difference is striking
between the percentage of the Paulista and the Mineiro elites who formed
a part of what Fausto (1981) called the "coffee bourgeoisie" and what
the authors of the regional case studies (Wirth, 1977; Levine, 1978;
Love, 1980) called the "export complex", encompassing (a) agricultural
society officers; (b) exporters; (c) fazendeiros; and (d) comissirios
(short-term lenders to fazendeiros). Whereas just over 17 percent of
the Mineiro elite had a stake in the export economy--overwhelmingly
devoted to and sustained by the coffee trade--over 40 percent of their
Paulista counterparts were linked to the export economy (Table II-3).
The rising importance of industry in Sao Paulo, too, is reflected in the
proportion of industrialists in the state's political elite: 28 percent
(Table II-3). Moreover, economic elites were well represented on the
Executive Commission of the PRP in its final decade (1926-1934): 60
percent of its members were fazendeiros; 44 percent, industrialists; 36
percent, bankers; 16 percent, exporters; and 16 percent, merchants.
While both states had excessively high proportions of lawyers in their
elites (67.9 percent in Minas and 69.3 percent in So Paulo), the
Mineiro elite leaned more exclusively in the direction of professional
and bureaucratic occupations. In Minas the most common professions
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Table II-3
Old Republic Oligarchies: Minas Gerais vs. Sao Paulo
Minas Gerais
% #1
Sao Paulo
% #
Member of agricultural
export complex*
Fazendeiro
Industrialist
Merchant
Lawyer
Educator
Journalist
17.1 210
16.7
17.8
5.6
67.9
32.2
23.8
Member of, or related to,
imperial elite**, through
first cousin, consan-
guinal or affinitive, or
direct descendent through
grandson
210
214
213
212
213
214
16.2 185
Related to at least one
other member of same
state elite, through
first cousin - consan-
guinal or affinitive
Break with state estab-
lishment's position
over presidential suc-
cession in:
1909-10
1921-22
1929-30
46.3 177
10.7
4.6
5.9
149
151
136
*Included in the agricultural export complex are: (a) agricultural
society officer; (b) exporter, manager or director of, or investor in,
exporting firm; (c) fazendeiro, and (d) comissario (a short-term lender
to fazendeiros).
**Imperial elite includes senators, or title-holders of barao (baron)
and above.
Source: Love, 1980: 283, 286; Wirth, 1977: 242, 245, 246, 247.
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40.3
37.7
27.8
16.6
69.3
21.2
26.6
233
239
241
241
241
241
241
23919.7
42.5
7.9
.6
3.2
240
164
178
125
_ _
_
after lawyer were educator (at the secondary or university level (32.2
percent) and journalist (23.8 percent) (Table II-3).
The Paulista planters were a commercially-oriented agricultural
elite. They invested heavily in coffee, and given low land prices and
the relatively quick exhaustion of coffee-growing lands, they were
willing to move, extending the coffee "frontier" (Love, 1980: 55). This
"planter bourgeoisie" turned capital from the coffee economy toward the
state's industrialization, investing first in banks and importing
establishments, and then "merging" (through intermarriage) with the
industrial bourgeoisie of largely immigrant origins (Dean, 1969). While
recent historiography has challenged portions of Dean's thesis,
23
particularly that referring to the origins of the industrialists, we
can still be certain that while agrarian elites complained at times
about "artificial industry", they did not oppose its expansion, provided
24
their needs were attended to.
The Paulista elite was an entrepreneurial elite who acted
politically upon its economic interest. But the Paulistas, like the
Mineiros, were also a political elite. They were even slightly more
represented in the imperial elite (19.7 percent as opposed to 16.2).
The cohesiveness of this elite was enhanced, as was true with their
Minas counterparts, by the degree of interrelatedness of the elite. The
Paulista elite was only slightly less interrelated than the Mineiro
(42.5 percent as opposed to 46.3 percent for the Mineiro) and at least
as politically united (Table 11-3). Indeed, in Sao Paulo the state
establishment was able to impose more impressive discipline within elite
ranks in each of three contested presidential successions than in Minas
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(Table II-3). The PRP was likely at least as professional and organized
as its Minas counterpart, and it too relied on local bosses to support
its rule (Love, 1980: 130-131). Coronelismo, typically associated with
the most backward parts of Brazil, was not only not absent from the
interior of Sao Paulo, but indeed, it served as the inspiration for the
Nunes Leal classic, Coronelismo, Enxada e Voto (1977). Coronelismo in
Sao Paulo was select, internally differentiated, and most pervasive
where it was difficult for the state administration to penetrate,
especially in the frontier zones (Love, 1980: 130-131). As Wirth (1977:
227-28) has pointed out:
Minas and So Paulo had similar state machines:
both had executive committees based on regional
satraps, both were run by business-oriented
elites, and both followed similar trajectories of
internal cleavages and growing gubernatorial power
during the Old Republic. While socially more
diverse, the Paulista political domain offered
little more room than Minas for newer types of
political organizations to develop or compete.
Like Minas, the elite there never lost control.
... [U]ntil 1930 -- and ambiguously so after that
-- it cannot be said that Paulista politics were
more open and participational, owing to economic
growth, and that by way of contrast Minas was
politically more traditional because of a lower
growth rate. Traditional modes based on co-
optation, clientelism, and violence were equally
important in the Paulista elite's kit of tools.
The variables that best account for this similar
behavior are convergent political organization and
leadership, not divergent economic performance.
Another manifestation of the overall importance of politics in the
distribution of power was that despite the representation of Brazil's
most powerful planters and nascent bourgeoisie, Sao Paulo was no more
successful politically than Minas: the state controlled the presidency
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three times, and was poorly represented in the ministries in the years
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it did not (1910-1926) (Table II-2). Schwartzman (1975: 120-121)
concedes that occupying presidential and ministerial posts might not
have been important for the Paulistas to secure from the central
government what they needed. Valria Pena found that Paulista coffee
growers at one time received almost 70 percent of Bank of Brazil
resources (Schwartzman, 1975: 121); the Paulistas controlled the
administrative machinery governing coffee interests; and they were able,
whenever necessary, to effect major changes in central government policy
to protect coffee. The most dramatic illustration of this latter
manifestation of Paulista power is the coffee "valorization" schemes by
which the federal government indebted itself in order to support coffee
producers. When the world market price for coffee was low, the federal
government purchased stocks from the planters (financed by borrowing
abroad), then sold the stocks in the international market when world
prices were favorable. By stockpiling coffee when the world market
price was low, Brazil was able to take advantage of its dominant
position to force up the international price. Three times during the
Old Republic the federal government thus intervened in the market in
order to boost the price of coffee.
Yet, these benefits aside, Sao Paulo did not gain as much from its
hegemony as we might expect. The Minas oligarchy achieved greater
benefit from the Union due to its political strength than did its
richer, southern neighbor. Paulista representatives complained bitterly
of "overtaxation"--Sao Paulo's 'subsidizing' of other states as measured
by the volume of taxes paid into Union coffers as opposed to the amount
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of federal monies spent in Sao Paulo--and the more favorable treatment
26
received from the Union by Minas Gerais. In fact, Minas Gerais did
pay fewer taxes into federal coffers, and obtained far greater benefits.
According to data provided by Love (1980: 261-262), So Paulo
contributed five times as much to the federal treasury as Minas in 1925-
30, and between seven and eight times as much in 1931-37. Paulistas
outpaid the Mineiros in 1939-40 on a per capita basis as well: 2.9:1.
The ratio of receipts to expenditures, never favorable to Sao Paulo,
even under the Empire, progressively worsened during the Republic: in
the 1890s, this ratio was 7.1:1;' in 1928-37, 7.2:1; and in 1937, 8.7:1
(Love, 1980: 262). In Minas Gerais, in 1937, the ratio was 1.6:1.
This gap in receipts to expenditure was readily apparent in one
important area of public expenditure: railroads. In 1928, the state of
Sao Paulo operated 88 percent of its railroad system. In Minas Gerais,
which had a slightly larger network, 70 percent was the property of the
federal government (Schwartzman, 1975: 123). Viewed from another
perspective, in that same year, Minas had 28 percent of the federal
railway network in its territory, while only 4 percent was located in
Sao Paulo. Wirth (1977: 179) reports that almost 40 percent of all
federal railroad construction in the 1920s occurred in Minas.
The Minas oligarchy had every reason to be content with its
arrangement with the Union during the Old Republic. In firm control of
state politics, with no real challenge from any social sector, and
benefiting amply from the status quo, there was no movement from within
Minas Gerais to disrupt the Republic. Yet change was thrust upon it.
Its ability to adapt attests to its resilience.
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The Revolution of 1930 and the "Crisis of Oligarchical Hegemony"
The year 1930 was a watershed in Brazilian history. That October,
the Old Republic came to an official end with the "Revolution" led by
Getilio Vargas, amidst an economic depression (and a crisis in the
coffee economy) and intra-oligarchical regional rivalries. The 1930
Revolution had both immediate, conjunctural causes as well as deeply
rooted, structural causes. In 1930, the Paulista president, Washington
Luis, broke the fundamental agreement upon which "governors' politics"
had rested. He attempted to impose his choice for presidential
successor, Jlio Prestes, a Paulista, despite the fact that it was
27
Minas' "turn to choose". The Mineiros retaliated against their former
ally by backing the candidate of the "Liberal Alliance", Getulio Vargas,
from the state of Rio Grande do Sul. When Prestes was declared victor
28
(the opposition claimed fraud), troops from Rio Grande to the south,
ParaIba to the north, and Minas Gerais to the west, began a march upon
29
Rio de Janeiro (then the nation's capital). In the view of one
student of these events (Skidmore, 1967: 5-6), to avert what they saw as
an impending civil war, senior officers deposed President Luls in
October, 1930. Ten days later, on November 4, they delivered power to
Getilio Vargas. The undisputed leader of the Liberal Alliance had
become president of Brazil.
Vargas came to power at the head of a broad and loosely-knit
coalition. He was supported by the tenentes, young army officers--
predominantly lieutenants--with reforming ambitions, and their civilian
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allies, who manifested visible discontent with the Old Republic during
30
the 1920s. He also rode the revolt of the smaller states acting in
concert against the stronger. The fissure between Sao Paulo and Minas
over the presidential succession of 1930 created the opening for which
the smaller states had been waiting. They joined forces with Minas
Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul.
One view of the 1930 "Revolution" credits the bourgeoisie,
supported by other new urban classes--the middle classes and the new
urban workers--with the overthrow of the oligarchical Republic. Another
sees the regime change as brought about by a "revolution from above"
which ultimately loosened the state apparatus from the grip of the
coffee exporting oligarchy, strengthening it and enhancing its autonomy
such that it could formulate policy which favored not necessarily coffee
and other agricultural interests, but those of industry. Both views
agree the Vargas regime was a "modernizing dictatorship", a victory of
the 'bourgeoisie' and the central government over the powerful state
31
oligarchies.
These interpretations of the events of 1930 and their aftermath
share a common assumption that the Minas oligarchy suffered a loss in
its position as a result of the Revolution of 1930. Entering the period
as a hegemonic political force on the national scene, virtually any
change in the status quo might be interpreted as prejudicial to their
interests and as an indicator of a relative loss of strength. When,
however, the change is in the direction of greater centralization, this
might be viewed as especially harmful to the regional oligarchies, and
the success of such a centralizing regime would be inversely related to
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the strength of the Minas and Paulista oligarchies. Many students of
Brazilian politics believe that during the height of Vargas'
centralizing dictatorship, the Estado Novo, these regional oligarchies
found themselves marginalized from power, and helpless before a barrage
of legislation which favored industry at the expense of agriculture, the
Union at the expense of the states, and new elites at the expense of the
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old.
Vargas did in fact change fundamentally the nature of the
relationship between the regional oligarchies and the central government
(cf. Skidmore, 1967: 33; Campello de Souza, 1976: 85). His aim was to
subordinate these oligarchies to the Union, and to strengthen the
federal executive. To this end, he proceeded quickly. In November 1930
he abolished federal and state legislative bodies, and appointed
"interventors" to act as the chief executives in their states. These
interventors were by and large natives of their states but on the
fringes of their states' political machines. Vargas used the
interventors as his agents in the states to strengthen his own hand vis-
a-vis the regional oligarchies. This was especially true in the early
years of Vargas' regime in the recalcitrant states, where he imposed
military officers as interventors. In Sao Paulo, Vargas foisted a
tenente, Joao Alberto, on the Paulista oligarchy, an appointment which
caused two years of strained relations between Sao Paulo and the central
government (Fausto, 1981: 31) culminating in the Paulista revolt of
1932. By choosing someone from outside the machines to replace
governors who were almost uniformly the choices of those machines, he
improved the odds that the interventor would do his bidding, and not
94
become the new leader of a revitalized state machine and state
interests. In the larger states, he was additionally forced (or at
least he believed it wise) to rotate the interventors with some
frequency, in order that they might not become too established in the
state machines, for this very same reason.
To check the power of the interventors, Vargas enacted an
administrative reform in 1938 which had the effect of strengthening an
independent state bureaucracy. The centerpiece of this emerging
parallel power was the "Administrative Department of Public Service"
(DASP), which had responsibility for the preparation of the budget and
other duties normally performed by the legislature. It was presided
over by bureaucrats and staffed by engineers, agronomists, and
statisticians--persons considered immune from clientelistic pressures.
Lawrence Graham argues that the DASP became a "super-ministry" and that
in the states, the regional presidents of the "DASPinhos" (little DASPs)
were even more powerful than the interventors (Campello de Souza, 1976:
96-97). Whether or not the power of the bureaucracy exceeded that of
appointed politicians, Vargas' intent was to foster competition between
the interventors and the DASPinhos, and in so doing, to maximize his
own, and the state's, autonomy. The centralization of government
functions culminated in the Estado Novo, Brazil's experience with
fascist government from 1937 to 1945. Patterned after Italian fascism
(though in a milder form), the Estado Novo enacted social welfare
legislation, corporatist labor legislation, economic nationalism, and
most of all, authoritarian government. Unlike its European varieties,
Vargas' semi-fascist regime had no party to support him; rather, he
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banned parties altogether, calling for a democracy which did not place
parties as intermediaries between citizens and the state.
An exclusive focus on this Union-state relationship assumes a
dichotomy which may not exist. A strong central state does not
necessarily imply a weak regional oligarchy, nor must one gain at the
other's expense. The expansion of the federal state's powers,
especially into new areas, could be viewed instead as the strengthening
of public versus private power, something which might threaten an elite
whose power rests on private assets but not necessarily an elite whose
power came to rest increasingly on the distribution of public resources.
Moreover, such a framework assumes that the regional oligarchies were
always in competition with the central state, which the Minas oligarchy
clearly was not. Minas Gerais, unlike So Paulo, was not fiscally and
economically independent from the central government. It needed the
financial support of the central government, not to the same degree, but
in the same spirit, as its weaker northeastern neighbors. Minas
distinguished itself from other states in a similar relationship of
fiscal dependence with the Union by its political power, which enabled
it to achieve a measure of independence. Its sizeable militia served as
a disincentive to federal intervention, and most important, its
membership at the top of the coalition which upheld the Old Republic
placed it in a position to win important federal support. It took
advantage of a situation of dependence to better itself, turning
dependence into mutual dependence. Minas continued this relationship,
in its broad outlines, into the Provisional Government and the Estado
Novo. Although the growth of federal troops overwhelmed that of its
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militia, its political support for the central government was no less
crucial than during the Old Republic.
While good historiography (such as Fausto, 1981) has, in a welcome,
sophisticated fashion, demonstrated a divergence within the oligarchy
along unmistakable regional lines when analyzing the causes of the fall
of the Old Republic, such studies often break down when examining the
outcome, assuming a single effect of the Vargas revolution on the
oligarchy as a whole. While certainly there are interests common to all
oligarchies, there are many more areas of intra-oligarchical (regional)
disputes.
The Mineiro oligarchy emerged from the Vargas revolution relatively
unscathed, especially in relation to its Paulista counterpart. The
Paulistas were "defeated" first in October 1930 when their president,
Washington Luis, was deposed, and his hand-picked successor, Julio
Prestes, was not allowed to take office, and they were humiliated by the
imposition of tenente Joao Alberto as their interventor. The Mineiros,
in contrast, backed Vargas to the presidency. In exchange for their
support, the elected governor, Olegario Maciel, was permitted to remain
in his post of chief executive until his death in 1933. The Paulistas'
1932 "corstitutionalist revolution", an armed revolt against Vargas and
the Union, was crushed with the help of Olegario Maciel and the Minas
state militia. That Vargas extended the Paulistas an olive branch after
their defeat attests only to his political guile, not any strength on
the part of the broken Paulista regional elite. Vargas' choice for
Maciel's successor, Benedito Valadares, on the other hand, would become
his most trusted interventor.
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The question which should be asked is what of the Minas oligarchy
during Vargas' reign? Did new elites supplant the old? Does Vargas'
naming of the "outsider", Benedito Valadares, and the movement of such
Republican party stalwarts as Artur Bernardes, former governor and
president of Brazil, into the opposition, mark the 'defeat' of the old
oligarchy and the rise of a new class of regional elites, loyal to
Getilio Vargas himself? Focusing on the political careers and partisan
attachments of former governors and members of the Executive Commission
of the Minas Republican party (as well as those of any new elites
emerging after 1930), we must conclude that no clear trend emerges which
can support the belief that the pre-1930 oligarchies became the 'outs'
of the 1930s and 1940s (Table II-4). First, political alignments were
not immutable. Former governor Antonio Carlos, who headed the Chamber
of Deputies and his relative, Jose Bonifacio, a cabinet member, remained
in the Vargas camp until 1936; after a Vargas maneuver against Antonio
Carlos, they migrated to the opposition. Cristiano Machado, a
"Bernardista", and Bias Fortes, son of a Minas governor who would one
day become governor himself, on the other hand, spent brief periods in
the opposition (1931-36 in the former case and 1931-32 in the latter)
before returning permanently to the Vargas fold. Secondly, the
"oligarchy" did not behave as one. Wirth (1977: 247) reports that 22
percent of the Minas political elite broke with the Olegario Maciel
administration (1930-1933); 15 percent when Valadares was appointed as
interventor in December 1933; and 14.5 percent when the PRM and the
Partido Progressista were fused by Valadares in 1936. Approximately 40
percent of the PRM Executive Commission bolted to the opposition led by
98
Table II-4
The Minas Oligarchy and the Vargas Interregnum
Executive Commission, PRM 1930-1936 Post-1945
1926-1930 Pro-Vargas Anti-Vargas UDN* PSD
Julio Bueno Brandao D
Francisco Alvaro Bueno de Paiva n.d.
Joao Pio de Souza Reis n.d.
Teodomiro Carneiro Santiago n.d.
Artur da Silva Bernardes X (PR)
Alaor Prata Soares X
Afonso Pena Junior X X
Eduardo Carlos Vilhena do Amaral X
Afrinio de Melo Franco X D
Augusto Mrio Caldeira Brant X X
Levindo Duarte Coelho X X
Wenceslau Bras Pereira Gomes X H
Antonio Carlos de Andrada X
Jose Monteiro Ribeiro Junqueira X
Alfredo Sa
Fernando de Melo Viana X
Jose Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva X X
'New' Elites
Benedito Valadares Ribeiro X X
Gustavo Capanema X X
Cristiano Monteiro Machado X X
Virgilio de Melo Franco X X
Noraldino Lima X X
Washington Ferreira Pires X
Pedro Aleixo X X
OtacIlio Negrao de Lima X
Odilon Duarte Braga X X
Jose Francisco Bias Fortes X
Olavo Gomes Pinto D
Djalma Pinheiro Chagas X
*Includes signatories of the Manifesto dos Mineiros.
D=descendents; H=political 'heir'; PR- Artur Bernardes signed the
Manifesto, but rather than remaining with the UDN, he formed his own
Republican party.
Sources: Wirth, 1977: 97-98, 110-116, 248-253, 255-256, 257-260;
Carone, 1976: 305; Benevides, 1981: 35; Oliveira, 1981: 109; Hippolito,
1985: 129, Horta, 1956: 66, 67-68, 71-72, 74-75, 76-77, 79, 86, 87-88;
and author's biographical data file.
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Artur Bernardes in the years preceding the Estado Novo, an equal number
(including their political heirs) emerged after 1945 as prominent
members of the PSD, Vargas' oligarchical supporters. They were equally
prominent to those who bolted: former governors Wenceslau Bras (and his
protge Noraldino Lima), Bias Fortes (through his son), Raul Soares
(through his political heir, Levindo Coelho), and Melo Viana, all
eventually permanently aligned with Vargas. Third, not all 'new elites'
were all that new. Benedito Valadares was a member of one of the 27
"governing families" of Minas Gerais--the Joaquina do Pompeu family
(Rebelo Horta, 1956: 76-77). Finally, even those who "lost" did not
lose much in Minas Gerais. Milton Campos and Jose de Magalhaes Pinto,
both signatories of the Manifesto dos Mineiros became state governors in
the post-war period, and Pedro Aleixo, another stalwart of the anti-
Vargas UDN, the country's vice-president under military rule.
The apparent permanent effect of the Vargas interregnum was to
split the Minas oligarchy into two camps, polarized along a pro- and
anti-Vargas axis of conflict. These factions correspond only to
political alliances, not to economic interests. In the post-war period,
these factions would find expression in political parties competing for
control of the state. These oligarchical factions were now forced to
dispute each other for government, but they merely converted their
monopoly over politics and the state into an oligopoly.
Oligarchy and "Democracy"
Traditional political elites survived the transition to "democracy"
and in relatively politically competitive circumstances because of the
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persistence of political clientelism emanating from the state and
channeled through the political parties. The Minas oligarchy, in firm
control of the state as well as the governing Social Democratic party,
the PSD, reapplied the formula discovered during the Old Republic to
maintain oligarchical power. A considerable degree of continuity in the
elite of the Estado Novo and the post-war Republic was assured by the
stamp of both Getulio Vargas and the powerful regional oligarchies on
the construction of the post-war party system. Vargas, deposed but not
defeated, crafted the post-war party system, placing in top posts in the
major parties the political officials and elites of his regime (Campello
de Souza, 1976). The regional oligarchies were well placed in the new
system; though the parties were organized nationally, real power within
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the parties resided in the regional directories (diretorios). The
regional directories named the municipal directories, and elected as
well representatives to the national convention and national directory.
This party system was organized along pro- and anti-Vargas lines.
The PSD solidified the reign of the politicians promoted under the
Vargas regime. In the states, the PSD was organized by the interventor,
and incorporated the appointed mayors (named by the interventors),
members of the state administration, many of the Old Republic's local
political bosses (Roett, 1984: 56), and other government supporters.
Whoever opposed the state interventor, even if he wished to support
Vargas, was relegated to the opposition. The first president of the PSD
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was the Minas interventor and Vargas confidant, Benedito Valadares.
The origins of the National Democratic Union, the UDN, the principal
rival to the PSD throughout the post-war period, were nearly the
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opposite of the PSD. It was formed by those who opposed Getulio Vargas.
Members of "dethroned" oligarchies; people who had once supported Vargas
or had served in his governments but for one reason or another (either
he moved against them or they resigned their posts) had broken with
Vargas; traditional liberals; and various leftist currents who stood to
profit from a return to democratic competition and rights came together
under the UDN umbrella with the intention of hastening the departure of
Vargas (Benevides, 1981: 29-31). Some of these actors were traditional
enemies, divided by intense personal and ideological rivalries in some
cases since the days of the Empire. Some elements were true to liberal
principles, others to socialist appeals, still others represented the
old state oligarchies. But the ideology they all adopted was a return to
"democracy". This movement originated in the celebrated 1943 document,
the Manifesto dos Mineiros, a call for an end to Vargas' Estado Novo and
a return to democratic liberties signed by ninety-two Mineiros
36
(Benevides, 1981: 34-35). Among the signatories of the document--
Pedro Aleixo, Milton Campos, Virgilio de Melo Franco--were some of the
most prominent Mineiro elites of the post-war years. This motley UDN
united in 1945 around the presidential candidacy of Brigadier General
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Eduardo Gomes, but the party was unable to retain its disparate
elements. Former president and governor of Minas Gerais, Artur
Bernardes, formed, or reformed, the Republican party; Gauchos broke off
to form the Partido Libertador; and Adhemar de Barros of Sao Paulo
formed the Partido Social Progressista (PSP). In a severe blow to the
UDN, Barros' PSP, which became the major electoral force in Sao Paulo,
rarely allied with the UDN after the 1945 election (Benevides, 1981: 47-
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49).
In the post-war Brazilian Republic, political participation was
increased, and there was greater mass access to the state. Access to
the state was however, as always, mediated and hierarchically organized.
Citizens could be linked to the state, and to political elites, in
"populist" networks. This was the case in Rio Grande do Sul and Sao
Paulo. Where populism was the prevalent pattern of political
representation, it incorporated the organized working class along
functional lines, and the 'mass' related directly to a single,
charismatic leader. Unions, organized and licensed by the state,
accomodated the interests of the working class, but strictly controlled
their activity by placing populist politicians at the top of the
pyramid. Mass populism, an urban phenomenon, was conducted through the
PTB, the Brazilian Labor party created by Vargas (Vargas was its
standardbearer in the 1951 presidential election), the PSP of Adhemar de
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Barros, or through no party at all, as in the case of Jnio Quadros,
mayor of Sao Paulo and later president of Brazil (1961) (Figure II-2).
Of all the populist leaders, Quadros most closely approximated the pure
charismatic ruler who establishes a direct relationship with his
followers based on the force of his personality (Weffort, 1970). The
ability to control the urban masses--the "new force" in politics and the
"sole source of legitimacy in the system" (Weffort, 1970)--ccnferred
power upon state elites.
Populism, however widespread, never incorporated the popular
sectors in the rural areas, nor was it everywhere the rule of thumb in
urban areas. In many parts of Brazil, notably the Northeast and Minas
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Gerais, clientelism overshadowed populism as the pattern of political
representation. Minas Gerais was less urbanized than southern states
which exhibited more pronounced trends toward populism, but only
slightly less so than the national average, and far more so than the
northeastern states (Table II-5). Jose Murilo de Carvalho (1966) twenty
years ago discovered a pattern of pervasive clientelistic politics in
the Minas city of Barbacena, which then had a population of over 40,000
persons. Not an insignificant municipality, the two families who
contested local politics through the use of their urban-based political
machines were two of the most important families in state politics.
Clientelism structured politics for nearly all citizens not incorporated
within the populist rubric. If populism was the challenge to
oligarchies (cf. Weffort, 1970), clientelism was their sustenance.
In Minas Gerais, as in much of Brazil, traditional and modern forms
of political clientelism assumed even greater importance with (a) the
expansion of the political market and (b) the sustained fiscal
dependence of the municipality upon the state. Coronelismo may have
been more important after 1945 than before, despite the fact that we
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might expect its importance to decline commensurate with urbanization.
With the collapse of the Estado Novo, the electorate expanded markedly:
five million new voters were added to the electoral rolls between the last
election for the Chamber of Deputies in 1934 and the 1945 election. A
greater need to deliver votes enhanced the importance of clientelism.
The continued weakness of municipal governments did nothing to reverse
this trend. As a product of the 1934 constitution, municipalities saw
their share of public revenues drop from 11.8 percent in 1930 to 8.2
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Table II-5
Brazil and Selected States: Urban Population, 1940-1960
(in percent)
State 1940 1950 1960
Minas Gerais 25.0 29.9 39.6
Northeast* 23.4 26.4 33.9
Rio Grande do Sul 31.2 34.1 44.4
Guanabara** 86.1 96.9 97.5
Sao Paulo 44.1 52.6 61.8
BRAZIL 31.2 36.2 44.7
*Includes the states of Maranhao, Piau{, Ceara, Rio Grande do Norte,
Paralba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe, and Bahia, as well as the island
territory of Fernando de Noronha.
**Guanabara encompasses the city of Rio de Janeiro, and little else--it
is the old Federal District. For this reason its urbanization rates are
so high.
Source: IBGE, 1979a: 74.
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percent in 1945 (FJP, n.d., I: T-13). They were weakened even further
during the "democratic" post-war era. The municipal governments' share
of public sector expenditures, which would most accurately reflect the
pool of funds available for spending, rose slightly in the 1950s in
relation to the end of the Estado Novo period, but dropped
precipitiously in the early 1960s, to a post-war low of 5.9 percent in
1962 (Table II-6).
Clientelism was conducted above all through the PSD. The
importance of the PSD as a patronage machine is suggested by the fact
that in the entire period from 1945 to 1964, the PSD's access to
national state resources was interrupted only briefly after Vargas'
suicide in 1954, and for the seven months of the Quadros presidency
in 1961. The supreme party of the "ins", the PSD conducted itself in
such a way to perpetuate its government role. Hippolito (1985: 124-
127), who studied extensively the PSD, identified as essential
attributes for securing control of state-level politics within the PSD:
(1) to be a top vote-getter: (2) to have public resources to distribute;
(3) to be able to liaise with local leaders; and (4) to be able to
control the state's representatives in congress. Each were geared
toward the entirely instrumental goal of achieving and maintaining
power, and paid little regard for other typical criteria in elite
recruitment (talent, administrative effectiveness, etc.). Indeed,
Hippolito describes a party leadership which is obsessed with retaining
power, even in relation to party leaders in other times and places. She
coins the PSD the "Michelian party par excellence". To retain control
of the state party machine at all costs was the primary goal of the
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Table II-6
Public Sector Expenditures, 1939-1964
(in percent)
Year Fed. Govt. Fed. Para- Union State Municipal
Statals Total Govts.* Governments
1939 56.6 2.4 59.0 31.3 9.7
1947 42.6 11.7 54.3 39.4 6.4
1950 41.7 14.6 56.3 36.2 7.6
1952 35.0 i4.7 49.7 42.2 8.1
1955 35.7 18.2 53.9 38.6 7.5
1957 35.4 19.5 54.9 37.1 8.1
1960 34.3 20.2 54.5 39.2 6.2
1962 37.0 21.6 58.6 35.4 5.9
1964 36.9 21.5 58.4 34.1 7.5
*Includes state para-statals
Source: FJP, n.d., I: I-21.
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oligarchy: it accomplished this aim reasonably well.
The axes around which party competition revolved in "democratic
Brazil" were Vargas - anti-Vargas and elite - mass. The PSD and the UDN
were both vehicles for the oligarchies. The PTB, while supporting
Vargas, by and large was not dominated by representatives of the
oligarchy. These divisions may be conceptualized as:
Elite Mass
I I
Pro- ' A ' B
Vargas (PSD) (PTB)
Anti- C D
Vargas (UDN) (Janio Quadros)
I I I
In Minas Gerais, state politics was the contest of the two parties
of the traditional political elite. The UDN was more successful in the
state than nationally; it controlled the state executive from 1947 to
1950 and again after 1962. There was little programmatic difference
between these parties, nor did they represent different constituencies.
The close identification of the PSD with the agrarian elites, and the
'democratic' demands of the UDN, led many observers to conclude the PSD
was a rural-based party, and the UDN a representative of urban classes.
The PSD was indeed important in rural areas, but no more so than the
UDN. In Minas Gerais, where both parties were significant, the shades
of difference between the two along this dimension are negligible. A
study of over 27,000 members of the municipal directories of the parties
(Carvalho, 1960: 283) revealed that 43.5 percent of PSD members were
farmers and cattlemen, compared to 42.1 percent for the UDN. Both
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parties were, of course, considerably more rural than the PTB, 17.8
percent of whose members belonged to the agrarian sector. The
Republican party which Artur Bernardes resurrected, also an oligarchical
vehicle, allied with both the UDN and the PSD in various local elections
in Minas Gerais from 1945 to 1964. Which side the PR chose to side with
was determined purely by local considerations.
National elections in the course of the post-war era suggest an
erosion of support for the "conservative" parties, the PSD, the UDN, and
the PR. Soares (1981), among others, has placed great emphasis upon
this fact in his analysis of the effects of urbanization and
industrialization on the post-war party system. This trend is most
marked in the case of the PSD, whose representation in the Chamber of
Deputies slipped from a dominating 52.8 percent in 1945 to 30.3 percent
in 1962. It even had to contest being the largest party with the
PTB. The PTB, also Vargas' vehicle, was the beneficiary of party
fragmentation in the post-war period, rising from a mere 7.7 percent of
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the seats in the Chamber of Deputies in 1945 to 19.8 percent in 1962.
This pattern does not obtain in Minas Gerais. The erosion of
partisan support for the PSD is slight when compared to the national
trend (43.8 percent in 1962), and the polling strength of the PTB was
far less than suggested nationally: in the 1962 election, 12.5 percent
of the Minas delegation to the Chamber of Deputies was from the PTB, as
compared to 29.8 percent nationally (Table II-7). This difference holds
up in the state-level elections as well: combined, the PSD, UDN, and PR
garnered only 37.83 percent of the seats in all state legislatures (in
1962), but in Minas Gerais, these same parties received nearly two-
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Table II-7
Brazil and Minas Gerais: Party Strength, Federal and
State Legislatures, 1945-1962
(in percent of seats)
Party Chamber of Minas Dele- All State Minas Legis.
Deputies gation, Assemblies Assembly
1945 1962 1962 1962
PSD 52.8 30.3 43.8 PSD~ 22.0\
UDN 29.0 23.4 33.3 UDN 337.83 31.7 65.9
PR * 8.3** PR v 12.2
PTB+ 7.7 29.8 12.5 20.43 14.6
PSP+ 5.4 2.1 J 11.0
PL+ - 3.7 (PL-MTR)
PDC 2.4
PRP 2.4
PCB 4.9
"Small
Parties" 5.6 16.2
*Included with "small parties".
**The Republican party elected only four representatives to the
Chamber of Deputies in 1962 -- all were from Minas Gerais. This
represents a substantial drop from the 19 elected nationally in 1945.
+Allied in Minas Gerais in 1962 for the federal deputy elections.
Sources: Bastos, 1964: 321, 325; Oliveira, 1981: 110.
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thirds of the seats (65.9). Finally, the Republican party, which was
all but eliminated in other states, retained its foothold in Minas
Gerais. Its four representatives elected to the Chamber in 1962 by
Minas were the party's only representatives.
Does this mean that Minas was exceptional in some sense? Yes and
no. Lima (1981: 30) is correct to point out that no national trends
emerge from Brazilian voting in the 1945-64 period, only aggregations of
state and regional trends. The sharp rise in the national
representation of the PTB is in large part accounted for by its strength
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in the state of Rio Grande do Sul (Vargas' home state).
Minas' trends therefore do differ from the national picture, but
not from any single national pattern. Brazilian politics in this era
was an amalgamation of various regional patterns of politics. And
significantly, while populism took hold in Rio Grande do Sul and in Sao
Paulo, through the PTB in the former case and the personages of Adhemar
de Barros and Janio Quadros in the latter, it did not take firm root in
Minas Gerais. Minas Gerais had one of the strongest, persistent trends
toward support for the three 'conservative' parties. Clientelism was
apparently more important, and for longer, than populism.
The control of the Minas oligarchy over its state politics was as
secure as ever, even in 1962, when the national political system had
entered into its phase of accelerated fragmentation (Santos, n.d.).
Yet, the presence of Joao Goulart, a PTB politician and Vargas' ex-
Minister of Labor (who assumed office over oligarchical protest when
Janio Quadros unexpectedly resigned) in the presidency created a rupture
between the national executive and who really held power in the
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political system. To rectify this imbalance and to recapture the
national state, the traditional elite of Minas Gerais, joined by its
counterparts in other states, plotted and launched the military coup of
1964 (Motta, 1971; Schneider, 1971: 97-99).
The UDN in particular took the lead in spurring the military on to
seize power. The most famous "golpista" was Carlos Lacerda, a Carioca
journalist and ex-governor of Guanabara, whose anti-communist diatribes
of the early 1960s are almost legendary. Less notorious but no less
significant, UDN president and Mineiro, Bilac Pinto, often publicly
denounced the government of Joao Goulart in the early months of 1964
(Benevides, 1981: 124). The coup itself was planned in Minas, led by
then governor Magalhaes Pinto and General Mourao Filho. Magalhaes
Pinto's Secretary of Public Security, Jose Monteiro de Castro, admitted
to the conspiracy against Goulart: "Many nights we flew to secret
meetings with military officers" (as cited in Isto, 7/25/84: 92). In
an interview with Istoe (7/25/84: 94), he reflected on the 1964
movement:
In 1964, ... the Revolution was preceded by the
formation of a cabinet of unity by Magalhaes
[Pinto]. There were Afonso Arinos, Milton Campos,
[Jose Maria] Alkmim. It was a cabinet without
portfolios, representing unity. ... In that moment
Minas was very resistant to the structural changes
proposed by Goulart. These prompted rural action in
Minas, and it was the landowners who were the most
ardent revolutionaries. They sought me out as
Secretary of Public Security to offer arms and
money.
Once the military moved, UDN reaction was swift and certain. The party
issued an official statement on April 3: "Commending once again the
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patriotism, bravery and lack of personal ambition on the part of the
Armed Forces, the UDN places itself entirely at their side in every way,
for whatever measure is necessary, in order to save democracy" (as cited
in Benevides, 1981: 125).
Once the coup was an accomplished fact, much of the PSD, too,
backed the military in the congress. During the Goulart presidency,
supporters and opponents of change drew new lines of cleavage in the
political system which cross-cut party boundaries. The "Ala Moga" of
the PSD (the group which Hippolito (1985) calls "reformers"), together
with the "Bossa Nova" wing of the UDN, similarly committed to reform,
and the PTB, united in favor of agrarian reform, a nationalist economic
policy, liberal social policy and an independent foreign policy. In
response, the oligarchies in all parties closed ranks in similar fashion
to defend oligarchical politics and power.
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Conclusions
Regional oligarchies created the Brazilian Republic to serve their
interests and perpetuate their reign. The Minas oligarchy in particular
played a leading role in shaping the structures of state which would
ensure their dominance even after economic development created new
classes and political participation increased. What distinguishes the
Minas oligarchy and the Brazilian political system from other dominant
elites and pre-industrial, elite-dominated political systems is the
centrality of the public, political sphere to the exercise of
oligarchical dominance. The Minas elite took refuge in the state, and
made use of clientelistic political parties to integrate politically
participating and non-participating citizens. The Minas Republican
party and later the Social Democratic party Union provided the
organizational base to achieve consensus in this system.
In the Old Republic in Minas Gerais, power was extremely
centralized in the hands of the governor and the party elite. The
centralization of fiscal and political power in the executive branch of
government was far from detrimental to the oligarchical interests. The
degree of centralization of authority in the executive per se is not the
key variable in understanding oligarchical power, but, rather, the
relationship of the party qua oligarchical vehicle to the executive.
Where a powerful executive is separated from elite interests,
centralization can be damaging indeed to an oligarchy. But where
oligarchies, through parties, penetrate and control the state apparatus,
centralization can abet traditional elite rule by diminishing the
viability of any challenges. Seen in this light, the challenge posed to
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the Minas oligarchy by the centralization undertaken during the Vargas
interregnum was not as great as believed. Some elites weathered, others
profited from, Vargas' reign. The Minas oligarchy in particular
reemerged from the Estado Novo with firm control of party and state.
The growth of the federal state functions and resources initiated under
Vargas offered it, as well as other regional elites who controlled their
own states and exercised national influence, an opportunity to further
enhance their positions.
In the Old Republic, power resided in the states, and politics was
organized along regional lines. The federal state was strengthened over
time, but regionalism endured as a permanent feature of the Brazilian
political landscape. During the heyday of the oligarchy, the governing
Republican parties which bore the same name in different states had
little in common. As one historian (Fausto, 1981: 91) has written,
"Class divisions didn't occur along national lines, and internal
divisions within the dominant classes took a regional character."
Cross-regional, class, and even more narrow socio-economic interests did
not develop and become translated into national political programs and
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parties partly, but not entirely, for economic reasons. Different
areas of Brazil had very different sub-regional economies. The
Northeast produced sugar at the same time that Sao Paulo was rapidly
expanding its coffee-growing areas. Agrarian elite interests in the
different states of Brazil therefore were not identical, or even
sufficiently overlapping that a set of coherent public policies might be
formulated which would advantage the entire landowning class.
Conversely, in the largest urban centers, there was an overlapping of
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interests between agrarian and industrial bourgeoisies.
Whatever the causes of regionally-based politics, its effects were
paramount for the enduring nature of political organization in Brazil.
Regional oligarchies assumed political identities which were expressed
in state government and state political parties. Regionalism prevented
political parties and political representation from developing along
class or other interest lines. Instead it had the effect of reinforcing
oligarchical power.
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Notes
1. One of the most comprehensive and conceptually sophisticated
analyses in this vein is that of Weffort (1970: 387ff). Weffort views
the Revolution of 1930 as a clear end to oligarchical hegemony, but one
without a clear resolution. The Brazilian middle class lacked
sufficient autonomy to establish a democratic regime in accordance with
its liberal aspirations. In a situation in which no group held
exclusive political power, the state separated itself from the dominant
groups and exercised its authority over the society as a whole.
Weffort, without calling it such, describes to a tee the Bonapartist
state.
Weffort is unambiguous in his assertion that the Revolution of 1930
did away with "the system of access to power through the traditional
families and economic groups, which would have enabled the oligarchy to
renew itself within its own group," -- concluding "there was no longer
an oligarchy".
2. "Minas Gerais", in Portuguese, means "General Mines".
3. The notorious droughts and abject poverty of the Brazilian
Northeast led in 1959 to the creation of the Brazilian Superintendency
for the Development of the Northeast (SUDENE), and the introduction of
fiscal incentives to stimulate development in the region. SUDENE was
originally headed by the economist Celso Furtado. It offered fiscal
incentives in the form of tax rebates to industries wishing to
(re)locate in the underdeveloped Northeast.
4. This figure may be an underestimate, since the data are not
complete on parentela.
5. Despite the fact that not all identical surnames are part of
the same clan and they were counted as such, any errors in estimation
would likely understate the degree of family relations in the
bureaucracy. Different surnames from the same family tree would have
escaped the author, and functionaries in the interior were not counted.
6. They may have even represented a small proportion of the
imperial elite. According to Murilo de Carvalho (1980: 78-87), the
percentage of ministers who by occupation were landowners and merchants
for the entire period (1822-1889) was less than five percent; senators,
less than 15 percent; and deputies, less than ten percent, although over
40 percent of ministers did have landholdings and another 11 percent
engaged in commerce and/or finance.
7. Martins did check the biographical data against a list of 1,102
leading coffee growers and 741 cattle ranchers of the state for the
period from 1905 to 1927.
8. In 1808, when Napoleon invaded the Iberian peninsula, the
Portuguese royal family fled to Brazil, its colony, and there
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established its court. After the defeat of Napoleon and the monarchy's
return to Portugal, Dom Pedro I remained behind, and declared Brazil's
independence in 1822. This was accomplished without a shot being fired.
9. See Reis (1980) for an application of Barrington Moore's thesis
regarding the balance of power between Crown and landlords to the
Brazilian case.
10. Slavery was the backbone of the Northeastern sugar economy as
well as coffee production. In 1818, it is estimated that slaves
constituted one-half the Brazilian population. In the 1820s, 53 percent
of the slaves were in the Northeast, and 37 percent in the Center-South.
In 1873, as abolition and the end of the Empire approached, that
proportion had been inverted: 57 percent of the slaves were now in the
Center-South, and 35 percent in the Northeast. By 1872, slaves
accounted for only 10 percent of the population of the Northeast. This
shows the rising importance of the coffee economy, and its ability to
siphon slaves away from the Northeast. As northeastern plantation
owners had to accomodate themselves to losing their slave laborers,
slavery became less important to sugar growing, but coffee fazendas
became ever more dependent on slave labor.
11. The sources of military discontent sprang from internal
disciplinary questions and civilian-military disputes. After the war
with Paraguay, military budgets were cut and civilians appointed to the
war ministry. For an overview, see Reis (1980: 97-99), and for an
account of how these issues became salient in Rio Grande do Sul, see
Love (1971: 30-31).
12. Slavery in Brazil was abolished in four steps over the course
of nearly four decades. The first step was the prohibition of the
international slave trade (at British urging) in 1850 (the Euzibio de
Queiroz law), which had the effect of ceasing the import of any new
slaves into Brazil. The next piece of abolitionist legislation was the
"free womb" bill of 1871 (the Rio Branco Law), by which all children
born to slaves would be freed once they reached adulthood (21 years of
age), or, if freed when they were eight years old, the slaveowner was
entitled to compensation. This bill was bitterly opposed by the
congressional representatives of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Sao
Paulo--the coffee-producing states. The third anti-slavery law was the
liberation of the elderly in 1885 (the Sararva-Cotegipe Law), which
freed all slaves over the age of 60, and provided no compensation.
Finally, the Abolitionist Bill of 1888 (the Golden Law), put an
unqualified end to slavery in Brazil. It provided for no compensation
to former slave owners. For an excellent account of the politics of the
abolition, including the shift of coffee representatives to support
abolition, see Reis (1980: 58-77). J. Martins (1977) concurs that
coffee planters supported abolition once they became aware it would free
capital.
13. The federal government sponsored immigration programs by which
public funds were provided to foreigners for free transportation and
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initial lodging. Subsidies covered the transportation costs of 63
percent of the i58,420 immigrants who entered Sao Paulo between 1888 and
1890, and 80 percent of the 719,595 who came between 1891 and 1900
(Villela and Suzigan, as cited in Reis, 1980: 45). Most immigrants came
from Italy.
14. Not only was Minas behind Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro whose
first Republican clubs were organized as early as 1870, but its
Republican movement was nowhere near as developed as even that of Rio
Grande do Sul. In Rio Grande, the Republican movement, once rooted (a
Republican party was organized only in 1882), enjoyed strong state
support, and acquired a coherent programatic outlook: it opposed
slavery (Rio Grande had few slaves and anti-slavery was gaining in
popularity) and endorsed Comtian positivism (Love, 1971: 26-27).
15. Political hegemony during the second reign (1840-1889)
belonged to Rio de Janeiro, the country's administrative and financial
center and its principal port (Cardoso Silva, 1982: 146), as well as
Bahia (Murilo de Carvalho, 1980: 104-107). In 1885, Minas had only 16
percent of the deputies in the imperial legislature, despite having over
22 percent of the population. Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, and Pernambuco all
had more ministers.
16. Artur Bernardes, the new governor in 1918, seized from the
PRM's founders, but did not dismantle, this oligarchical system. He
strengthened the governor's position, but after his successor Raul
Soares died in 1924, the party reverted to pre-1918 patterns of
oligarchical control (Wirth, 1977: 108-110).
17. Some of these charges were documented in the Jornal do Povo by
dissident members of the Executive Commission, Mendes Pimental and
Antonio Olinto: falsification by the executive of nominations made by
the local directories; flaunting of party norms; substituting police
officials in opposition stronghold municipalities; clandestine
registration; moving electoral divisions in order to force the
abstention of voters; and various other forms of intimidation and
cooptation (Lage de Resende, 1982: 181).
18. Lage de Resende (1982: 194) cites the example of the
municipality of Carangola, in which the opposition of 2000 voters (out
of 2800 registered) all but disappeared within one week after state
police forces were sent into the area to brutalize the population. Tens
of murders were recorded in the Jornal do Povo.
19. In the municipality of Pitangui, Slvio Gabriel Diniz (as
cited in Lage de Resende, 1982: 201) discovered 200 voters of an
opposition faction were denied registration by the district judge.
20. Tightening up the restrictions on the voting of illiterates
would come to be a demand of urban, liberal constitutionalist groups
later in the Old Republic as a means of curtailing the power of the
landed oligarchy. Enforcement of the literacy requirement would tend to
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benefit the urban bourgeoisie because the illiterate vote was
manipulated by the agrarian elites.
21. On the origins, structure, and functions of the National Guard,
see Uricoechea (1980: 64-75). Also, for detail on the history of the
relationship of coroneis to the Guard, see Pang (1973: 67-69).
22. Pang (1973: 77-79) states categorically that the assumption
that all coroneis were landowners is erroneous. He identifies at least
seven types of coroneis: the coronel-landowner; the coronel-merchant;
the coronel-industrialist; the coronel-priest; the coronel-warlord; the
coronel-'bandit'; and the coronel-party cadre. In this latter category
he describes two sub-types: the party bureaucrat and the city ward
boss. While not all these types are likely to have been present in the
more developed southern states such as Minas Gerais (especially the
coronel-'bandit' and even the coronel-priest are more typical of the
hinterlands of the Northeast), some would be better represented in the
Center-South, particularly those in urban occupations (merchant,
industrialist) and above all the party cadres.
23. Jose de Souza Martins (1977: 785-786) challenges Dean on the
origins of the industrialists. Dean underscored the role of importers,
especially their intimate knowledge of the market and their capital, in
stimulating the industrialization of Sao Paulo. According to data he
provides, 37 of 65 important importing houses in 1910 had, by the onset
of the war, begun to produce directly the goods they previously
imported. Martins points out that "It is not the same to say that
almost 50 percent of importing houses began to develop some kind of
industrial activity than it is to say what is the proportion of all
industries at this time that originated from importing houses. In
reality, Dean explained what happened to the importing houses, and not
what was happening in industry." Martins asserts that the proportion of
industries with commercial origins is in all likelihood far lower than
the 50 percent suggested by Dean, and, moreover, that some industries
which Dean classified as having been initiated by merchants were in fact
only purchased by the merchants.
Martins (1977: 786-788) also disputes the importance which Dean
attaches to the coffee economy in the industrialization of Sao Paulo.
He dissents especially from Dean's conclusions that coffee provided the
money economy that coffee needed (according to Martins, sugar and cotton
growing in various regions of Sao Paulo, which preceded coffee, had
already established such a economy), and that cycles of
industrialization were related to crises in the export sector.
These objections, even if accurate (as they appear to be), do not
undermine Dean's analysis of the posture adopted by the agrarian elites
toward industry, nor of the political behavior of the bourgeoisie after
1907, whatever its origins in the nineteenth century.
24. Paulistas were able to obviate many of the differences almost
certain to arise between the policy preferences of agricultural and
industrial elites in the course of industrialization due to a
combination of the limited ambition of industrialists, the posture of
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the planters, and chance circumstances. The boom years for coffee
(1907-1913) were also boom years for industry, with the success of the
coffee economy fueling domestic demand (Fausto, 1981: 46).
Industrialists were astutely not willing to "push their gains too far or
to press for political advantages at the expense of the planters. ...
"It was difficult for the industrialists to conceive of the development
of the Paulista economy in terms different from those embraced by the
planter and the importer, at least until the 1930s. Self-evidently
coffee had created its market; to do it any harm would be nearly
suicidal" (Dean, 1969: 69-70).
"Chance circumstances" abetted this outcome. The loci of the most
rapidly expanding agricultural and industrial areas were not distinct as
in the United States but identical (Dean, 1969: 70), heightening the
possibility that the two interests might merge at some point. Also, no
conflict materialized over tariffs comparable to that which surfaced in
many other countries between industry and agriculture. The planters in
Sao Paulo were quite willing to tax imports, not to protect industry,
but to generate revenue. They preferred a duty on imports to an even
more painful tax on land or income (Dean, 1969: 70-71). A third
circumstance was that the industrialists processed secondary, not
primary, Paulista exports. Planters who grew such crops as cotton,
sugar, and vegetable oils were quite favorably inclined toward the
industrialists who in effect provided them with a secondary market.
25. Schwartzman (1975: 120-123) argues: "The political importance
of Sao Paulo never corresponded to that which its growing economic
weight would suggest." In a well-known and controversial thesis, he
suggests that the Mineiros developed a different pattern of politics
than did the Paulistas, and attributes the failure of the Paulistas to
establish political hegemony to their view of politics, and their means
of engaging in it: "For the Paulistas, politics was a form of improving
their business; for almost all others, politics was their business."
26. Sao Paulo's tax burden increased from 13 percent of federal
receipts in the 1890s to 30 percent in the decade from 1928 to 1937.
Still, the Federal District paid in more: 52 percent in the 1890s and
45 percent in the latter period (Love, 1980: 261).
In 1930, a high official of the state of Sao Paulo's finance
department published a book protesting precisely the enormous disparity
between what Sao Paulo and Minas paid into the Union coffers and what
they received in return (Schwartzman, 1975: 123). He argued explicitly
that in the period from 1922-24, Sao Paulo had contributed almost one-
third of the federal budget, and that Minas Gerais had received the
greatest part of those resources. Similarly, in the Constituent
Assembly of 1933-34, Sao Paulo's delegates charged that their state paid
a far higher ratio of federal to state taxes than the other two leading
states, Minas and Rio Grande do Sul (Love, 1980: 261).
27. Allegedly, his motivation was to ensure the continuation of
his economic policies in depression-stricken Brazil. Pang (1973: 85)
cites as reasons for his breach of the governors' agreement a
personality conflict with the governor of Minas to whom the nomination
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would have fallen, Antonio Carlos Ribeiro de Andrada; serious
differences in economic beliefs; and domestic pressure from Sao Paulo.
28. Fraud was commonplace in the Old Republic. One could even say
it was institutionalized. Cammack (1982: 57) writes: "[F]raud was
widespread in the period, with the registration of the dead or otherwise
absent (known as fosforos) and the wholesale writing in of voters
(eleigoes a bico da pena) the most widely used tactics. Success in such
endeavors was dependent upon control of the local electoral board and
the successive levels at which the declared results were subject to
review, ending on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies itself, and
therefore invariably attended official candidates. An indication of the
extent to which fraud had vitiated the 1930 elections is given by the
fact that the new registration for the election of a Constituent
Assembly in 1933, which included women for the first time, still
produced scarcely more than two-thirds as many registrations as there
had been votes cast in 1930."
29. What catalyzed the opposition to act was the assassination of
Governor Joao Pessoa of Parafba, its vice-presidential candidate.
Though assassinated by a local political enemy, it had the effect it did
because Washington Luis supported that faction. As Levindo Coelho
(1957: 127) recounts the episode: "Joao Pessoa, then president of the
state [Paraiba] was assassinated, which shocked and moved the country.
Later the news spread that his assassin would not be handed over for
political reasons." Reportedly, Carlos Pinheiro Chagas delivered a
rousing eulogy at the graveside in Rio de Janeiro.
30. Resenting the oligarchical grip on the national political
scene, the tenentes staged armed revolts in 1922 in Rio de Janeiro and
again in 1924, both of which were repressed. They are best known for
the "Prestes Column" in which they marched through the Brazilian
hinterland for three years from 1925-1927, carrying their message to the
interior of the country, all the while eluding federal troops. In 1927,
after marching more than 15,000 miles, the column disbanded and several
of its members went into exile. Great importance has been attached to
the role played by this march, and the Tenentista movement, in eroding
the legitimacy of the Old Republic (Carone, 1975: 123-147, as cited in
Reis, 1980: 246-247; Forjaz, 1977). The tenentes enjoyed a considerable
degree of power in the early years of the Provisional Government (1930-
1933), but lost influence after 1932, in part because their presence in
government angered other coalition members (Skidmore, 1967: 10). Campos
Coelho (1976: 89-91) claims that by 1932, the tenentes had been
thoroughly coopted by the civilians with whom they were associated.
31. The claim that the "Revolution of 1930" was a "bourgeois
revolution" was advanced by such contemporary political thinkers as
Azevedo Amaral and, representing the left, Abguar Bastos (Fausto, 1981:
16). Later, several social scientists attempted to further develop or
refine this argument in one form or another. Among them: Werneck
Sodre, Wanderley Guilherme, and Andre Gunder Frank. The latter, for
instance, viewed the events of 1930 as the movement of emerging
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industrial interests against those of the entrenched, agrarian exporting
oligarchies (Fausto, 1981: 17-19).
Fausto (1981: 29-43) has methodically demolished the thesis that
the "Revolution of 1930" was instigated, propelled, or even endorsed, by
the budding industrial bourgeoisie, in either their areas of greatest
concentration--Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro--or in the states which
championed the Vargas revolt--Rio Grande do Sul and Minas Gerais. He
presents a wide array of evidence in support of this claim. First,
though small, this bourgeoisie was capable of expressing itself
politically, et never presented an industrial program as an alternative
to the system based on coffee interests. Secondly, during the
presidential campaign of 1929, the principal industrial associations of
Sao Paulo publicly endorsed the candidacy of Jlio Prestes to continue
the government's financial and industrial policies and they did not
change their position during or after the "Revolution of 1930". Had
they wished to break with the state political machine, they might have
taken advantage of the opportunity presented by the rift between the
political elites of Sao Paulo and the central government caused by the
imposition of the tenente Joao Alberto as the federal interventor in Sao
Paulo. Instead, the industrialists, not induced to side with the
federal government (Joao Alberto made the entrepreneurs nervous with his
promises to labor), supported the 1932 Constitutionalist Revolt of Sao
Paulo against Vargas' regime.
The Partido Democratico of Sao Paulo which did oppose Washington
Luis and join the Liberal Alliance had no support among industrialists.
The party's response to Roberto Simonsen's defense in June 1928 of
protectionism is illustrative of its position toward industry: "It is
necessary to repeat one million times: Brazil is essentially an
agrarian country. We must exploit our land by agriculture, husbandry,
and mining. We have 8,500,000 square kilometers, of which 89 percent is
virgin land. It is ridiculous to sacrifice this for the benefit of two
dozen industries in Rio and Sao Paulo." Rather, industrialists had
close ties with the old Paulista Republican party. The nature of this
alliance was not transitory or happenstance, but "intimate and
permanent". During the 1920s, various industrial associations raised
more money for the PRP than did the old Brazilian Rural Society.
Nor is there any evidence of any connections among the Frente Onica
in Rio Grande do Sul, who launched the Vargas candidacy, and any
industrial interests of that state (or any other). In Minas Gerais,
what few industrialists there were in this period (largely concentrated
in Juiz de Fcra), were allied with Antonio Carlos, and were overshadowed
by the agrarian-based oligarchy. And finally, nowhere in the election
manifestos of the Liberal Alliance was there any indication of a pro-
industrial program.
Fausto (1981: 47-50) similarly discards the hypothesis that the
Vargas regime was a "revolution from above", which promoted
industrialization and development on behalf of the industrial
bourgeoisie in the years from 1930 to 1937. He points out that Vargas'
tariff and exchange policies in this period were designed to benefit
coffee: industrial representatives harshly criticized in the Chamber of
Deputies and in the Senate a commercial accord reached in 1935 with the
United States which facilitated the entry of coffee in the US market in
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exchange for lower duties on manufactured imports that competed
directly with domestically produced goods. While industry did benefit
from having some of its representatives appointed to high posts in the
Bank of Brazil and in the Ministry of Labor, and incentives helped
establish cement factories in the country, there is no evidence that any
coherent set of policies was adopted to favor industry. In sum, neither
directly, nor through state intervention, did the Revolution of 1930
bring the industrial bourgeoisie to political power.
32. In this "pro-industrial, "anti-aristocratic", state
centralizing regime, some observers see the antecedents of the
modernizing, centralizing dictatorship of the 1960s and early 1970s.
33. Size of Largest State Militias and Federal Troops, 1917 & 1928
1917 1928 % Increase
Sao Paulo 8,618 7,622 -11.56
Minas Gerais 2,976 4,111 38.13
Rio Grande do Sul 2,528 3,212 27.05
Bahia 2,200 3,153 43.31
Brazil (federal troops) 24,070 40,926 70.02
Source: Henry H. Keith, "Armed Federal Interventions in the States
During the Old Republic," in Henry Keith and Robert A. Hayes (eds.),
Perspectives on Armed Politics in Brazil, (Tempe, Arizona, 1976), pp.
59 and 64 as cited in Reis, 1980: 229.
From 1927 to 1937, armed forces of all states registered a modest
increase (from 28,000 to 38,000) in relation to the sharp rise in
federal troops (from 38,000 to 75,000) (Levine, 1970: 157, as cited in
Reis, 1980: 230).
34. When the pro-Vargas political party was in the process of
being formed, political elites in Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais voiced a
preference that political parties be regional entities, as they had been
in the pre-Vargas era. It has been suggested that through regional
parties, these oligarchies would hope to recreate Old Republic politics,
especially the "cafg-au-lait" alliance (Hippolito, 1985: 120-121). In
the new regime, however, Getilio Vargas was able to impose over the
objections of the Paulista and Mineiro representatives the decree of
national, rather than state-level parties. In this, he was supported by
such states as Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro. While Sao Paulo and Minas
formally lost out on this score, the regional branches of the PSD were
given a great deal of autonomy, and in practice, the party became as
decentralized as government had been in the Old Republic.
35. While he was deposed in 1947, the movement which ousted him
was spearheaded by his fellow Mineiros.
36. Benevides (1981: 35) suggests they did so to outflank Vargas,
who was himself moving in this direction -- undoubtedly due to the
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impending Allied victory in the War and the presumed demise of fascism
in Europe.
37. Benevides (1981: 48) states that of all "illustrious old
politicians", the support of Artur Bernardes for the Brigadier (as he is
called in Brazil) was the most difficult to secure. Apparently, upon
being invited to join the UDN, Bernardes had said, "I don't know Mr.
Eduardo Gomes. There has been only one incident between us to this day:
this military man, in 1924, flew a revolutionary mission against my
government [Bernardes was president of Brazil from 1922-1926].
Nonetheless, if he has all the qualities that people attribute to him,
there is no reason that he shouldn't be my candidate to lead this
country".
38. Cardoso (1978) qualifies the standard interpretation of the
PSP as a populist party; he suggests it behaved as a clientelistic party
with ties to the state.
39. Cammack (1982: 57) makes such an argument and suggests that
Nunes Leal's perspective (Nunes Leal had argued in 1948 that coronelismo
reached its apex in the Old Republic) was blurred by contemporary
events. He points out that prior to 1930, less than four percent of the
population was eligible to vote, and the prevalence of fraud made
dependent votes attached to an individual a doubtful asset. Control of
the electoral machinery would appear to have been more important than
the ability of an individual to produce dependents to vote with him.
40. Juscelino Kubitschek to some extent represents an exception
to the iron control they maintained over the party; the nominee of the
party for governor of Minas in 1951 and again for jpasident of Brazil in
1955, his candidacy was not the first choice of the party machine, but
rather was won in a grass-roots campaign. Yet, despite the degree to
which Kubitschek was an outsider, his case was (1) rare, and (2)
represented no threat to the oligarchical system. He made no attempts
to reform either the PSD or Brazil. He did, however, demonstrate the
ability to secure votes, to win the adherence of local elites to the
PSD, and the other pre-requisites for membership in the higher echelons
of the oligarchy.
41. When parties submerged their labels to contest elections as
coalitions, it is impossible to disaggregate the percentages of the vote
each party received. For this reason, we conform to the customary use
of the number of seats won as an indicator of popular support for the
parties.
42. See Trindade (1978) for an account of the strength of the
populist parties in Rio Grande do Sul. He suggests the populist - anti-
populist divide was the most important axis of political conflict in the
state.
43. Cammack (1982: 56) dissents from this consensus. He argues
that throughout the Old Republic, policy considerations and economic
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interests were decisive in shaping alliances and divisions within the
state and between the state and the federal government. He bases this
claim on the differential impact of certain policies on different
regional landed interests in Minas Gerais.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE STATE AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION
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Introduction
The new Brazilian regime established after the 964 coup d'etat was
the first "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regime in South America. If the
coup's civilian backers expected the military to deliver to them the
reins of state, they soon learned the officer corps had its own agenda.
The military intended to stabilize the economy, rationalize production,
hold wages and inflation in check, and set Brazil on a path of
capitalist development. The centerpiece of the strategy to accomplish
these aims was to attract private and especially foreign capital
investment to develop industries in such advanced sectors as consumer
durables and capital goods.
The problem with what was initially a liberal state plan was that
the private sector was too weak and capital-poor to take the initiative
to lead this development, and foreign capital needed to be prodded to
assist in developing Brazil. The Brazilian state was forced to assume
an even more significant role in the economy to compensate for the
deficiencies of the private sector than it had performed in the postwar
1
period. After the regime change in 1964, state involvement in the
economy became more pervasive, and the nature of the state's role
changed from that typical of a state in a late developing capitalist
society, subsidizing the private sector by building infrastructure and
providing social support, to one that might be called "state capitalist"
(Baer et al, 1976). The state organized and controlled investment,
launched major new lines of industries and steadily increased its
domination over the private sector of the economy. It also contributed
capital for joint ventures with foreign enterprises, and negotiated
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foreign investment on reasonably favorable terms for Brazil. Its
success in attracting multinational capital to invest in dynamic
manufacturing sectors (in a departure from the old multinational pattern
of investing exclusively in primary sector activities--mining and
agriculture) led Cardoso (1972) and Evans (1979) to label Brazil's
phenomenal growth "dependent development".
Much of the Brazilian 'economic miracle' of the early 1970s was
located in Minas Gerais. The interests of the federal and state
governments, local elites, and foreign and national businessmen
converged around developing the regional economy, particularly industry
in advanced, dynamic sectors. The Brazilian state established major
steel and metalworking plants in Minas in the 1970s, and foreign
investors particularly responded to fiscal incentives offered by the
state when choosing where within Brazil to locate their plants. One
observer, noting the prominent role of the state government, state and
foreign capital, and technocracy in the upper echelons of the state
apparatus, represented Minas' industrialization, in both its economic
and political dimensions, as a "replica" of the larger Brazilian model
of industrialization (Grossi, 1977). For the first time in the century,
Minas no longer lagged behind the major industrial centers of the
country.
One might have anticipated the fundamental transformation of a
predominantly agricultural economy into an industrially-based one would
be accompanied by profound political change inherently threatening to
traditional elites. Yet, it was not. "State capitalist" development
produced different political results than "liberal capitalist"
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development might have. In restructuring patterns of economic ownership
and redrawing the lines between public and private economic activity,
state capitalism produced a distinctive constellation of classes and
class power, enhanced state resources and the political value of state
positions, and offered unanticipated opportunities to extend dominance
for a political elite rooted in the state. The movement of national
resources from agriculture into industry did not lead to a transfer of
power from agrarian to industrial elites because the Minas bourgeoisie
played only a secondary role in local industrialization. Rather, the
position of the state elite was strengthened. The stakes in controlling
the state rose even higher with the growth of popular classes only
loosely attached to the private sector. The modernization of
agriculture evicted peasants, but most were unable to find adequately
compensated work in the private sector of the economy. They would
instead eventually come to depend upon state transfers and other public
sector resources. The proletariat which did form was small and
geographically isolated, diminishing its potential political role.
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Brazilian "State Capitalism"
In 1940, Rudolf Hilferding (1971: 511-512) challenged the thesis
emerging among European Marxists that the Soviet economic system under
Stalin was "state capitalist". In Hilferding's view, the concept of
state capitalism could "scarcely pass the test of serious economic
analysis". Once the state became the owner of all means of production,
he reasoned, the functioning of a capitalist economy was rendered
impossible. "A capitalist economy is governed by the laws of the market
... A state economy eliminates precisely the autonomy of economic laws."
Hilferding's objections notwithstanding, state capitalism as a concept
has gained even wider acceptance today, especially among scholars
puzzling over how to understand the vastly expanded role of the state in
the economies of both developing and developed countries.
Despite, and perhaps because of, its wide usage, "state capitalism"
remains an ill-defined concept (cf. Canak, 1984). O'Connor (1973) in a
chapter entitled "An Anatomy of American State Capitalism", nowhere
defines the term. Similarly, Baer et al (1976) do not attempt to
delineate what state capitalism means. Implicitly, they treat it as a
residual category, conforming neither to Anglo-Saxon [liberal]
capitalism nor to centrally-planned socialism. The problem with this
conception of state capitalism which equates it with a mixed economy is
that patterns of state involvement in the economy as diverse as those
characterizing Bismarckian Germany and Tsarist Russia, the post-war
welfare states of advanced industrial societies, and contemporary Third
World 'revolutions from above' can all be considered "state capitalist".
Indeed, virtually all countries in the modern world display
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characteristics of "state capitalism", thus viewed: this usage of state
capitalism might even better describe the economic systems of most
contemporary countries than "liberal" capitalism and "socialism".
A minimum consensus holds that in state capitalism, the state is
the motor of economic development: it sets basic prices, it contributes
substantially to the domestic product through its capital and current
expenditures; it is the leading financier, controlling savings and
investment; and it establishes productive enterprises in the commanding
heights of the economy. Of these functions, the most salient are the
state's own contribution to investment, its control over crucial
variables that determine private investment decisions, and its network
of productive enterprises in key economic sectors. In principle, a
minimum, quantifiable level of state involvement in these economic
activities could help define state capitalism, as could an indication of
which productive sectors should be under state control. These
specifications alone, however, would not distinguish "state capitalism"
from other forms of capitalist economic organization. While the state
necessarily subsidizes investment and operates its own enterprises in
state capitalist societies, it performs similar roles in certain
advanced industrial societies which are not "state capitalist".
"State capitalism" cannot be understood by purely economic
measures. Its definition must also be framed to incorporate two
political variables: Who is the dominant state elite? How autonomous
is this elite from private sector elites? In free-market or liberal
capitalist economies, state elites with no independent economic interest
serve the interests of a more powerful bourgeoisie: state intervention
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in the economy enhances private profit by socializing the cost of
overhead and by absorbing losses in key service industries. In state
capitalism, in contrast, the state's participation in the economy does
not necessarily complement, and may bring it into conflict with, the
3
private sector (Freeman, 1982; Sorj, 1983). State enterprises attempt
to maximize profit in order to accomplish state, not private objectives;
state elites are not accountable to the bourgeoisie (though this does
not preclude their alliance with other groups or classes). We may
therefore define state capitalism as an economic system broadly
organized according to market principles (although the market is often
contravened in setting prices and wages) in which politically dominant
state elites use the state's control over investment and production to
achieve state-defined economic goals. This conception of state
capitalism is akin to Guimaraes' (1977) notion of "state-dominated
4
capitalism".
The Brazilian economy since 1964 has been organized along state
capitalist lines. Direct state involvement in the economy in Brazil
antedates contemporary "bureaucratic-authoritarianism" and "dependent
development", but the state's many roles in the economy have grown,
eclipsing the private sector, since the change of regime. The Brazilian
state first became a producer when it created the National Steel Company
(1941) and the Rio Doce Valley Mining Company (1942). During Vargas'
second term the state ventured into the business of electrical power,
which had been a bottleneck to industrialization (Evans, 1979: 87-93),
and petroleum (1953). Since the regime change, however, the state's
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holdings have grown steadily. One hundred and eight federal state
enterprises were added to the state sector from 1967 to 1973 (Araijo,
1977: 238). This explosion in state enterprises continued, even after
the "miracle" had been exhausted. In 1983, there were 683 public sector
companies (195 federal, 372 state, and 116 municipal) (Visao, 1983:
431). These enterprises dominated the commanding heights of the
economy. In the 1970s and early 1980s, they consistently topped Visao's
"Who's Who" of the 200 largest non-financial corporations: in 1982, 79
state enterprises controlled three-quarters of the net assets and
accounted for half of the sales in this elite category (Visao, 1983).
The advancing dominance of state firms was visible throughout the
economy. The public enterprise share of net assets of the largest
nonfinancial firms in Brazil rose from 39 percent (of 5113 companies) in
1974 (Baer et al, 1976) to 50.5 percent (of 8480) in 1983. Also in
1983, state enterprises accounted for over half (51.2 percent) of
5
Brazil's financial institutions. These enterprises dominated the
petroleum, transportation and storage, mining, metallurgical (especially
steel), and public utilities sectors for at least a decade (Table III-
1). Only in the case of the petroleum industry has the state's
participation declined: exploration by foreign corporations was
permitted after the oil shocks in order to alleviate Brazil's acute
energy crisis.
Unlike in many advanced industrial societies where governments
subsidize lame ducks to maintain vital services and service industries,
in Brazil state enterprises in both the productive and financial spheres
6
generated surplus, at least until the recession of the 1980s. Prior
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Table III-1
Brazil: The State's Productive Sector, 1974-1983
Sector/Subsector
Mining
State Firms - Percent of Net Assets
1983(1) 1980(2) 1975(3) 1974(4)
62.0
Metallurgy [Metal Products]
(iron and steel)
60.5
61.5
(81.6)
37.8
61
(62.5)
40
Chemicals and Petroleum
(chemicals and petro-
chemicals)
(petroleum)
Transportation and Storage
(railroads)
(storage)
Public Utilities [Services]
50.8
(25.0)
(82.7)
88.9
(100.0)
(75.1)
98.3
58.0
(22.4) 32*
(85.0) 98
89.6
(100.0)
(78.8)
98.5
*Martins does not make plain which subsectors this figure comprises,
and thus we should not necessarily conclude that the state's share of
this sector has declined.
Sources: (1) Visao, 1984; (2) Visao, 1981; (3) L. Martins, 1977,
Appendix: 17-18; (4) Baer et al, 1976; Faucher, 1980.
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62
34
55
89 78
90 88
to 1964, Brazil's state enterprises behaved pretty much as state
enterprises do in 'liberal' capitalist economies. Public sector
pricing, especially in the railway services, electrical energy sector,
and steel industry essentially subsidized the cost of industrial inputs
to the private sector (Mendonna de Barros and Graham, 1978: 8; Faucher,
1980: 16). This practice fueled inflation and drained the national
treasury. Following the coup, a priority and accomplishment of the
stabilization plan was for these enterprises to operate in the black.
They became profitable in absolute terms, by international standards,
and relative to the private sector. Trebat (1981: 49-51) attributes the
profitability of Brazilian state enterprises, especially compared to
their Mexican counterparts, to the fact that Brazilian firms were not
saddled with many "social objectives", and that they were reasonably
unfettered in their price setting. After 1966, they were much more
concerned with accumulating a surplus which could be used to finance
investment spending than Mexican public corporations which generally
subsidized the private sector by running losses on current operations.
The performance of state enterprises compared favorably with
7
private sector firms until the 1980s. Private enterprise was unable to
compete with public sector firms for capital in the stock market, for,
"according to any criteria of an expected rate of return, public
enterprises [were] a more secure and reumnerative portfolio investment
for prospective stock-holders than private firms" (Mendonga de Barros
and Graham, 1978: 14). The situation changed after 1980, when a severe
recession had a more damaging impact on public than private sector firms
(Visao, 1983: 23).
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The influence of state firms, moreover, extends beyond their own
operations. Mendonga de Barros and Graham (1978: 8) point out that as
buyers of capital goods, public enterprises are an important market for
domestic heavy industry. The large capital investments of these firms
can also have a multiplier effect on the entire economy. In 1974,
state-owned enterprises accounted for more than 26 percent of all
investment in the Brazilian economy. When combined with government
investment, the public sector's share of total investment was over 60
percent (Coutinho and Reichstul, 1977: 63).
The state also dominates financial markets. For at least a decade,
state financial institutions have been by far the most important source
of investment capital for the private sector: in 1974, the state
supplied 72.2 percent of all investment loans to private borrowers, and
43.5 percent of working capital loans (Cipolla, 1977: 100); in 1983,
71.6 percent of all loans conceded by Brazil's development and
investment banks were made by the official federal and state government
development banks (and one public investment bank) (calculated from
Visao, 1984: 386). The actual percentage of investment originating from
within the state is even higher, for these figures do not include the
investments of the National Housing Bank (BNH) targeted to urban
8
development and housing. In 1980, nearly half of housing loans
originated in the BNH; some were authorized directly, the rest through
other financial institutions. All private commercial housing bank loans
were from credit lines made available by the National Housing Bank
(IBGE, 1983: 902).
The metamorphosis in the state's role in the economy produced a
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marked expansion in state resources: during the 1960s and 1970s, state
revenues and expenditure rose in real terms, on a per capita basis, and
in relation to the gross product. General government expenditures
(including state and municipal governments, but excluding state
enterprises) as a percent of GDP rose from less than 20 percent in 1949
(Baer et al, 1976: 73) to approximately 24 percent in the 1970s (IBGE,
9
1983: 948, 956). In comparative terms, this rate has been higher over
the period of the past two decades as a whole than that of the other
major economies in Latin America. The rise in federal state spending
was made possible by the sharp increase in the state's revenue base.
Between 1965 and 1969, the number of federal income taxpayers rose from
400,000 to 1.5 million (FJP, n.d., I: II-2). Revenue was also enhanced
by indexing tax payments in arrears. The gross tax burden (27 percent
in 1973 and 28 percent in 1981) is the highest in Latin America, as was
the public sector's gross capital formation until it was surpassed by
Mexico's after 1975 (Baer et al, 1976: 73; FitzGerald, 1979: 214; BID,
1984: 231, 262, 273, 289, 357, 391). While the central government was
the principal beneficiary of increased state revenues, this visible
increase in spending extended to other branches of government: the
states of Brazil taken as a whole saw their shares of gross product rise
on average nearly 10 percent per year from 1970 to 1976 (FJP, n.d., I:
IV-14).
The private sector felt constrained by the state's control of the
economy. The business magazine, Visao (1981: 411; 1983: 432-33),
complained for several years that despite the government's declared
commitment to privatizing state firms, the growth in the number of
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public enterprises continued (only in 1984 did the number of state
enterprises level off), and that this expansion left little room for
private enterprise:
According to our figures, in terms of net assets,
more than half the Brazilian economy belongs to the
government. On the monetary side, government
financial institutions represent more than 50% of
the assets of all banks and intermediary financial
institutions in the country. If, in addition to the
government as entrepreneur, we consider the other
forms of state intervention in economic activity,
such as price controls, state monopolies and favors,
interference in capital markets, excessive taxation,
etc., we come to the somber -- but true --
conclusion that little space is left for private
enterprise in the Brazilian economy (1983: 432).
The Industrialization of Minas Gerais: State and Bourgeoisie
Most studies upon which our understanding of the Brazilian
bourgeoisie and its relationship to the state are based have focused
on Sao Paulo, the site of the country's most advanced industry. In
perhaps the best known work on this subject, Evans (1979) found the
predominantly Sao Paulo-based Brazilian bourgeoisie to be an active
partner in a triple alliance of state, foreign, and national capital
primarily responsible for Brazil's development in the 1970s. Its "most
surprising and impressive" strength was perhaps abetted by its long
establishment: the Paulista entrepreneurial class came into existence
10
prior to World War I (Cardoso, 1965), and was fully formed by 1945.
In Minas Gerais, where the local bourgeoisie began from a less
established position and the state's relative role in economic
development was more pervasive, native industrialists were weak,
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dependent on the state, and marginal to industrialization.
In the early 1960s, private Minas capital was concentrated in the
"traditional" industrial sector, a plethora of small-scale, family-run
production units with outmoded managerial practices; low growth rates,
low levels of technology, productivity, and efficiency; obsolete
equipment; and less than optimal plant locations (BDMG, 1968, I: 23,
180-83; Campolina Diniz, 1978). In contrast, local capital in the
"dynamic" industrial sector, which accounted almost exclusively for the
industrial growth registered in Minas in the 1950s and 1960s, was
limited to a few non-metallic minerals and construction industries, in a
11
sector otherwise dominated by state and foreign capital. In 1965,
economic groups with headquarters in Minas Gerais were found by Queiroz
(1965) and Martins (1965) to be practically non-existent. Of 83 groups
(out of an estimated universe of 221) whose capital assets ranged from
one to four billion cruzeiros, 54 were owned by nationals, and of these
54, only two were headquartered in Minas (Martins, 1965: 85). Of those
55 groups whose capital assets exceeded four billion cruzeiros, five had
their decision-making centers in Minas, but at least two were foreign
12
(Queiroz, 1965: 65). Locally-owned groups' principal activity was not
manufacturing industry: one group was predominantly involved in
banking, and the other in the export-import business.
The rudimentary character of Minas industrialists was brought to
light in an industrial survey of firm size, wages and salaries, and
productivity in five Brazilian states based on 1960 census returns
conducted by the Minas Gerais Development Bank (BDMG) (Lamounier, n.d.).
Of the five states--Guanabara, Sao Paulo, Minas, Rio Grande do Sul, and
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Bahia--Minas' composite score on 13 indicators of entrepreneurial
structure was fourth, and the gap dividing first and second ranked
Guanabara and Sao Paulo from the other three states was substantial
13
(Table III-2). In all major indicators, Minas fell far behind the
country's most advanced regions. Its average firm size was one-third
that of Guanabara's, and its average wages and salaries two-thirds the
level paid in the city of Rio. The survey's author flagged wages and
salaries as an important measure of industrial development; more
advanced industries tended to pay their employees better salaries. Also
significant was the percentage of stock-issuing companies (number 6);
here, too, Minas lagged far behind Rio and Sao Paulo. In labor
productivity (number 8), it ranked last. The only indicator in which
Minas was competitive, the percentage of blue collar workers in the
14
total industrial labor force, should have been omitted. Only Bahia, a
relatively backward northeastern state, ranked lower.
Studies of state industry conducted by the Minas Gerais Development
Bank in the early to mid 1960s criticized the small scale, low wage
levels, and low capital and labor productivity of Minas industrial
establishments. They especially found fault with the low rate of
private investment in productive sectors, and the persistence of family-
owned ("traditional") enterprises as the primary organizational form in
local industry. The technocrats who wrote these studies largely blamed
local entrepreneurs, whom they perceived to be incompetent or
uninterested in industrialization, for the failure of Minas to
industrialize in the preceding decades. In 1968, in the Diagn6stico da
15
Economia Mineira (BDMG, 1968, I: 42-43), the technocrats charged:
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Table III-2
Indicators of Entrepreneurial Structure in Five
Industrial Sector, 1960
Brazilian States'
Indicators Guanabara Sao Paulo R.G. Sul Minas Bahia
1 33.15 22.93 10.66 11.37 8.40
2 26.31 18.89 9.39 10.05 6.53
3 99.00 94.00 70.00 62.00 56.00
4 5,824.00 5,649.00 1,947.00 2,208.00 1,440.00
5 10,547.00 8,327.00 3,033.00 2,723.00 2,254.00
6 74% 50% 42% 29% 11%
7 3.683 3.123 3.466 2.624 2.607
8 318.00 363.00 284.00 239.00 268.00
9 400.00 437.00 322.00 270.00 345.00
10 1,201.00 1,153.00 628.00 326.00 196.00
11 2,101.00 1,610.00 484.00 352.00 163.00
12 1.7 1.3 0.7 1.0 0.8
13 79.0% 83.0% 88.1% 88.3% 77.0%
Key to Indicators:
1. Average number of persons employed per establishment.
2. Average number of blue collar workers per establishment.
3. Salaries and wages paid during 1959 - average per person employed -
in new cruzeiros.
4. Applied capital per establishment - in new cruzeiros.
5. Value of industrial transformation during 1959 - average per
establishment.
6. Establishments organized as stock-issuing companies (corporations,
limited companies, or partnerships) - percent of all establishments.
7. Value of production during 1959 by applied capital (capital
productivity).
8. Value of industrial transformation during 1959, by personnel
employed (labor productivity) - in new cruzeiros.
9. Value of industrial transformation during 1959, by blue collar
workers employed.
10. Average value by establishment of inventory of products as of
12/31/59 - in new cruzeiros.
11. Average value by establishment of inventory of inputs as of 12/31/59
- in new cruzeiros.
12. Input inventory over product inventory.
13. Percentage of blue collar workers in total industrial labor force.
Source: Lamounier, n.d.: 22.
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Their [the Minas entrepreneurs'] direct contribution
in terms of industrial investments ... was
appreciably low. ... It seems safe to conclude that
private investment in the industrial sector grew at
an unsatisfactory rate, while capital applied in
sectors deemed unproductive experienced a
considerable increase. ... It seems plausible to
characterize as conservative, or better, as
undynamic, the participation of the Minas
entrepreneurial class as an agent of the economic
development process, as indicated by the persistence
of traditional organizational forms (family
enterprises) and the maintenance of outdated
managerial practices. ... The conduct of the
entrepreneurial sector, in sum, is not characterized
by the degree of aggressiveness typical of the so-
called "entrepreneurial spirit", which, in other
contexts, has characterized the modernizing behavior
of the entrepreneurial elite.
This assessment was not entirely accurate. Local businessmen were
not uninterested in industrialization. For years, they had urged the
state to assist in establishing basic industry in the region. In the
early 1960s, the Minas Gerais Federation of Industries (FIEMG) urged the
creation of a state development bank to be patterned after the federal
entity, the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico (BNDE) (founded
in the 1950s), to provide long-term finance capital for industrial
projects. Their clamor brought about the establishment in 1963 of a
state development bank in Minas, the BDMG, which narrowed the shortfall
16
in available financing for industry. Minas entrepreneurs were
similarly enthusiastic about the organization of a network of productive
sector state enterprises to equip the industrial sector with valuable
infrastructure, exploit the state's natural wealth, and otherwise
17
contribute to industrial development. One of the first state
enterprises was CEMIG, the state electric company, which figured
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prominently in then governor Juscelino Kubitschek's priority program to
furnish "energy and transportation" in the early 1950s. Shortly
thereafter, public and mixed enterprises sprang up in sectors which were
at that time defined outside the sphere of public competence. METAMIG
was created to foster industrial projects in the mining and metals
transforming industries, an important sector given the resource base of
Minas. In the same vein, to stop the tide of what Mineiros perceived to
be the export of their raw materials to Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo for
processing, regional meat-processing plants were introduced in the North
and Northeast of Minas to handle native production of beef and pork. As
one Minas observer (Dias, 1968/1969: 122-123) wrote:
Wasn't there strong pressure from the producer
classes in the constitution of, for example,
FRIMISA, METAMIG, AOMINAS, and USIMINAS? In the
latter case, this influence is evident. The initial
idea for the constitution of this firm arose from
the entrepreneurs' associations. Of course USIMINAS
does not properly represent a state [of Minas] mixed
enterprise, as the participation of BNDE is greater
than that of the government of Minas (which entered
initially with approximately 20 percent of the
shares) but the organization of this company
depended in large part on state legislation. In the
other cases mentioned above, there was also
initiative within the [business] interest
associations. The idea of constructing a steel
factory in the Paraopeba Valley echoed almost like a
refrain--such was its constancy--in the meetings of
Minas entrepreneurs. The network of meat processing
plants was, in turn, suppported by the same
entrepreneurs.
But this only led state technocrats to accuse Minas entrepreneurs of
"demanding and not participating" (BDMG, 1968, I: 42), encouraging the
state to undertake the task of industrialization on its behalf. In
their view, local entrepreneurs had, by their inability to carry out a
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project for industrialization, in effect forfeited their claim to lead
this process.
Beginning in the mid 1960s, a pro-industrial state economic policy
was put into place to speed economic development. The state took the
lead in Minas' industrialization by creating several agencies to
facilitate development and promoting technocrats within them to
responsible positions (L. Andrade, 1980); enacting fiscal and other
incentives for private investors; and providing directly a majority of
investment and financial capital. Among the more prominent of the new
state agencies were the Institute for Industrial Development (INDI),
created in 1969 to accelerate the state's economic growth, and the
Industrial Districts Company (CDI), created in 1971 to provide basic
infrastructure necessary for industrial plants. INDI aggressively
courted investors throughout the developed world, making available
market and sectoral studies to tempt them to set up operations in Minas
Gerais (Grossi, 1977; Suzzi, 1980). The CDI cleared land and supplied
water and sewerage facilities at state expense in order to reduce the
cost of new industrial investment and enhance the attractiveness of
various sites throughout the state for potential investors.
Substantial fiscal incentives guaranteed Minas' success in inducing
private capital to invest in the state. An attractive fiscal incentives
law was enacted in 1969 which returned to investors a tax rebate of 25.6
percent of the federally-levied but state-collected sales tax (ICM).
Two hundred and seventy-eight firms took advantage of this particular
incentive before the federal government, under pressure from Paulista
constituents who were losing to their northern neighbors, outlawed such
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manipulation of the ICM in 1975. Minas replaced this incentive with
yet another attractive one, a Fund for the Support of Industrialization,
which provided working capital loans free of interest and monetary
correction to companies who invested in new manufacturing projects or in
19
a 50 percent or greater expansion of their physical volume. Also, all
companies based in an industrial district established by the Industrial
Districts Company were exempted from municipal real estate taxes for a
period of ten years (INDI, 1978: 129-133). Finally, the state also
granted import credits for a broad range of industrial inputs to
investors in heavy industry.
Not only did the Minas state government create a favorable climate
for investment, but public capital also constituted the lion's share of
new industrial investment--64 percent in the boom years from 1970 to
1977. The proportion of state investment is bloated by two giant steel
projects, Agominas and Usiminas, which together account for 49 of the
20
57 billion cruzeiros the state invested in this period, but its key
role in the industrial economy should nevertheless not be understated:
SEPLAN has calculated that federal public investments were responsible
for 33 percent of the Minas manufacturing gross internal product from
1970 to 1977 (SEPLAN, 1978, 8: 82). The state participated directly and
indirectly in capital investments of major industrial projects. The
best known, and perhaps largest, was FIAT. The Italian automobile
manufacturing giant was enticed to install a plant in Betim, a municipio
bordering Belo Horizonte, marking the first time in Brazil that an
automobile factory had located outside of Sao Paulo. FIAT maintained
majority control in an industrial project in which the state of Minas
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provided 44 percent of the firm's capital. The importance of
investments such as these extended beyond the principal project to the
supporting industries they spawned.
State capital was augmented by foreign and non-Minas private
capital. Multinational firms financed ninety-two projects, 70 of which
represented new industries, and 22 the expansion and/or modernization of
existing plants. Foreign capital, concentrated mainly in the capital
and consumer durables sector, represented 20 percent of the investments
of the 1970s (Table III-3). In 1976, after many of these investments
would have come on line, two-thirds of the net assets of the 1985
existing principal industrial corporations in the state were foreign-
and state-owned (Table III-4).
This strategy was quite successful in propelling industrial growth.
Between 1960 and 1977, Minas Gerais underwent a metamorphosis from an
agrarian state to one in full industrialization. In 1960, the agrarian
economy contributed one-half of the state's income (BDMG, 1968, I: 140),
and employed three out of every five Mineiros (SEPLAN, 1978, 7, I: 171).
From that date to 1977, annual industrial growth rates averaged 11
percent and the manufacturing sector bettered its share of the Minas
gross internal product 10 percentage points and nearly doubled its
payroll. By far the most striking gains were achieved during the 1970s,
when the industry-wide average growth rate was 16.5 percent per annum,
and non-traditional industries scored especially impressive growth:
capital goods and consumer durables expanded by more than 27 percent per
year, and chemicals, by 34 percent (SEPLAN, 1978, 8: 5). Minas also
outperformed all other Brazilian states but Sao Paulo in industrial
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Table III-3
Minas Gerais: Industrial Investments, 1970-1977
(in thousands of 1975 cruzeiros)
Private
National (%) Foreign (x) State (%) Total
Non-Durable
Consumer
Goods 4,824,540 76 1,540,608 24 --- - 6,365,148
Intermediate
Goods 8,836,703 12 9,949,036 13 55,922,987 75 74,708,727
Capital Goods
and Consumer
Durables 828,421 10 6,647,434 80 816,501 10 8,292,356
TOTAL 14,551,592 17 18,137,078 20 56,739,488 64 89,428,159
*Only projects in operation or with installation begun by 12/31/77.
Source: SEPLAN, 1978, 8: 23, 97.
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Table III-4
Distribution by Capital of the Principal
Industrial Corporations of Minas Gerais, 1976*
(in percent)
Net Assets
National
Sectors Private Public Foreign
Non-Durable Consumer Goods 90.9 4.4 4.7
Food 82.0 10.0 8.0
Beverages 76.0 - 24.0
Tobacco - - -
Textiles 100.0 -
Clothing and Shoes 100.0 -
Woodworking - -
Furniture 100.0 -
Furs, Skins, and Related 100.0 -
Printing - - -
Intermediate Goods 21.7 37.0 41.3
Paper 9.3 90.7 -
Rubber - - -
Chemicals 32.0 32.6 35.4
Non-Metallic Minerals 71.9 - 28.1
Metallurgy 14.1 40.1 45.8
Capital and Durable Consumer Goods 39.7 24.2 36.1
Machinery 12.4 67.6 20.0
Electrical and Communica-
tions Material 17.6 - 82.4
Transportation Material 100.0 -
Various
TOTAL 35.1 30.4 34.5
*The 185 corporations whose assets have bean compiled in this list
form part of a larger study of the 500 largest corporations with
headquarters in Minas conducted by the Superintendency of Statistics and
Information, a division of the Minas Gerais Secretariat of Planning.
These 185 represent the total of manufacturing industries. I have
chosen to represent only the net assets of the firms. By the standard
of liquid fixed investment, the percentages of public enterprises are
higher, and national and foreign private are lower. By that measure,
the distribution of capital was 22.7 percent national private, 57.2
percent state, and 20.1 percent foreign.
Source: SEPLAN, 1978, 8: 95.
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investment. Its investment rate (the ratio of liquid investment to
industrial product) was nearly 50 percent, twice the national rate in
the same period (SEPLAN, 1978, 8: 54). In fact, the state captured
fully one-quarter of the value of all fixed investment in Brazil for the
22
years 1971 through 1977 (SEPLAN, 1978, 8: 47). Minas specialized in
intermediate goods. In 1982, the state produced 40 percent of Brazil's
steel (IBGE, 1984: 202).
"Private national" capital constituted 17 percent of industrial
investment, but this category tells us little about the role played by
local Minas capital. A large part of the private national capital
component is accounted for by non-Minas industrialists, principally from
the state of Sao Paulo. Many firms relocated or set up new operations
in Minas because industrial overcongestion in the environs of Sao Paulo
had restricted opportunities for physical plant expansion. The fiscal
incentives offered by the state of Minas induced investors who could
otherwise have transferred operations elsewhere in the state of Sao
Paulo to settle instead on the South of Minas. A survey of all
investments in the South of Minas and existing plant expansion and/or
modernization contracted up to 1975 which benefited from fiscal
incentives shows a high proportion of Paulista capital in the industries
in this region. Of 21 national firms for which data were available, at
23
least 11 were known to be headquartered in Sao Paulo.
While the private national capital component of all industrial
investments is not available in disaggregated form, this type of
breakdown does exist for the industrial projects assisted by the state's
Institute for Industrial Development (INDI), about nine-tenths of all
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investments in industry during the 1970s. Table III-5 presents data
on projects divided according to controlling capital, differentiating
25
private national capital from local, Minas capital. Unfortunately,
the percentage distribution by capital ownership of INDI-assisted
projects and those recorded in the Secretariat of Planning is not
comparable because of the omission of the Aominas project from the INDI
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data, making it impossible to arrive at a precise figure for Minas
private capital. We may confidently estimate, however, that the Mineirc
component of private national investment is far lower than the 16.3
percent of total industrial investment from 1970 to 1977 (Table III-3).
If the (2:1) ratio of national to Mineiro capital in the INDI figures is
used as a guideline, the share of local capital could be as low as five
percent.
The economic weakness of the local industrialists situated them
poorly to capitalize on the incentives offered and opportunities
presented by the state's industrialization drive. Private entrepreneurs
in Minas were unable to marshall the capital required to launch non-
traditional enterprises, even with state fiscal incentives, state
development bank financing, and foreign technology. Of those capital
goods and consumer durables industries installed after 1970, only one,
short-lived, micro-electronics firm, Transit, was the venture of local
27
Minas entrepreneurs. The Minas bourgeoisie was also apparently unable
to form joint ventures with state and foreign capital. Evans (1979:
281) has drawn attention to the potential importance for local firms to
form partnerships with multinationals and the state, judging the ability
to build alliances to be at least as, perhaps more, significant than
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Table III-5
INDI-Assisted Projects:
Distribution by Controlling Capital, 1980
Percent of Number of Percent of
Number Investment New Jobs New Jobs
National 145 30.0 39,836 33.0
Mineiros 204 15.8 32,464 26.9
Foreign 90 45.7 45,465 37.7
State 5 8.5 2,903 2.4
Source: INDI, 1980.
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entrepreneurship. Certain Sao Paulo based groups--Matarazzo and
Antunes, for example--were able through these alliances to build
extremely powerful positions, gaining "benefits quite out of proportion
to their contribution of capital or technology." In Minas, this did not
happen. Local entrepreneurs did not, for example, participate in the
spate of projects which sprang up around FIAT. Among the many
supporting industries in the metals, plastics and other sectors that the
establishment of an auto industry in Minas generated were joint ventures
between foreign firms and the state government, such as the FMB foundry
in Betim and Forjas Acesita in Santa Luzia; fully foreign firms, such as
Formin of Italy in Sete Lagoas; and Paulista firms such as Commander and
28
Plisticos Mueller in Contagem. Apparently, local capital was unable
to find a niche in Minas' industrialization as international and non-
Minas private capital had. Unlike the entrepreneurs studied by Evans
who aggressively bargained their way into joint ventures with foreign
and state capital, Minas entrepreneurs lacked either the interest or the
leverage with which to negotiate entry into lucrative projects.
They were also unable to purchase already operating establishments
from the state on terms intended to facilitate the transfer of
controlling stock to the private sector. The Brazilian state in 1981
announced its intention to sell public enterprises as part of a
"debureaucratization" and "destatization" campaign. Before the first
list of firms for sale was published, in Rio and Sao Paulo, hopeful
Carioca and Paulista private sector entrepreneurs and their national
leaders contemplated aloud which firms within their respective sectors
they might wish to purchase (Estado de Minas, 7/17/81: 11). News of the
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policy was received differently in Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul,
the state with the most comparable level of industrialization to Minas.
In both, representatives of private sector industry responded
ambiguously. First they congratulated the state in principle on
reversing the "dangerous trend toward statization", but then protested
the timing of the proposed sales -- arguing economic recession and high
interest rates would make it impossible for them to buy the firms.
Instead, they feared, industries which in many cases were of national
29
interest would fall into foreign hands. The Minas reaction can be
summed up by the technocrat Paulo Haddad, then state secretary of
planning, in his defense of state enterprises: "Better to statify than
to denationalize (Estado de Minas, 9/13/81: El)."
The hesitancy of Minas entrepreneurs was understandable. Had
current interest rates been lower and foreign investors uninterested,
native Mineiros still could not have assumed ownership of state
enterprises. They would have been unable to outbid their own countrymen
on the open market. Earlier that year in a sale which attracted little
attention, the state of Minas, in a partial divestiture of its firm,
Hidrominas, made available for private sector purchase the mineral water
rights of various towns (Cambuquira, Araxa, Caxamb). The highest and
winning offer was entered by Supergasbras, a Rio-based economic group
(Estado de Minas, 2/22/81).
The State and the Popular Sectors
State capitalist development in Minas Gerais in the 1960s and 1970s
restructured the labor market. It rearranged the lower end of the class
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scale in a manner different from that predicted by theories of
industrialization based on the experiences of the first industrializers.
Economic development is conventionally expected to diminish the economic
and political roles of the peasantry and enhance those of an urban,
industrial working class or proletariat. In Minas Gerais, state-
sponsored agricultural modernization produced half this equation: it
reduced the size of the peasantry, and substantially increased the
urban population. Yet, the process of economic development remained
incomplete. Private industry proved incapable of absorbing new, migrant
labor, and entry into the ranks of the industrial proletariat was
limited. Instead, many former, full-time agricultural workers who
migrated to urban areas divided their time between urban employment and
temporary, seasonal agricultural labor. Others, who became permanent
urban dwellers, on the other hand, fared little better; they were for
the most part confined to temporary, unskilled, and poorly remunerated
jobs in the construction and service sectors.
The Modernization of Agriculture. State-supplied capital
investment revolutionized traditional agriculture in Brazil in the 1960s
and 1970s. Fiscal incentives attracted private industrial, financial,
and commercial capital to agricultural production, supplementing direct
state financing. The National Credit System created in 1965 made
capital available to rural enterprises at interest rates below the
inflation rate. In 1970, interest rates on government agricultural
loans were 11.3 percent, and the rate of inflation 19.3 percent; a
decade later, average agricultural interest rates of 20 percent were far
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below official inflation rates of 110 percent. This cheap capital was
also widely available. In 1969, the government allocated 6.5 billion
cruzeiros to finance agriculture and livestock raising; 10 years later,
that sum was increased to 33 billion cruzeiro; in constant terms.
Overall, from 1971 to 1977, available rural credit rose by 1900 percent
(Spindel, 1983: 10-11). Easy access to capital made possible the
widespread introduction of machinery, fertilizers, and pesticides into
Brazilian agriculture. From 1960 to 1970, the number of tractors in use
rose from a ratio of one tractor for every 468 hectares under
cultivation to one per every 217 hectares (Silva e Gasques, 1982, cited
in Spindel, 1983: 11). Brazil also registered one of the highest rates
of increase in the consumption of fertilizers in the world, from 221,000
tons in 1959 to 2,361,000 tons in 1976, and its consumption of
pesticides rose from 16,193 tons in 1964 to 101,057 in 1974.
The modernization of agriculture also entailed a major production
shift from traditional cash and subsistence crops -- coffee, corn,
beans, and rice -- to livestock raising and dairy production, crops for
export, and products for domestic food-processing (soy, cotton, sesame,
cotton), and other industries (e.g. sugar cane for alcohol) (Sorj, 1980:
115; IBGE, 1977: 409; Spindel, 1983: 13). In Minas, the most pronounced
trend in land use was toward livestock raising and dairy production;
land devoted to pasturage increased from 21,904,384 hectares in 1960 to
30,168,218 in 1980, an increase of nearly 40 percent (Table III-6). In
the same period, cultivated land declined by slightly less than one-
third. The most striking instance of cutting back on traditional crops
was coffee: the amount of land used for coffee growing fell by two-
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Table III-6
Minas Gerais Agrarian Land Use, 1960-1980
1960 1980 Percent Change
Dairy and Live-
stock
Farms: 122,291 238,033 +94.6
Land(has.) 21,904,384 30,168,218
% of total
land
Crops
Coffee(land) 798,967
Total culti-
vated land 15,142,214
265,378(1970)
2,176,259(1980)
12,220,761
Sources: IBGE, 1977: 401, 435; IBGE, 1980a: 20, 26.
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57.1
+37.7
72.6
-66.7
+720.0
-19.3
thirds in the 1960s, but then rebounded sharply when the international
price rose in the 1970s.
These changes in traditional agriculture reduced substantially the
agricultural labor force. Mechanization made many workers redundant,
and the conversion of cultivated land to pasture lowered the demand for
rural labor since animal husbandry was far less labor intensive than
30
crop tillage. In Sao Paulo, the state in which agriculture is the
most advanced, the index of agricultural production rose from 100 in
1948 to 224 in 1980, while the agrarian employment index fell from 100
to 25 (Spindel, 1983: 24). In Minas, from 1960 to 1977 the number of
persons employed in agriculture declined steadily from 1.8 to 1.5
million, or from 60.4 percent of the work force to 39.1 percent (SEPLAN,
31
1978, 7, I: 171).
The nature of economic change in the countryside also precipitated
a decline in the number of workers employed on a permanent basis both in
absolute terms and in relation to temporary workers. While an important
trend in agriculture throughout southeastern Brazil (IBGE, 1977), the
process of conversion to temporary labor appears to be more advanced in
Minas Gerais than in many other Brazilian states. By one estimate,
temporary rural workers in Minas Gerais in 1972 represented 72 percent
of the rural work force; only Goias (75%) had proportionally more, and
other states with significant numbers of temporary agricultural
laborers, So Paulo (58%), Parant (49%), and Pernambuco (47%), all had
substantially less (Gomes Silva and Rodrigues, 1982, cited in Spindel,
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1983: 7). According to another estimate, the number of temporary
workers exceeded in 1970 the number of permanent workers by 52.7 percent
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in Minas Gerais as opposed to 25.2 percent in Sao Paulo (IBGE, 1977:
409). Crop conversion played a small part in this change. Cane, soy,
and fruits (especially oranges) require substantially more workers
during the harvest than during other stages of production; throughout
Brazil, the area cultivated with these crops grew by 100 percent
(Spindel, 1983: 13). A more significant economic factor swelling the
ranks of temporary laborers was the subdivision and proliferation of
minifundia. Minifundistas, owners of bare subsistence plots, hire
themselves out as day laborers on larger farms to supplement their
meager earnings (Sorj, 1980: 130). The number of minifundia, especially
at the lower end of the scale, rose sharply in Minas Gerais in the 1960s
and 1970s (Table III-7). Farms of less than five hectares tripled from
25,533 in 1950 to 74,511 in 1980, and increased one and a half times as
a percent of all farms.
A second, political, factor which was crucial in prompting a shift
from the use of permanent to temporary labor was the passage of the
Rural Worker Statute (Estatuto do Trabalhador Rural) in 1963 and the
Land Statute (Estatuto da Terra) in 1964. The first extended labor
rights to rural workers, the second guaranteed at least some security of
land tenure (Martinez-Alier and Boito Junior, 1978: 294). While
legislation had been on the books since 1943 granting rural workers such
labor rights as a minimum wage, annual paid holidays, and compensation
if fired for "unjust causes", this coverage afforded little real
protection, since the government created no means for its enforcement.
Moreover, since rural unions were illegal in this period, there were no
channels through which workers could articulate grievances. The
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Table III-7
Minas Gerais: Farm Size, 1950-1980
1950 1960 1980
Farm Size --------------------------------------------------------
(in hectares) # % % # % % # %
Farms Land Farms Land Farms Land
Less than 1 2,025 .8 -- 4,437 1.2 -- 8,631 1.8 --
1 - 2 4,068 1.5 -- 8,819 2.4 -- 12,767 2.7 --
2 - 5 19,440 7.3 .2 39,726 10.7 .4 53,113 11.1 .4
5 - 10 26,108 9.8 .6 47,875 12.9 1.0 63,293 13.2 1.0
10 - 100 149,130 56.1 16.0 199,658 53.7 19.6 252,353 52.5 19.9
100 - 1000 59,776 22.5 44.7 66,500 17.9 46.7 83,357 17.3 47.0
1000 - 10000 4,989 1.9 29.7 4,727 1.3 26.3 5,260 1.1 23.6
10000+ 120 -- 8.6 100 -- 5.9 173 .03 8.1
no data 3 -- 17 -- 1,684 .4 --
Total 265,559 371,859 480,631
Source: IBGE, 1980a: 2-4.
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Estatuto do Trabalhador Rural redressed the shortcomings of the earlier
legislation, introducing a battery of laws which governed such aspects
of work as the length of the work day and the work of women and minors,
extended social security to the countryside through the creation of
FUNRURAL (Fundo de Assistencia e Previdencia ao Trabalhador Rural), and
established an arbitration council to hear cases of workers' grievances
(Spindel, 1983: 14-15). The Statutes' aims were to provide permanent
workers residing on rural estates with the same benefits that their
urban counterparts enjoyed. Their effect, however, was quite different.
Estate owners responded to rural labor legislation by expelling
resident agricultural workers to avoid their obligations as employers,
and rehiring those same workers on a temporary basis (Sorj, 1980: 127).
Employers and employees in various regions of the state of Sao Paulo
confirmed the promulgation of the Rural Worker Statute had a significant
impact on the steep rise in the number of temporary rural workers
33
(Spindel, 1983: 15-16). Employers cited the Statute as a factor
impelling them to change over to temporary labor, not so much for the
economic costs associated with permanent employees--minimum wage, 13th
month salary, paid holidays--as for the advantages this Statute gave
workers in labor disputes. Rural workers won the majority of court
cases brought against their patrons, for which they were awarded
sizeable indemnization (Spindel, 1983: 16). This two-tiered labor
market structure was formalized in 1973. Acknowledging that temporary
workers had no de facto rights, new legislation formally withdrew legal
recognition of rural workers who were not regular, permanent employees
of a single estate.
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The decline in permanent employment was accompanied by the passing
of traditional production relations in the Minas countryside and
throughout most of southeastern Brazil. Sharecropping, for instance,
once the prevalent form of labor in Minas agriculture, began to
disappear. In 1960, there were 238,248 sharecroppers in Minas Gerais
working on 54,427 farms. In 1970, that number had plummeted to 123,182
sharecroppers on 11,209 farms, a decline of 79.4 percent in the number
of establishments based on sharecropping and an 82.5 percent drop in the
number of persons employed under this system (IBGE, 1977: 408). This
reduction has been attributed to the contraction of coffee and other
traditional crops cultivated predominantly by sharecroppers (IBGE, 1977:
407-408), as well as to the relative abundance of labor, and the ease
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with which it could be contracted (IBGE, 1977: 411).
In the place of traditional labor institutions, such as
35
sharecropping and renting, new relations of production have emerged in
the countryside based on contracted, wage labor. The most important
group of temporary workers are the "boias-frias", so-called for the cold
lunches which these workers carry to work in the fields. Unlike
minifundistas, who live on their own farms, and "itinerants", casual
laborers under contract to a foreman who live on and move from one
fazenda to another (thus circumventing the Rural Labor Statute), the
"b6ias-frias" typically live on the outskirts of cities, and commute to
the fields where they are employed on a contract basis as day laborers
(Sorj, 1980: 125; Spindel, 1983: 1, 6, 21-22). "Boias-frias" journey as
much as 20 to 50 kilometers (12.5 to 31.25 miles) to work, and, during
peak periods (the harvest), employers recruit workers from as far away
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as 80 to 100 kilometers (50 to 62.5 miles) (Spindel, 1983: 20).
Official accounts of the plight of the "boias-frias" emphasize their job
insecurity; they are to all intents and purposes unemployed for a period
of from 90 to 100 days between harvests. During this time they must eke
out a living in the informal urban sector, usually as street vendors,
but also in various menial jobs (IBGE, 1977: 409, 412-413).
Changing labor relations in the countryside coupled with an overall
contraction in the rural labor force diminished the size of a peasant
class that owed its survival to landlords, through reducing the
potential for rural elites to dominate this class politically. Sorj
(1980: 132) saw this transformation of labor relations in southeastern
agriculture as the harbinger of new political possibilities in the
countryside:
It is difficult to have a precise idea of the nature
and pace of the decomposition of traditional
structures of domination in the countryside. The
decline of insulated relations of production
(sharecropping, renting, and, to a certain extent,
permanent wage labor), the rise of temporary wage
labor and squatters, the growing importance of
formal credit and the lessening of informal credit,
an increasing political centralization, and a
growing mass communication network together with
permanent contact with the urban world, are, without
doubt, affecting the structure of traditional
domination, eroding paternalistic and clientelistic
structures of social control.
While Sorj is undoubtedly correct in claiming that the traditional
systems of labor relations in the countryside have broken down, his
conclusion is a premature inference. The disappearance of traditional
domination and the escape from clientelistic politics of both those
workers who left agriculture and those who remained cannot be asserted,
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but depends critically on the alternatives that were available to them,
especially for the many who migrated, the structure of the labor market
and labor relations in the cities.
Urbanization without Industrialization. The exodus from
agriculture contributed to Minas Gerais' convulsive population
migrations of the 1960s and 1970s. In 1940, 25 percent of the
population resided in cities, a figure which did not increase
substantially for two decades. Until 1960, the rural population grew in
absolute terms but declined as a percent of total population from three-
quarters in 1940 to three-fifths in 1960. After this date, the momentum
shifted toward the cities. Minas' urban population outnumbered the
rural after 1970, and by 1980, comprised two-thirds of the total
population (Table III-8). Over these two decades, the rural population
fell by one million inhabitants, while five million more Mineiros
resided in cities in 1980 than in 1960. Although official figures tend
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to overstate the urban population, the process of urbanization was
nonetheless intense, dramatized by the finding of the 1980 population
census that 364 predominantly rural municipalities of the state's 722
had fewer residents than in 1970 (Estado de Minas, 2/1/81: 7), and 41
cities accounted for 90 percent of the state's population growth between
1970 and 1980 (SEPLAN, 1981: 13). By and large, these high growth
cities were those attracting new industry. Yet, the new capital goods
and consumer durables industries established by state, foreign, and
Paulista industry, as well as the decline of traditional industries and
the rise of labor-saving plant modernizations, limited new industrial
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Table III-8
Minas Gerais: Population, 1940-1980
Year Urban Rural Total
Number (%) Number (%) Number (%)
1940 1,693,658 25.0 5,069,710 75.0 6,763,368 100
1950 2,322,915 29.9 5,459,273 70.2 7,782,188 100
1960 3,825,249 39.6 5.832,489 60.4 9,657,738 100
1970 6,060,300 52.8 5,427,115 47.3 11,487,415 100
1980 8,982,134 67.1 4,396,419 32.9 13,378,553 100
Source: IBGE, 1983: 76, 78.
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employment nd curbed the growth of a modern sector labor market.
During the 1960s and 1970s, new employment in manufacturing
expanded at a far slower rate than the industrial product. In Minas
from 1960 to 1970, the 96 percent increase in industrial product was two
times greater than in industrial employment (T. Andrade, 1980: 22).
Employment opportunities did expand faster during the seven year period
of 1970 to 1977 than during the entire decade of the 1960s, yet this
reflects only the more rapid industrialization of the period, for the
gap between industrial growth and industrial job growth was larger than
in the preceding decade.
Many industrial jobs were lost in the consumer non-durables sector
in the 1960s, especially in traditional industries. The "traditional
sector's" contribution to the gross domestic product declined sharply
from 74 percent at the beginning of the decade to 46.4 percent at its
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end (FIEMG, 1980: 13). The economic crisis of the mid-1960s and the
policies of the new military governors to combat the crisis, especially
the restriction of credit and the reduction of wages (and therefore
demand), resulted in the bankruptcy of many firms in the non-durable
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consumer goods sector throughout Brazil. At a competitive
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disadvantage, Minas factories were especially hard hit. The
traditional industries which survived in these very competitive sectors
of the economy, moreover, were fundamentally transformed. They were
forced to become more productive largely by cutting labor costs.
Productivity rose 52 percent from 1970 to 1977 in the non-durable goods
sector (T. Andrade, 1980: 25), while employment opportunity contracted
in these typically labor-intensive industries, the most salient of which
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in Minas were sugar, dairy, and textiles. In the textile industry, the
replacement of antiquated plant equipment raised productivity by 79
percent from 1970 to 1977, but this burst in productivity was matched by
only a three percent increase in employment (less than 1000 new jobs)
(T. Andrade, 1980: 28). Employment in textile manufacturing declined
from 24.5 percent of the total industrial work force in 1959 to 14.9
percent in 1974. Thus, even those traditional industries which survived
the crisis could not generate new jobs commensurate with their plant
expansions undertaken during the take-off decade of the 1970s. The
introduction of more technologically sophisticated equipment brought a
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corresponding reduction in the need for new labor.
The new industries developed under state capitalism, concentrated
in the intermediate and capital goods sectors, were poor providers of
mass industrial employment. They could not produce jobs at a pace that
could compensate for those lost in traditional sectors, let alone
generate industrial employment on a mass scale. The ratio of investment
to new employment in the intermediate goods sector was significantly
higher than that in the non-durable consumer goods industries, and
higher still in chemicals and metallurgy, the sectors which accounted
for at least half of all investment in Minas during the 1970s (SEPLAN,
1978, 8: 11). Approximately 150,000 new jobs were created between 1970
and 1977 as a result of the local economic miracle. Even with a 50
percent increase in manufacturing employment, from 1970 to 1977 the
sector increased its share of state employment by only 2.5 percent, from
8.4 to 10.9 (Table III-9).
The service sector absorbed most of the displaced workers in the
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Table III-9
Minas Gerais: Employment by Economic Sector, 1960, 1970, 1977
Sector 1960 1970 1977
Number % Number % Number %
Agriculture 1,819,516 60.4 1,714,109 50.4 1,539,696 39.1
Mining 31,551 1.0 43,088 1.3 47,555 1.2
Manufacturing 192,223 6.4 283,803 8.4 429,841 10.9
Construction 110,100 3.7 197,078 5.8 307,112 7.8
Services 857,454 28.5 1,157,850 34.1 1,614,914 41.0
TOTAL 3,010,844 3,395,928 3,939,118
Source: SEPLAN, 1978, 7, I: 171.
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Minas economy (in 1980, it employed 43.9 percent of all economically
active persons). "Service sector" is an eclectic category that explains
little about the nature of employment in tertiary activities. At one
extreme of the service sector is a number of scientific and liberal
professionals (doctors, technicians, journalists). At the other are
domestic and personal service workers (maids and beauticians), who
represent 25 percent of the sector. The poor remuneration of this
latter group is revealed by the fact that in 1980, in all economic
sectors, approximately 40 percent of all workers earned less than one
"minimum salary", the legally-defined margin of subsistence, while in
personal services, that proportion was closer to 60 percent (IBGE,
1980b, 5: 57-60). Between the two extremes, the service sector
encompasses a diverse range of jobs, including commerce (20 percent),
transportation and communication (ten percent), food and repair services
(five percent each), financial sector employees (five percent), and
various public administration and public service jobs (25 percent)
(IBGE, 1980b, 5: 29-34).
The bloated service sector and its generally poor levels of
remuneration are symptomatic of the uneven absorption of the labor force
into productive economic activity. Official accounts confirm that "the
decline in the primary population ... was not accompanied by a growth
in the active population in industry and services at a pace that would
make possible the complete absorption of the labor force" (IBGE, 1977:
178). The formal rate of labor force participation fell from 33.5
percent of the total population in 1940 to 30.9 percent in 1950 to 29.5
41
percent in 1970. Levels of family income, a measure which
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provides a more realistic indicator of the living standards of household
members by aggregating the inferior earnings of young women with the
income of their fathers and husbands, are no higher than those of
individual income: 22.8 percerL of all families in Minas earned less
than one minimum salary, and 25.3 percent between one and two (IBGE,
1980b, 6: 82-83). The "unabsorbed" labor force of poorly integrated and
remunerated workers in the service and agricultural sectors, a by-
product of revolutionary agricultural modernization and robust
industrialization, was thus relegated to the margin of the formal market
economy.
Industrial Concentration and Uneven Development
If industrialization in Minas Gerais generated little new
employment opportunity, the small industrial work force which did form
was clustered territorially. Uneven industrial expansion resulted in
the concentration of new industries in a small number of communities, a
development that allowed traditional elites the opportunity to persist
in greater numbers than had industrialization proceeded in a more
spatially diffuse manner.
The rapid industrialization of the 1970s exacerbated a pre-existing
pattern of uneven, concentrated spatial development. On the eve of the
economic boom, economic opportunity and industrial employment were
concentrated in Planning Region I (for planning purposes, the state
has been divided into eight regions which correspond closely to state
zonal divisions accepted by popular convention). Region I encompasses
the metropolitan region of the capital city, Belo Horizonte, and lying
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200 kilometers to its northeast, the "Valley of Steel," so called for
the giant steel enterprises of Usiminas and Acesita in the city which
now bears it name (formerly Timoteo). The region was home to slightly
more than one quarter of the state's population and produced over half
of the gross domestic product and almost three fourths of the industrial
product in 1970 (Table III-10). The only other regions which hosted any
industry of note were the Mata and the South. For the most part, these
were traditional textile and food industries serving the Rio and Sao
Paulo markets. After 1970, Region I grew even more rapidly than the
rest of the state, receiving over 80 percent of all new industrial
investment from 1970 to 1977, the lion's share of which was targeted to
the area's steel industries and the increasingly dense cluster of
42
manufacturing plants in the metropolitan region of the state capital.
Metropolitan Belo Horizonte alone acquired one-third of all investment
channeled through the Institute of Industrial Development from 1969 to
1980 (INDI, 1980: 3-4). Only two other regions, III and VI, made
significant strides toward industrialization during the decade. Region
III was host to many relocated Paulista industries. Region VI became a
preferred site for industrial location because of the double fiscal
incentives it could offer investors: in addition to the the state fiscal
incentives available to all investors, the area's inclusion in the
43
SUDENE region qualified new industrial investors for a second set of
44
federal economic incentives offered under Articles 34-18.
Industrial development was even more concentrated than regional
level data would lead us to believe. Disaggregating the data on project
location even further shows that the investments in Regions I, III, and
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Table III-10
Minas Gerais: Regional Shares--Gross Domestic Product,
Industrial Product, Population, 1970-1980
(in percent)
Gross Domes- Industrial Total Industrial Total
Regions tic Product Product Population Investment Population
1970(1) 1970(1) 1970(1) 1970-77(2) 1980(3)
I 53.3% 73.3% 26.0% 80.97% 32.1%
II 9.6 7.5 13.7 2.60 12.3
III 11.8 7.7 16.0 4.79 15.6
IV 7.4 3.8 8.0 4.91 8.6
V 4.4 2.3 5.6 2.41 4.9
VI 4.5 1.8 8.8 3.88 8.9
VII 2.2 0.5 7.0 0.02 6.2
VIII 6.8 2.7 14.9 0.42 11.4
Sources: (1) L. Andrade, 1980: 123; (2) SEPLAN, 1978, 5: 99; (3)
Preliminary census figures as reported in Estado de Minas, 2/1/81: 8.
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VI are restricted to a mere handful of municipios. All but 18 percent
of new industrial jobs created in Minas from investments contracted
between 1971 and 1974 were located in about 25 municipalities (Table
45
III-11). Of special note is the concentration of one-third of all new
employment in the metropolitan region of the capital.
This uneven development was neither aberrant nor accidental. The
Minas technocracy, as early as 1968, advocated the geographical
concentration of industry as one of three principal strategies for
accelerating industrialization in the state:
...[I]t seems evident that in the special case of
Minas Gerais, it doesn't make sense to disperse
[industrialization] efforts in search of greater
equity, when the level of existing urbanization is
so low. Be they in the installation of new
[production] units in the dynamic sector, or in a
concentration [of existing industries] in the
traditional sector, at least at first, all
industrialization efforts should seek to allocate
resources in select "poles" which already have
indispensable external economies. In this way,
greater productivity can be achieved in the short
term, diffusing more energetically the positive
effects of industrialization (BDMG, 1968, I: 183).
This strategy was implemented through the construction of industrial
districts. The idea and practice of lumping together factories in
industrial parks dates back at least as far as the inauguration of the
Industrial City of Contagem in 1947, but it was formalized as a state
policy with the creation of the Industrial Districts Company in 1971.
The CDI, together with INDI, persuaded various foreign and national
46
investors to locate their plants in these districts. By deliberately
concentrating industries in this way, state government planners believed
public authority could gain control over the process of industrial
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Table III-11
Minas Gerais: New Industrial Employment by Municlpio, 1971-1974
Number of Projects Number of New Jobs New Jobs (%)
Region I:
Belo Horizonte 50 7,188 5.3
Betim 17 17,323 12.7
Contagem 60 11,150 8.2
Santa Luzia 18 4,501 3.3
Vespasiano 7 1,249 .9
Pedro Leopoldo 6 1,248 .9
Lagoa Santa 2 417 .3
Metropolitan Region 165 43,076 31.6
Ipatinga 5 6,057 4.5
Timoteo 2 1,583 1.2
Monlevade 2 1,800 1.3
Belo Oriente 1 3,700 2.7
Itabirito 4 2,069 1.5
Itauna 7 4,640 3.4
Sete Lagoas 9 1,106 .8
Region II:
Juiz de Fora 21 6,765 5.0
Region III:
Varginha 4 2,225 1.6
Tres Coraqoes 3 1,396 1.0
Pouso Alegre 7 4,155 3.1
Pogos de Caldas 13 2,579 1.9
Itajuba 8 3,689 2.7
ReRion IV:
Uberlandia 12 2,557 1.9
Araxl 2 1,700 1.3
Region V
Morada Nova 1 10,000 7.4
Region VI:
Montes Claros 25 8,918 6.6
Pirapora 5 862 .6
Varzea da Palma 4 1,138 .8
Others and Under Study 167 25,387 18.7
TOTAL 467 135,402
Source: Pacheco, 1975: 64-85.
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location, first apparently to lure industry by cheapening initial
overhead costs, and later to promote actively the deconcentration of the
metropolitan region of the capital. The conscious attempt to create
47
"dispersed concentrations", so as not to overload the state's center,
was perceived by planners as eminently practical; they dismissed as
quixotic any attempt to encourage industry to locate in backward regions
or apart from other industries.
The strategy of dispersed concentrations favored the successful
development of new industrial centers, such as Pogos de Caldas,
Varginha/Tres Coragoes, Itajuba, and Pouso Alegre in the South of Minas;
Montes Claros in the North; and Uberaba and Uberlandia in the Triangulo.
It also had the effect of cordoning off vast tracts of Mineiro territory
from industrial growth. Of over 30 industrial districts already
established or in construction, few lay outside the Belo metropolitan
region or these select centers of the South, SUDENE region, and the
Triangulo.
The Minas industrial explosion was more accurately a series of
isolated eruptions, confined to what may be termed industrial
'enclaves'. Indeed, as of 1980, concentrated industrialization and
uneven spatial development had resulted in more continuity than change.
With hundreds of Minas Gerais' 722 municipios left virtually untouched
by industrial transformation, traditional elites remained firmly in
control of vast expanses of Mineiro territory and the overwhelming
majority of political communities.
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Conclusions
The economic development of Minas Gerais in the 1970s suggests
that where state capitalism bolstered by foreign capital is the
prevailing form of economic organization, industrialization may not
engender the two great industrial classes--bourgeoisie and proletariat--
upon whose political roles much social science theory rests its
understanding of the transition to industrial society. Even if these
classes emerge, their resources, and hence political role, may differ
from that anticipated by conventional theory.
The industrialization of Minas Gerais had little transformative
impact on politics. State intervention in the economy and foreign
investment did not strengthen the local bourgeoisie. This class, whose
failure to spark industrialization is presumed to have necessitated
state capitalism, remained weak economically, even after
industrialization was well underway. Despite every advantage the state
could offer--financing, the purchase of already sound enterprises, or
joint ventures--local industrialists could not participate meaningfully
in local industrialization. Moreover, the highly capital intensive
strategy adopted by new and expanding industries in advanced sectors
generated too few jobs to transform a peasantry expelled from the
countryside into a proletariat. Urbanization created popular classes
that would come to be integrated into the public economy. And the
extreme, if not uncommon, spatial concentration of industry made the
political upheaval manageable.
The economic beneficiaries of the industrialization of Minas Gerais
were foreign investors and Paulista entrepreneurs. The political
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beneficiaries, however, were state elites. The expansion of state
resources and clients augmented the power associated with
positions in the Brazilian state. For a class such as the traditional
political elite who had demonstrated its skill at converting state
resources into political resources, and who had no alternative basis for
exercising dominance in a modernizing economy, maintaining its place in
the state was both its major challenge and opportunity.
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Notes
1. There is a long tradition in the social sciences of
highlighting the state's leading role in economic development in late
industrializers. Gerschenkron (1962) illustrated this point through the
cases of Germany, Austria, Italy, and Russia. Hirschman (1971) extended
this concept to Latin America. According to this perspective,
industrialization in late developing countries hinged on the state's
organization of channels of capital investment; in the dependent
economies of Latin America, the state was further required to become a
producer.
Baer et al (1976) make the argument that states in Latin America
were forced into entering certain key sectors in which investment
requirements were high and maturation periods were long, especially
those sectors encompassing industries deemed to be in the national
interest. The alternatives to state intervention, both equally
unacceptable, would have been to depend for industrialization in these
sectors exclusively upon foreign capital and technology, or forego those
industries altogether if foreign investors were uninterested. In
Brazil, the state for these reasons established public enterprises in
the energy and steel sectors (Evans, 1979). Similarly, FitzGerald
(1979) argues that the growth in the state sector in Peru after 1968 was
a direct response to the failure of domestic capital to sustain
industrialization or negotiate effectively with foreign enterprise.
2. According to Evans' account (1979), the state in dependent
development pressures foreign corporations to participate in local
capital accumulation. With their status (and investments) vulnerable to
nationalistic attack, they acquiesce, and take local partners for
political protection. In exchange, both public and private local
capital win from their new foreign associates the technology they sorely
need to become competitive.
3. Sorj (1983: 73) identifies state capitalism as a limiting
situation of state intervention in the economy "in which public sector
accumulation implies a confrontation with, and the partial or total
elimination of, the private sector." While a useful beginning, this
definition is ultimately misleading. If the role of public sector
enterprises is strengthened at the 'expense' of the private sector, but
also at its request, is this 'confrontational'? Also, can the state
'eliminate' actors who are not present?
4. Guimaries (1977: 129) distinguishes two types of capitalism
with a prominent role for state elites: "politically-oriented" and
"state-directed" capitalism. A politically-oriented regime is one in
which political groups (bureaucracies, parties, militaries) define
political objectives for the state that imply an expansion of
governmental activities which deliberately create new lucrative
opportunities for private groups. In "state-directed" capitalism,
political groups mobilize the state apparatus, imposing direct controls
over the economy, restructuring markets, and controlling resources for
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the realization of priority policies.
5. The Visao lists include only corporations, which has the effect
of understating the role of private national capital.
6. In the late 1950s and early 1970s, Trebat (1981: 49) found
rates of profitability (current surplus as a percent of net worth) in
public enterprises in the mining sector to have averaged over 20 percent
from 1966-1975, petrochemicals, 18.7 percent, electricity, 7.4 percent,
and steel, which suffered losses in the years from 1966-1969, rebounded
after 1970 to achieve rates of profitability of 4.3 percent from 1970 to
1975. In 1980, during an economic downturn, the rate of return of state
enterprises in the primary (mining) sector was 11.3 percent, in
manufacturing industry, 6.9 percent, in the financial sector, 13
percent, and in public utilities, 3.8 percent (Visao, 1981: 414-432).
The sole exception to this rule of profitability is the railroads. Of
all the enterprises created in the state sector, the nationalization of
the railroads was the only one which could be considered an example of
the state taking over a declining public service (Abranches, 1977: 9).
7. According to a 1972 survey of 318 of the largest non-financial
firms in the country (Doellinger and Cavalcanti, as reported in Baer et
al, 1976: 79), the before tax profitability (before tax profits divided
by equity, unweighted average) of state enterprises was higher (17.6)
than that of both private Brazilian (16.4) and multinational (15.8)
firms. The results of a 1974 survey of 731 firms in 48 different
sectors conducted by Wilson Suzigan (as reported in Cipolla, 1977: 99)
do not show quite as favorable comparative rates of state enterprise
profitability, but they are still quite good: profits in the state
sector were the highest of the three sectors (state, foreign, national
private) in capital goods; the lowest in intermediate goods; and more
profitable than national private, less than multinational, in durable
consumer goods.
8. Complicating our ability to clarify this important measure is
the fact that BNH financing is not included in Visao lists of the public
and private banking system.
9. The true figure is higher because "entrepreneural activity" is
excluded from the data in both Baer's and our calculations, which
effectively omits state enterprises from the totals. In 1969, state
enterprises were responsible for 26.4 percent of all investment
(Coutinho and Reischstul, 1977: 63), and in 1975, the "core" state
enterprises accounted for 20 percent of investment in Brazil (Trebat,
1981: 51).
The Fundacao Joao Pinheiro places state expenditure as a proportion
of gross domestic product at even higher levels: according to their
data, excluding para-public agencies, foundations, and public and mixed
enterprises, public expenditure in the country for all levels of
government rose from 12.5 percent in 1920 to 17.1 percent in 1947 to
32.2 percent in 1969 of the gross domestic product (FJP, n.d., I: IV-9).
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10. Two-thirds of the leading economic groups--sets of companies
connected by links of shared ownership or multiple interlocking
directorates--originated before the first world war. Others were
founded as follows (Evans, 1979: 105):
Pre- 1914- 1930- Post-World
World War I 1929 1945 War II Total
Largest Locally-Owned
Economic Groups 64% 28% 8% 0% 100%(25)
Largest Foreign-Owned
Economic Groups 20% 37% 17% 27% 101%(30)
11. The industrial sub-sectors included under the grouping of
"dynamic" industries were mining, electrical energy, civil construction,
non-metallic minerals, and metallurgy. Of these, mining and electricity
were the preserve of state capital (cited as examples of these 'dynamic'
firms were the Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, CVRD, and Centrais Eletricas
de Minas Gerais, CEMIG), and metallurgy, of both state and foreign
capital (Usiminas, Belgo Mineiro, Mannesmann, Aluminas).
12. Unfortunately, Queiroz does not distinguish explicitly the
national origins of groups in the data disaggregating state
distribution. A determination in four of five cases was made from the
textual descriptions of the firms in those economic sectors in which the
Mineiro groups appeared.
13. The author acknowledges two complications in working with
census data which would work to the detriment of the more industrially
advanced states. First, the unit of analysis in the industrial census
is the "establishment" - not the "firm". The more powerful firms are
subdivided into several establishments. Secondly, census data do not
distinguish establishments located within a given state which are
subsidiaries of firms headquartered in other states.
14. The author cautions that this indicator, originally included
to ferret out artesanal operations, did not accomplish this purpose
since family labor was considered blue-collar if directly involved in
production. Moreover, the fourth place ranking of Sao Paulo suggests
obvious distortions. I have included it in Table III-2 because it
formed part of the composite ranking.
15. The Diagnostico da Economia Mineira, a six volume document,
has wider significance than the analysis of the economy which it
presented. Drafted by a group of technocrats, it served, in the view of
most observers, as the ideological justification for the replacement of
traditional politicians with technocrats, and the expansion of the state
in the economy during the administration of Rondon Pacheco. Grossi
(1977) has called it the "Magna Carta" of the technocrats.
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16. In addition to its indirect capital participation in various
projects (SEPLAN, 1978, 8: 89-90), the bank funded, at least in part,
many projects contracted during the 1970s. (These data are available
through the Fundagao Joao Pinheiro.) Capital markets in Brazil do not
function as in the developed world. Savings deposits are funneled
through the National Housing Bank (BNH) and normally end up in
construction projects. Industry not surprisingly has difficulty raising
capital, and usually looks to state and federal development banks as its
only viable source of capital financing.
17. A complete list of principal industrial enterprises with
shareholding participation of the state of Minas through June 1978 can
be found in SEPLAN (1978, 8: 89-90).
18. ICM rebates still exist for firms which locate in the Minas
SUDENE region.
19. Monetary correction adjusts the value of the loan to account
for inflation, which in the Brazilian case is enormous. Before a major
economic reform in early 1986, it exceeded 200 percent per annum.
20. The six investments undertaken by federal public enterprises
in the period from 1970 to 1977 are as follows (SEPLAN, 1978, 8: 83):
Name of Firm Investment
(in thousands of
1975 cruzeiros)
Ago Minas Gerais S.A. (Agominas) 30,747,773
Usinas Siderurgicas de Minas Gerais
S.A. (USIMINAS) 18,315,541
Agos Especiais de Itabira S.A. (Acesita) 4,129,904
Usiminas Mecanicas S.A. (USIMEC) 816,501
Vale do Paranalba Fertilizantes S.A. (VALEFERTIL) 3,097,241
3,097,241
Forjas Acesita S.A. 292,058
TOTAL 57,399,018
21. Grossi (1977: 260) cites a higher figure of 46 percent.
22. SEPLAN (1978, 8: 47). These percentage figures are based on
investments in constant prices of 1975 cruzeiros. The totals pertain to
projects approved by the Industrial Development Council of the national
Ministry of Industry and Commerce (CDI/MIC).
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23. I drew up a list of 42 investments made by 40 firms from data
gathered at the Fundagao Joao Pinheiro. Research on the ownership and
headquarters of these firms in Visao (1981) turned up information on 26.
The 14 firms for which data are missing would have been omitted from
Visao's list of "Who's Who" if either their net assets did not meet an
established minimum, or they were not incorporated. Of course both
would tend to underestimate the component of local capital. I also
dropped five foreign-based firms from this list in order to show
more clearly the distribution of national capital. More than these 11
firms are believed to be headquartered in Sao Paulo, but no concrete
evidence is readily available to support that claim.
24. Because of the lack of comparability between the various
measures of investment, such as years in which the investments were
undertaken, base years used to calculate investment capital, and so
forth, it is extremely difficult to arrive at a more exact figure. The
nine-tenths figure used represents an accurate percentage of employment
generated by new industry. In terms of the number of projects, the
INDI-assisted investments might represent a share higher than 90
percent.
25. The measure of controlling capital tends to understate the
role of state capital, much of which entered into joint ventures with
foreign capital as a minority partner. In Minas, the most significant
joint venture was between the state government and FIAT.
26. Factoring this investment back into the figures is
problematical because of the different years and systems used in the two
data sets to correct for inflation in these investments. INDI uses
government bonds (ORTNs) to correct for inflation, while SEPLAN uses
as base years 1974 and 1975. While INDI does provide a figure for the
AQOMINAS investment (15.3 million cruzeiros), this is obviously a
current figure, and no year is attached to make this investment total
comprehensible in constant terms.
27. Transit Semicondutores opened in Montes Claros in the heart of
the Minas SUDENE region in 1973, having received state fiscal incentives
and BNDE financing. By 1978, the firm was already tottering, amidst
accusations of being poorly located and ill-equipped, unable to attract
and keep qualified technicians, in short ill-conceived from the
beginning and kept afloat only because of access to government loans.
28. This partial list of firms is drawn from SEPLAN (1978, 8: 99),
where the ownership of firms is listed by national origin. The specific
characteristics of capital identified as Brazilian were determined by
data provided by Visao (1981).
29. To save Acesita and Usimec, the two most prominent state firms
located in Minas available for private purchase, the Commercial
Association of Minas proposed to treat Acesita as a special case, and
transfer its control from the Banco do Brasil, the then majority
shareholder, to Siderbras (Siderurgica Brasileira), another state sector
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enterprise. This proposal was endorsed by then state Secretary of
Industry, Jose Romualdo Cangado Bahia. No state action was taken on the
proposal, but neither did investors rush forward to buy the industries
then operating in the red (Estado de Minas, 10/23/81: 11).
30. Spindel (1983: 13) points out that livestock raising not only
reduces labor requirements but also expels subsistence activities, and
thus produces a contingent of landless laborers.
31. These numbers differ slightly from the census, which in 1970
counted an agrarian population of 1,979,847, but they represent the most
complete set of figures, and the trend is in the same direction and at
approximately the same rate of decline.
32. The authors of this study from which Spindel drew these
figures acknowledge they represent the maximum number of temporary rural
laborers. Spindel (1983: 8) argues that this set of statistics is
overestimated. Based on data from the Instituto de Economia Agricola of
the Secretary of Agriculture of Sao Paulo, in 1970, non-resident
"volantes" represented 12 percent of the rural labor force, and in 1980,
25.26 percent. The Secretary of Agriculture of Sao Paulo cited a figure
of 500,000, which would represent 43 pe-cent of the agricultural work
force of the state.
In the case of Minas Gerais, we are inclined to agree with Spindel
that the figures are inflated, since the 1.8 million figure cited for
1972 surpasses the total number of agricultural workers in both 1970 and
1975. This does not, however, necessarily refute the validity of the
percentages.
33. Spindel (1983) and Sorj (1980) have pointed out that attempts
have been made to deny such a causal connection, principally by
Marxists, because superstructural changes should not be able to effect
changes in the mode of production.
34. Even with the fall in agrarian employment and rural
population, supply still outstrips demand throughout the state. The
ratio of agrarian employment (the demand for agricultural workers
divided by the supply, measured in man hours) shows an unmistakable
excess of rural labor, even as late as 1975 and the 1980 projections.
Though increasing, from 43.6 percent in 1970 to 55.4 percent in 1980,
this ratio demonstrates a continued abundant supply of rural labor.
While there are exceptions, in the fourth trimester (the harvest) in
Regions III, IV, and V in 1980, and III and IV in 1975, only in Region
III in 1980 was the demand for agricultural labor greater on a yearly
basis than the pool of available labor (SEPLAN, 1978, 7, I: 183, 185,
186-209).
35. Minas Gerais was an exception to the decline in renting. It
has been hypothesized that in the late 1960s capital innovations were
taking place through the rented sector. Marketable crops such as
English potatoes, pineapples, and strawberries were used as collateral
to secure bank financing (IBGE, 1977: 412).
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36. The definitions of urban and rural population in Brazil differ
somewhat from internationally accepted norms. In Brazil, centers which
are seats of municipal and district governments are automatically
considered urban, regardless of the size of the resident population.
Whereas in 1950 the IBGE counted as urban 30 percent of the population,
in fact only 17 percent of the population resided in centers of 5,000 or
more inhabitants. And in 1970, lowering the urban threshold to 3,600
still does not correct the discrepancies between official and actual
figures: 42 percent of the Minas population by this definition could be
considered urban in 1970, far below the 53 percent registered by the
official census. In 1980 projections, by lowering the minimum
population required for urban status to 3,000, 59 percent of the
population were residing in legitimate urban centers (SEPLAN, 1978, 5:
17-21).
37. Unfortunately, "traditional" in this context is not precisely
defined.
38. There is a long list of works on the Brazilian model of
development pursued in the post-1964 period. In English, the interested
reader may consult Serra (1979) and many essays in Stepan (1973a).
39. The streamlining of Minas' traditional industries is most
evident in the textiles and food processing sectors, which in 1960 had
represented over half of the Minas industrial product. In the 1959-60
harvest year, 30 (of a total of 36) sugar mills were operating; by 1975,
only 15 remained in operation. Similarly, the number of milk processing
enterprises were reduced by 25 percent from 1960 to 1970: the 1960
census registered 601 dairy producing firms; the 1970 figure was 450.
Bankruptcies were repeated in the textile industry, where 15 of 98 firms
failed between 1965 and 1970, and another 11 after that date (Campolina
Diniz, 1978: 123, 126, 128-30, 133; SEPLAN, 1978, 8: 105-107).
40. This argument is made by T. Andrade (1980: 22-28). The
author's data on the contributions to the industrial product,
productivity, and employment of each industrial group (non-
durable consumer, intermediate, and capital and durable consumer goods)
and economic sector confirm that employment varies inversely with
productivity, and that overall growth rates were based on the greater
value of the industrial product of low labor-absorbing sectors.
41. These percentages improve slightly when the potential
economically active population is limited to persons above 10 years of
age, though the trend is in the same direction: 48.5 percent of the
active population in 1940 to 44.9 percent in 1950 to 43 percent in 1970
(IBGE, 1977: 178).
Some possible explanations for the decline in the economically
active population offered by the IBGE relate to the age structure of the
working population. In the first set of figures, the decline in the
entire work force could have been abetted by the better enforcement of
the legal prohibitions on working minors (less than 14 years of age) in
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urban areas, a trend bound to become more important as the population
urbanizes. In Minas, minors aged from ten to 14 years of age in the
labor force declined from 184 percent in 1950 to 4.8 percent in 1970. A
second explanation, which would pertain to both sets of figures but
especially to the second set which excludes minors, is that the increase
in social security permits the population from 60 to 69 yeras of age to
withdraw from the labor market. The proportion in this age group of
workers declined from four percent in 1950 to 3.5 percent in 1980 in the
Southeast region as a whole (IBGE, 1977: 179).
42. The Usiminas and Aominas steel plants were both located in
Region I (SEPLAN, 1978, 8: 56).
43. The Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast
(SUDENE) was created by the Brazilian government in 1959, officially
recognizing the plight of the underdeveloped Northeast. Through a
program of fiscal incentives, it hoped to attract industry to the
region, thereby promoting economic development. An early evaluation of
the program was done by Hirschman (1963).
44. These enabled companies located in Brazil to apply 50 percent
of their income tax liability to investments in projects approved by
SUDENE, which in turn qualified for low interest financing of up to 80
percent by the Bank of the Northeast (BNB) and funding from the Fundo de
Investimentos do Nordeste (FINOR), ranging from 30 to 75 percent for
domestic firms and a maximum of 50 percent for foreign firms. Other
benefits accruing to companies locating in this region were import duty
exemption of up to 80 percent for new equipment (if no similar product
was manufactured in Brazil), 50 to 100 percent income tax exemption (for
projects contracted up to December, 1978), and a relatively high return
of up to 60 percent on the ICM sales tax. The entire list of incentives
are catalogued in the English language publication, Economic Information
on Minas Gerais, Brasil, published by INDI (1978: 152-154), which was
meant as a background guide for potential investors.
Despite considerable incentives, up to 1967 only two projects in
Minas Gerais of any consequence had been approved by SUDENE (Campolina
Diniz, 1978: 148). This situation was reversed during the 1970s, when
Minas successfully advertised its territory included in the SUDENE
region as that closest to major southeastern Brazilian markets (INDI,
1978: 152). By 1978, 120 companies had submitted proposals for
industries to be located in the Minas SUDENE region for approval by
SUDENE, and were benefitting from the outlined incentives.
45. The data have the serious shortcoming of including only the
years from 1971-1974, yet were used nonetheless as the most complete
list of industrial projects available in disaggregaged form, and in
light of the fact that the rate of investment dropped off after 1974.
New employment was used as a measure of industrial dynamism rather than
investment, on the assumption that employment had deeper implications
for the socio-political transformation associated with
industrialization.
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46. This assertion is based on a reading of correspondence between
INDI and the Industrial Districts Company written through 1980.
47. A term used by a superintendent of the Institute for
Industrial Development. Author's interview with Eduardo de Mello Cruz,
Belo Horizonte, January 23, 1981.
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CHAPTER FOUR
POWER AND POSITION IN THE STATE
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Introduction
At the onset of bureaucratic-authoritarianism, traditional
political elites were anchored in and dominated the state. Executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of federal, state, and local
government, as well as the state militias, were commanded by a political
class comprised largely of the sons and grandsons of a landed oligarchy.
Following the 1964 coup d'etat traditional political elites found their
monopoly over formal state power jeopardized for the first time in
republican history. The military who at first depended upon traditional
political elite support to legitimate its seizure of power appeared to
break off its close relations with this class. To implement a program
to achieve political stability and economic development, to make Brazil
a great power, and to rid it of radical influences, the military
centralized economic policy-making in the national ministries and
strengthened the executive which it controlled. It then filled key
federal state posts with economists, engineers, educators, and
professional administrators--the core of a new technocratic elite. The
regime's political agenda put it at apparent odds with the traditional
political elite. The military hoped to cleanse the state of 'corrupt'
politicians, clientelistic practices, and politics which stood in the
way of development. To do so required not only centralizing economic
policy-making and purging the system of populist politicians, but also
attacking the foundations of traditional political elite rule in the
states. If successful, the center of politics would move from the
periphery to the center.
Many observers read into the regime's aims and early actions a
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shift of power away from traditional political elites toward a new
ruling coalition of the military, a technocracy, and large foreign and
native capitalists (Cardoso, 1973, 1975, 1979; Evans, 1974, 1979;
1
McDonough, 1981a, 1981b; Bresser Pereira, 1984). Cardoso (1973: 146-
147) for example claimed that traditional sectors and pliticians were
dispossessed in the wake of radical economic change:
The older ruling sectors have lost their relative
power position in the total structure. ... The
position of the career politicians, generally
identified with the dominant classes in the previous
arrangement, has also been extensively undermined.
These politicians had served to express, at the
overt political level, the class alliance in terms
of which power had been organized since the Old
Republic (1889-1930).
The top echelons of the state apparatus became, in Cardoso's (1975:
178-179) words, the chasse gardee of the military and the bureaucrats.
McDonough (1981b: xxviii, 99) asserts that many formerly well-entrenched
elite groups, including politicians as a class and most notably those
who had been associated with the Revolution of 1930, were marginalized
from power. "The concentration of power by the military and the
civilian technocracy began to deprive these elites of their
constituencies. They were made increasingly irrelevant." Cintra (1979:
151) concurred: "Elites from such states as Minas Gerais, whose
sizeable electorate accounted for the power they wielded in the center,
have fallen into ostracism."
Because the regime restricted the functions of parliament and the
political parties, politics had to be transacted through functionaries
recruited from public and private enterprises: technocrats, planners,
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economists, engineers, and firm managers (Cardoso, 1975: 206).
Bourgeois and other private actors had to wrest concessions from an
increasingly omnipotent state through what Cardoso called "bureaucratic
rings". These rings were alliances that cut horizontally across the
public and private bureaucracies and united parts of the sector
controlled by private enterprise with segments of the state bureaucracy.
This new system of interest representation undermined existing forms of
political organization, such as federalism, and superseded the old
institutions of political life, such as political parties. "Not only
the political party system but all other forms of political action ...
became dependent on contacts and alliances with the military and
technocratic groups that alone controlled the state apparatus (1973:
147-148). The vehicle for political advancement shifted from the
political parties, the classic instruments through which social groups
achieved power, to the state, the Brazilian "Modern Prince" (Cardoso,
2
1975: 200). Thus not only were traditional elites imagined to have
been stripped of their power and position in the state, but the
political system through which they advanced, under which they had
governed, and to which they were indispensable, was said also to have
been transformed.
Military efforts to centralize power and depoliticize the state
had inherently federalizing tendencies and the potential to weaken the
regional oligarchies. They may have paved the way for a new state elite
eager to pursue similar policies at the state level. In Minas, after
the governor loyal to Juscelino Kubitschek, Israel Pinheiro, exited from
office, Rondon Pacheco, a trusted confidant of the military, was named
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his successor. He brought with him to office a technocratic team and
launched a local version of the national development program. Focusing
largely on his administration, many works postulated that traditional
political elites in Minas had been dislodged from key posts by
technocrats (Grossi, 1977, 1979; Campolina Diniz, 1978; L. Andrade,
1980; Cintra, 1979), and that the slide of one was directly proportional
to the rise of the other. Grossi (1977: 262-263) articulated this view
best:
It seems clear that "traditional" politicians have
been eliminated from power and the center of
decision-making, which is gravitating more and more
toward the executive branch. This is due to the
fact that on the one hand they are no longer found
in the key posts for decision-making, and, on the
other, and this is the most important, their source
of power and the system itself in which they hold a
prominent place is in the process of disappearing.
Our study of state officeholding in Minas Gerais suggests that in
Minas shifts in power-holding from politicians were less abrupt, longer
in the making, more reversible to political control than on the federal
level, and not as complete as has been commonly assumed. In Minas, in
the early to mid 1970s, traditional political elites and technocrats
"shared" the state. The most important state post, the governor,
officially appointed in Brasilia, was in practice named from within the
oligarchy in much the same manner that the Republican party chose its
governors during the Old Republic. Economic and fiscal policy was
planned by technically qualified personnel, but officeholders in these
departments could not be considered a class; they did not pursue a
single route to power, nor did they rise through institutions that might
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have replaced political parties as an elite recruiting ground. These
technocratic elites, moreover, did not displace traditional political
elites in those posts in the distributional arm of the state which
controlled state patronage. After a very brief period of depoliticized
administration and technocratic ascendancy, traditional political elites
and processes were restored. By the late 1970s, political criteria once
again determined career advancement. The political elite, moreover, was
led by its most traditional elements.
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The Bureaucratic Regime
The military-led authoritarian regime centralized power and
decision-making. It appropriated the executive and strengthened it at
the direct expense of the legislature. The president could propose
amendments to the Constitution, which now required only a simple
majority for approval (the 1946 Constitution had required a two-thirds
majority for amendment). Congress had 30 days in which to consider
proposed constitutional amendments and other executive-initiated bills;
the lapsing of this period resulted in their automatic enactment into
law (Brazil, 1981: 40-45). Only the president could initiate finance
bills; congress could not increase the amount stipulated in expenditure
measures submitted by the executive (Roett, 1984: 128). During the
Medici presidency, 100 percent of executive-initiated bills were passed
(Wesson and Fleischer, 1983: 82). The executive also had recourse to
enact legislation by "decree law", which by-passed the legislature
altogether. In the first three years of military rule, Castelo Branco's
regime issued over 6,000 decrees and decree-laws; Costa e Silva issued
more than 4,000 in his two years in office (Schmitter, 1973: 190). In
one three day period alone (February 26-28, 1967), 151 decree laws were
issued (Schneider, 1971: 200). Typically, decree laws were employed for
such unpopular measures as wage packages in order to spare government
deputies from future electoral peril. Whenever the congress displayed
initiative, attempted independent action, or appeared to rebel against
executive will, institutional procedures could be and easily were
rewritten, and individual senators and deputies expelled from the
congress and stripped of their political rights.
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Not only was power consolidated in the executive branch of
government, but it was also concentrated in certain ministries of the
federal cabinet and inter-ministerial councils. Economic policy-making
and the direction of the state administrative apparatus were entrusted
3
to civilian and military technocrats from the beginning of the post-64
regime (Skidmore, 1967; McDonough, 1981a, 1981b; Schneider, 1971; Ames,
1973; L. Martins, 1977, 1983; Mendes, 1980; Bresser Pereira, 1984).
During the Castelo Banco administration (1964-1967), the minister of
planning, Roberto Campos, was accorded wide latitude for his
stabilization program. Castelo Branco's successor, Costa e Silva,
appointed ten military and nine civilian ministers to his cabinet
(Schneider, 1971: 205). The new team's leader, a 38 year old economics
professor from Sao Paulo, Antonio Delfim Netto, became the "czar" of
Brazil's "economic miracle" of the 1970s. He was the technocrat par
excellence.
At least one student of Brazil has argued the military favored
technocrats over political representatives because it firmly believed
that politicians were incompetent and weak-willed (Skidmore, 1973: 17,
46). Military hard-liners harbored deep antagonism toward the alliance
of traditional elite and populist politicians which governed Brazil for
most of the postwar period. They did not conceal their frustration over
Kubitschek's calling off Brazil's stabilization program in 1959, and
their disgust over Goulart's acquiesence to what they perceived as
workers' inflationary wage demands. Addressing why military
"extremists" and technocrats could work together, Skidmore (1973: 19)
wrote,
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Each has his own reasons for wanting an
authoritarian regime. Each needs the other. The
hard-line military needs the technocrats to make the
economy work. The high growth rates in turn give
pragmatic legitimacy to the authoritarian regime --
'it works'. The technocrats and managers need the
military in order to stay in power, or at least in
order to have the power and authority to carry out
their policies.
This trend toward technocratic rule was continued even after the economy
had been 'normalized' because the military's coup had not purged the
country of forces loyal to ex-president Kubitschek: the electoral
successes of gubernatorial candidates Israel Pinheiro in Minas Gerais
and Francisco Negrao de Lima in Guanabara in October 1965 convinced the
military of the necessity to prolong military-technocratic rule.
The rise to prominent governmental positions by persons who came to
them after successful careers in complex and highly bureaucratized
organizations (such as the armed forces and the public bureaucracy)
informed O'Donnell's (1973: 91) distinction between bureaucratic-
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authoritarianism and other 'mere' authoritarian regimes. O'Donnell
(1973: 77) attributed the rise of echnocrats in Brazil and Argentina to
the complexity of the social structure produced by modernization (and
its key component, industrialization), which created public and private
management needs in which technology played an ever-increasing part.
"As modernization proceeds, more technocratic roles are to be found in
more and more social activities".
The presence of technocrats in government was not new in Brazil.
"Running the state" has long depended on public administration, and, as
Meynaud (1968: 72) claims, "the establishment of an absolute separatism
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between the political and administrative sectors has never been more
than a simple piece of legal fiction". The ever increasing complexity
of the administration of state services heightened even further the
influence of professional managers and experts in government. Because
they hold the monopoly on technical knowledge needed to write
legislation, model economic planning, and otherwise "run the state",
acquired either through education or longevity in a particular
department, ministers depend on them to execute policy. In France,
where an army of bureaucrats staff a strong, centralized state, this
dependence allowed technocrats, in Meynaud's words, to "slip sideways"
into positions of decision-making. Even in Britain, where it was
commonly believed civil servants were non-partisan and served dutifully
whichever party triumphed at the polls, Gordon (1971) has shown the
convention of "ministerial responsibility" to be largely a myth. While
technocrats are nearly always formally subordinate to politicians, they
have risen in advanced industrial society to high government posts and,
in some political systems, they have even risen to cabinet rank,
encroaching upon the power of elected representatives and officials. In
Britain and other parliamentary systems ministers are rarely chosen from
outside Parliament on the strength of their technical ability, but in
France's presidential system ministers can rise from the grandes coles.
Two presidents of the Fifth Republic, Georges Pompidou and Valery
Giscard d'Estaing, began their political careers as technocrats.
Technocratic penetration of government in Brazil appeared to differ
from other instances of technocratic influence and decision-making in
one critical respect. Brazil under bureaucratic-authoritarianism was
197
alleged to represent the extreme case of technocratic influence, what
Meynaud (1968: 30) has called "open dispossession", or pure technocracy,
when policy choices and law-making are officially transferred to the
technocrat. According to Bresser Pereira (1984: 64-65): "Brazil was
unlike the majority, if not all the rest, of the capitalist countries,
in that its public sector technocrats and professional administrators
became a true technocracy -- that is, they assumed a considerable part
of the decision-making power". Technical complexity and military design
together provided the opportunity for a 'technocracy' to acquire even
more power in Brazil than in the more modern, more complex societies of
Europe and North America.
In Brazil, for the traditional political elite who had only a
heterogeneous and relatively weak private economic base, holding state
office was and is absolutely vital for retaining class power. State
positions and control over patronage resources had underlain traditional
elite power in Minas Gerais during the populist era, and these became
only more important with the relative decline of traditional elite
economic strength and the rising stakes in controlling a state leading
economic development. The future prospects, indeed survival, of
traditional political elites depended upon their ability first to
stabilize, and then reverse, the trend toward their expulsion from the
core of the state.
State and Power
In the United States, political scientists looking at their own
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political system have long debated whether power resides within or outside
the state, and how best to study where power lies in a society. Decades
of local, state, and national studies have produced no consensus on
whether the 'decisional', the 'positional', or the 'reputational' method
is the best -- only the incentive for scholars to state their findings
5
with a degree of humility. But liberal and Marxist scholars agree on
one point: 'real power' may reside outside the state. The liberal view
(e.g. Dahl, 1961) assumes plural centers of decision-making; elite
theory (e.g. Domhoff, 1967), that private elites may influence policy in
their favor because of the resources they command in the private sector
of the economy. The state is seen alternately as a useful ally or as
the pawn of some other, more powerful, societal group. While recent
scholarship (Stepan, 1977; Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, 1985) has
attributed to the state far greater scope for independent action, most
observers would agree that in liberal capitalist society, the state is
one, but not the only or most the important, locus of power in society.
In an authoritarian regime such as Brazil's operating under the
principles of state capitalism, power and state position overlap.
Decision-making unambiguously takes place within the state. In state
capitalism the state's productive and distributional resources advantage
its elites vis-a-vis their weaker private sector counterparts. The
decisions taken in the public sector have a farther reaching impact than
in advanced industrial societies with proportionally stronger private
sectors. In the United States, private corporate leaders set levels of
investment in railroads, steel, and mining; in Brazil, state managers
operate these sectors of the economy. Citizens bring their interests to
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secretaries and undersecretaries over a much wider range of issues than
in liberal capitalist society. The corporatist (Schmitter, 1971) and
6
the 'bureaucratic rings' models of interest representation share the
view that private elites in most authoritarian regimes, particularly in
Brazil, must interact with relevant ministers of state and their
7
undersecretaries to conduct business. The concentration and
centralization of economic resources and decision-making power in the
public sphere and the higher echelons of the state makes the occupants
of state office formal and informal power-holders in the political
system. Consistent with this general principle, in Brazil, most state
positions confer economic and political power.
Where is power located within the state in Brazil? McDonough
(1981b) and most other observers locate the most important sources of
power squarely in the ministries with influence over economic policy-
making--Planning, Finance, Industry and Commerce, Transport--and in
state banks and industries. McDonough derisively views the authority of
office holders outside these select ministries as limited to commanding
only the 'underside' of the state.
The policy-making ministries--Planning and Finance--do have the
authority to set budget priorities and even the power to veto
expenditures in other state departments, and state enterprise managers
administer enormous budgets, in extreme cases exceeding the funds
available to many state governments. But there are nonetheless at least
two reasons to doubt that chiefs of economic departments alone wield
state power. First, while the managers of state enterprises do control
immense resources, the lion's share of these resources are consumed by
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the great fixed capital requirements of these enterprises. The second,
and principal, weakness of this perspective is that it neglects the ends
uf office holding for different groups, and the different resources
within the state which they need to access. The traditional political
elite does not need to grant exemptions on import duties nor to set
prices; it must control such patronage resources as employment and
public works to sustain its power. An exclusive focus on the outputs of
decision-making, such as industrial policy, price setting, and so forth,
neglects those parts of the state that control patronage resources.
This is a serious omission in a society such as Brazil in which entire
communities depend for their economic livelihood on injections of public
monies for development projects, public sector employment, and other
state resources.
Technocrats in the national Ministry of Planning formulated macro-
economic policy, but political elites implemented state policy and
programs. They administered federal programs within state borders, in
many cases politicizing them at the state level. Discretionary
distributional decisions were taken in the state governments, and the
heads of even seemingly insignificant state departments who were
responsible for the implementation of state policy controlled ample
state resources.
In our research on the Minas elite, we highlighted the composition
of the state cabinet (including the appointed mayor of the state capital
and the lieutenant governor) to test the claim that authoritarian
centralization transferred power away from traditional elites to
technocrats through changes in the executive branch. If federal and
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state legislatures had indeed been stripped of all meaningful functions
and jurisdictions by the military-technocratic alliance, prolonged
tenure in legislative posts, the typical focus of elite studies, would
mear little about real power. Followed, however, by higher, appointed
office, it would show continued reliance of the governing coalition on a
class of political elites.
In order to address two key questions: Did post-coup patterns
differ from pre-coup patterns? and What happened to pre-1964 political
elites after the coup?, we compared the career paths of officeholders in
two pre-coup administrations with those in the post-coup state cabinets
in Minas. We elected to focus on the administrations of Magalhaes Pinto
(1961-1965) and Bias Fortes (1956-1960) in order to include as broad as
possible a cross-section of the pre-coup elite. By beginning our study
of officeholders in 1956, we were able to include secretaries from both
the old PSD (Bias Fortes was Minas' last PSD governor) and the UDN
(Magalhaes Pinto's administration favored UDN politicians, and also
included some from the Republican party), but had we pushed the limits
of our study back any further, we would have complicated our ability to
monitor the political fate of the pre-coup oligarchy by introducing a
cohort who would have been for the most part too aged to survive into
the 1970s. For the purposes of comparison and establishing trends, we
divided elite cohorts according to governors' terms.
To assess the roles of technocrats and the traditional political
elite in the state, 'technocrats' must be distinguished from
'politicians', and a "technical" route to power from a "political" one.
Despite the critical role assigned to technocrats in Brazilian
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development, there is no scholarly study of their rise and influence nor
of their numbers nor even a clear sense of who the technocrats were.
Often the term "technocracy" is employed in the Brazilian context to
connote a super-elite stratum of national economic ministers and central
bank officers. At other times, it refers to a far larger public and
semi-public bureaucracy which includes but is not limited to the staffs
of state agencies and enterprises.
Meynaud (1968) characterized technocracy as the rise to power of
8
those who possess technical knowledge or skill. Defining technocrats
by their common attributes, especially the possession of a particular
degree, poses problems for classification, however, and a degree in
itself may not be the officeho'.der's ticket into the cabinet. Did the
son of a traditional elite who holds an economics degree rise into the
state elite as a member of the 'traditional elite' or as a 'technocrat'?
Are technocrats who submit themselves to popular ratification by
standing in elections no longer technocrats? Suleiman (1974: 378), who
has contributed substantially to the debate on technocracy, takes the
position that "civil servants who engage openly in politics do so as
politicians and as members of political parties from across the
political spectrum". While this position has merit, its principal fault
is that it cannot distinguish between cases in which an act of popular
ratification founds the basis o the technocrat's power, and those in
which it is merely a cosmetic gesture to defuse the criticism of
technocracy's opponents. Popular ratification, especially in a "safe"
electoral district, can be a mere formality, and an ex-post facto
confirmation of power already achieved.
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How do we distinguish "technocrats" from politicians who have
studied economics or engineering rather than law? In this work, the
distinction between technocrats and politicians is founded on the
considerations which influenced the appointment of a particular
secretary to office. What could the appointed officeholder offer to the
executive who selected him? Technical competence? Votes from his
native region? The allegiance of an entire political faction which was
loyal to his family? In instances where a technocrat-secretary offered
technical competence but little else, it seems reasonable to conclude
that he was chosen for his technical expertise. However, when the same
officeholder derives from a prominent family, or is a member of a
political party, mapping his route to power is problematic. To what
extent should technocratic officeholders be disassociated from
traditional political classes?
Labelling members of the state elite is based on the best
assessment of their primary route to power. The crucial distinction is
drawn between those who owe their position to a political following, and
those who do not. A descendent of the Minas oligarchy who had engaged
in no known political activity but who has a long and distinguished
career in public administration and enterprises is considered to be a
technocrat. On the other hand, a civil engineer who has risen through
the ranks of party and legislative service is identified, for the
purposes of this analysis, as a politician. The effect of this
procedure is to set stringent conditions for the label of technocrat,
but one which is justified if we are to determine the extent to which
traditional political elites in Brazil were deprived of their access to
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state resources--their primary power base. Displacement of a group
should not be confused with a shift of power within it--in this case,
from one kind of politician to another. A third category of state elite
is representatives of the private industrial and banking sectors. If an
officeholder appears to have been in a position to offer primarily the
support of the local business class, he was included in this category.
Once the principal categories have been established, intra-group
analyses are conducted to discern and interpret shifts from within the
sets of state elites. Did changes take place in the degree of political
accountability of technocrats? Were there were any significant
differences in the politicians of the pre- and post-coup eras? Did
traditional political elites, especially descendants of former governors
and founding fathers of the Republican party, suffer an erosion in their
position relative to new political elites?
The Minas State Elite
The most powerful man in state politics is the governor. He
appoints the cabinet secretaries, bank presidents, and agency heads who
make state policy. Regardless of methodological disposition or
analytical sympathies, one would be hard pressed to argue that any other
public or private job was more important politically than the chief
state executive. Clearly, at no time did Minas politicians cede this
post.
The first governor to assume office after the 1964 coup d'etat (and
the last by direct election) was Israel Pinheiro in 1965. The son of
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former governor Joao Pinheiro was initiated into politics through the
old Minas Republican party and the Liberal Alliance (which helped bring
Getulio Vargas to power). Through a propitious alliance with Vargas'
federal interventor in Minas, Benedito Valadares, Israel Pinheiro
embarked on a long and distinguished career in state and national
politics which brought him to posts in the state cabinet (1933-1942),
the state enterprises (as president of the Rio Doce Valley Company in
1942), the congress (as president of the Finance Commission in the
Chamber of Deputies), and at the invitation of President Juscelino
Kubitschek, active involvement in moving the federal capital from Rio de
Janeiro to Brasilia, first as the president of the company which laid
the groundwork for the construction of the new capital, NOVACAP (Cia.
Urbanizadora Nova Capital), and later as Brasilia's first mayor in
1960.
Israel Pinheiro's successor, Rondon Pacheco, appointed (or "elected
indirectly") governor of Minas at the height of technocratic power in
1971, was neither a civilian nor military technocrat, but very much a
politician. First in state politics and later as a federal deputy,
Pacheco had held important posts within the UDN party. He was its
leader on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies in 1960, and he also
served as a member of Magalhaes Pinto's cabinet from 1961 to 1962.
After the coup Pacheco rose in national stature, becoming secretary-
general of the new ARENA in 1966, Costa e Silva's Chief of the Civil
Cabinet (unambiguously one of the most powerful cabinet positions in the
national government) in 1967, and national president of ARENA beginning
in 1969, a post which he held until Mdici nominated him to be governor
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of Minas Gerais. Pacheco's successors, Aureliano Chaves (1975-1978) and
Francelino Pereira (1979-1982), were also politician-governors, as well
as high-ranking national figures in the ARENA party; Pereira, like
Pacheco, had served as national party president immediately preceding
his ascension to the state's highest office.
Politician-governors were the rule, not the exception, in Brazil.
Most governors in the 1970-74 period, unambiguously the most
authoritarian, were politicians (68 percent). Five traveled the
technocratic-bureaucratic path to power, and two were drawn directly
from the ranks of the armed forces (Table IV-1). Politicians were not
generally supplanted in the highest offices in their states. The
regional oligarchy in Minas, and if Minas' experience can be
generalized, perhaps in other states, retained state autonomy in this
period. Rondon Pacheco's ascendancy in Minas suggests, moreover, that
the Minas elite was well connected with upper military circles.
Politician-governors, even in authoritarian surroundings, behaved
first and foremost as politicians. Even at the height of technocratic
influence, Rondon Pacheco played politics even if some of his cabinet
secretaries did not. The departments of Interior and Justice, Labor,
Administration, and Government, were left, as always, to politicians, as
9
was Belo Horizonte's city hall. Moreover, Pacheco handed out
lucrative directorships in the state banking system to old political
stalwarts Jose Augusto Ferreira Filho and Francisco de Castro Pires
Junior, both of whom had served as presidents of the state Legislative
Assembly in the 1950s. Another politician from the Bias Fortes era, and
a member of the oligarchy, Juarez de Souza Carmo, was made president of
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Table IV-1
State Governors, 1966-70 - 1970-74
Paths to Power
Technical
Bureau- Armed
Education Political cratic Forces Total
1966 1970 1966 1970 1966 1970 1966 1970
Engineer 2 2 1 5 - 2 3 9
Economist - 1* - - - - - 1
Doctor 1 2 - - - - 1 2
Entrepreneur 3 1 - - - - 3 1
Lawyer 11 9* - - - - 11 9
Professor 1 1 - - - - 1 1
Military 1 - - - 1 - 2 -
Accountant 1 - - - - - 1 -
Total 20 15* 1 5 1 2 1 -
*The governor-elect for Rio Grande do Norte, Jose Cortes Pereira, was
included twice in the column "political" - as both a lawyer and an
economist.
Source: Santos, 1971: 126.
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the state's housing division (COHAB). Pacheco's lieutenant governor,
Celso Porflrio de Araujo, had been Bias Fortes' secretary of Public
Security.
Our findings of the routes to state office followed by cabinet
secretaries from 1956 to 1982 are summarized in Table IV-2. Two
measures of elite office holding are utilized. The first represents the
number and percentage of cabinet secretaries during a particular
administration by the career path (traditional political elite,
technocrat, private sector) they followed to state office. The second
measure represents the percent of total time (the sum of the number of
months each cabinet post was in existence) cabinet offices were occupied
by secretaries falling into these categories. The second measure has
been included to eliminate any distortions which might be caused by
weighing equally secretaries who served extremely brief terms in office
(in many instances no more than one to two months) with those who served
nearly full terms. Taken together, these measures offer as complete and
accurate a picture as can be achieved in summary form of the patterns of
advancement in Minas Gerais and their change over time.
Before the coup, most cabinet secretaries rose in Minas politics
because of family connections or through political channels. In the
late 1950s, Minas politics was governed by partisan considerations, and
remained the preserve of traditional elites. The governor, Jose
Francisco Bias Fortes (1956-1960), was from one of Minas' most
illustrious families; his father, Crispim Jacques Bias Fortes, was the
first governor of Minas Gerais (1894-1898). Similarly, his lieutenant
governor, Artur Bernardes Filho, was the son of Artur da Silva
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Table IV-2
The State Elite: Composition of the Cabinet, 1956-1982(a)
Routes to Power
Gubernatorial Traditional Political Techno-Bureaucratic
Administration Num. (%) % Time Num. (%) % Time
Bias Fortes
(1956-1961) 16 (89%) 96% 1 (6%) 2%
Magalhaes Pinto
(1961-1965) 40 (69%) 80% 9 (16%) 9%
Israel Pinheiro
(1966-1971) 23 (61%) 58% 11 (19%) 29%
Rondon Pacheco
(1971-1975) 8 (40%) 47% 11 (55%) 47%
Aureliano Chaves
(& Ozanam Coelho)(c) 12 (55%) 49% 9 (41%) 48%
(1975-1979)
Francelino Pereira
(1979-1982) 13 (65%) 70% 3 (15%) 17%
Totals 98 (62%) 41 (26%)
Notes: See next page.
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Table IV-2
The State Elite: Composition of the Cabinet, 1956-1982(a)
(cont.)
Routes to Power
Gubernatorial Private Sector Insufficient Data
Administration Num. i%) % Time Num. (%) % Time N(b)
Bias Fortes
(1956-1961) -- -- 1 (6%) 1% 18
Magalhaes Pinto
(1961-1965) 3 (5%) 4% 6 (11%) 3% 58
Israel Pinheiro
(1966-1971) 2 (5%) 7% 2 (5%) 2% 38
Rondon Pacheco
(1971-1975) 1 (5%) 5% -- -- 20
Aureliano Chaves
(& Ozanam Coelho)(c) 1 (1%) 1% 1 (4%) 2% 22
(1975-1979)
Francelino ereira
(1979-1982) 2 (10%) 9% 2 (10%) 4% 20
Totals 8 (5%) 12 (8%) 159
(a) State cabinet posts include the lieutenant governor and all state
secretaries for each administration, except military portfolios. The
post of the prefect of Belo Horizonte is included during the terms of
the post-coup governors, Israel Pinheiro, Rondon Pacheco, Aureliano
Chaves, and Francelino Pereira. This post was omitted in the pre-coup
period because, as an elected position, it was by definition one which
was achieved by political means. After the coup, it became an appointed
position.
(b) Column does not total because secretaries who occupied posts in more
than one administration were counted only once. Each administration is
considered as a separate unit in the rows, but the duplicates have been
removed from the columns.
(c) Ozanam Coelho, the lieutenant governor during the administration of
Aureliano Chaves, became governor in 1978 when Chaves resigned his post
to "run" for vice-president.
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Bernardes, governor of Minas (1918-1922) and president of Brazil (1922-
1926). Eighteen men served in the cabinet of the Bias Fortes
administration, including the lieutenant governor. Sixteen are known to
have risen by these means. Only one had had substantial administrative
experience.
A similar pattern is evident during the administration of Bias
Fortes' successor, Magalhaes Pinto. Magalhaes Pinto appointed 40 of 58
cabinet secretaries from political ranks, and nine were drawn from the
public bureaucracy. Politicians occupied state cabinet offices for
four-fifths of Magalhaes Pinto's term. In some cases, they were chosen
to head up secretariats for no apparent reason other than the base of
support they could offer the incumbent from their party's ranks. This
was especially true of several minor party leaders, who joined the
cabinet because the UDN was not a majority party. Political elites
overshadowed representatives of the business community in the
administration of the banker Magalhaes Pinto, but private sector elites
were no less prominent than during the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime
when they were alleged to be part of the ruling coalition.
After the regime change, technocratic participation in the cabinet
increased, peaked during the administration of Rondon Pacheco (1971-
1975), and then declined. The technocratic rise began in the
administration of Israel Pinheiro. Like his father, Joao Pinheiro, the
positivist governor of Minas Gerais at the turn of the century, and his
political mentor, Juscelino Kubitschek, Israel Pinheiro promoted
economic development in Minas. For this purpose, he invited into his
administration several technically qualified personnel, approximately 30
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percent of the state cabinet. Technocrats reached the apogee of their
influence over state policy during the administration of Rondon Pacheco.
More than half the cabinet, they held office a little less than half the
duration of his administration. Near the end of Pacheco's tenure as
governor, traditional political elites and technocrats shared fairly
equally state office. Aureliano Chaves, who assumed office in 1975,
maintained the technocratic presence in state government at
approximately half his cabinet. Politicians were even more clustered
toward the end of his term, which was served out by his lieutenant
governor and old stalwart of the PSD, Ozanam Coelho. The last governor
of the authoritarian period, Francelino Pereira (1979-1982), appointed
only three technocrats to his cabinet, and their combined time in office
was less than one-fifth of the total. When the trends in office holding
in these two administrations are added to our graphic representation of
the Minas state elite, a radically different picture emerges from that
projected at the height of the authoritarian period.
The paths of the traditional political elite and technocrats in the
state cabinet never quite crossed. A curvilinear pattern of office
holding by the two groups shows their positions merged in the mid-1970s,
but then diverged nearly as sharply as they had in the pre-coup years
(Figure IV-1). The picture is lluminating, if crude: traditional
political elites were neither pushed off the scale at any point, not
even during the apogee of technocratic office holding in the 1971-1974
period, nogr was the relative loss of their positions to technocrats
permanent and irreversible. Viewed from 1974, it was evident only that
traditional political elites had slid dramatically from their pre-coup
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Figure IV-1: The State Cabinet, 1956-1982
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highs: it was not obvious that their fortunes would soon reverse
themselves. What appeared in 1974 to be an endpoint or only slightly
better, the midpoint of a unidirectional slide, was actually the
nadir of a longer curve. What is striking when the whole picture is
taken into account, indeed, is how brief the period of technocratic
ascendancy was.
The brevity of the ascendancy of technocrats attests that
traditional elites were not ultimately dislodged from the state. But to
know that technocrats held office "47 percent of the time" alone tells
us little about the actual configuration of power within the state, and
how disruptive their presence was to traditional politicians. In fact,
the reach of technocrats was by and large limited to the ministries
which formulated economic policy.
Technocrats and politicians achieved a modus vivendi. Technocrats
held onto the key economic ministries--Finance and Planning--and
traditional politicians were returned the instruments of their
patronage: the Departments of Education, Public Works, and Interior.
In Minas, in the early 1970s, technocrats were assigned to administer
the Departments of Planning, Finance, Industry and Commerce, and
Agriculture (Table IV-3). Traditional political elites at no time
controlled the Department of Planning, and after losing control over
Finance during Israel Pinheiro's government, they never regained it.
But even during the height of technocratic influence they retained the
patronage departments of Interior and Justice and Administration, and
they quickly recaptured others: Education, Health, and Public Works.
In the administration of Francelino Pereira, they were returned to head
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Table IV-3
Political Elite Control of State Office, 1956-1982
(percent of cabinet post time)
Administration(a)
Cabinet Office I II III IV V VI
Economic Departments
Finance
Agriculture, Industry,
& Commerce (1956-63)
Agriculture (1963-82)
Planning (1970-82)
Industry, Commerce, and
Tourism (1972-82)
Economic Development
(1964-66)
88%
100%
70%
100%
41%*
_-- 63%
60%
78%
0%
0% 0% 0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
77%
73%*
0%
0%+
0%
Patronage Departments
Education
Interior & Justice
Public Works
Administration
Health
Mayor, Belo Horizonte
Others
Public Security
(1956-70)
Government
Science & Technology
(1977-82)
Labor (1963-82)
Social Action Affairs
(1964-66)
Rural Credit & Supply
Affairs (1964-66)
100% 63% 14/mil mil mil
-- 64%* 77%* 100%
-- 39%* li%
-- 100% 100%
-- 100%
mil
17% 100%
0% 73%*
100% 100% 100%
76%
(a) For cabinet administrations, refer to Table IV-2.
*Minimum estimates - officeholders included in total for whom data were
insufficient to determine career path.
+Officeholding shared by technocrats with business elites.
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100%
87%
100%
100%
0%+
98%
100%
88%
82%
66%
100%
86%
100%
29%
65%
86%
39%
0%
100%
0%
100%
0%
100%
17%
100%
100%
100%
83%*
0%
100%
100%
73%
100%
58%
100%
the Department of Agriculture, a post which in the preceding
administrations had been trusted to agronomists. Even departments such
as Labor and Science and Technology afford ample opportunity for
patronage. Perhaps the largest patronage job for a politician, mayor of
Belo Horizonte, was awarded to politicians at various times during the
authoritarian period, having been shared with technocrats and
representatives of the business community. Technocratic presence in
government did not long divorce traditional elites from their sources of
clientelism.
Politicians not only held onto and regained state cabinet posts,
they even invaded the terrain of the scientific experts with some
success. Former governors assumed control of some of the most important
state enterprises. Upon leaving the office of governor, Rondon Pacheco
became the president of USIMINAS, the national steel company located in
Minas Gerais. The belief that presidencies of state enterprises were
awarded on the sole basis of technical competence in authoritarian
Brazil has little foundation in fact. Moreover, following public
service many members of the traditional political elite found lucrative
state bank directorships awaiting them. In all, more than one-quarter
of the members of the traditional political elite throughout the three
decades of our study served at some point as directors, presidents, or
board members of state banks.
Technocrats and Politicians
Even with their scope of action limited to economic ministries,
technocrats may still have accumulated vast power and challenged the
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traditional oligarchy. The technocrat-secretaries of the early 1970s
appeared to differ fundamentally from other well educated and
experienced cabinet secretaries who preceded them. Unlike previous
career public servants who faithfully executed the policies of elected
politicians, the scientific experts of the 1970s were believed to be the
product of a new political system, accountable not to politicians, whom
they had supplanted in the state, but only to their military patrons.
Their presumed common origins, technical training, and advancement
through the state administration, para-public agencies, and state
enterprises was thought to have led to shared beliefs and behavior.
Common purpose and coordinated action, in turn, were believed to
generate power. They were thus viewed not as a loose amalgam of career
bureaucrats but as a budding technocracy.
Brazil has no equivalent of the French grandes ecoles [cole
10
Nationale d'Administration (ENA) and the cole Polytechnique], which
might have fostered some national esprit de corps. In Minas, two state
agencies, the state development bank, the Banco de Desenvolvimento de
Minas Gerais (BDMG), and the state electric company, Centrais Eltricas
de Minas Gerais (CEMIG) seemed to provide a disproportionate number of
11
economists and engineers for political duty. "In the decade of the
1970s, practically all key posts of decision-making in the state's
economic sphere were under the control of the group originating from
these two institutions" (Campolina Diniz, 1978: 143).
If there was a 'technical' route to office holding in Minas Gerais
which circumvented and devalued traditional political channels for
attaining state power, it was not a single one. The Minas technocratic
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corps was not monolithic (Table IV-4). The formal educational
experiences of technocrat-secretaries varied widely: only 15, or 37
percent, held economics or engineering degrees. While four-fifths of
the technocrats had had job experience which prepared them for their
posts in state government, their experience was neither uniform nor
centered in a few state agencies. Seven officeholders schooled in
medicine became secretaries of Health, and four agronomists headed the
state Department of Agriculture. In Pacheco's government most
technocrats were educated and trained for their posts, but this is not
true of Chaves' government, in which the schooling of only one-third of
the technocrat-secretaries was related to the requirements of their
posts, and just over half had related job experience. During the entire
period from 1956 to 1982, only 37 percent of the technocrats rose in the
state enterprises (as distinct from the fully public bureaucracy), a
figure only slightly higher (45 percent) during Pacheco's
administration.
This lack of common origins and even expertise does not of course
preclude the possibility that technocrats might have acted in a
coordinated fashion in office, nor that a motley set of capable
administrators still might have superseded a group of political relics
in orienting state policy. Common origins and experience may not be
necessary for a "technocracy" to impose a single vision on state
government policy, nor for technocrat-ministers to enhance their
12
power. Suleiman (1974) has argued that an administrative elite
becomes a 'technocracy' when technocrat-ministers act in common with
their counterparts in other, rival ministries. Another way to measure
219
Table IV-4
Technocrats: Education, Job Experience, and Political and
Private Sector Connections, 1956-1982
Education(b)
Cabinet(a) Job Type
Related(c) Law Med- Econ. Agro- Other
Yes No icine & Eng. nomy
Bias 1 0 1
Fortes (100%) (100%)
(1956-61)
Magalhaes 7 2 3 4 1 1
Pinto (78%) (22%) (33%) (44%) (11%) (11%)
(1.961-65)
Israel 5 6 3 5 1 2
Pinheiro (45%) (55%) (27%) (45%) (19%) (18%)
(1966-71)
Rondon 8 3 2 6 2 1
Pacheco (73%) (27%) (18%) (55%) (18%) (9%)
(1971-75)
Chaves/ 3 6 3 3 1 2
Coelho (33%) (67%) (33%) (33%) (11%) (22%)
(1975-79)
Francelino 2 1 1 1 1
Pereira (67%) (33%) (33%) (33%) (33%)
(1979-82)
Totals 24 17 10 7 15 4 5
(59%) (41%) (24%) (17%) (37%) (10%) (12%)
Notes: See page 222.
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Table IV-4
Technocrats: Education, Job Experience, and Political and
Private Sector Connections, 1956-1982
(cont.)
Public Job Experience(d) Poli- Private
tical Sector
Cabinet Job Public Public Univ- Connec- Connec- N=(g)
Related(c) Bureau- Enter- ersi- tions(e) tions(f)
Yes No cracy prises ties
Bias 1 0 1 1 0 1
Fortes (100%) (100%) (100%)
(1956-61)
Magalhaes 9 0 8 1 4 0 9
Pinto (100%) (89%) (11%) (44%)
(1961-65)
Israel 7 4 6 3 2 7 3 11
Pinheiro (64%) (36%) (55%) (27%) (18%) (64%) (27%)
(1966-71)
Rondon 11 0 2 5 4 1 4 11
Pacheco (100%) (18%) (45%) (36%) (9%) (36%)
(1971-75)
Chaves/ 5 4 4 5 7 5 9
Coelho (56%) (44%) (44%) (56%) (78%) (56%)
(1975-79)
Francelino 2 1 2 1 3 0 3
Pereira (67%) (33%) (67%) (33%) (100%)
(1979-82)
Totals 33 8 20 15 6 21 12 41
(80%) (20%) (49%) (37%) (15%) (51%) (29%)
Notes: See next page.
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Notes to Table IV-4
a. Included in cabinet positions are the lieutenant governor and
secretaries of state for all positions except those which became
military portfolios. Additionally, the mayor of Belo Horizonte is
included beginning in 1967 when it became an appointed position, and
thus figures into the administrations of Israel Pinheiro, Rondon
Pacheco, Aureliano Chaves/Ozanam Coelho, and Francelino Pereira.
b. Education is the highest degree held before assuming office.
c. When a secretary holds more than one post in the same
administration, his education and job training are related to the
position held longer or first, depending upon which is more prominent.
d. Included under the rubric of public bureaucracy is work in the
administrations of the federal, state, and, in the case of Belo
Horizonte, local governments. Public enterprises, though strictly
speaking part of the state bureaucracy, are distinguished by their semi-
autonomy. The public enterprises which appear most frequently on the
vitaes of the technocrat-secretaries are the state electric company,
steel companies, development bank, agrarian enterprises, and department
of roads -- in other words, those agencies executing development
projects and running the economy. While many technocrats who worked
their way up in the bureaucracy and public enterprises also hold
university appointments, the secretaries identified as having job
experience in the universities are distinguished by such high-level
career positions as university rector.
e. "Political connections" include any one of the following:
admission of a partisan affiliation; relatives in politics; and tenure
in political posts. In most cases, these are elected, but I have also
included such appointed posts as state interventor (federally-appointed
governors), and municipal chief executive (state-appointed mayors)
during the years of the Vargas dictatorship.
f. Secretaries may have been engaged in private enterprise either
before, during, or after having held office. Low-level positions in
private enterprises before entering public service are not included.
g. The total number of secretaries does not total 44 as it
apparently should because three secretaries held posts in more than one
administration. Each administration is considered as a separate unit in
the rows, but the duplicates have been removed from the columns.
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technocratic power is by the degree of the "technocrat's" accountability
to, or autonomy from, political elites.
The Minas technocrats were hardly an omnipotent, apolitical body.
They appeared to be above partisan calculations and not answerable to
political elites for only a brief time. The secretaries of the
administration of Rondon Pacheco were highly professional: only one (of
11) had any political or partisan affiliation- But the technocrats of
Chaves' administration had vast political connections -- more than
three-fourths either had extensive contacts with politicians or engaged
directly in politics themselves. Some had served politicians in a
personal capacity; private secretaries of cabinet secretaries who later
became governors, for example, themselves became cabinet secretaries
during their former patrons' administrations. All three technocrats in
Francelino Pereira's government had political connections.
Many technocrats were descended from Minas' traditional families.
Indeed, family connections are not easily separable from the ascent of
some technocrats into the state elite. Aureliano Chaves' secretary of
Planning, Paulo Camillo de Oliveira Penna, a chaired professor of
Planning and Public Administration in the Economics Department of the
Federal University and president of the state development bank from
1963 to 1966, was also from one of Minas' most traditional families of
the Rio Doce Valley, a descendant of ex-president Afonso Penna, a nephew
of former governor Milton Campos (1947-1951), and private secretary to
Magalhaes Pinto from 1961-1963 during his term as governor. Penna's
first cousin, Jose Israel Vargas, the first state secretary of Science
an- Technology, could hardly have been more qualified: he held a Ph.D.
223
in chemistry from Cambridge University and had worked on the French
Atomic Energy commission. Penna's successor in the Planning Ministry
(he died in office in 1976), Helio Briz, had managerial experience in
foreign firms and technocratic training, but was also the grandson of
Wenceslau Bras, governor of Minas during the Old Republic (1908-1910)
and president of Brazil (1914-1918).
Many technocrats had been active in politics at some point in their
public life. A small number early in their careers occupied such
political offices as local city councillor or promotor de justiga. Even
more admitted to partisan affiliations. At least 11 secretaries who
rose through technocratic ranks claimed membership in or identified
with a political party.
Though their political activity was probably not the primary reason
for the rise of these technocrats to state office, the differences in
political connections between the technocrat-secretaries in the
administrations of Rondon Pacheco on the one hand and Aureliano Chaves
and Francelino Pereira on the other are hardly irrelevant. They reveal
a trend: as the recruitment to state government began to revert back to
the political class, technocrats themselves began to display political
attributes, and their selection appeared to satisfy political
constituencies. The appointment of Joao Valle Mauricio, a medical
doctor with an impressive background in public health, as state
Secretary of Health in 1981 mollifed the politically important North of
Minas, which felt it had been underrepresented in Francelino Pereira's
cabinet. Mauricio had previously been the leader of the Republican
party and city council in Montes Claros before the coup, and briefly
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13
served on the local ARENA diretorio thereafter.
Political Elites, Traditional Elites
The return of political elites to state office in the second decade
of bureaucratic-authoritarianism belied the notion that the Brazilian
political system had been fundamentally transformed. Its original
contours were quickly restored. The persistence of the most traditional
elements of this elite, moreover, suggested that the substance of this
system was essentially unaltered.
Elites who held legislative office were not powerless. They were
still capable of garnering votes, an important political resource in a
regime struggling to maintain legislative majorities in federal and
state chambers. It provided them with a launching pad into the higher
state elite. Politicians per se were once again rewarded for party
service and their vote-drawing ability in the administration of
Francelino Pereira, when state cabinet appointees were drawn from the
ranks of elected officeholders. Setting aside the ARENA candidates who
received the first and third most votes in the 1978 congressional
elections, former governor Magalhaes Pinto and his associate Hlio
Garcia [who bolted from ARENA to become the national and state
presidents, respectively, of the newly formed Popular Party (Partido
14
Popular)], top vote getters ascended quickly to elite ranks. ARENA's
second most voted federal deputy, Mauricio Campos, was named mayor of
Belo Horizonte; the sixth top vote getter, Carlos Eloy, the Secretary of
Public Works; the seventh Gerardo Renault, the Secretary of Agriculture;
and so forth. In all, four federal deputies and three state deputies
225
served as cabinet secretaries in the first round of Pereira's
government, in addition to Maurrcio Campos and the lieutenant governor,
Joao Marques de Vasconcellos, a ranking politician in the state
legislature. Also rewarded with a cabinet portfolio for his party
service was Fernando Fagundes Neto, who had sacrificed a congressional
seat to run unsuccessfully against heavily favored MDB candidate
15
Tancredo Neves in the 1978 direct senatorial election.
Far from having been neutralized politically in the post-coup
authoritarian system, prominent figures of Mineiro politics before the
1964 coup fared quite well in circumstances of military governance. In
many cases, they made their way to quite powerful posts; in others,
quite lucrative ones. Striking is the overall levels of political
survival characteristic of this group. Of 77 pre-coup political elites
identified from a universe of state and federal posts (see Appendix A),
at least 36 (46 percent) served in the executive branch after the regime
change (Table IV-5). Of these 36, 22 achieved such noteworthy positions
as governor, vice-president, and state and federal cabinet ministers, or
such highly paid ones as state bank presidents, directors, and board
chairmen. In ten cases, they survived "partially", retaining a measure
of power for a limited period, or securing a less than top elite post.
In a third category, the career successes of five descendents of
deceased elites are taken into account.
When the potential field of elite survivors is narrowed to reflect
demographic and political realities, the political survival rate rises.
Excluding ten members of the political elite who died in the 1960s and
1970s (other than those whose children, brothers, or nephews went on in
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Table IV-5
Minas Gerais: Pre-Coup Political Elites -- Post-Coup Careers
Noteworthy Survival(a)
Partial Survival
(lesser posts or
temporary)(b)
Close Relatives Who
Survived(c)
Survived in Legis-
lature and ARENA(d)
No Known Post-Coup
Posts
Gaps in Data - May
Have Survived(e)
PTB-MDB Elites
Elites Who Died in
1960s and 1970s
Total
Number
22
9
5
11
10
3
8
10
27
13 46
6
13
13
4
10
13
Percent
31
15 53
7
15
15
4
12
36
17 61
8
17
17
5
38
18 65
9
18
18
X
X X
X X X
77
(a) The type of posts represented under the rubric of "noteworthy" are
state governor (of which there are three), vice-president, cabinet
posts, president of state banks, and so forth.
(b) Lesser posts are directors of lesser state agencies, and certain
judicial posts. An example of 'temporary' survival is Francisco Negrao
de Lima, elected governor of Guanabara in 1965, who in the mid-1970s was
denied a party candidacy even by the MDB for a senate race.
(c) Included are sons, brothers, and nephews. Excluded are cousins and
other, more distant relations.
(d) By this is meant either a state or federal deputy, or a high-ranking
party post.
(e) In three cases, there is reason to believe that high appointed posts
may have been held after the coup, but the dates of tenure in those
posts are unavailable.
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public careers) from the universe of the pre-coup elite brings the
percentage of those who survived to over half. Similarly, when those
elites who belonged to the PTB and who later joined the MDB (most of
whom were participants in the Goulart government which was overthrown by
the military in 1964) are also removed from consideration, by the logic
that they never really were traditional political elites, but their
challengers, the percentage of surviving oligarchs surpasses three-
fifths.
Prominent among the front ranks of the political elite in state
office, moreover, were direct descendents of the core of the
"oligarchy"--the 27 "governing families" who can trace their origins to
the Brazilian independence movement that were boldly identified by Cid
Rebelo Horta (1956). To appreciate the importance of these families in
Minas politics, 33 of 55 presidents of Minas when it was a province
under the Empire and 80 percent of its republican governors were
descended from these families. In 1981, Jose (Zezinho) Bonifacio de
Andrada, a prominent political oligarch from one of Minas' most
important traditional families, concurred heartily with Rebelo Horta's
characterization of Minas politics as the domain of 27 "governing
families":
In all states a certain number of families control
politics. Only in the South, where immigration is
significant, this does not happen. In Bahia [a
northeastern state], for example, Luiz Vianna was
governor, Luiz Vianna Filho [son] was governor, and
Luiz Vianna Neto [grandson] is president of the
Senate (Estado de Minas, 1/18/81).
At least 31 members of the traditional political elite identified
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in the pre- and post-coup periods are known to have been descended from
these families, which represents roughly one-quarter of the total. Even
in the post-coup period, the prominence of the Coelhos of Uba, the Bias
Fortes and Andradas of Barbacena, and the Oliveira Pennas is startling.
Prominent among Chaves' leading political appointees to the cabinet were
the heads of two of the most reknowned oligarchical families of Minas,
Bonifacio de Andrada and Bias Fortes, both sons and grandsons of
governors. The list can be extended even further, into the
administration of Francelino Pereira, when Carlos Eloy Carvalho
Guimaraes was named secretary of Public Works. Ex-state president of
ARENA, former majority leader in the state legislature, and a serious
contender for the PDS nomination for governor in 1982, Eloy traces his
lineage to the legendary Joaquina de Pompeu, matriarch of a cluster of
governing families (Estado de Minas, 1/18/81). Representing the
oligarchy in the Figueiredo government was Joao Camilo Penna, minister
of Industry. In 1981, at least 16 federal deputies and 28 state
representatives also belonged to these same 27 "governing families"
(Estado de Minas, 1/18/81). The reach of the Minas oligarchy, moreover,
extends beyond its blood and marriage relations. Significantly, its
members are often found in top posts or in positions to broker who, if
not they, shall rise in Minas politics and in the state. "New"
political elites often owed their allegiance and positions to
oligarchical patrons.
Politics in Minas is not a closed affair. Even during the First
Republic, new blood was allowed entry into the elite (cf. Wirth, 1977).
In recent years, rather modest politicians such as lieutenant governor
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Joao Marques de Vasconcellos and Ibrahim Abi-Ackel, minister of Justice
during Joao Figueiredo's presidency, were able to rise to high ranking
posts. The blend of oligarchical roots, political service, and even
technical competence among the illustrious are features of Minas
politics which remain unchanged. What is surprising and significant in
the light of regime change is the sustained, measurable degree of
influence which these oligarchs retain over the political system which
their forebears created nearly a century ago.
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Conclusions
Traditional elites in Minas Gerais were not eclipsed irreversibly
by a centralizing military regime. The announcement by scholars of the
death of this class was premature. For a brief period, technocrats
appeared to have displaced traditional elites in many high state
offices. But traditional political elites regained most of these very
soon thereafter, and the technocrats who served in economic departments
in the mid and late 1970s had extensive political attachments and worked
well with politicians. These technocrat-secretaries represented neither
a new class nor a threat to politicians.
Traditional political elites defended their positions and power in
the state by traditional political means. The design of macro-economic
policy by the federal government did not structurally deprive political
elites in the states of the means with which to implement policy along
clientelistic lines. Traditional elite access to their sources of
patronage was interrupted for only a very brief time. Moreover, no
identifiable, irreversible break took place in patterns of elite
recruitment. Political parties remained vehicles for political
advancement--"Modern Princes"--and by the mid to late 1970s, the ability
to marshall support for the regime, largely but not exclusively by
drawing votes, was once again highly regarded and rewarded. The
upturn of the "traditional political elite curve", a barometer of
political activity in an authoritarian regime, after 1974 suggests the
military failed in its quest to purge politics from the state. The
resilience of the most traditional members of the political elite
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implies that the military was unable to even sponsor a new political
elite more to its liking. In outlasting a regime which had no obvious
place for it, the Minas oligarchy demonstrated its strength within the
state and the force of traditional politics.
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Notes
1. So confident was McDonough (1981a: 79) of this fact that he
began his study of Brazilian elites during the Medici regime by flatly
asserting: "The objective [of this study] is not to discover the power
structure, as if there were serious doubt about its existence or even
much mystery about its composition". Faucher (1981) argues that the
bourgeoisie withdrew from the ruling clique.
2. Cardoso is of course referring to Gramsci's (1971: 129)
revision of Machiavelli's concept of the Modern Prince. For Gramsci,
the Modern Prince was the political party.
3. "Technocrat" here is not intended in the perjorative sense in
which it is sometimes used. I have opted to maintain its usage because
the alternative, "technician", is inadequate to describe those experts
who are alleged to have accumulated political influence. Moreover, if
Suleiman (1977) is correct that "technocrats" are generalists, and
"technicians" are specialists, they are not interchangeable terms.
4. Such as those defined by Apter (1965) and Linz (1970).
5. Smith (1979: 318) sums up the shortcomings of all three:
The reputational approach depends too heavily on the
perception of informants, who may or may not be
well-informed and who might tend to overestimate the
visible trappings of leadership, not to mention
political gossip, whereas real power might be
exercised behind the scenes. The institutional
approach stresses organizations and overlooks
informal sources of power. And the decision-making
criterion, notwithstanding its merits, deals only
with overt cases of conflict; it says nothing about
the issues which never reach the political arena and
which, for that very reason, might be the most
crucial of all. There is no way of avoiding the
likelihood of error: all you can do is pick your
pitfall.
Having acknowledged this fact, there are nonetheless differences in
political systems which might suggest one method over another. In
Brazil, where heresay about the composition of the power structure has
been accepted as fact, the reputational method tends to reinforce
existing stereotypes. In McDonough's (1981b: 98) study, for instance,
'elite' informants most often cited the president of the Republic and
Delfim Netto as the most powerful personages in Brazilian society during
the Mdici regime. To accept their reputations, in this case, as
confirmation of their power is tantamount to accepting unverified
gossip.
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6. For a summary comparison between the two, see Guimares
(1977).
7. Because of this, studying who holds power by 'mapping' out the
frequency of contacts between businessmen and other private citizens and
office holders may tell us less about power and more about how business
is conducted in a state capitalist economy. To cite an example of the
potential problems inherent in this approach, McDonough (1981a) "maps
out" the power structure during the Medici regime in Brazil by recording
the contacts between businessmen and state ministries regulating affairs
of interest to them. He interprets the frequency of those contacts as
proof that these groups formed a powerful alliance. Yet, he does not
explicitly consider the nature and purpose of those contacts. This is
an especially serious omission in light of the interweaving of the
private and public economies, the purchases and deliveries from the
private to the public sector, and the regulation of imports, prices, and
other factors crucial to the management of a business. Frequency of
contracts, especially if the "bureaucratic rings" model is an accurate
representation of reality, cannot in itself imply influence over the
final decision, but merely the 'normal' means of articulating one's
interest to the centers of decision-making. McDonough's record of
personal contacts, therefore, is less an exposition of the power
structure than a confirmation of patterns of interest representation in
an authoritarian political system.
For much this reason, there is a serious question about whether who
influenced policy can be determined in an authoritarian regime. This
point is argued for the case of Mexico by Smith (1979).
8. Meynaud (1968: 27) hastens to include under the rubric of
those who possess technical knowledge both those whom he describes as
experts, who have a thorough knowledge of a particular field or subject,
and the general manager or administrator, who "has the ability to
control various stages or sectors of operation and see them all as a
whole". Suleiman (1977) has shown that it is rare that technocrats
actually possess technical skill, at least in France. There, such an
ability is viewed with scornful derision by top civil servants who take
pride in their ability to see things whole and make well-reasoned
decisions. They are the "generalists" to which Meynaud refers.
9. Interestingly, Pacheco's appointee as mayor of the capital,
Oswaldo Pierucetti, had served in the same post as Belo's last elected
mayor from 1965-1967.
10. The empirical record is contained in McDonough (1981b: 67).
The one exception is military elites, who were for the most part
schooled at the Superior War College (ESG). See Stepan (1971) for the
most complete study of the common background of the military elite.
11. While the BDMG was created in 1962 to fund small and medium
industry in Minas, it soon took on the functions of the state body
responsible for economic studies. A Department of Studies and Planning
was created, and a new technical team hired to prepare first a series of
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sectoral studies (e.g. sugar, textile, and meat processing industries),
and later the major work, the Diagnstico da Economia Mineira, published
in six volumes in 1968. This document served to enhanc, the position of
the authors, the so-called "Prophets of Catastrophe"; one Minas observer
has claimed that it legitimated their rise at the expense of the
"political class" (Campolina Diniz, 1978: 143).
12. Suleiman (1974) is quick to point out that mere common
backgrounds of education do not lead necessarily to homogenous behavior
as technocrats, nor to one technocratic ideology. He goes to great
lengths to show instead that civil servants owe their loyalty and
attachment to their particular administration, and that this loyalty is
a chief obstacle to coordination among the ministries which he seems to
feel would be required for a functioning, rational technocracy.
13. Background on Joao Valle Maurlcio and the conclusions about
the reasons for his selection were drawn from Montes Claros em Foco,
Vol. XIV, No. 39, October, 1981.
14. The Popular Party (PP) was a shortlived party, which was
created when electoral laws were rewritten in 1979 to allow
multi-partism, and which was disbanded in 1982 when revisions in the
electoral laws made it more difficult for a divided opposition to
advance in the polls that coming November. Throughout its brief life,
the PP was a Mineiro-dominated party.
15. Francelino Pereira perceived that he needed to rely on a
political class in his government. Illustrative is the near automatic
selection process for his lieutenant governor. After Jose Bonifacio
Lafayette de Andrada nixed his first choice for lieutenant governor,
Bias Fortes, Francelino fulfilled his need for a representative from the
old PSD faction of the ARENA party by nominating Joao Marques de
Vasconcellos. This nomination came as somewhat of a surprise since
Marques did not have an established reputation as a state power-broker.
The most obvious explanation for his selection was that he was the vice-
leader of ARENA in the state Legislative Assembly, and the top ranking
ex-PSD legislator in the house. Marques himself, in an interview with
the Jornal da Casa, saw his nomination as proof of Francelino
"fulfilling his promise to govern Minas with the 'political class"'.
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CHAPTER FIVE
STATE CLIENTELISM IN MINAS GERAIS
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Introduction
Political clientelism has long been the mainspring of traditional
Minas politics. Since the inception of the Republic, the Prazilian
political system has operated on the basis of patronage. Most political
institutions and facets of political life were geared to facilitate the
flow of state resources from the center to the periphery.
Traditionally, federal funds were appropriated by the more powerful
regional oligarchies, who, in turn, bolstered the rule of loyal
municipal bosses with state aid. Local political elites, the coroneis,
who achieved their positions by virtue of being landowners, demonstrated
their loyalty to state oligarchs by delivering the votes of their
"herds". The fiscal dependence of impoverished municipalities on state
and federal governments left local elites, and their subjects, little
alternative but to support the existing order.
For traditional political elites who enjoyed the perquisites of
political clientelism, the nature of economic development after 1964
presented an unanticipated opportunity to strengthen their positions.
The Minas oligarchy, despite eroding, rural patron-client relations,
retained its political dominance through its command over an expanded
state patronage system. This patronage system evolved from one in which
state elites delegated public authority to local bosses whose source of
domination was private assets (ordinarily land), to one whose patrons,
clients, and resources were incorporated within the domain of the state
sector. An explosion occurred in the number of clients dependent on
state patronage. The modernization of agriculture, mass urbanization,
and incomplete industrialization precipitated the formation of a mass
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state client stratum. At the margin of the formal market economy, this
stratum was sustained by state subsidies.
After 1964 state resources expanded dramatically, and state
agencies and programs to distribute them proliferated. The dynamism of
the public sector economy enabled the state to meet the demands posed by
a growing state client class. The resources to maintain and even
broaden the state's patronage programs were generated by state
capitalism. The centralization of finance and policy-making introduced
during the authoritarian regime did not, as might have been anticipated,
transfer control over patronage from regional traditional political
elites to the federal government and technocratic policy-makers. The
Minas state oligarchy was capable, through state, transferred, and
borrowed resources, of sustaining its patronage operations. It
retained, moreover, the fundamental power of implementing national
policy and programs. National policy-making by technical experts
notwithstanding, the channels by which state resources reached
municipalities and citizens remained highly politicized. Fiscal and
political centralization only transformed the patronage system into an
oligarchical monopoly. In authoritarian Brazil, controlling state
office became a self-perpetuating political resource.
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The Expansion of State Patronage
The expansion of national public resources in the 1960s and 1970s
was paralleled in the states. In Minas Gerais, from 1947 to 1969,
public expenditure grew annually by 6.5 percent (FJP, n.d., I: IV-13),
1
and from 1971 to 1977, by 16.9 percent (FJP, n.d., I: IV-13). In real
terms, state expenditure per capita nearly tripled between 1960 and 1977
(FJP, n.d., III: 141, 145). Public sector spending in Minas Gerais also
increased as a share of the gross domestic product: state spending
alone (state direct administration, para-public agencies, foundations,
and enterprises) reached 19.0 percent in 1977 (SEPLAN, 1978, 6: 253,
252). When to this is added the spending of the federal and municipal
governments within the state, as well as the spending of a select few
federal para-public agencies--the INPS and FUNRURAL--and educational
foundations, that figure rises to 28.9 percent (SEPLAN, 1978, 6: 255)
(Table V-1).
To administer a richer and increasingly complex state government a
number of new federal and state enterprises and para-public agencies and
foundations were created. Between 1960 and 1977, the number of agencies
of the state's "direct" and "indirect" administrations, foundations, and
enterprises rose from 45 to 124 (Table V-2). Taken together, these
para-public agencies and foundations represented approximately one-fifth
of all non-entrepreneurial public spending in the 1970s. Through these
institutions, the state provided vital services. The most important of
these agencies (those with the largest budgets) delivered roads, water,
and energy; administered social security; sold agricultural inputs;
constructed elementary schools; and even ran the lottery (FJP, n.d.,
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Table V-1
Minas Gerais: State Expenditure, 1977
(as Percent of GDP)
1) State of Minas: Direct Administration, Para-
Public Agencies and Foundations 8.7
2) Entrepreneurial Activity
expenditure 5.4
annual increased in fixed assets 5.8
total (11.2)
3) Direct Administration
federal government (within Minas) 1.7
municipal governments 3.1
4) Select Federal Para-Public Agencies and
Foundations [INPS(a), FUNRURAL(b),
Educational Foundations] 4.1
Total Public Sector 28.9(c)
(a) Instituto Nacional de Previdencia Social (national social security
administration)
(b) Fundo de Assistencia e Previdencia ao Trabalhador Rural (rural
social security)
(c) Rounded sum
Source: SEPLAN, 1978, 6: 252, 254.
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Table V-2
Minas Gerais: Composition of the Public Sector, 1960-1977
(number of agencies)
1960 1970 1972 1977
Direct Administration 28 45 49 58
Para-Public Agencies and Foundations 6 26 28 32
Public Enterprises, Mixed-
Ownership Corporations, etc. 11 21 22 34
Total 45 92 99 124
Source: SEPLAN, 1978, 6: 112.
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III: 103, 113-14).
The state's expanded role into new branches of the economy and into
the provision of new social services broadened the possibilities for
state patronage. The state supported a large and growing number of
clients, many directly through public employment. One quarter of all
service sector employment is formally state employment, representing a
diverse range of state jobs including administrative, personnel,
doctors, teachers, and transportation workers. Five areas of public
employment included in this rubric (government, public education, public
health, sanitation, and communication) accounted for 10 percent of total
employment in Minas Gerais in 1977 (Table VI-3), more than double the
amount employed in these same professions in 1960. The number of
persons employed as public school teachers (186,000) particularly stands
2
out. Moreover, nearly one-fifth of the state's industrial employment
3
is in state enterprises. By the late 1970s, therefore, the number of
direct public employees (approx. 444,972) exceeded that of industrial
workers in the private sector (approx. 342,900).
State spending also generated an impressive number of indirect
jobs. One significant area of public expenditure creating employment
opportunity was construction, encompassing housing, government buildings
(schools, hospitals, bus stations), and civil engineering. The IBGE
(1977: 184) attributed the substantial increase in construction
employment between 1950 and 1970 in southeastern Brazil to the national
housing program. In Minas Gerais, where 457,310 persons were employed
in construction in 1980 (an increase of 50 percent with respect to
1977), at least 73,000 new jobs in the sector were officially credited
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Table V-3
Minas Gerais: Public Sector Employment, 1960, 1970, 1977
1960 1970 1977
Areas ------------- ------------- --------------
1000 1000 1000
persons % persons % persons %
Government 69.0 2.3 98.0 2.8 123.1 3.2
Public
Education 54.0 1.8 112.0 3.3 186.4 4.8
Public Health 12.0 0.4 18.0 0.5 23.6 0.6
Sanitation 13.0 0.4 20.0 0.6 25.9 0.7
Communication 10.0 0.3 14.0 0.4 17.7 0.4
Total 158.0 5.2 252.0 7.6 376.7 9.7
Source: SEPLAN, 1978, 6: 259.
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4
to state spending on housing in 1980 alone (SEPLAN, 1981: 97). How
much indirect employment can be attributed to Brazilian state spending
is hard to know. In calculating this measure for the United States,
O'Connor (1973: 17) estimated that when production organized by
industries under contract with the state (such as highway construction)
was added to the state sector, the percentage of the civilian labor
force employed by the state rose from about one-eighth to perhaps as
much as one-third. Given comparable levels of direct state employment
and the more pervasive presence of the Brazilian state in the productive
sectors of the economy, indirect employment generated by state spending
may have been at least as much.
For those for whom the state could not provide directly, the state
in Minas Gerais in the 1970s expanded traditional patronage programs and
developed new ones. It shifted resources away from development-oriented
goals toward subsidies for the marginal population. Table V-4
highlights the changing patterns of state spending in the 1960s and
1970s; the three sample years reflect three different sets of state
priorities. In 1959/60, the close of the decade in which Juscelino
Kubitschek committed Minas to developing its physical infrastructure,
energy and transportation garnered one-third of state expenditure. In
1972, during the height of the state's industrialization drive,
infrastructural spending declined sharply while spending on "industrial
development" rose from 1.5 to 8.6 percent of the total state budget.
Between 1972 and 1977, the most significant increase in state spending
came in the area of "urban development", rising more than on any other
5
significant government service. State resources earmarked for urban
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Table V-4
Minas Gerais: Per Capita State Expenditure, 1959-1977(a)
(in 1977 cruzeiros)
1959/60 1972 1977
Services Amount % Amount % Amount %
Administration
Legislature
Judiciary
Public Security
Finances(b)
Health
Education
Welfare & Social
Security
Commerce
Transportation
Communications
Planning
Regional De-
velopment
Industrial De-
velopment
Urban Develop-
ment
Environment
Statistical &
Research Ser-
vices
Agriculture
Energy & Mineral
Resources
Culture
Financial Ser-
vices & Tourism
Modernization of
Public Services
Total
11,884
2,917
9,651
40,320
35,280
23,472
32,396
24,122
11,422
89,745
920
8
3.5
0.9
2.9
12.1
10.6
7.0
9.7
7.2
3.4
26.9
0.3
0.0
14,837
6,996
13,153
71,735
51,325
19,518
157,363
50,319
15,875
106,260
1,285
3,866
2.3
1.1
2.0
11.0
7.8
3.0
24.0
7.7
2.4
16.2
0.3
0.6
5,648 0.8
5,196 1.5
75 0.0
68 0.0
4,985 1.5
16,992 5.1
24,340 7.3
156 0.0
186 0.1
95 0.0
334,230
56,304 8.6
3,924 0.6
11,687 1.8
22,125 3.4
6,579 1.0
1,191 0.2
32,980 5.1
732 0.1
653,702
14,852
14,614
33,286
91,420
42,091
45,021
239,245
139,813
32,889
222,579
4,940
20,027
1.1
1.1
2.5
7.0
3.2
3.4
20.6
10.7
2.6
17.0
0.4
1.5
2,918 0.2
86,707 6.6
83,030 6.1
2,574 0.2
26,502 2.0
52,833 4.0
108,050 8.2
3,138 0.2
9,811 0.7
8,650 0.7
1,281,990
(a) Includes direct administration and para-public agencies and
foundations, but excludes state enterprise, federal, and municipal
expenditures.
(b) Debt service and transfers to municipios.
Source: FJP, n.d., III: 141, 145.
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development subsidized the urban population whose growing numbers
reflect the shift of the population from the hinterlands and agriculture
into urban agglomerations.
Of all urban development programs, perhaps the most important was
housing construction. In 1980, the state in Brazil, through the
National Housing Bank and federal and state Caixas Economicas, furnished
nearly three-fourths (73.8%) of the capital in the housing mortgage
market (IBGE, 1983: 902). Additionally, federal and state governments
occasionally organized special housing programs to benefit the low-
income population. In Minas Gerais, such a program was successfully
launched on a somewhat modest scale in the first year of Francelino
Pereira's government (1979), and later expanded into a major development
project. From 1979 to 1982, the state government built 107,343 new
residential units, a substantial share of its 7.8 billion dollar program
to build 130,000, mostly low-income, residential units. In the
following year, the governor promised 300,000 more units would be
constructed by the end of his term in office in 413 municipios (half the
state's total) (SEPLAN, 1981: 97-99). If implemented, the state's
housing program would have provided shelter for roughly 15 percent of
6
the state's population. In the 1983-1986 period, an additional 78,890
units were planned for 100 municipios (Pereira dos Santos, 1983: 345).
Other urban development funds were channeled through ambitious
projects like the federal and state Intermediary Cities Programs, backed
by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, respectively.
The state program expanded on a federal project to develop mid-sized
"dike" cities to halt migratory flows into metropolitan capital regions
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by rechanneling them to these entrepots. Minas extended the benefits of
the program from the two "dike-cities" in the federal program (Montes
Claros and Juiz de Fora) to 14 other mid-sized cities. The programs
delivered basic sanitation (sewerage and water), infrastructure
(including public transportation), health and education, labor training,
credit, and income-improving opportunities such as subsidies for
artesanry to two million low-income inhabitants (one in seven of the
state's population) between 1981 and 1985. The "Dike-Cities" Program
was the most ambitious of all state development programs. It was not,
however, unique. Table V-5 indicates the broad scope of state programs,
and the size of potential target groups.
Not all effective state patronage programs were expensive.
PRODECOM, the state Program for the Development of Communities, a low-
cost, 'self-help' program for low-income communities, was initiated in
1979 as a form of "participatory planning". In theory, the community
was invited to define areas of community need and to contribute to
meeting those needs in conjunction with the state. The program's
spokespersons proclaimed that it would substitute for the actions of the
"paternalistic state" (Haddad, 1980: 115). In practice, regardless of
the source of program initiatives, PRODECOM brought public goods to vast
numbers of Mineiros at little cost to state government. Moreover, in
many cases, this program tied already existing neighborhood associations
directly to the state.
Of the program's priority areas, "nutritional improvement" and the
construction of "popular" housing soon became the services most in
demand. Nutritional improvement, which encompassed operating community
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Table V-5
State Development Programs in Minas Gerais
Program
Cidades-Dique
Cridito Rural
Prodemata
Purpose
Reorient Migratory
Flows
Rural Credit
Rural Development
Beneficiaries
Two million low-income inhab-
itants of 16 mid-sized cities
30,000 small producers
25,500 small rural producers
& landless sharecroppers
Rural Development 30-35,000 low-income farmers
Planoroeste II
PDRI/ARG
Polocentro
Geoeconomica
de Brasllia
Prodevale
PDRI-
Gorutuba
Projeto
Sertanejo
Integrated Rural
Development
Rural Development
Rural Development
Reduce Migratory
Flow to Brasllia
Rural Development
Integrated Rural
Development
Rural Development
Low-income population &
small rural producers
7,000 small rural producers
Rural property owners in 44
municfpios of Triangulo
Low-income population in 13
northwestern municrpios
Needy population in the
Jequitinhonha Valley
5,000 rural producers in
northern munic'pios
Small rural producers in six
municlpios in Minas N.East
Refloresta-
mento
Increase Wood and
Charcoal Supply
Saneamento
Basico
Metropolitan Belo
Water Supply
Slum Dwellers
Connecting 1,043
Small Communities
Minimize Effects
of Drought
Transportes
Carvao e Alcool
1,800,000 inhabitants
Rural population in 42
municIpios of Minas N.East
Improve Transportation from Fuel Alcohol and
Charcoal Producing Regions
Source: SEPLAN, 1981: 33-71.
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MG-II
Firms
Energia
Eletrica
Recursos
Hidricos
markets, raising farm animals and gardens, aiding small farmers, and
even granting land titles to peasants, was aimed at alleviating
malnutrition among the poor. Since food accounted for 70 percent of the
family budget of the poor (Estado de Minas, 2/22/81: 16), better diets
could be attained only by reducing food costs. The establishment of
community markets was a step in this direction. Goods sold in community
market stalls were as much as 60 percent cheaper than those purchased
through normal retail channels (Estado de Minas, 12/27/81: 6). Animal
farms were also introduced as a way to improve nutritional levels;
animals such as goats required little attention, and yielded milk to
7
supply entire communities.
The aspect of PRODECOM's "nutritional" program most in demand was
8
that of granting land titles to peasants. In his request of May, 1981
for a 17 million dollar aid package for PRODECOM from the World Bank,
Minas governor Francelino Pereira included funds for the legitimation of
lands for 25,000 families in 1983 (Estado de Minas, 5/21/81: 13). As of
September, 1981, 2,300 persons had been served by the program (in six
communities). At least 34 other communities had already applied by
December of 1981 for the land title project. Another 56,000 hectares
were due to be awarded to about 2,000 families during 1982 (Estado de
Minas, 12/27/81: 6). In all, the "nutritional" programs underway in
late 1981 were to have benefited 261,000 persons.
The housing programs conducted by PRODECOM brought instant and
largely unanticipated success. To finance the program, PRODECOM tapped
a credit line secured by MinasCaixa, the state savings institution, from
the National Housing Bank (BNH) for low-income housing construction in
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the state. In February, 1981, PRODECOM set a provisional goal of
erecting 5,000 houses for persons with incomes below three minimum
salaries. The interest rate for eligible buyers was an affordable 3.2
percent. By August, 15,000 homes had been built or were in
construction, after only eight months of operations (Estado de Minas,
8/30/81: E6). The program's success in making itself visible to the
needy is evidenced by the fact that by that same August, there was
already a demand for 24,000 units on the part of community associations
(Estado de Minas, 8/30/81: E6). Responding to demand, Francelino
Pereira, in November 1981, negotiated an agreement with the Caixa
Economica Federal, the federal savings institution, to build 20,000
additional houses in 150 different municipalities (Estado de Minas,
11/15/81: 3).
While the state accelerated its program for urban dwellers, it did
not neglect those who remained in agriculture. One critical way in which
the state had traditionally supported small (as well as large) agrarian
10
producers was to extend them credit: 90 percent of all agrarian
credit in 1980 in Minas Gerais was disbursed by public entities (IBGE,
1980a: 52). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, after years of relative
neglect, agrarian producers, and especially small producers, were once
11
again privileged in state budgetary priorities. A state Program for
the Promotion of Small Rural Producers, MG-II, for which a 264.2 million
dollar investment was planned to benefit at least 30,000 small producers
and their families in 102 municipios, as well as 1000 small
entrepreneurs in the target regions, had by the end of 1982 reached over
17,000 rural producers. A second program, PRODEMATA (Program for the
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Integrated Development of the Mata zone), intended to reach 128
municipios in the Mata one and 25,500 sharecroppers and small farmers
(Estado de Minas, 1/20/82: 11), brought credit and technical assistance
to 25,000 families, 97 percent of its goal (Pereira dos Santos, 1983:
47). The reasonably good success of the most important of the state's
programs for the rural areas augured well for the government's ability
to reach its targeted 70,000 program beneficiaries, representing one in
five of all small agrarian producers in the state of Minas Gerais
12
(Estado de Minas, 5/21/81: 14).
While essentially providing economic assistance, these state urban
and rural development programs had far-reaching political effects. They
reached a remarkable number of low-income citizens; by providing
indirect employment, shelter, basic amenities, and other necessities,
they integrated marginal workers into the public economy. Because these
workers were now dependent on public resources, this heightened the
political importance of the way in which state resources reached state
clients. Where entry to state employment is subject to civil service
examination, and where state transfers are allocated to individual
citizens on an automatic basis, there is little political gain for
program administrators. This has been the case with social security in
Brazil under the military (Malloy, 1984). Where, however, important
volumes of resources are allocated to communities on a discretionary
basis, the potential for political gain is very high indeed. The state
oligarchy now presided over a vast reservoir of patronage resources, a
considerable source of power given the formation of a truly mass state
client stratum. For the traditional political elite, reaping political
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advantage from the distribution of expanded state resources depended on
its ability to neutralize the effects of fiscal centralization.
The Centralization and Distribution of State Resources
Fiscal centralization initiated b Brazil's military regime after
1964 strengthened the federal government and threatened the regional
oligarchies. A sweeping tax reform package, enacted in 1966 and
incorporated into the new Constitution in 1967, concentrated revenues in
the central government. From 1965 to 1975, the federal government
increased its share of public sector revenue from 63.9 percent to 72.9
percent (Table V-6). Under the new system, the federal government
collected nearly all direct taxes and over half of all indirect taxes
(Baer et al, 1976: 71). It retained the most important source of
revenue in Brazil, the Income Tax (Imposto de Renda, IR), while leaving
to the states the lesser ICM (Imposto sobre a Circulacao de
Mercadorias), a value-added sales tax, and to the municipalities a tax
13
on urban property (Imposto Predial e Territorial Urbano, IPTU). The
federal government, moreover, set the rates and granted exemptions on
state and locally-collected levies. As a result of fiscal reform,
state-collected revenues especially declined after 1969, while the
municipalities were left with virtually no tax base. In 1975, municipal
government in Brazil collected only 2.6 percent of all tax revenue
(Table V-6).
The 1966 reform also instituted a vast revenue sharing program with
the state and municipal governments. Transfers from both the municipal
revenue sharing fund, the Fundo de Participaao de Municlpios (FPM) and
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Table V-6
Brazil: Government Tax Revenue, 1965-1975
I. Gross Tax Revenues of the Federal, State, and Local
Governments, 1965-1975
Year Federal State Municipal
1965 63.9 31.2 4.9
1969 65.3 31.7 3.0
1972 69.5 27.6 2.6
1975 72.9 24.5 2.6
II. Net Tax Revenues after Transfers of the Federal, State,
and Local Governments, 1970-1973
Year Federal State Municipal
1970 51.2 36.5 12.3
1971 50.8 37.1 12.1
1972 48.5 33.8 17.7
1973 49.5 33.2 17.3
Source: FJP, n.d., I: II-3, II-4.
253
the state fund, the Fundo de Participaao de Estados (FPE), were
allocated on an automatic basis and calculated according to population
size. Additionally, transfers to states were inversely related to a}
capita income, thereby serving as a territorially redistributive fiscal
instrument. Municipal governments also benefited from state revenue
sharing: 20 percent of the state-collected ICM was returned to the
municipalities in which the tax revenues originated. While transfers
considerably enhanced state and municipal revenues (Table V-6), how
the subnational governments could use these monies was pre-determined by
guidelines set by the central government. Twenty percent of the
transfers derived from the FPE had to be allocated to education, ten
percent to health, ten percent to rural extension, and ten percent to
development funds (FJP, n.d., I: II-5). Similarly, 20 percent of
municipal FPM funds was earmarked for education, ten percent for health
and sanitation, and at least 50 percent of FPM monies were to be
channeled into capital investments (30 percent for smaller, poorer
municrpios) (IBAM, 1976).
This concentration of fiscal authority in the hands of the central
government represents a significant departure from traditional patterns
in Brazil. In the twentieth century, the Brazilian central government
was weak relative to the states, by design of the regional oligarchies.
In the heyday of the regional oligarchies, from 1907 to 1930, federal
government revenues as a share of total public sector income fell from
65.8 to 51.2 percent, and the central government ran budget deficits
every year from 1910 to 1926 (FJP, n.d., I: I-6). The Constitution of
1934, centralizing in its spirit and effects and implemented during the
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previous height of central government authority, Vargas' Estado Novo
(1937-1945), only partially reversed this trend; the federal government
increased its share of public sector revenue from 51.2 percent in 1930
to 55.7 percent in 1945, but at the expense of the municlpios, not the
states. The fiscal debility of the municipalities left them dependent
upon higher levels of government for most of the century.
Scholars claimed the fiscal centralization of the post-64 Brazilian
regime empowered the central government at the expense of the states
(Martins, 1977; Baer et al, 1976), a development which might have
threatened the power base of the regional oligarchies by depriving them
14
of independent sources of revenue and hence patronage. These claims
were based on two elements of fiscal centralization: federally-imposed
ceilings on state and municipal revenues; and federal government
restrictions on the use of transferred funds. Baer et al (1976: 74),
for example, argued that by designating the end-use of federal funds,
the federal government undermined state and local autonomy.
There are several reasons to believe that these claims are
overstated. First, they assume centralization to be irreversible, and
state governments powerless to halt its march. In fact, state
governments regained some lost ground. Center-South states, of which
Minas is one, had for several years assailed the tax system, and
especially federal government control of the ICM, for depriving states
15
of their rights to raise needed revenues. In 1980, they successfully
petitioned the federal government to adopt a series of measures intended
16
to enhance state revenues.
Second, it is doubtful that the restrictions placed on state
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government revenues by federal constitutional legislation curbed state
spending. Minas Gerais overcame in part the restraints placed upon its
tax base by borrowing abroad heavily. In the 1970s, the state came to
borrow regularly more than 10 percent of its total revenue, and, in some
years, this figure represented as much as one-fourth of state revenue
(Table V-7). This trend seems to have continued into the 1980s:
perhaps as much as 24 percent of state income in 1980 and 19 percent in
17
1981 derived from borrowed monies. During this time, imaginative
negotiations with foreign development banks produced matching federal
grants, thereby augmenting further the state resource base. When
borrowed money is factored into state revenues, it becomes apparent that
state dependence on the federal government was less than imagined. In
Minas Gerais, transfers accounted for less than one-fifth of the state's
budget from 1965 to 1975 (Table V-8). Even as late as 1982, they
represented 19.2 percent of state revenue (Ministerio da Fazenda, 1984:
18). Transfers similarly did not constitute a large proportion of state
income in other Center-South states. The most vociferous complaints of
fiscal centralization and the loss of state autonomy were lodged by
precisely the states who relied least on the FPE (Table V-9).
Moreover, the importance which scholars attributed to the strings
attached to federal transfers was probably inflated. While these
strings implied that the national government had the authority to direct
spending, substantial evidence from the municipal level suggests that
18
federal guidelines had little impact on local spending patterns. A
detailed study of the pattern of expenditures of eight Minas
- 19
municipios from 1967-1972 (IBAM, 1976) revealed that local spending
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Table V-7
20
Minas Gerais: Government Borrowing, 1960-1977
(in 1975 cruzeiros)
Year Cruzeiros % of Total Revenue
1960
1961 -- --
1962 61,556 3.2
1963 34,000 1.6
1964 386 0.0
1965 261,120 9.3
1966 46,603 1.7
1967 42,376 1.7
1968 254,414 6.6
1969 72,401 1.8
1970 77,916 1.7
1971 577,652 11.7
1972 1,686,694 25.9
1973 1,126,769 15.6
1974 871,891 11.5
1975 1,369,780 15.2
1976 1,337,458 13.8
1977 490,033 4.8
Source: SEPLAN, 1978, 6, II: 355, 356.
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Table V-8
Minas Gerais: State Revenue by Source, 1965-1975
(in percent)
Year Transfers Taxes Credit Other
1965 12.1 58.3 7.0 22.6
1966 14.3 59.5 -- 26.2
1967 10.6 73.1 -- 16.3
1968 15.8 69.0 6.5 8.7
1969 15.1 78.7 1.3 4.9
1970 13.0 80.7 .9 5.4
1971 14.1 68.8 12.6 4.5
1972 12.6 54.6 26.5 6.3
1973 18.5 57.8 16.5 7.2
1974 18.5 61.1 11.9 8.6
1975 17.6 58.7 16.3 7.3
Source: Ministerio da Fazenda, 1981: 210, 236.
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Table V-9
Brazil: Member-State Revenues, 1982
(in percent)
State Transfers Taxes Credit Other
Sao Paulo* 12 77 4 7
Rio Grande do Sul* 16 65 12 7
Rio de Janeiro* 18 61 7 14
MINAS GERAIS* 19 68 7 6
Parana* 21 69 4 6
Santa Catarina* 23 58 15 4
Esplrito Santo 23 68 3 6
Amazonas 24 49 13 14
Bahia 25 55 9 11
Pernambuco 25 64 6 5
Mato Grosso do Sul 28 50 19 2
Goias 29 62 4 5
Par! 34 58 2 6
Cearl 35 51 10 4
Alagoas 36 53 2 9
Rio Grande do Norte 43 35 14 8
Paraiba 45 38 12 5
Mato Grosso 47 35 9 9
Maranhao 51 27 18 4
Sergipe 53 37 3 7
Piaui 63 29 5 3
Rondonia 76 17 1 6
Acre 83 14 - 3
*Center-South states.
Source: Ministerio da Fazenda, 1984: 14-19.
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did not conform to predicted levels on specified government services, in
some cases well exceedin3 government minima, in others, not satisfying
legally prescribed levels. For instance, while nearly all the
municIpios spent well in excess of the amount stipulated by law on the
broad category of "education and culture" (IBAM, 1976: 48), in more than
half the possible cases (eight municipios for six years = 48) the
municipios failed to allocate the required funds to primary education
(IBAM, 1976: 51). Instead, the money was spent on a medical school in
one municipality, a TV transmission tower in another, and new sports
facilities in several others. Similarly, most of the 10 percent of FPM
funds mandated to be spent on health and sanitation was spent on
sanitation (water, sewerage, and paved roads) alone. As municipalities
21
typically disburse more than this amount on sanitation, federal
efforts to attach 10 percent of the FPM for this end were purposeless.
On the other hand, spending on health did not rise, despite the federal
directives, since in most instances the states and the private sector
run medical posts (IBAM, 1976: 57), and most municipalities cannot
afford to pay the salaries of highly skilled medical professionals. The
federal government has apparently been unable to induce compliance in
its priority areas where local authorities either cannot or will not
spend, despite the fact that the penalty for non-compliance with
prescribed spending minima is suspension of the quotas (at least until
the irregularities are corrected). Only municipalities with more than
25,000 inhabitants (one-fifth of Brazilian municipios) are required by
law to furnish their balance sheets to the federal government (IBAM,
1975: 60). As of 1975, less than seven percent had their quotas
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suspended.
If fiscal centralization had robbed state and local governments of
their autonomy, moreover, how could the very different spending patterns
across subunits of government within Brazil, and even within Minas
Gerais, be explained? Table VI-10 shows wide divergences in spending on
various public services by region. In one of the more extreme cases,
the Center-West spent nearly three times the amount on transportation
and communication (30.3 percent) than the northeastern municipalities
(10.4 percent) and their southeastern counterparts (11.6 percent), while
the Southeast spent nearly double the amount on urban services (39.0
percent) than the Center-West municipalities (20.7 percent). Even
within Minas, where a more uniform pattern of expenditures might be
expected given there should be less diversity state-wide than
nationally, there are considerable fluctuations in spending levels on
various services.
A more significant constraint on local spending than federal
directives was the absence of state aid. In the eight municIpios
studied in detail by IBAM (1976), the most urbanized spent approximately
ten percent of their total budgets on education, while the more rural
municipalities spent nearly double that amount. Because the state is
primarily responsible for urban education, the more urbanized a
municipality, the more state funds it receives for this purpose and the
less it needs to spend of its own resources. Similarly, in one
municIpio which had no federal and state highways in municipal
territory, the local government was forced to construct and maintain its
own road network, for which it spent on average more than three-fifths
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Table V-10
Brazil: Municipal Expenditures by Region, 1971
(in percent)
Regions
Services Brazil ----------------------------------------
North Northeast Southeast South Center-West
Government
& General
Adminis-
tration
Financial
Adminis-
tration
Defense &
Security
12.3
11.5
.6
19.2
8.9
2.0
17.1
17.8
1.3
10.4
11.0
0.4
13.3
8.8
0.4
18.0
9.1
0.7
Natural
& Agric.
Resources
Transpor-
tation &
Communica-
tion
Industry &
Commerce
Education
& Cutz.ture
Health
Social
Welfare
Urban Ser-
vices
.8
14.1
1.3
13.8
4.5
7.9
33.2
.6 1.8
19.4
.6
9.9
3.6
7.1
28.7
10.4
.3
15.5
6.0
5.9
23.9
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.4
11.6
1.6
13.1
4.6
7.9
39.0
1.5
23.2
1.5
15.7
3.4
10.3
21.9
1.7
30.3
.1
13.0
3.6
2.8
20.
Source: IBAM, 1975: 53. Original source: Financas Publicas,
no. 317, 1974, Subsecretaria de Economia e Financas.
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of its municipal budget (IBAM, 1976i 35). Without special federal and
state funds, local governments were forced to pay their own way, and
divert resources from discretionary funds to the provision of basic
public services. The poor municipalities of the interior, therefore,
sought to complement automatic transfers with public works, employment,
and social services programs from higher levels of the state.
While state patronage operations were funded primarily by the
federal government, and the federal government appropriated broad
policy-making prerogatives and set national development goals, federal
authorities did not directly allocate discretionary state benefits.
Instead, funds to implement these programs and priorities were entrusted
to the state governments for execution. In other words, patronage
programs were attainable as always, from the state oligarchies. Policy
implementation, left to the discretion of state political elites, meant
that the allocation of state resources was highly politicized (cf.
Tarrow, 1978: 16). State clients and their communities did not secure
employment, homes, and loans for development aid from a, 'faceless',
impartial state, but through the mediation of elected political
representatives. As Tarrow (1978: 2) put it in another context, "the
growing demand for services of local governments, and for the national
subsidies to provide them, have increased the importance of the linkages
between center and periphery of the political system and of the skills
and resources of the politicians and administrators who serve as
gatekeepers between each level." The ability of local elites to retain
their dominance depended on their access to state patronage. Where it
was of paramount importance to secure supplementary federal or state
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funding to provide public services, municipalities needed to elect local
leaders and representatives who were well-connected in order to profit
from state clientelism.
The Politics of Patronage
The fiscal dependence of the municipios on the state induced most
local bosses to pledge their allegiance to the state leadership in
exchange for state aid from the pork barrel. In the words of one
opposition mayor: "Because of the centralization of revenue, the
22
municIpios are slaves of the federal and state governments." In Minas
Gerais, the patronage system offered traditional elites entrenched in
the state an effective means with which to preserve their political
support.
The Minas oligarchy had mastered, and did not hesitate to employ,
the first rule of patronage politics: reward one's friends and punish
one's enemies. Public goods were dispensed to bolster the local
administrations of the governor's supporters in electorally critical
areas, to show municipios with opposition leaders the futility of
their continued resistance to the state oligarchy, and to keep potential
malcontents from defecting. Throughout the interior of Minas Gerais,
accounts by local elites support the view that state resources were
allocated according to political criteria. The vice-mayor of Varginha,
a dynamic center of the state's southern region, for one, spoke about
his city's inclusion in the "dike-cities" program, which meant a bonanza
of public works for the city. He revealed that Varginha had not been
included in the preliminary list of municipalities, but that the
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mayor, Eduardo Otoni, had fought for and won Varginha's inclusion. The
risk of incurring an accusation of patronage in a World Bank financed
program was not a sufficient disincentive for the vice-mayor to brag of
the weight the mayor punched with the state administration. The gift
from the state administration had had the desired effect. When
questioned about his partisan affiliation, the vice-mayor responded:
"PDS, because the party of the government party has always helped us.
23
We can't even think of changing parties, out of gratitude."
Cities in northern Minas Gerais shared similar perceptions about
state government. According to natives of the region, there were two
periods: "before [Governor] Francelino [Pereira], and after". (Pereira
assumed office in 1979.) In their view, prior administrations had
overlooked the North, but Pereira, who built his political career based
on support from northern politicians, showered the region with specially
designed programs such as the Projeto Sertanejo, the PDRI-Gorutuba, and
a water project (Recursos Hidricos) (see Table V-5). The centerpiece of
this "northern strategy" was the mushrooming municfpio of Montes Claros.
Long a mere stopover on the migration route from Brazil's Northeast to
the wealthier South, and especially Sao Paulo, Montes Claros in the
1970s began to benefit from state policy fashioned to prevent migratory
flows from advancing farther south. Francelino Pereira's administration
seized upon the federal government's decision to make Montes Claros a
national "dike-city", and built up the area with its own development aid
programs.
In contrast, Sete Lagoas, another city north of the capital
experiencing growing pains, was discriminated against by the state
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administration as an opposition stronghold. Its industrialization,
largely a bootstrap operation, and one rare case of being fueled by
local capital, was not abetted by the state in any way, except for the
24
awarding of an early industrial district. Its mayor, commenting
upon the question of state aid, compared the fortunes of his municfpio
to those of Montes Claros: In comparison, he jested, "Sete Lagoas does
not even get crumbs". Afranio de Avellar Marques Ferreira was
essentially correct in his allegations: whereas Montes Claros received
2593.1 cruzeiros for every inhabitant in 1982 in discretionary state
25
aid, Sete Lagoas received less than one-tenth that amount, only 219.1
cruzeiros (Ministerio da Fazenda, 1984).
While Afranio de Avellar Marques Ferreira was able to withstand the
punishment of state government for his transgressions with his political
fortunes intact, and Sete Lagoas was able to prosper, the same was not
true for other municipalities. In Curvelo, a popular opposition mayor
serving a third (non-consecutive) term was unable to resist the
governor's overtures, and bribes, to cross over to the PDS. His
municipio was dying, from a once-powerful agrarian center, to a city
left behind in the state's industrialization. Its rural population had
declined from 14,322 in 1970 to 10,961 in 1980, and overall, its
population had increased by only an average of 1.16 per annum during
this decade -- surely less than the natural rate of population growth.
When, then, the mayor was invited to the governor's weekend palace and
promised an array of new public works projects including a new bus
station and a low-income housing program on the condition he change his
26
partisan affiliation, the poor mayor acceded. Upon signing his
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affiliation with the PDS, he began to reap his rewards. Agreements for
low-income housing, electrification, telecommunications, roads, bridges,
and urban development were all delivered by the state government to the
municipality, virtually overnight. In response to the question, "Do you
believe, as a mayor of the government party, that your administration
has benefitted from the state and federal governments?", Olavo de Matos
offered the following: "Yes, absolutely. There has been a radical
difference [since joining the PDS]. If I had continued in the
opposition, I would have received nothing. It facilitated the
industrial district; I would not have gotten it [if I had not changed
over] 2"
Finally, the governor did not hesitate to use state resources as a
political weapon to dissuade potential party defectors. When a
dissenting faction of the local traditional elite in Varginha
contemplated bolting the PDS, Governor Pereira swiftly threatened to
inundate the municIpio with special projects, something which would
certainly have benefited politically that faction's rivals, then the
local leadership.
For such a hierarchical patronage system to be successful, a
network must be in place which makes it run. In Minas Gerais, state
clientelistic channels are managed by the governor and operated by
federal and state deputies. These elected representatives have been all
but ignored by scholars who see them as token representatives in the
powerless parliaments of an authoritarian state. While their
legislative prerogatives may have indeed been pruned by centralized
decision-making, they remained, nonetheless, key figures in the
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system. In Minas Gerais, deputies who receive the most votes on the
ticket of the winning party in a particular municipality--the "majority
deputies"--are awarded the "command" of that municipality. The
"political command" (comando politico) allows a deputy to fill all
public posts in the municipality, and to make other public sector
decisions. How far this system extends beyond Minas is unclear, nor can
we be certain when this system was first instituted. It has been in
place at least since the administration of Israel Pinheiro (1966-1971).
Federal and state deputies, in charge of the local distribution of
state patronage, are the messengers of governors and secretaries; they
are also the lifelines of local mayors. The mayor of Curvelo, Olavo de
Matos, once remarked that "a mayor would not find an open door without a
deputy -- deputies use mayors as 'cabos eletorais"' ("ward bosses").
Throughout the interior of Brazil, mayors enlist the support of federal
and state deputies who attempt to gain state projects for the areas of
their greatest electoral support. Unlike senators who are elected by
the plurality system (as were governors and the president before the
coup), deputies are chosen, according to Brazilian electoral law, in a
districtless proportional representation system. The votes of each
candidate of the same party are tallied, and a number of seats awarded
in both federal and state legislatures according to the proportion of
votes the party totals statewide in that election. Each elector votes
for only one deputy, and deputies run statewide. Thus it is not
uncommon for a voter to choose one candidate for deputy for whom to cast
his ballot from a list of 50 for each party, in the case of federal
deputy elections in Minas Gerais. A voter has even greater choice in
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state deputy elections.
Mineiro deputies, though elected by a system of statewide
proportional representation, behave as district representatives might be
expected to. Cardoso (1978: 66) has aptly pointed out that support for
deputies who either represent a constituency that is not spatially
concentrated or an ideological theme tends to be dispersed throughout a
state. Conversely, where deputies' votes are concentrated in electoral
zones, it is safe to assume their vote is enhanced by paternalism and
clientelism.
With clientelism the dominant organizational principle of politics,
the proportional representation system which typically gives voters a
greater incentive to vote for a party ahead of individual candidates
works in quite the opposition fashion. A deputy normally receives most
of his votes in a handful of municipios. Commonly, these can be quite
concentrated; a hopeful deputy might launch his statewide political
career from a single municipal base. If he was once mayor of a large
enough city, his electors could give him enough votes to win a seat on
the party list. If, on the other hand, a deputy delivers state
services to remote areas lying outside his primary political base, he
may receive high vote votals in non-contiguous areas. Not often,
however, was a deputy able to garner widely dispersed support. Very
prominent politicians, such as Magalhaes Pinto and Tancredo Neves, drew
votes from all corners of the state -- but they were exceptions that
proved the rule.
In Minas Gerais, the quintessential clientelistic polity, Araujo
(1980) conducted a study of the pattern of voting support for the
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cohort of federal and state deputies elected in 1978 (Table V-ll).
While the author's categories reflect a concern with projecting how
Minas deputies would fare under a district electoral system rather than
the proportional representation system, they still permit important
conclusions. If we take as the meaningful divide categories "4" and
"5" on the assumption that even a deputy in danger of not being
reelected in a district electoral system might still draw support from
specific municlpios that he favors with state resources -- and they are
found in different parts of the state -- we see that 89 percent of ARENA
federal deputies and 84 percent of MDB federal deputies in Minas
exercise a form of what Cardoso called "clientelistic-paternalistic"
control. Few could qualify as "ideological representatives". Even more
revealing are the patterns of electoral support for state deputies.
Presumably younger and with less established "prestige" which accrues
from operating in the national political arena, 98 percent of ARENA
state deputies and 52 percent of MDB state deputies had concentrated
geographic support.
Deputies appeal to electors of the basis of their ability to
deliver state patronage, and once in office, both they and their
constituents perceive the exercise of clientelism as their prime
function. In a survey conducted in 1968-69 of most (73 of 80) of the
Minas Gerais state deputies at that time (Bastos and Walker, 1971), when
the deputies were asked to name their most important campaign appeal,
their most frequent response was a combination of development (e.g. road
construction) and assistance (funds for schools, hospitals, and so
forth) (58%); followed by just "assistance" (18%). Only four percent
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Table V-ll
Minas Gerais: Patterns of Electoral Support
for Deputies, 1978*
Federal Deputies State Deputies
ARENA MDB ARENA MDB
1) With more than or close
to 50% of the vote in 1 5 1 3
an electoral district
2) High vote percentage in
a single district - but
not enough to be elected 2 3 13 6
in a district election
3) Around 30% of the vote
in contiguous cities
and towns which, if 12 0 9 1
grouped into one dis-
trict, might serve as
a base for election
4) Solid vote totals in
scattered districts 10 8 18 5
Subtotal - categories
1 through 4, in % 89% 84% 98% 52%
5) Dispersed support -
no zone with 30% of
the vote 3 3 1 14
Total 28 19 42 29
*Minus those elected with most of their support in Belo Horizonte.
Source: Araujo, 1980: 51-64.
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responded that "ideological" appeals were most important (Bastos and
Walker, 1971: 146). These appeals are understandable when placed in the
context of the demands made of them (Table V-12). Deputies were
inundated with requests for jobs for their political supporters. Even
MDB deputies were not immune from clientelistic pressures: 93 percent
of the opposition representatives were expected to be able to deliver
public patronage. Such an expectation was wholly unrealistic.
Opposition deputies are generally unable to deliver major projects.
Mayors who approach them for state resources report that such
consultations are largely symbolic acts. Afrinio de Avellar Marques
Ferreira, mayor of Sete Lagoas, enjoyed good contacts with local
opposition deputies Srgio Emllio Vasconcellos Costa (MDB) and Renato
Azeredo (MDB), as did Olavo de Matos prior to his defection to the PDS.
However, as opposition deputies, they were unable to secure benefits for
Sete Lagoas and Curvelo. "The municipio grows with its own resources,"
was the pronouncement of the mayor of Sete Lagoas.
Of all political actors in patronage politics, deputies face the
keenest electoral competition, and hence, are the most politically
vulnerable. Under great pressure to deliver the goods or lose votes,
deputies do their utmost to convince local party leaders and
constituents their actions were responsible for local gains. Jairo
Magalhaes Alves, the mayor of Itabira, a large mining town and a bulwark
of the opposition, explained: "[At election time], PDS deputies try to
show they are doing something for the city. Before electiontime, they
don't pay attention to requests for help. They listen, say they will
help, and then do nothing. ... In March, 1977, I negotiated for the
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Table V-12
Most Frequent Demands Made of State Deputies in Minas Gerais*
1968-1969
"Jobs for Political Supporters":
Yes No
ARENA 45 (80.4)
MDB 14 (93.3)
Total 59 (83.1)
"Construction of Educational and Medical Units
Districts":
Yes
ARENA 25 (44.6)
MDB 2 (13.3)
Total 27 (38.0)
11 (19.6)
1 ( 6.7)
12 (16.9)
for Municipal
No
31 (55.4)
13 (86.7)
44 (62.0)
"Support for the Construction of Municipal Projects":
Yes
ARENA
MDB
Total
9 (16.1)
2 (13.3)
11 (15.5)
No
47 (83.9)
13 (86.7)
60 (84.5)
"The Establishment of Financial Institutions or Enterprises
Controlled by the State in Municipal Districts":
Yes
ARENA
MDB
Total
2 ( 3.6)
0 ( 0.0)
2 ( 2.8)
No
54 (83.9)
15(100.0)
69 (97.2)
*Deputies were asked to identify the two most frequently made demands of
them.
Source: Bastos and Walker, 1971: 147.
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installation of CARPE (primary school buildings). It was supposedly in
the budget every year. Only in 1981 did it get installed. MaurIcio
27
Campos was running for governor the next year - he came to inaugurate
28
it. It was the first public work [in Itabira] in 20 years.
Where deputies cannot deliver major projects, they attempt to
build support among individual constituents. Individuals seek public
employment through the intervention of their city councillors and state
deputies. A young woman of the interior seeking appointment as a public
school teacher must first take her case to a state deputy. If she is not
well-connected, her city councillor intercedes on her behalf. The
deputy then obtains the appointment from the state Secretary of
Education.
Elected representatives climb the political ladder by becoming
patrons to municipal bosses. In order to advance their careers,
deputies needed to do better than merely get elected; top vote getters
are rewarded by state party elites with cabinet-level appointments.
If lucky or clever enough to be appointed a state department secretary,
the politician then uses his position to build up his personal following
for a later run for the governorship. Municipal elites caucused to
choose candidates to whom they pledged their support well in advance of
party nominating procedures - sometimes years ahead of time - with the
explicit intent of using that support to net further gains from the
state administration. In Varginha, the local PDS chapter favored the
candidacy of Gerardo Renault, state Secretary of Agriculture, for
29
governor in 1982.
The system of patronage rewards and punishments upheld the
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oligarchical political system. The concentration of national resources
in the public sector provided a powerful incentive for municipalities
with poor rates of success in garnering patronage projects to remain in
the fold and press harder their case to the same state oligarchy which
may have shunned them in the past. Thus state clientelism allowed
traditional political elites to retain their dominance.
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Conclusions
When state capitalist development in Minas Gerais formed state
clients, traditional elites shifted their power base from land to the
state and used positions of public power to preserve their dominance.
State patronage has, with rare exceptions, heretofore not been conceived
as a stable power base of dominant elites. While in certain
clientelistic societies, such as southern Italy, public jobs and works
are understood to be controlled by Christian Democratic party patrons,
these elites are scarcely viewed as a coherent power elite. They are
seen instead as political power-brokers, subordinate to the hegemonic
northern industrialists.
Part of the reason for underestimating the power inherent in the
control of state resources lies in the perceived lack of durability of
these assets. The basis of class dominance is more typically understood
to be fixed assets, such as land. Scott (1972: 97-98) does include in a
typology of sources of patronage the "indirect control of the property
or authority of others (often the public)", and suggests these posts are
attractive because the resources connected with many of them are far
greater than those which an individual can amass directly. Yet, because
he interprets the availability of this resource as dependent upon
continuity in positions ultimately given or withdrawn by third parties,
usually electors, he views it as a less durable source of power for a
patron than land or other privately-owned assets.
In Minas Gerais, authoritarianism diminished the likelihood of
state elites being voted out of office, and in so doing, made their
control of public resources less tenuous. Tenure in state office may
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thus be viewed as dependent upon the political system, and specifically
the nature and degree of permissible political competition. In
circumstances of limited competition typical of most authoritarian and
quasi-authoritarian regimes, public assets can prove more durable than
private resources, especially where reform and revolutionary change
threaten private property. Viewed from a political perspective, the
control over both public and private resources are secured only as long
as political circumstances are favorable; the difference is not one of
kind, but of degree.
Fiscal centralization, and the authoritarianism which engendered
it, reduced the channels by which state resources were allocated to a
single political alignment. With few exceptions, state oligarchies
30
supported the national government. Local leaders were left with
little practical alternative but to find sponsors well placed in the
state hierarchy. The penalty for non-cooperation was to forfeit state
aid, something most municipalities could ill afford. Thus
centralization abetted a monopoly over power, and the monopoly was
guaranteed to the incumbent, traditional political elite, firmly
entrenched in state office.
At the same time that the regional oligarchies of Minas Gerais and
other Brazilian states reaped political advantage from the patronage
system, these elites were also willing pawns of the federal government.
The heightened importance of the links between each level of government
offered both the state oligarchies and the national government an
opportunity to construct durable political alliances based on the
dispensation of state resources, thus bolstering one another's rule.
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The authoritarian restriction of political competition ossified this
system.
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Notes
1. The growth of public expenditure from 1970 to 1977 is recorded
as 18.3 percent. I chose to use the 1971-1977 figures instead because
the state report from which these data are drawn caution that the 18.3
percent figure is slightly deceptive, due to a fall in public
expenditure in 1970 relative to 1969. More rapid spending, therefore,
occurred in 1971 to regain previous levels. The 16.9 percent real
average growth rates in public expenditure over the years from 1971 to
1977 was thus considered more accurate.
2. This mirrors a pattern throughout the developed southeast
region: the IBGE reports that the growth in the tertiary population
employed in teaching in the states of the Southeast (Minas Gerais, Sao
Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Espfrito Santo, and Guanabara) rose 281.5 percent
between 1950 and 1970.
3. The number of workers in the state enterprises was obtained by
counting employees in those federal and state public enterprises
headquartered in Minas Gerais (55,268), as reported in Visao (1980),
plus a fraction of those employed in federal state enterprises
headquartered in other states but known to employ vast numbers of
Mineiros, such as the federal railway authority and the Rio Doce Mining
Company. This should be interpreted as a minimum figure, for at least
20,000 workers in the public utility companies (e.g., 7,671 in TELEMIG
and 11,311 in CEMIG) were not included because of the possibility they
might have been counted as "Communications" workers in Table V-3.
4. Chubb (1981) also reports a high percentage of employment in
construction in Palermo, Sicily, due to state spending.
5. indexing the spending levels of the state government according
to 22 categories of government functions reveals that spending on urban
development rose from 100 (base year) in 1959/60 to 106,706.7 in 1977.
Only spending on planning accelerated more rapidly, to 250,337.5. Yet,
nominal levels of spending on planning were substantially lower than on
urban development - 1.5 percent as opposed to 6.1 percent (FJP, n.d.,
III: 145).
6. Author's estimate (430,000 x 5 [average household in Minas
Gerais] = 2,150,000 / 14,000,000 (state population) = 15.3%).
7. In the municipio of Patroclnio, one farm was to feed 300
schoolchildren and their families (Estado de Minas, 2/22/81: 16), and in
Funilindia, an initial investment of 50 goats and two breeders were
expected after three years of operation to meet the dairy needs of 7,500
persons (Haddad, 1980: 119).
8. This facet of the program was executed by a state foundation,
RURALMINAS, and the rural syndicates; the average land plot was 29.15
hectares,
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9. This line was FICAM, Financiamento de Aquisigao, Construcao,
Ampliagao e Melhoria Habitacional.
10. Forty-four percent of the Bank of Brazil loans in 1974 were
allocated to agriculture, as opposed to only 15 percent of private
commercial bank credit (Baer et al, 1976: 75).
11. State expenditure on agriculture fell from 5.1 percent of the
total in 1959/60 to 3.4 percent in 1972, and then began to rise again.
In 1977, it represented four percent of state expenditure (FJP, n.d.,
III: 145). Unfortunately, later figures are not available. We suspect,
however, that they would continue to show an upward trend, given the
well-financed array of agrarian programs launched during the
administration of Francelino Pereira (1979-1983).
According to then state secretary of Planning, Paulo Haddad, state
programs for agrarian producers were reaching the population
marginalized in the process of industrialization in Minas in the
preceding 12 years, a process which accentuated regional disparities,
increased pressure on large urban centers, and transformed Minas into an
importer of foodstuffs (Estado de Minas, 5/21/81: 14).
12. These include Planoreste II, Prodevale, Alto Rio Grande, and
Vale do Gorutuba. See Table V-5 for a program summary.
13. In all, the federal government authorized itself ten taxes and
two apiece to the state and municipal governments. In addition to the
ICM, the states were permitted to collect the ITBI, a transport tax. Of
the two, the ICM was by far the more important, accounting for more than
95% of state-collected tax revenue in Minas Gerais in the 1970s
(Secretaria da Fazenda). The municipalities were also allowed to levy a
tax on social services (ISS).
14. Martins (1977: 6) argues that this centralization of power in
the federal government appeared to be a movement for the political
control of territory, unlike the previous centralizing episode in the
1930s, when the government's intention was to unify the national market.
15. These states, Minas Gerais, Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Rio
Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Parana, worked in a common effort to
wrest concessions from the federal government for several years. In
their view, federal government exemption of high-turnover industries
such as tobacco from paying the ICM cut into state revenue, for no sound
reason. These states, the wealthiest in Brazil, also protested that
through their FPE quotas they were in effect subsidizing the poorer
states of the Northeast and the developing regions of the North and
West. A more detailed statement of their positions can be found in
"Finangas Pblicas: Uma experiencia estadual nos ltimos anos",
January, 1979, prepared by the secretaries of finance of those states.
16. Requested were measures to rescind several exemptions to the
ICM, to revise FPE quotas, and to lift federal restrictions on foreign
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borrowing. The federal government agreed to extend the ICM to
cigarettes and to transfer the minerals tax to the state governments.
It rejected the states' petition to subject liquid fuels to the ICM, and
to permit states to borrow freely without federal approval (Palestra of
Secretario de Estado da Fazenda, Estado de Minas Gerais, n.d.).
17. These figures are taken from raw data (in graph form) from the
state finance department (Secretaria da Fazenda do Estado de Minas
Gerais).
18. For advanced industrial societies, Tarrow (1978: 12) has
similarly argued that the "empirical case that fiscal centralization has
robbed subnational governments of their vitality has yet to be made."
His claim rests on three factors: (1) though national spending has
increased, subnational spending has increased still more; (2) while
numerous categorical grants tie down the activities of many local
governments, the general revenue sharing that is more common leaves them
far more freedom; and (3) there is apparent a continued high level of
variation in spending across subunits within industrial nations, in many
cases closely linked to local political factors.
In Brazil, subnational spending has not increased at a faster rate
than national spending in the past two decades, but it has increased in
real terms. Although state spending, at least in the early 1970s,
suffered a decline relative to other levels of government, it rose in
real terms, and municipal spending especially has increased. Thus
Tarrow's first factor may be inconclusive for Brazil. The other two,
however, are examined in the text.
19. These eight municipios were chosen systematically to
illustrate relationships between socio-economic characteristics and
revenue collection and public expenditure. Four pairs of municIpios
were selected from four categories of population size. Minduri and
Sardoa represented two extremes of urbanization within the category of
the smallest municipalities; Bocaina de Minas and Sao Joao Evangelista,
while exhibiting similar percentages of urban population, were at
opposite ends of their population size category; Sao Joao do Paralso and
Sao Lourenco, with roughly the same size population, were found at
opposite ends of the urban spectrum; and Itajuba and Conselheiro
Lafaiete, in the category of the largest of Minas municipios, with
similar population sizes and similar dependence on transfers from the
federal revenue sharing fund, exhibited very different degrees of
dependence on the ICM (IBAM, 1976: 22, 24, 26, 28).
20. Ministerio da Fazenda (1981) data differ slightly: for the
years from 1968-1975, government borrowing as a percent of total revenue
is recorded as: 6.5, 1.3, .9, 12.6, 26.5, 16.5, 11.9, and 16.3 percent,
respectively.
21. Water and sanitation are most often municipally-provided
services. Over 92 percent of Brazilian municipalities, for example,
were responsible for local sewerage (IBAM, 1976: 53-54).
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22. Interview with Afrinio de Avellar Marques Ferreira, Sete
Lagoas, MG, October 19, 1981.
23. Interview with Ronaldo Venga, Varginha, MG, October 13 and 14,
1981.
24. Industrial districts, authorized and funded by the state
Industrial Districts Company, provided prepared land to industry. The
municipal contribution was normally to grant exemptions on local
property taxes.
25. The concept of "discretionary state aid" is used here to
distinguish aid over which state elites exercise some choice from that
which they must transfer as part of the federal and state revenue
sharing programs. It includes "other capital transfers", "other current
transfers", and "credit".
26. Interview with Olavo de Matos, Curvelo, MG, October 9, 1981.
27. Mauricio Campos, a federal deputy who had been appointed
mayor of Belo Horizonte, was the favorite of Governor Francelino
Pereira. He failed, however, to secure his party's nomination due to
factional squabbles.
28. Interview with Jairo Magalhaes Alves, Itabira, MG, October 16,
1981.
29. Interview with Jose Fernando Prince, President, Vrginha PDS,
Varginha, MG, October 14, 1981.
30. There were only two exceptions to this rule: Governors Chagas
Freitas of the MDB in Rio de Janeiro, and Alacid Nunes of Para.
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CHAPTER SIX
AUTHORITARIAN POLITICS AND TRADITIONAL ELITES
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To limit popular influence over state policy, the bureaucratic-
authoritarian regime centralized fiscal authority, placed technocrats in
high places in economic ministries and inter-ministerial committees, and
pruned the legislative prerogatives of Congress. Unlike in other
bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America -- Chile is the most
notable example -- however, politics in Brazil did not die. Parties
operated, elections were held, and the Congress was in session for most
1
of the regime's life. Lacking an alternative formula upon which to
base its legitimacy, the military turned to the oligarchy to produce
popular endorsements at the polls. Reluctantly, it accepted as allies
elites who predated its regime and who did not share its vision for the
nation.
The exercise of authoritarian rule in a functioning political
system required congressional majorities and loyal local officials. To
ensure electoral victories and retain its majorities, the military
redefined the political-electoral realm. It purged from the political
arena its most effective opponents primarily through denial of political
rights and exile. It appointed governors and created a two-party system
in which one official party was guaranteed supremacy. Inter-party
competition was reduced to intra-party competition, competition which
was confined, moreover, to a party formed and dominated by the
traditional political elite.
The political arrangements, alliances, and rules of the
bureaucratic-authoritarian regime helped preserve traditional elite
dominance. Political centralization, the party system, and the rules of
electoral competition instituted by the military governors froze pre-
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coup political alignments, restricted real competition, and precluded
the formation and emergence of new leadership. Institutional changes
'fixed' the composition and leadership of the political parties and
party factions, local politics, and mutually serving if unequal
alliances between local and state political elites. Pre-coup alignments
survived the regime; without the help of specially-designed rules and
boundaries, they might not have. Parties which even before the military
coup appeared to play a diminished role in such areas as policy
formation and decision-making seemed irrelevant in relation to an
2
executive which grew only stronger during authoritarian rule. Yet,
ARENA continued to dominate elite recruitment, mobilize support for the
regime, and act as state agent in the cities and towns of the interior.
As Schmitter (1973: 211) wrote when the parties were at their nadir,
"this artificial and unrepresentative party system is quite appropriate
to protracted authoritarian rule."
Authoritarianism enhanced the effectiveness of state clientelism
for both the regime and the oligarchy. Authoritarianism was the
regime's stick and clientelism its carrot to dissuade opposition and
build support. Authoritarianism allowed the oligarchy who organized
clientelistic networks within the ARENA party to secure its grip on the
state and retain its monopoly of the distribution of state resources.
Incumbents naturally advantaged in a clientelistic system became
virtually invincible in one in which competition was sharply reduced by
law and practice.
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The Brazilian Authoritarian Regime
The Minas traditional elite was joined by rural dominant classes of
the Northeast, modern business elites of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro,
the petty-bourgeoisie, liberal professionals, and the bureaucratic
middle classes in coalition with at least four broad currents in the
armed forces--the sorbonistas, the hard-liners, right-leaning
nationalists, and military chiefs faithful to corporate unity (Velasco e
Cruz and Martins, 1984: 16)--in April, 1964 to overthrow the government
of Joao Goulart. This heterogeneous coalition of civilian and military
forces proceeded on their political course without consensus on the form
of the new regime nor on its priorities. The legalistic wing of the
military, the sorbonistas, and its civilian counterpart, the UDN, who
first took command of the 'Revolution' (as its adherents preferred to
refer to their seizure of power) intended in a limited term in office
only to institute the reforms necessary to rationalize the bureaucracy,
raise productivity allowing capitalism to flourish, and then "restore"
'free' political competition to the electoral arena, which in practice
meant enabling the UDN to achieve the victories that had eluded it
through most of the post-war period (Velasco e Cruz and Martins, 1984:
3
18-19).
Seventeen "Institutional Acts" and more than 100 "Complementary
Acts"--unilateral declarations on the part of the military governors--
established the framework for military rule. Superseding the
Constitution (Institutional Act Number 4 (AI-4), 1967, was the new
Constitution), they dictated electoral laws and juridical practice.
Institutional Act Number 1 was the declaration of the 'Revolution';
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later acts were ad hoc responses on the part of the military governors
to challenges to their rule. The notorious AI-5, which inaugurated the
harshest years of the dictatorship, strictly curtailed opposition to the
regime by cancelling the mandates of select, rebellious officeholders,
stripping citizens of their "political rights", and imposing censorship
on the press. Though fundamental to the foundation of the authoritarian
regime, it did not directly and significantly affect the oligarchy.
After 1964, political power was centralized in the national
executive, now the exclusive preserve of the military. A strengthened
executive, however effective in administering the 'miracle', could
ensure neither elite nor popular compliance with the regime's project.
In its first real test, the elections of 1965, PSD candidates closely
associated with former president Juscelino Kubitschek-whom the regime
stripped of his political rights in June 1964-won the gubernatorial
contests in Minas Gerais and in Guanabara (the city of Rio de Janeiro).
PSD and PTB candidates were the victors in five states overall. The
UDN, staunch allies of the military, achieved outright majorities in
only three of 11 states.
The military responded to what was widely regarded as its 'defeat'
with two Institutional Acts which dramatically reshaped the politico-
electoral system to its advantage. To safeguard against any future
embarassments, Complementary Act No. 4 of Institutional Act No. 2
(October 27, 1965) abolished all existing political parties in November,
1965. New parties would be recognized and allowed to function only if
at least 120 federal deputies and 20 senators were affiliated. One
purpose of this requirement was to curtail the number of small parties
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which in the years leading up the 1964 coup had proliferated to 13.
Another was to create a strong official party while keeping up the
fagade of democratic procedure. This decree effectively transformed
what was by 1964 a 'fragmented', multi-party system into a two-party
system. Politicians were forced into either the National Renovating
Alliance (ARENA), which became the principal recruiting ground for
government politicians, or the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), the
refuge of government opponents, regardless of stripe or color.
The military relied on the oligarchy to organize its official
party. Most members of the defunct UDN flocked to the ARENA banner, as
did many, though a smaller percentage, of the ex-PSDers (Table VI-1).
The UDN had instigated the coup; the PSD was persuaded by Castelo Branco
to play along (Velasco e Cruz and Martins, 1984: 25-26). The ex-UDN
assumed the most prominent role in the new ARENA party: 90 percent of
its deputies and 100 percent of its senators joined the ranks of the
government supporters, in comparison to the 65 percent of the PSD
deputies and 74 percent of PSD senators who cast their lot with ARENA
(Wesson and Fleischer, 1983: 03-105). The UDN dominated the ARENA
party in Alagoas, Sergipe, and Guanabara; it had to share power in
Minas, Goias, Santa Catarina, and Piaui with the members of the PSD, and
took a back seat to the PSD in Maranhao and Rio Grande do Sul (Roett,
1984: 67). While some members of the PTB joined with these two
conservative parties in Bahia, Pernambuco, Sao Paulo, Ceara, and Parg,
most joined the MDB. As the party of the incumbent president, the PTB
had the most to lose in the coup. Of the PTB deputies who were
permitted to remain active in politics (PTB deputies had
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Table VI-1
Brazil: Pre-1966 Party Affiliations of Federal Deputies
and Senators, 1966-1971
Pre-1966 AI-1
Party 1963 and 1966-67(b) 1967-71(c)
Affiliation AI-2(a) ARENA MDB Total ARENA MDB Total
Deputies
PTB(d)
PSD
UDN
PSP
PDC
PTN
PST
PR
PL
PRP
PSB
PRT
Subtotal
Unknown
Total
Cassados(e)
119
118
91
21
20
11
7
4
5
5
5
3
409
409
37
11
2
4
3
1
5
1
0
0
3
0
67
0
67
67
34
80
84
20
15
8
3
4
3
6
1
2
260
0
260
75
44
10
4
5
5
1
0
0
0
2
2
148
0
148
109
124
94
24
20
13
4
4
3
6
3
4
408
1
409
34
83
105
13
18
6
1
4
4
4
2
1
275
1
276
28
50
39
14
8
5
7
2
0
2
0
1
0
128
5
133
66
84
122
119
21
23
13
3
4
6
4
3
1
403
6
409
94
Senators
PTB
PSD
UDN
PSP
PDC
PTN
PL
PRP
PSB
Subtotal
Cassados
19
23
16
2
1
1
2
1
1
66
_-_
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
2
O
6 13 19 3 10 13
17 6 23 18 5 23
16 0 16 19 1 20
2 0 2 3 0 3
1 0 1 3 0 3
0 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 2 1 1 2
1 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1
44 22 66 47 19 66
-- -- --0 4 4
(a) Cassados removed by AI-1 (1964) and by AI-2 (1965-66).
(b) Realignment among surviving members of the 5th Legislature,
elected in 1962.
(c) Legislators elected to the 6th Legislature in November 1966.
(d) Includes legislators of the MTR splinter party.
(e) Cassados removed by the AI-5 after December 16, 1968.
Source: Wesson and Fleischer, 1983: 104.
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disproportionately lost their mandates and their political rights--they
were cassados), 70 percent remained in the MDB opposition, while a
handful (34) joined ARENA. At its inception, the MDB hardly qualified
as a party: the government had to "loan" the party two senators in
order for it to meet the newly established minimum of 20. It suffered
another blow after the issuance of Institutional Act Number 5. At least
40 percent of its deputies and senators were cassados by the regime
(Velasco e Cruz and Martins, 1984: 37).
Most traditional Minas politicians joined ARENA and the government,
as would be expected of an elite which prompted the regime change and
which was tied to the state. More than 80 percent of the members of
each of the three most important parties, the PSD, the UDN, and the PR
who were in the state Legislative Assembly in 1968-69 joined ARENA
(Bastos and Walker, 1971: 141). The affiliation of deputies was part of
a larger movement of the entire traditional elite into the government
camp. It followed upon the decisions of oligarchical leaders to adhere
to the regime. Once the deputies moved into the party, lower ranking
members of the political class in the interior had little choice but to
follow. The regime's centralization ensured compliance at every level
of the system.
Following on the heels of AI-2 was Institutional Act Number 3
(February 5, 1966) which replaced the direct election of governors and
lieutenant governors with "indirect" election by state legislatures, and
that of mayors of state capitals with appointment by state governors.
In practice, those nominated for governor were pre-approved by the
5
military. Candidates acceptable to the military were most often drawn
290
from the traditional political elite.
The two changes altered the nature of political competition. The
major beneficary was the traditional political elite. The certain
outcome of the partisan affiliation of every post-coup governor sharply
influenced the stability of state and local political coalitions. The
military monopoly of the national executive and its appointment of loyal
governors limited the appeal of competition through opposition, and only
with great difficulty could a challenge be mounted within ARENA. The
new 'artificial' two party system left party management to the oligarchy
and regulated the entry of new contestants into the political arena.
Coalitional shifts, previously a common feature of postwar Brazilian
politics, were all but ruled out. Traditional local bosses easily
dominated local politics and resisted any incipient challenges to their
rule, helped elect and reelect federal and state deputies, and
contributed to the durability of state elite factions.
The 'Semi-Competitive' Political System
In a state clientelistic political system such as the Brazilian,
parties generally do not compete for votes on the basis of their
programs, policy proposals, or records of administrative competence in
office. Rather, votes are traded in blocs for state resources from
superiors or for votes in other elections from coalition partners.
Politicians at all levels of the political system from governor to cabo
eleitoral-the "ward boss" responsible for turning out the vote-compete
for their positions on the basis of their ability to deliver the maximum
number of votes or state resources, depending upon their position in the
291
hierarchy. Competition, and ultimately turnover of the political elite,
depends on the ability to shift alliances, redraw factional lines, and
access state patronage by alternating in office. Competition is
virtually never confined to individual races at a single level of
government, but operates according to alliances which bridge territorial
units.
The Brazilian political system is distinguished by a high degree of
territorial integration. The hierarchical nature of that integration,
the fiscal dependence of lower levels of government upon the higher, and
the deep penetration of the state into most aspects of municipal life
make it impossible for even remote localities to insulate themselves
from state and national developments. National political change
inevitably reverberates to the lowest levels of the political system.
The direction change takes locally depends on whether opportunities for
the reorganization of clientelistic networks are created or denied at
the state and federal levels. In 1930, the replacement of the national
leadership triggered the formation of new local coalitions. The
authoritarian regime's appropriation of the state executives and
creation of a new party system with new electoral rules in 1965-66
produced the opposite effect; it fixed the axes of conflict and froze
standing alliances. In 1930, Vargas' overthrow of the Old Republic
disrupted existing federal, state, and local alignments. Splitting the
ranks of the oligarchy offered a choice of sides to local chiefs. The
power of the dominant coroneis allied with newly ousted members of the
Old Guard in the state elite was undermined, in some towns only
temporarily, in others on a more permament basis. Local power studies
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document, if in a sporadic and descriptive fashion, the jolting of the
6
rule of the "in" families after 1930 (Table VI-2). In some municipios,
change took the form of the replacement of one family by another (Rio
Rico); in others, the bifurcation of family control (Barbacena), and in
yet others, the overthrow of traditional family rule altogether
(Itapetininga) (Murilo de Carvalho, 1968/69: 246).
The degree of competition among the elite has varied widely through
the course of this century. In the Old Republic, the most successful
state oligarchies used rigid centralization in the state, an iron grip
on the dominant party, and the diversion of state clientelism through a
single party, the Republican party, to curtail competition and maintain
themselves in power. The regional oligarchies of the weaker states had
to face constant competition spurred on by federal intervention and
local uprisings. But except for the Estado Novo, even this hierarchical
system everywhere allowed for, at times fostered, challenges to local
political elites.
Local contests seldom were waged with only local resources nor were
they of exclusively local interest. Local rivals competed with one
another by building alliances with state and federal authorities in
which they accepted federal or state aid and protection from their
enemies in return for delivering local votes. Higher officials used
local bosses to secure their own places in the oligarchy. Taking "A" to
signify the "ins" (the situaionistas) and "B", the outs, the possible
combinations of political alignments in the Old Republic and in the
post-war era can be expressed as:
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Table VI-2
Studies of Local Power in Brazil
Community State Urban % Pop. Power
Pop. Urban Structure**
Political Studies
Dores do Indaia MG 5,474 40 1(1945)+
Cachoeira do Campo MG 1,492* 50 2
(Rio Rico) BA -- -- 1(1930)1
Sao Joao Evangelista MG 2,870* 21 2(1930)1
Itapetininga SP 7,864* 45 1(1930)+
Barroso MG 5,973* 83 2(1954)+
Picos PI 8,176* 16 2 +
Barbacena MG 42,866 79 1(1930)2
Anthropological Studies
Cunha SP 6,500 26 +
Cruz das Almas SP 2,723 90 1
(Ita) PA 600 23 3(1912)+
(Passagem Grande) AL 3,713 -- 1
Cerrado (and Retiro) MG 2,425 25 2
Minas Velhas BA 1,427 53 3
Vila Reconcavo BA 1,462 34 3
Itaipava SP 1,485 5 3(1930)+
*Data not supplied by the authors of the case
de Carvalho from the 1950 census. Rio Rico,
are fictitious names.
studies, taken by Murilo
Passagem Grande, and Ita
**This column represents an attempt to indicate whether local power is
controlled by families. The numbers indicate the number of families
that are said to control local power. The date between the parentheses
indicates the epoch of important changes in municipal politics. The +
sign signifies the disappearance of family control over politics,
although family ties may still be very important.
Source: Murilo de Carvalho, 1968/69: 242.
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Level Patterns of Alliances
I II III IV
Federal A B A B A B A B
State A B B A B A A B
Local A B B A A B B A
In the Old Republic, the most common alignment where state
oligarchies were strongest, as in Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo, was type
"I"; local "ins" sided with state "ins" who dominated the national
government. The "outs" were similarly allied at each level of
government. Each hoped to draw material support from the others, and
perhaps to capitalize upon an error committed by their allies'
opponents. In a system dominated by a single party they had little
alternative. In smaller states, where the state and federal "ins" were
enemies, however, local "outs" could choose to ally with federal "ins"
(type "II"), state "ins" (type "III"), or their rivals. Often, state
oligarchies ("ins") who found themselves on the wrong side of the
federal government were extremely vulnerable to federally-inspired
uprisings by hostile coroneis (Cintra, 1979: 136). These relied on
federal military support, and were coordinated by their state rivals.
If state group "A" were to be defeated in state politics (as in this
case because the federal "ins" supported their adversaries), then the
local elites under their protection would be left without their
sponsors. The local elite's place was secure only as long as the state
gvernment to whom it offered its allegiance could stay in power.
Otherwise, the successful state and local insurgents, their local
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rivals, would soon replace them as the local "ins". The fourth
alignment was not often possible: only when a city had its own
resources and was not dependent on the upper levels of government could
a local group hope to occupy and retain office without powerful
friends.
In the post-war party system, actors at each level of the
political system had more freedom of choice, which in turn intensified
political competition. Multi-partism provided channels for discontented
political veterans and new entrants in politics to contest office.
Inter-party coalitions helped elect otherwise nonelectable candidates.
A small party could barter its votes for the gubernatorial nominee of a
major party for support for one of its candidates for lesser office--
state deputy or local mayor. Schmitter (1973: 209-210) has called this
post-1945 "Getulian" system which "permitted local-level competition on
the basis of coalitional shLfts, but ensured a stable [fSD-PTB]
dominance at the national presid;ential level" "semi-competitive".
Even in this "semi-competitive" post-war regime designed to
preserve PSD-PTB hegemony, the real if limited possibility of a
national UDN victory and the frequent state victories allowed the system
to become more competitive. It created a different set of expectations
about local and state competition. Many states elected governors during
the period from parties opposed to that of the national executive. In
Minas Gerais, the UDN elected the first post-war governor at a time when
the presidency was controlled by the PSD. On the eve of the 1962
elections, the last before the coup, state and federal authorities
represented opposing camps in several leading states.
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When governors and presidents were on opposite sides of the fence,
each supported the candidates of their parties (or allies) for senate
and deputies. As Ribeiro (1964: 96) describes the 1962 elections in
Ceara:
The federal government lavishly favored PTB
candidates, putting to political use its
bureaucratic machine. Federal meddling took the
form of eliminating jobs, substituting heads of the
principal federal agencies, distributing about 100
ambulances, using official vehicles, and making
electoral donations of medical and surgical
instruments and a substantial quantity of medicine.
There was undisguised federal support for the
trabalhista [PTB] candidate for Senate. Beyond
this, the federal government, by various means,
displayed malicious hostility toward government
authorities in Cearg, denying them the collaboration
of federal authorities.
For its part, the state government mobilized its
apparatus to support the candidates for the "Union
for Cearg", principally the candidates of the
Partido Trabalhista Nacional, the party organized by
the state governor when he split away from the PTB.
He sought to elect as many representatives as
possible to the national congress and the state
legislative assembly from his party. As a form of
electoral influence, the government gave away jobs,
used its official vehicles, and bestowed highway
contracts in an attempt to offset federal government
interference.
On the municipal level, most mayors used municipal
funds for electoral ends -- to sponsor their own
successors, or to get themselves elected to the
state legislative assembly.
Incumbent governors failed to elect chosen successors in most states in
1962. In three races (Bahia, Guanabara, and Pernambuco), UDN governors
could not prevent the election of PTB and other labor (socialist)
gubernatorial candidates supported by the federal government (Sampaio,
1964: 44-45; Rios, 1964; Chacon, 1964). In Cearl, Rio Grande do Sul,
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and Sao Paulo, motley coalitions formed to stop the PTB were successful
(Ribeiro, 1964: 99, 102; Ferreira, 1964).
Those who held state office had the greatest impact on local
elections, and were therefore more important for local elites. The
governor used the ample resources of state available to him to influence
local and state assembly elections to his party's advantage. In
Pernambuco, Ceara, and Minas Gerais the full force of state clientelism
was brought to bear by state officials in the 1962 elections. In
Pernambuco, party votes in the Chamber of Deputies and the state
Legislative Assembly elections varied widely. Incumbent governor Cid
Sampaio could not prevent 12 PTB candidates from being elected as
federal deputies (of 24 places) but only one state deputy was elected as
a candidate of that party (Chacon, 1964: 214-215; 224-225). In Ceara, a
PTN governor helped elect nine deputies (14%) running on that party's
ticket to the state legislative assembly; in 1958 the PTN had not
fielded a candidate (Ribeiro, 1964: 102). In Minas, the election of UDN
gubernatorial candidate Magalhaes Pinto in 1960 produced substantial
gains for the party in the state legislative assembly and municipal
elections in 1962. In 1958, the UDN won 11 of 74 seats in the Assembly
(15%); in 1962, 26 of 78 (33%) (Barbosa, 1964: 187-188). In 1958, when
Bias Fortes of the PSD was governor, the PSD won outright 42 percent of
the mayoral races and another 13 percent in alliance with other parties;
the UDN "outs" elected less than 10 percent of its candidates directly
and another 19 percent in alliance with other parties. In the 1962
elections, with a UDN governor in the Palacio da Liberadade, the tables
were turned. The UDN captured 61 municipalities from the PSD, raising
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the number of UDN mayors from less than 10 to 22 percent. The PSD, now
in opposition, saw its share of mayors drop from 42 to 35 percent. Even
the PR, in alliance with the PSD, suffered the same fate: its vote
totals rose with PSD success in 1954 and 1958, and fell in 1962
(Barbosa, 1964: 189-190).
The election in 1960 of Janio Quadros as president on the UDN
ticket raised expectations about competition even further. For the
first time uncertainty surrounded the outcome of the next scheduled
presidential election of 1965. As Schmitter (1973: 209) points out, an
opposition victory caused the parties to proliferate and alliances to
shift. From "semi-competiLrve", the system had become "truly
competitive". Schmitter goes on to argue that the military, once it
understood the scope of the problem, took steps to reverse this
development toward real competition. To "restore" the system to its
semi-competitive basis, it eventually created a "one-and-a-half" party
system guaranteeing the predominance of ARENA over the MDB and allowing
local and state but not national competition.
Both regimes were "semi-competitive", but the degree of competition
permitted by law and tolerated in practice differed between the two and
with that so too did the possibilities for the transformation of the
system. In the post-war Republic when votes could be bartered and
coalitions were fluid, competition for resources and for office was
real. When authoritarianism took away this possibility, opposition
became quixotic. Political alliances and divisions ossified, fixed
alignments eliminated competition, and the oligarchy and local bosses
were left in place at all levels of the political system. Unlike its
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predecessor, the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime could not become
truly competitive.
The Pattern of Authoritarian Political Competition
The brand of authoritarianism instituted by the military revamped
the pattern of competition in postwar Brazil and returned the country to
the even more rigid version of authoritarian politics that Minas Gerais
and Sao Paulo lived under during the Old Republic. Weak state
oligarchies, moreover, now had federal government protection which they
lacked in the earlier period. State elites that never really lost their
grip, like the Mineiro, had less to gain immediately but nonetheless
profited from a more secure order in the long term. Inter-party
competition as a means for elite turnover became extinct, and
oligarchical control of a single dominant party made intra-party
competition equally illusory.
The security of oligarchical tenure begins in the municipios.
Political elites begin their careers in local politics. Unlike many
U.S. politicians whose first race may be for U.S. senate, even grandsons
of presidents in Brazil must demonstrate they can win votes in city
council elections. A new elite not of an oligarchical family is under
even greater pressure to do the same.
Through disaggregated returns for mayor and city council elections
in 25 municipios, and field research in a subset of these, we examined
the organization of local politics, the stability of local political
7
coalitions, and the turnover rates of local power elites. While our
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findings are only suggestive, they fit a larger pattern and offer
hypotheses for future research.
Local Politics: From Inter-Party to Intra-Oligarchical
Competition. The regime wished to maximize its local support among the
traditional political elite. It could not tolerate a situation in which
local rivalries drove away one half of its strongest supporters among
the traditional political bosses and still hope to hold a comfortable
advantage in the electoral arena. To maximize local support, it used
both negative and positive inducements.
In an authoritarian system operating with a state clientelism that
reserved federal and state executive positions for the government and
its supporters, state "outs" could no longer become state "ins", and the
chances for federal "outs" ousting the military governors were even
slimmer. Eliminating the customary means for successfully challenging
local "ins"--riding the coattails of the state opposition to power at
some future date--diminished considerably the incentives for local
"outs", be they traditional bosses or newcomers, to ally with state and
federal "outs". With political alignments fixed by authoritarian rules
of competition which could be rewritten at any time (and often were
based on the latest polls conducted by military intelligence) to
guarantee the victory of the "ins", the only practical recourse for most
local challengers who hoped to come to power was to join ARENA.
Few politicians of the interior could afford to join the MDB. Had
the local political elite divided evenly between government and
opposition, opposition candidates might have overcome the disadvantages
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of being outside clientelistic channels. Because most politicians of
the interior did join the government, however, only political
representatives in a few select concentrated areas of heavy industry
where the opposition was strong--Contagem, Betim, and the "Steel
Valley"--and powerful local oligarchies in affluent municlpios could
8
successfully challenge state and federal elites. In Sete Lagoas, the
PSD and the faction of the UDN that had been allied with Governor Israel
Pinheiro and former cabinet minister Milton Campos (who resigned as
Minister of Justice in October 1965 when he saw Institutional Act Number
2 coming), joined the MDB. In Sete Lagoas, the MDB thus had a
competitive edge throughout the authoritarian era which it did not enjoy
in most cities and town. The exception that proves the rule, it was
possible for its oligarchy in the MDB out of conviction or convenience
to win. At the opposite end of the spectrum, traditional elites with
personal clienteles in very poor, very backward places who joined the
MDB for whatever reasons found themselves in a precarious position. In
a small town in the Minas cerrado, the traditional elite lost the
command of their municipio to a new ARENA elite backed by the state
(Reis, 1985). Of course, "authentic" MDBers affiliated with the party
out of conviction. Especially young politicians who for the most part
entered politics after the coup fought elections for the MDB as a means
of galvanizing protest against the regime. They did not expect to win,
nor could they until 1982. During authoritarian rule, even those who
were willing to pursue a long-term strategy, betting that the regime
could not endure indefinitely, had to face electors who however poor and
uneducated understood that opposition municipios received next to no
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state aid above their meager legally-mandated transfers.
However powerful the disincentives to defecting to the opposition
in this system, incorporating UDN and PSD politicians locally was
nonetheless no easy task. It required fitting opposing factions who
were bitter enemies into the same party structure where there were no
ideological obstacles to prevent oligarchs from contemplating MDB
membership. As a first step toward incorporation, party leadership was
shared. Places on executive commissions were alternated between the
major parties of the postwar era. If the PSD were allocated the
presidency, for instance, the general secretaryship was automatically
assigned to the UDN, and so on with the first and second vice-presidents
and other, lesser positions. Similarly, places on the party list in the
proportional representation elections (e.g., state and federal deputy
elections) could be found for members of each faction. But the regime's
dilemma was only partially solved by conventional means of political
compromise: who would contest various elections on the party ticket
could not be settled as easily in the plurality races in which parties
could field only one candidate. This difficulty which surfaced vividly
in the gubernatorial contests of 1982 posed the greatest problems for
the regime during the authoritarian years at the local level.
To make room for the entire local traditional political elite in
its band of supporters, the regime devised a new electoral arrangement,
the "sublegenda"--literally "sub-ticket". Employed in elections for
mayors and later for federal senators, up to three candidates from the
same party were allowed to contest the same office in general elections.
The votes of each "leRenda" were totalled and the office awarded to the
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highest vote getter of the party that polled best, even if a minority
party candidate received more votes than the eventual winner.
Sublegendas were indeed successful in persuading local bosses to
fall into the goverinment camp alongside their traditional rivals.
Schmitter (1973: 211) reported that in the 1972 municipal elections, the
MDB was able to run candidates in fewer than 2,000 of the country's
3,500 electoral districts. In most municipios in our sample, local PSD
and UDN politicians opted for ARENA immediately after the 'Revolution'.
Ex-PSDers became "ARENA 2", and ex-UDNers, "ARENA 1", or vice-versa.
Local, like state enemies, uncomfortably coexisted within the same ARENA
party, occupying separate sublegendas.
The regime was wise to use all the means at its disposal to keep
traditional elites in the ARENA camp. With rival local bosses running
for the same office on the same ARENA ticket, ARENA was sure to win most
local offices. In the mayoral elections of 1972, ARENA candidates won
92 percent of the races in the country (Sarles, 1982: 45). When there
were breaks in the ARENA coalition, its vote totals suffered. In the
1972 municipal elections in Varginha, when ARENA ran only one candidate
for mayor and one for vice-mayor, the ARENA nominee narrowly edged out
his MDB rival by a margin of 1246 votes (6,414 to 5,168 or 53.8% to
48.8% of the party vote). In the next municipal election, held in 1976,
when a second candidate ran for mayor on the "ARENA 2" sublegenda, the
two ARENA candidates combined received just over 15,000 votes, or 81.7
percent of the party votes cast. The lone MDB candidate ran a poor
third with 2,897 votes. A similar pattern appears in other
municipalities (Table VI-3). In Muriae, the ARENA legenda's share of
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Table VI-3
Local Elections, Select Municipios
Mayoral Elections
Pop. 1976 1972
1980 ARENA MDB ARENA MDB
# Leg % # Leg % # Leg % # Leg %
Barbacena
Conselheiro
Lafaiete
Curvelo
Dores do Indaia
Eloi Mendes
Guanhaes
Itabira
Itajuba
Januaria
Leopoldina
Montes Claros
Muriae
Patroclnio
Pirapora
Pogos de Caldas
86,388
72,438
50,770
15,184
16,986
22,781
71,115
60,593
71,941
42,118
177,308
69,990
44,373
32,673
86,972
Pouso Alegre 57,364
Santa Rita Sapucal 22,212
Sete Lagoas 100,628
Teofilo Otoni 128,827
Tres Coraoes 44,382
Uba 53,311
Uberaba 199,203
UnaI 67,883
Varginha 64,906
Varzea da Palma 18,533
2 53 3 38
2 80
3 54
2 89
1 65
2 62
3 36
2 62
1 82
2 95
2 80
2 95
3 13
3 40
1 6
1 25
3 28
3 55
3 32
0 --
0 --
3 14
2 2
3 86 1 10
2 97
2 33
3 35
1 34
3 40
3 71
2 81
1 45
2 76
2 44
o _
1 61
1 56
2 60
2 54
3 22
2 11
1 51
2 17
2 46
1 55 1 33
3 52
2 50
2 95
0 --
1 51
3 27
1 30
1 78
2 73
2 93
2 97
3 40
3 44
0 --
1 88
0 --
3 61
1 66
0 --
1 20
0 --
0 --
2 97 0 --
2 94
1 60
1 26
3 34
2 48
1 81
2 94
1 50
1 49
3 66
1 2
1 30
1 68
2 59
2 46
0 --
1 1
1 47
2 42
2 28
Pop. 1970 1966
1970 ARENA MDB ARENA MDB
# Leg % # Leg % # Leg % # Leg %
Barbacena
Conselheiro
Lafaiete
Curvelo
Dores do Indaia
Eloi Mendes
Guanhaes
Itabira
Itajuba
Januaria
Leopoldina
Montes Claros
73,905
50,919
45,494
15,747
14,712
22,489
56,394
51,727
62,615
41,337
116,464
1 59 1 11
2 64
1 61
1 65
1 78
2 92
2 92
3 58
2 94
1 48
2 72
3 24
2 30
1 21
0 --
0 --
0 --
3 33
0 --
1 38
1 17
2 89 0 --
1 45
2 44
2 93
1 78
2 91
2 77
1 77
2 90
1 78
1 77
1 45
1 47
0 --
0 --
0 --
1 8
1 15
0 --
0 --
0 --
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Table VI-3
Local Elections, Select Municipios
(cont.)
Mayoral Elections
Pop. 1970 1966
1970 ARENA MDB ARENA MDB
# Leg % # Leg % # Leg % # Leg %
Muriae 58,428 1 51 1 35 2 91 1 2
Patrocinio 35,600 ---- 1 72 0 --
Pirapora 20,339 2 89 1 5 2 91 0 --
Pogos de Caldas 57,643 ---------------- 1 73 0 --
Pouso Alegre 38,141 1 69 1 21 1 62 0 --
Santa Rita Sapucal 18,927 1 55 1 37 1 70 - --
Sete Lagoas 66,636 3 47 3 40 0 -- 2 82
Teofilo Otoni 132,960 1 51 1 36 2 53 1 38
Tres Coraoes 35,244 2 39 2 53 1 50 1 41
Ubg 44,663 2 94 0 -- 2 87 1 4
Uberaba 124,848 2 57 2 34 3 61 1 29
Una 52,427 1 48 1 48 2 50 0 42
Varginha 43,707 2 74 1 15 1 50 1 39
Varzea da Palma 13,383 1 42 1 50 1 68 0 --
a. Patrocinio and Pogos de Caldas were designated estancias
hidrominerais, which meant that, along with state capitals and 'national
security' areas, their mayors were no longer elected but appointed by
the governor. These municipalities, did, however, continue to hold
elections for city council.
b. These percentages of ARENA and MDB vote do not total to 100 because
they are percentage shares of the turnout. The remaining ballots were
either cast blank or voided.
Sources: IBGE, 1970, 1980b; TRE-MG.
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the vote for mayor rose from 51 percent in 1972 to 97 percent in 1976,
when it ran two candidates instead of one; in Pouso Alegre, from 69 to
94 percent in the same years under the same circumstances; in Dores do
Indaia, from 65 to 95 percent; and in Uberaba, the government party's
vote total rose, despite a constant number of candidates (2) but the
number of its opposition candidates declined. In cases where only one
sublegenda polled well, it was often the case that PSD and UDN ran on
the same ticket, with one running for mayor and the other as vice-mayor.
Schmitter (1973: 210) believed these "sub-tickets", while helping
to ensure majorities for the regime, would permit local conflict to
continue. Logically, sublegendas should have transposed inter-party
competition into intra-party competition. If they had, they might have
accomodated new elites. But by and large, the demise of inter-party
competition made local coalitional shifts more difficult to effect.
While a success from the regime's standpoint in maximizing its local
support, sublegendas merely allowed the oligarchy to confine competition
to its own ranks, and intra-oligarchical competition did not provide for
elite turnover. Why did vigorous and genuine intra-party competition on
the local level not develop through the mechanism of the sublegenda?
The sublegendas were assigned by local party diretSrios. In the
local "in" party, this meant they were controlled by members of the
local oligarchy. As on the state level, local bosses organized ARENA
chapters in the cities and towns of the interior. These bosses could be
the most powerful figures in their municipios, at times enjoying great
stature in state politics. In Varginha, PSD as well as UDN and PR
leaders joined ARENA. Most members of the ARENA diretSrio over the
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years were semi-permanent fixtures. Three-fourths of the members in
1975, the last elected diret6rio before the party's dissolution, had
been members in 1972. Of these, all but two were members from the local
party branch's constitution in 1969. In Sete Lagoas, 86 percent of the
members of the MDB diretorio in 1979 [comprised of the old PSD and half
the UDN] (the "ins) were carryovers from the previous election year,
1975. The executive commission in 1979 was reelected intact from 1975,
and three of its four members were also on the local party's top body in
1972. Seven of eight of the elected delegates to the party's state
convention had served on the party's diretorio at some point; half were
among the founders of the MDB in Sete Lagoas. Old elites even dominated
the PMDB leadership in 1984 (after the PP has been dissolved). Not one
leader (member of the diretorio or executive commission) of the PT and
the PDT in town had been on the MDB's diretorio, and only one member of
the PTB.
With local party leadership posts divided between prominent figures
from the two dominant, conservative parties of the pre-coup era, the PSD
and the UDN, two places on the "in" party's legenda in each city and
town were virtually "reserved" for old elites from their ranks. New
elites could enter the political arena on the side of the government
through only one of two avenues: the ranks of one of the factions (in
order to secure nomination on the sublegenda reserved for that group) or
on a third sub-ticket of ARENA, if open. Mounting a viable challenge to
local power on the third legenda was a formidable task. A third
candidate could not count on the support of the state party machine.
The state elite was split along the same pre-coup lines, and prominent
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state PSD and UDN politicians campaigned in the cities and towns for
"their own". The governor, who strove to be impartial in his dealings
9
with the two legendas, could hardly hope to maintain old oligarchs in
the fold if he assisted local challengers from outside both camps. The
difficulties in "going it alone" within ARENA were compounded by the
tendency of voters inclined to reject the local oligarchy to vote MDB,
the natural party of protest. If a challenger did have a realistic
chance of beating establishment candidates, the local diretorio was
under no obligation to nominate him for the city's top office (though
this would be frowned upon by the state elite.)
Most often, if a young aspirant with no family ties did wish to
enter politics, he did so under the aegis of traditional local bosses.
In Barbacena, state deputy Joao Navarro who began his political career
in the PTB independent of the city's two oligarchical families (and who
went on to become the president of the state Legislative Assembly),
joined the Bias Fortes faction. When he did, he could immediately count
on more votes for himself and the votes he brought with him in turn
strengthened Bias Fortes' position in the municipio and in the state.
Only in 1976 in the last municipal elections held in the authoritarian
era did it become less than rare for three candidates to contest the
same office on the local level. Controlled by the party oligarchies,
the sublegendas reinforced oligarchical rule.
Competition and Local Elites. What was good for the regime was
also good for the oligarchy. Many old politicians in our sample stayed
within the ARENA fold, guaranteeing for the regime a steady diet of
votes, and for themselves, a route to local power for local purposes or
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a base of operations for higher office. In only a few municipalities
did one of these factions defect to the MDB at some point during the
course of the authoritarian era. When this occured, it was more often
the case that individual candidates or a small group switched to the MDB
than an actual factional realignment take place.
The oligarchical grip on the parties and the impediments to
coalitional shifts led to a low degree of turnover in local elected
office, as well as in local candidates nominated. In Tres Coragoes, the
mayor elected in 1962 was reelected in 1972; the mayor elected in 1970
was returned to office in 1976; and the latter's brother served as mayor
in 1966 and was an unsuccessful candidate in 1972. In the estancias
hidrominerais in which the mayors were appointed by the state
administration, the survival of the traditional political elite was most
accentuated. In Pogos de Caldas, the Junqueiras, long the dominant
political force in the municipio, were named to head the city
administration in virtually every "election". Most local oligarchies
did not need such drastic forms of protection. In Guanhaes, the
surnames of the local oligarchy, the Coelhos, appear and reappear in
each election held during authoritarianism. In Varginha, Eduardo
Ottoni, widely touted as an 'outsider' and 'proof' that "new leadership"
had captured new migrant and worker votes and ousted the local elite,
was in fact a member of the PSD faction and married to the great-
granddaughter of the municipio's first mayor. In these municipios,
heading factions within ARENA secured a place for old elites. In Sete
Lagoas, on the other hand, the local oligarchy that controlled the
10
municipio and was sheltered by the MDB rather than ARENA faced more
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serious challenges than elsewhere. Local business elites assumed
leadership of the local ARENA branch, and local competition was real.
Partisan divisions which predated the authoritarian regime
outlasted it. Pre-1965 political alignments superimposed on the post-
1965 party system persisted on both the state and local levels
throughout the post coup period, up to and including the 1982 elections.
If a member of the defunct UDN were the ARENA party's gubernatorial
'nominee' during the authoritarian regime, his lieutenant governor
invariably was an ex-member of the PSD. Once fitted into the lopsided
two party system, these pre-coup alignments were fixed and became
perhaps the most important factor determining state and local politics.
A peasant in a small town in the Alto Paranalba region of Minas Gerais
remarked in 1981, sixteen years after they had been abolished, "As long
11
as there is a world, there will be a PSD and a UDN".
In the municipalities, factional lines drawn during the Vargas
dictatorship survived into the modern era. Where the pre-coup cohort
was aging, their sons and sons-in-law carried on their "political
tradition". In Varginha, the differences between the old PSD and the
ex-UDN-PR alliance were the most important source of political conflict
in the municipio. The dispute, which was as old as the Vargas
dictatorship itself, pitted Vargas' local foes (the PR-UDN) against the
PSD. This political divide permeated most aspects of municipal life.
The two major newspapers in town were owned and edited by the opposing
12
sides. Both sides joined ARENA when the party was organized in town.
While Varginha changed and grew economically, its partisan lines
remained unchanged for the entire authoritarian period. The old UDN-
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PR/PSD rivalry continued to constitute the most significant division
along which groups lined up in the municlpio. When change did occur in
1976, only the group in power changed, not the composition of the
contending factions. Even at the close of the authoritarian regime when
the local PDS chapter in Varginha was being constituted, the
intervention of the state party was required for the warring factions to
agree on the composition of the local party directory, with the general
secretary of the state PDS, Emilio Gallo, serving as arbiter (Gazeta de
Varginha, September 4, 1981). Sublegendas offered the ex-PSD faction,
and its allies, a chance to become competitive once again in local
politics. But it also denied other groups the same opportunity.
Throughout the state, when the political system opened for the first
time in anticipation of the 1982 gubernatorial elections, the ex-PSD -
ex-UDN divide resurfaced in Minas Gerais as if the coup had never
happened and ARENA had never been formed. Realignment took place two
years later, after a new governor had been elected and when it became
apparent the system could change at the top.
State politics: Authoritarian Politics and the Oligarchy.
Appointed governors and entrenched local bosses provided the stability,
protection, and patronage assistance from above as well as the support
and allegiance from below to hold the state oligarchy in place. The
restraints on political competition and decisions made by leaders of
local party branches who otherwise exercised little influence in state
and national party politics returned the same members to the state
Legislative Assembly in Minas Gerais, and to the state's delegation to
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the Chamber of Deputies. Deputies are significant in that state cabinet
members and future governors are recruited from their ranks, and such
powerful figures in the state elite often return to the Chamber of
Deputies after a stint in state and federal high office.
The state party diretorio fills available places on the party
state-wide deputy slate (incumbents have the prerogative of running
again). An ARENA slate may be aided by the actions of the governor and
federal government spending in a municipality, and an MDB ticket by poor
economic performance and reduced wages. Since deputies are ordered on
the party list by actual vote total, however, election depends on
winning votes among the electorate. Why individual candidates should be
preferred by voters over one of their colleagues rests entirely upon the
political skills and resources of the would-be deputy and the interests
of the local elites who endorse them.
In Brazil's system of statewide proportional representation,
general electors may vote for only one candidate from the entire slate
of all parties. Despite the wide range of choice, only three to five
candidates normally capture three-quarters of a community's vote. To
win such large blocks of votes, the aspiring deputy must court members
of local party diretorios. At times, a candidate might trade votes from
his hometown or other areas of support for a federal deputy from a city
whose vote he is soliciting, in exchange for that diretorio's support
for his run for state deputy. Local party endorsements which carry with
them anywhere from half the municipal vote for a native and 30 percent
for a parliamentary candidate from another part of the state are
crucial if a deputy is to garner enough votes statewide to be elected.
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Which deputies are elected, then, depends in large part on the
composition of the party diretorios in the cities and towns of the
interior.
Stable party leaderships such as those in Varginha and Sete Lagoas
are likely to support incumbent deputies, especially those who have been
good patrons to the cities they 'represent'. Long standing loyalties
and alignments can be a powerful political drive for good practical
reasons on both sides. Without electoral districts, were an incumbent
deputy to lose, a locality might be left without "representation"
altogether, something which no municIpio can afford in a system which
underfunds local government. Cities and towns of the interior must
supplement their revenues with state program funds and public works--
pork barrel projects which are usually secured through political
connections. The more traditional the aspiring political
representative, the better connected, and the more state resources he
can deliver. Even oligarchies in opposition can take advantage of old
networks. The mayor of Sete Lagoas, according to the president of the
Commercial and Industrial Association of Sete Lagoas [and member of the
PDS diretorio], was the best the municipality had had in twenty years,
13
"very well connected" despite being from the opposition. The local
oligarchy, who founded the PP (Partido Popular) in Sete Lagoas,
persuaded the local PDS to support two opposition federal deputies and
one state deputy, "sons of the city", who would in exchange attend to
requests from local members of the PDS in the state Legislative Assembly
and the federal Chamber of Deputies. Where connections are at a
premium, the only people worth supporting are those who can operate in
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state networks; the oligarchies best fit the bill.
Local bosses, in turn, are only as secure as the loyalty a deputy
displays toward them. Witness the testimony of Bonifacio Jose Tamm de
Ardrada, when asked about his relationship with his cabos eleitorais:
He claimed he demanded of these citizens only their
"unconditional loyalty to the Andradas", for which
he offered, in exchange, the support and prestige of
his political faction. To illustrate the modus
vivendi of this relationship, he cited a case where
he was once offered by an influential citizen in a
municipio neighboring Barbacena [his home] a number
of votes two times greater than what he was being
delivered by the then cabo eleitoral of the faction,
on the condition he abandon his old ally. He
claimed that he turned down the offer, preferring to
stick with his old cabo eleitoral, who, year after
year, had delivered to him a sure and steady vote
(interview on 16/11/78 with C. Carvalho, 1980: 92-
93).
These mutually beneficial if unequal alliances between local elites
and state oligarchs resulted in the reelection of not only a high rate
of ARENA deputies, but the same ARENA (PSD/UDN/PR, etc.) deputies. In
fact, a significant number of deputies (or their sons) elected even at
the end of the authoritarian regime whose tenure in the legislature pre-
dated the regime's birth. Even as late as 1978, 23 of 28 ARENA federal
deputies and 25 of 42 state deputies (who should be much younger)
belonged to the pre-1965 political parties (Table VI-4). Of these, most
(19 federal and 23 state deputies) began their political careers in the
"conservative" parties, the PSD, the UDN, and the PR (Araujo, 1980: 48-
49). In Sao Paulo, too, deputies elected in 1974 exhibited high
proportions of pre-coup party roots. The slightly lower rates for the
MDB in Minas are attributable to the weakness of the pre-1965 populist
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Table VI-4
Partisan Background, Brazilian Deputies, 1974-1978
Pre-1965 Party Affiliation
1 or more None/no information Total
No. % No. % No.
Minas Gerais
1978 Deputies
ARENA
MDB
Total
Sao Paulo
1974 Deputies
ARENA
MDB
Total
National
1974 Deputies
ARENA
MDB
Total
1978 Deputies
ARENA
MDB
Total
Minas Gerais
1978 State Deps.
ARENA
MDB
Total
Sao Paulo
1974 State Deps.
ARENA
MDB
Total
23 82
5 26
28 60
15 88
13 45
28 61
186 91
110 69
296 80
189 82
113 60
302 72
25 60
3 10
28 40
18 72
23 51
41 59
5
14
19
2
16
18
18
50
68
42
76
18
17
26
43
7
22
29
18
74
40
12
55
39
9
31
20
18
40
28
40
90
60
28
49
41
Sources: Minas Gerais: Araujo, 1980: 48-49.
Sao Paulo: Cardoso, 1978: 68-71.
National: Wesson and Fleischer, 1983: 107.
*(includes 6 cassados)
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28
19
47
17
29
46
204
160
370*
231
189
420
42
29
71
25
45
70
parties, such as the PTB and the MTR, and others whose members might be
more likely to join the MDB than ARENA, such as the Christian Democrats.
Rates of elite turnover were lower during the years of the
authoritarian regime than in the pre-coup party system. Fleischer
(1980b: 59) has provided the turnover rates of federal deputies:
percentages of new representatives in the Chamber of Deputies for each
of the cohorts of the post-war era are followed by the number of
deputies in the Chamber in that session:
1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978
70.7% 51.8% 49.1% 46.9% 41.3% 45.8% 43.4% 44.8%
(304) (326) (326) (409) (409) (310) (364) (420)
"New" deputies are defined as representatives who never before occupied
a seat in the federal Chamber (as opposed to those who may have returned
after a previous defeat or after serving in some other office).
Actual elite turnover may have declined even more sharply after the
regime change than these figures initially suggest. Institutional Act
No. 5, issued in December, 1968, annulled the legislative mandates of 28
ARENA and 66 MDB Deputies (94 of 409 or 23% of the total) and prevented
these representatives from standing for reelection in 1970. Nearly one-
fourth of the legislative seats in that year were ripe for 'new elites'.
Had each expelled deputy successfully defended his seat, the percent of
'new' deputies elected in 1970 (46) would have been halved. Though
fewer legislators had been cassados by the 'revolution', the
cancellation of mandates nonetheless exercised an impact on the
composition of the legislature elected in 1966 as well. Secondly, these
rates represent the number of new legislators over the total number of
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seats. Yet, in both 1974 and 1978, the size of the Chamber was
increased. Fleischer does not compensate for the increase in the size
of the Chamber, which he calls a "safety valve" for both returning
experienced legislators and for allowing new blood to enter. All other
factors being equal, an increase in the number of representatives from
364 to 420 between 1974 and 1978 should have produced a corresponding
increase in the percentage of new elites. Yet, turnover stayed at
practically the same level. Thus this understates how secure incumbent
elites were in office. It does, on the other hand, accurately inform us
of the full extent of the opportunities the system created for new
contestants.
In Minas Gerais, elite turnover declined even more dramatically
during the authoritarian regime from its pre-coup levels. By the same
measure which Fleischer uses to analyze the national data, as many as 41
percent of federal deputies were elected for the first time in 1954 and
46 percent in 1958 (Table VI-5), and over 50 percent of state deputies
in each year (1954, 1958, and 1962) before AI-2. Shortly after the
coup, turnover rates slumped despite the cassaCoes of many deputies (see
notes to Table VI-5). In the 1974 congressional elections, the first
post-coup elections unaffected by the expulsion of deputies and
generally regarded as the freest of the military term in office,
turnover rates fell sharply to 30 percent in the federal deputy
elections and 13 percent in the state elections; 1978 rates rose
moderately with the sizeable increase in the size of the legislatures
but not to the levels of the 1950s. When the size of the legislature is
held constant by counting only the deputies elected to previously
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Table VI-5
Federal and State Deputy Turnover, Minas Gerais, 1950-1978
Election Chamber of Deputies Legislative Assembly
Number New Deputies Number New Deputies
Elected # %* * Elected # %*
Pre-Coup
1950 38 -- -- 72 -- --
1954 39 15 38.5 (41.0) 74 38 51.3 (54.0)
1958 39 18 46.1 74 40 54
1962 48 14 29.1 (47.8) 82 41 50.0 (59.7)
Post-Coup
1966*** 48 15 31.2 73 39 53.4
1970**** 35 15 33.3 59 22 37.2
1974 37 9 24.3 (29.7) 61 6 9.8 (13.0)
1978 47 11 23.3 (46.0) 71 13 18.3 (32.3)
*This column represents the
incumbent.
deputies who "took away" the seat of an
**This column represents all new deputies.
***If not for the cassados, there might have been 11, not 15, new
deputies in the Chamber representing Minas Gerais, lowering the rate of
new elite entry to 22.9%. While the size of the state Legislative
Assembly did shrink in 1966, the deputies expelled from the legislature
probably artificially raised the turnover rate. If all the cassados had
been reelected, the rate would have been 45.2%.
****The figures for 1970 are inflated due to the cassacoes following
Institutional Act Number 5. Seven Minas federal deputies and three
state deputies lost their posts and their rights to defend them in the
next elections. If these 7 were reelected, as they had ever reasonable
chance of being, the turnover rate would have been only 22.8%.
Similarly, the state deputy turnover rate would have been 32.2%.
Source: A. Araujo, 1980: 65-70,
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existing seats, the rates remain significantly lower than their
corresponding measures in the pre-coup years: in the state race, 10
percent in 1974 as opposed to nearly 50 percent in 1962. The state
returns are particularly significant since these rates had been higher
in the pre-coup period than the federal elections, and it is at this
level where political elites first rise above their local milieu to join
the state elite. Becoming a state deputy is a springboard to
14
politically desirable state and federal administrative posts.
Neither Carvalho's nor Fleischer's data, moreover, take account of
the family ties of 'new' deputies. When Jose Bonificio Lafayette de
Andrada retired from politics before the 1978 congressional elections
his eldest son, Bonifacio Jose Tamm de Andrada, took "his place" on the
legenda and was easily elected. The younger Andrada's brother, Jose
Bonifacio Tamm de Andrada (Jose Bonificio Filho), in turn, replaced his
brother on the state deputy legenda and in the state Legislative
Assembly. Both, as "new" deputies, contributed to the increase in elite
turnover. Neither represent the infusion of "new blood" into elite
ranks.
The Authoritarian Coalition and Traditional Elites
The authoritarian regime renewed the traditional elite whose place
in the authoritarian coalition was crucial; the party system enhanced
its strongest resource: clientelism. The military needed the electoral
support which it could deliver to remain in power without resorting to
generalized and extreme coercion. From the beginning of the regime, it
had been forced to look to the traditional elements of the political
320
class when it needed civilian support (cf. Linz, 1973: 238). For a
brief period that support appeared expendable. But after the economic
miracle began to slow down in 1974, the military relied less oil
technocratically-produced economic growth rates and more on civilian
politicians, in many cases the most traditional of the political elite,
for its survival. The support of politicians became even more central
15
for the legitimation of a regime which had few alternatives. Unlike
populist leaders, the military could not afford to jeopardize the
support of the oligarchy. Vargas, for instance, could use urban lower-
middle and working class support against the traditional elite when it
ited him. The bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, predicated upon
excluding these classes from politics and from the fruits of economic
development, could not. Only traditional political elites in Brazil,
masters of state clientelism, could support the regime effectively by
channeling state resources through the ARENA party.
The regime equipped these old political elites to do battle in the
electoral arena with the opposition, moreover, with ample funds for the
patronage warchest. Political criteria once again became explicit and
overt in the decision-making process. Politicians were named to high
ranking cabinet posts with increasing frequency in the state cabinets in
which they had been absent and eventually in the national cabinet as
well. Social development funds were increased, and politically
distributed. Ultimately, this strategy entailed handing back the reins
of government to the civilian elite. In the short term, however, the
depth and timing of repoliticization were left purposively vague,
allowing the military to control its pace from above.
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In his inaugural speech in March, 1974, President Ernesto Geisel
pronounced the beginning of a political 'opening', or liberalization.
Velasco e Cruz and Martins (1984: 47-48) argue that 1974 appeared to be
an optimal time for a controlled political opening: this was the first
(and last) presidential succession in which the military was unified;
the MDB appeared weak; the left was defeated. So auspicious are the
circumstances that the regime's political wizard, General Golbery de
Couto e Silva, had wished to launch the liberalization even earlier,
during the height of the prosperity of the Mdici period. The regime's
confidence prompted it to permit the 1974 elections to take place in a
semi-free atmosphere, with ample media access for the opposition and
limited interference on the part of the regime in screening opposition
candidates.
With all signs pointing to a repeat of the government victories of
1966, 1970, and 1972, the regime and the opposition were truly taken
aback by the government's electoral setback in the 1974 congressional
elections. Beginning from a base of seven of 66 senators and 87 of 310
deputies, the opposition MDB won most of the senate seats available (16
of 22), made substantial inroads into the government majority in the
Chamber of Deputies (it elected 172 deputies as compared with 192 for
ARENA), and took control of five additional state legislatures (prior to
the election it held the majority of seats only in Guanabara) (Roett,
1984: 146-47). This stunning performance at the polls for the MDB was
not entirely of its own making. The MDB was widely acknowledged to have
captured, without a concerted effort, the allegiance of voters who
previously had stayed home on polling day, cast blank votes, or spoiled
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their ballots. In other words, it had capitalized upon a strong
undercurrent of protest.
While not threatened with outright defeat nor brought to the point
of surrendering power, the regime was nevertheless sufficiently shaken
to recognize its need for enhanced political support. To ensure that
1978 would not be a repeat of 1974, and that the government would not
lose its majority in the senate, the regime took a series of steps to
strengthen its institutional advantage. It declared Congress in recess
in April, 1977, and during that time, decreed an "April Package" of 14
amendments to articles of the 1969 constitution, three new articles, and
six decree laws. Among its provisions the "Package" extended the
presidential mandate from five to six years; reduced the quorum
necessary for voting on constitutional amendments from 2/3 of the
Congress to a simple majority (after the 1974 elections, it could no
longer muster a 2/3 majority); and, in one of its most innovative
measures, created "bionic" senators (Velasco e Cruz and Martins, 1984:
55). To retain its senate majority, one senator from each state would
thenceforth be elected "indirectly", the familiar authoritarian term for
a post appointed by the federal executive and "ratified" by legislative
majorities in the state assemblies. One of the most important measures
of the package, the "Lei Falcao" (named for the Justice Minister Armando
Falcao who enacted it), limited the opposition's access to the mass
media. Many analysts had credited the opposition's 1974 victories to
the effectiveness of the messages it conveyed in its mass media
campaign (see Sarles, 1982, for instance). To enhance even further its
probability of retaining control of both chambers of the legislature, it
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carved new states from old and gave premature statehood to territories
where the government had reason to believe it held the political
advantage. Thus, for example, Mato Grosso do Sul was subdivided from
the state of Mato Grosso, and recognized as an independent state in
1977.
As it turned out, the regime did not need at that time to have
passed such draconian measures. According to calculations by Fleischer
(1980: 72-81), ARENA would have won 55 percent of the seats in the
federal deputy contest of 1978 with or without those provisions of the
"Pacote" that affected the composition of the Chamber (the change from
the size of electorate to the size of population as the basis for
representation; the increase in the size of the house; and the limit
placed on the number of representatives from any one state which
deprived Sao Paulo of 26 seats) but not accounting for the effects of
the Lei Falcao. But, without "indirectly" electing one-third of the
senate, the MDB would have won majority control of the higher body.
What accounts for the ability of the regime to bounce back from
such a dramatic upsurge in opposition voting in 1974? Why the
difference in regime performance in senate and house races? The answer
to these questions lies in the nature of state clientelism and the
parties, and the channels traditional elites used to bring the state to
its citizens.
As "artificial" agglomerations (cf. Cardoso, 1978: 67), these were
scarcely political parties in the sense understood by political
scientists. In the early years of the regime, the MDB awkwardly
performed its role of token opposition party (the only one the regime
324
allowed it). Later, it did mature into a genuine opposition party on the
national level and in some metropolitan regions of the more developed
southern states, but the opposition it offered was protest rather than a
strong party program for the dispossessed. Given the circumstances of
the parties' birth it is hardly surprising that they should have started
out this way. But it is noteworthy that the parties more or less
retained their heterogeneous character for all 21 years of the duration
of the regime. With such disparate politicians in the two parties,
party platforms never really coalesced, nor was common ground achieved
in the states or nation.
Because the two parties could not be distinguished by the content
of their programs nor their projects for the future, the only really
meaningful divide between them was that ARENA supported the government
and the MDB opposed it. ARENA lived and died by its attachment to
the state. When the resources of the state could be employed to support
ARENA candidates, and voters could visibly recognize the advantages of
state assistance, they voted ARENA; when they wished to protest
government performance in such areas as the high cost of living (a
salient issue for the poor whose adjustments to indexed wages lagged up
to six months behind double- and later triple-digit inflation), they
voted for the MDB. The expression of these cross-cutting interests took
the form of a dichotomous voting pattern in which the government scored
well in local and deputy elections and the opposition benefitted from
protest votes in senatorial elections.
The regime enjoyed a decided advantage over its opponents in the
thousands of small, predominantly rural municipios in especially the
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Northeast of Brazil, but also extending west and south, to Minas Gerais.
In the North and Northeast, government majorities were secure: the
government party routinely trounced its opposition by margins of 2 to 1
in the North and 3 to 1 in the Northeast. The Northeast states alone
accounted for nearly half the government's representatives in the
Congress and the state assemblies (Table VI-6). In the western state of
Mato Grosso, there was only one opposition mayor of a possible 84
(Jornal do Brasil, 4/4/76). In the Southeast, the picture was quite the
opposite. The opposition had its strongest support in the developed
parts of the country.
This pattern of voting in which the MDB tended to do well in the
more industrialized regions of the country and ARENA in the less
developed was reproduced within states. Less developed, rural, and
smaller cities of the interior tended to favor ARENA, while large
cities, and industrial regions swang toward the opposition. Sarles
(1982: 58-59) found a significant correlation between the size of a
municlpio, rates of urbanization, and the vote for the federal and state
deputies in the old state of Rio de Janeiro (excluding the city of Rio)
in the 1974 elections, when the opposition MDB polled quite well. The
smaller, rural municipios supported ARENA in significant numbers: the
correlation coefficient for the Chamber of Deputies vote with municipal
size was -.708, and -.741 for the same election correlated with percent
urban. Sarles' study also demonstrates significant correlations between
the percentage of workers employed in agriculture and voting for the
government party (r= .744 for the Chamber of Deputies election in Rio de
Janeiro in 1974); wealth (r= .713); and migrants with rural, rather than
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Table VI-6
Brazil: Party Vote By Region, 1966-1978
1966 1970 1974 1978
Region Seats Seats Seats Seats
ARENA MDB ARENA MDB ARENA MDB ARENA MDB
Federal
Senate:
North
Northeast
Center-West
Southeast
South
Total
Chamber of
Deputies:
North
Northeast
Center-West
Southeast
South
Total
State
Legislative
Assemblies:
North
Northeast
Center-West
Southeast
South
Total
2 1
8 1
1 1
4 1
3 0
18 4
20
107
14
91
45
6 0
18 0
4 0
7 3
6 0
41 3
12 6
73 17
13 4
83 40
42 20
7
29
7
66
23
277 132
62
325
48
198
98
24
94
21
159
47
731 345
223 87
30
184
37
126
91
15
54
14
107
43
468 233
2 1
4 5
1 1
0 5
0 3
7 15
11 10
82 25
14 7
55 82
37 41
199 165
31
204
40
108
74
23
69
21
141
76
457 330
3 0
8 1
2 1
1 3
0 3
14 8
17 11
92 34
18 10
62 94
42 40
231 189
39
221
50
100
77
27
81
30
143
72
487 353
Source: Lima, 1984: 66-68. Original data
Eleitoral, Dados Estatisticos, vols. 8, 9,
from Tribunal Superior
and 11.
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urban, origins (r= .572). There is a strong, negative correlation
between areas of in-migration (from urban and rural settings) and voting
for ARENA (r= -.77i).
Faria (1981) found similar patterns in the state of So Paulo in
the same 1974 election. The most efficient predictors of ARENA vote in
bivariate correlations were rural employment (r=.666 in the senate race;
in the federal deputy election, .624; and .675 in the state deputy
election), levels of schooling (r=-.825; -.704; and -.704, respectively)
and electric lighting (r=-.798; -.718; and -.753, respectively). The
direction of the signs in these correlations suggests that the less
developed a municipality, the more likely it was to vote for ARENA.
The logical conclusion of these findings, and one Sarles draws
(1982: 65), is that by fostering economic growth, the military regime
was contributing to its own demise. In her words, "The regime is
thus in the paradoxical position of working toward an economic situation
that will undermine its political base. To the extent that it succeeds
in its economic goals, then, it is likely to fail in its political goals
of establishing a durable electoral majority and a stable political
system." This conclusion supposed that it would prove impossible for
the regime to retain urban, industrialized municlpios in its camp. In
Minas Gerais, this was not the case. The correlation coefficient for
municipal size and vote for ARENA in 1978 (the federal deputy legenda)
was -.180 (not statistically significant), and for percent rural and the
percent vote for the ARENA legenda, .457. While the higher opposition
vote totals in 1974 relative to 1978 may have influenced Sarles' and
Faria's correlations, if level of development is indeed the central
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independent variable in explaining voting against the government, then
the correlation should have been stronger in the 1978 elections when
16
these municipalites were more developed.
ARENA candidates demonstrated their ability to run well in urban
areas in various times and places. In Uberaba, one of Minas Gerais'
most important and largest cities with a population of nearly 200,000,
the two ARENA candidates for mayor combined received 52,000 votes in the
1976 municipal elections of a turnout of 65,000 (81%), while the MDB
candidate received only 7500. Where the MDB polled well in mid-sized
cities, moreover, its vote was volatile. In Pouso Alegre (pop. 57,000),
the MDB candidate received 2000 votes in 1970 and in 1972, only 184
votes. In 1976, the MDB did not even nominate a candidate. In Te6filo
Otoni, a "dike city" in the northeastern part of Minas Gerais, with an
electorate of 40,000, an MDB mayor was elected in 1976. Yet, the
surname of the victorious candidate reveals him to be a descendent of
one of the branches of the Minas oligarchy: S. The vice-mayor elected
in 1972 on the same MDB legenda "2" bore the surname for which the
municipio was named: Ottoni.
Not economic change per se but pre-coup local political alignments
may have had a decisive influence on the strength of the post-coup
parties in these municlpios. The best apparent predictor of voting for
the MDB in the later years of the authoritarian regime was how pre-coup
political forces lined up in the post-coup parties. Where the MDB
polled well, at least in local elections in Minas Gerais, it did not do
so because of new leadership but because of politicians who had been
strong before the coup, be they of a populist party like the PTB or an
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oligarchical party like the PSD, joined the opposition. Itajuba and
Pouso Alegre, two cities in the south of Minas, share certain socio-
economic characteristics but have very different political and voting
patterns. The size of their populations are nearly identical (Itajubi,
60,593 in 1980 to 57,364 in Pouso Alegre), and both received important
new industrial investments in the 1970s. In 1972, the MDB received 66
percent of the vote in Itajuba to capture city hall. and only two
percent in Pouso Alegre (Table VI-3), and in 1978, MDB candidates for
the Chamber of Deputies polled twice as well in Itajubi (Table VI-7).
One apparent difference between the two was that in 1962, the PTB
received 29 percent of the vote in Itajubi; in Po.'tso Alegre in the same
year, that party did not field a candidate (Table VI-7). In other
cities with a significant, independent PTB presence--Santa Rita do
Sapucal and Itabira--the MJ1B won at least one mayoral election during
the authoritarian era (Table VI--3). Where either the PTB or other
populist party, or elements of the oligarchy itself, joined the MDB, the
YDB stood a reasonable chance of winning local office. Where the MDB
began from scratch, and placed hope!s on new leaders, its road to even
local office was immeasurably more difficult. Pre-coup alignments in
many cities survived the political break.
Clientelism, when combined with authoritarian political alignments,
revitalized ARENA where it had previously lost support. In Juiz de
Fora, a city of 300,000 in the Minas Mata, after the party
reorganization of 1965, the MDB emerged as the majority party in the
city and ARENA, which absorbed the old elites, started a precipitous
decline. By 1972, according to Reis (1978a: 221), "ARENA had
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Table VI-7
Pre- and Post-Coup Voting Patterns by Municipio
1978 1962
% MDB Vote % Vote for Mayoral Candidates(a)
CD AL Sen. PTB PSD UDN PR PDC Other
Barbacena
Conselheiro
Lafaiete
Curvelo
Dores do Indaig
Eloi Mendes
Guanhaes
Itabira
Itajubi
Januaria
Leopoldina
Montes Claros(b)
Muriae
Patroclnio
Pirapora
Poos de Caldas
Pouso Alegre
Santa Rita SapucaI
Sete Lagoas
Teofilo Otoni
Tres Coragoes
Uba
Uberaba
Unal
Varginha
Varzea da Palma
38 36 42 6 49 30 5
29 27 42
47 56 48
36 34 45
19 17 33
9 8 28
39 48 41
62 54 54
1 1 14
25 26 38
23 23 43
14 15 24
31 29 36
20 19 48
38 37 32
32 33 47
36
51
48
32
12
24
39
16
40
32 48
50 50
43 48
30 42
13 25
24 26
38 40
15 38
35 39
9 36
--------- n.d.------
48*
62
50
36 15
29 29
45
37* 51
28
49
46
t* 40*
47
35
45
9*
47
45
45
27
51 43
38 47*
53 +
11 31
33
14 34*
25** 36*
45*
31
48*
42
6
22 34
55* *
40 *
34*** ***
44 *
* * 44** MTR**
(a) Parties often formed electoral coalitions in
the coup; since it is impossible to disaggregate
local elections before
each party's strength,
coalition partners are indicated by asterisks. In municipios where more
than one coalition challenged the mayoral race, members of the same
coalition are matched with multiple asterisks.
(b) The percentage for the PL (Partido Libertador) is inflated in 1962
because a popular mayoral candidate ran on this party label. The city
council elections may perhaps be more representative in this year: PSD,
32%; PR, 31%; UDN, 16%; MTR, 9%.
+The PSD did not run a candidate for mayor, but collected 49% of the
vote for vice-mayor.
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37
* 28
5
27
*
35-PL
6-PSP
19-MTR
1-PSB
3-PSP
5-PRT
37
PSP*;PL**
- I I --
practically disintegrated". Only four short years later, however, in
1976, ARENA recaptured city hall, and a majority in the city council.
In an opposition stronghold, the ARENA candidate had campaigned for four
years leading up the election on a platform calling for stronger ties
with the federal government, more state funds, and a renewal of
industrialization. What must have made this promise seem realizable to
the electorate if stronger ties could be forged with the regime was that
President Geisel visited the municipio a few days before the election to
dedicate a steel plant, a ceremony to which the local MDB administration
was disinvited. Despite their role in the negotiations for its
establishment in their city, it appeared the steel plant was a gift from
the ARENA party/state, and placing ARENA in power locally would deliver
more of the same (Reis, 1978a: 222). The traditional elite used ARENA
to distribute state goods, and ARENA was remembered by voters at
election time, at least in those elections where they would perceive a
direct connection between elected officials and public works -- federal
and state deputies and local officials, especially mayors.
The "artificiality" of the parties reinforced and reinvigorated the
cliertelistic basis of Brazilian politics by permitting deputies to
retain personal clienteles and followings rather than develop voter
loyalties based on partisan attachments, a development which could only
advantage the incumbent traditional elites. ARENA and the MDB did not
evoke sharp, strong, and durable partisan attachments by class (cf.
17
Cardoso, 1978: 74) that characterize other political systems. Aside
from important concentrations of MDB votes in the nation's largest urban
centers, survey research suggests that partisan attachment did not
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differ by income level. In Juiz de Fora, the MDB did not have
substantially more adherents among the poorest segments of the
population, their 'natural' constituency, than did ARENA. At the lowest
end of the income scale, 33 percent of Reis' respondents identified
themselves as ARENA supporters and 36 percent as MDB sympathizers (with
26 percent preferring neither party and five percent not responding); in
the next highest salary range, the margin of difference was even
slighter: 36 percent preferred ARENA to 37 percent for the MDB (Reis,
1978a: 227). Similarly, within the highest income strata were opinions
most often expressed opposed to the authoritarianism of the regime as
well as the largest contingent of 'arenistas' (Reis, 1981: 205). In
Presidente Prudente, a predominantly rural municipio in the state of Sao
Paulo, Lamounier (1978) found a high party identification with ARENA and
high levels of pro-government voting among the lower and upper classes;
some middle classes identified with the MDB. In Niteroi, the city
across the bay from Rio de Janeiro, lower classes there too did not
favor the MDB. Only rural upper classes appeared to consistently
identify with one party (ARENA). Nor can it be assumed, moreover, that
when lower classes do vote for the MDB, and upper classes for ARENA,
their votes follow from an accurate identification of and support for
the ideological content of the preferred party's message (Reis, 1981:
216). In Juiz de Fora, popular sectors subordinated party loyalty to
their perception of the immediate benefits or inconveniences that came
to them via the local administration.
Minas Gerais was a pivotal swing state. Its majorities were not as
secure as in the backward Northeast, but the Minas traditional political
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elite was able, despite the popularity of the MDB candidates for senator
in 1974 (Itamar Franco) and 1978 (Tancredo Neves), to retain the state
legislature and a majority in the federal deputy delegation to Congress
for the military regime (Table VI-8).
If Minas elites could deliver mid-sized cities and towns for the
regime in the 1970s, their counterparts in Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro,
and other southern, developed states could not. Opposition to the
regime arose from what only a few years earlier would have been the
least likely quarter, from members of the original coalition. Most
prominently, the Sao Paulo business community through their regional
press began to protest the purchasing and pricing policies of state
enterprises to which their own enterprises were bound and upon which the
financial solvency of their firms rested. When appeals for
"destatization" fell on deaf ears, they turned the object of their
protest to what they perceived to be their restricted access to
decision-makers in an authoritarian regime, and demanded a political
liberalization of the regime.
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Table VI-8
Federal and State Congressional Elections:
Minas Gerais, 1966-1978
Election/ 1966 1970
Ticket ---------------------------------------------------------
Seats % Turn- % Party Seats % Turn- % Party
out votes out votes
1 42.5%
- 28.8%
21.8%
6.9%
Chamber of
Deputies:
ARENA
MDB
Blank
Void
Legislative
Assembly
ARENA
MDB
Blank
Void
37 63.6%
11 19.0%
12.8%
4.6%
63 64.0%
19 19.4%
12.0%
4.7%
59.5%
40.5%
77.0%
23.0%
76.8%
23.2%
2 51.1%
- 13.0%
32.4%
3.5%
28 48.5%
7 11.8%
29.2%
10.5%
/:7 49.9%
12 12.7%
28.2%
9.2%
1974
79.7%
20.3%
80.4%
19.6%
79.7%
20.3%
1978
- 41.7%
1 36.5%
13.9%
7.9%
Chamber of
Deputies:
ARENA
MDB
Blank
Void
Legislative
Assembly:
ARENA
MDB
Blank
Void
18 46.7%
11 29.1%
16.9%
7.3%
31 47.4%
19 30.0%
15.5%
7.0%
53.3%
46.7%
61.6%
38.4%
61.2%
38.8%
- 37.4%
1 38.9%
14.7%
8.9%
23 46.2%
16 32.3%
15.1%
6.4%
35 46.8%
24 32.1%
14.7%
6.4%
Source: TRE-MG, Election
Senate:
ARENA
MDB
Blank
Void
Senate:
ARENA
MDB
Blank
Void
49.0%
51.0%
58.8%
41.2%
59.3%
40.7%
Reports.
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Conclusions
Upon seizing power, the military in Brazil set rigid parameters on
political activity designed to achieve a stable political infrastructure
in the states and localities in order to maintain itself in power. It
eliminated its opponents, removed the federal and state executives from
the electoral arena, and created a semi-official party. Traditional
political elites profited immeasurably from these restrictions on
political competition enacted by the authoritarian regime.
Possibilities for genuine mobilization from below vanished, as might be
expected in a regime which deprived citizens of political rights. But
the potential for opposition was also severely limited even for aspiring
elites. In a political system such as the Brazilian organized along
clientelistic lines, communities that depended for their livelihood upon
state and national government had to back political representatives who
could win and deliver state resources. Institutional advantages for the
ARENA party in the electoral arena and the exercise of state clientelism
within it rendered opposition, and with it inter-party competition,
meaningless--the MDB survived only as a party of protest.
In these special political circumstances, intra-party competition,
the only challenge possible to incumbents, did not take shape. Before
the regime change, factional lines were fluid. Old alliances were
broken and new ones formed as might be expected in a multi-party system.
Authoritarian practice, however, stifled even local competition.
Political factions in 1965 which might have mutated quite naturally over
time were cemented in place. The restrictions on political competition
at the state and federal levels prevented local coalitions from
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realigning and local conflict from breaking open local politics. Local
boss support for their patrons in the state traditional elite
underpinned oligarchical rule. Only those politicians, groups, and
factions who were the "situajao" at the regime's inception could retain
a place in the political alignment of the "ins". The semi-permanence of
these coalitions in an authoritarian regime contributed to the longevity
of the traditional political elite.
While there were undoubtedly hardliners in the military who would
have preferred to go on alone and purge the political system for the
long term of its "corrupt politicians", in the end, they lost the day.
Whatever its preferences, the regime was forced to rely on traditional
political elites to support itself in power. However the years of the
most severe repression--1969-1973--are interpreted, and how much
autonomy the military acted with in those years, traditional political
elites soon reassuned their highly visible place of prominence in charge
of the political system.
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Notes
1. The only exceptions were in December 1968 and April 1977.
2. A tradition of Brazilian social science finds such a trend to
have predated the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. Campello de Souza
(1976), for example, traces the character of modern Brazilian parties to
the Vargas regime. She argues that decrying the non-ideological
character of Brazilian parties diverts attention from the reasons that
old and new parties are non-ideological: they were dominated by the
state ever since Vargas' time.
3. According to Velasco e Cruz and Martins (1984: 19), the
perception was that because the PSD and PTB controlled the state
apparatus, and thus state patronage, the UDN never had a fair chance to
win national office. Thus, the regime attempted to rationalize the
bureaucracy and especially to reform the Social Security Department and
Ministry of Labor, the notorious preserves of the PTB bosses known as
pelegos.
4. The issuance of Institutional Act Number 5 was the regime's
reaction to Congress' refusal to remove congressional immunity for one
of their deputies whom the military wished to prosecute for remarks
"offensive" to military honor. Among its provisions, it empowered the
president to declare and set the duration of a state of siege, declare
Congress in recess, suspend the writ of habeus corpus and other civil
rights, and restrict liberal freedoms.
5. Schneider (1971: 319-20) describes the selection process:
Although the new governors would not be elected
formally until the existing legislatures acted on
October 3, by mid-year little doubt remained as to
their identities. Following a strategy of
controlled renovation basically similar to that
adopted by Castelo Branco in 1966, the President
handpicked the candidates for succession at the
state level. First the SNI [National Information
Service] explored the possible alternatives and
"vetted" the candidates while the presidential staff
studied the problems, needs, and priorities of each
state to decide which qualities would be most
required in a new chief executive. Then ARENA head
Rondon Pacheco paid a flying visit to consult in the
state capital with the leaders of the several ruling
party factions and to talk with the would-be
governors. Finally, Garrastazu MedicI made his
choice, often picking a political newcomer who had
proven his executive ability in an administrative
position or a military figure out of active duty and
associated with civilian affairs. Such new faces
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were favored particularly when there seemed to be an
impass looming between the ex-UDN and ex-PSD leaders
within the government party.
Strong state elites like the Mineiro had no cause to fear the
federal appointment of governors. Israel Pinheiro's successor as
governor of Minas Gerais, Rondon Pacheco, in addition to being head of
the civil cabinet and later national president of ARENA was also an
'insider' of the Minas UDN. He and each of the governors who followed
him had no apparent difficulty in choosing their successors. Had the
central government been able to impose its preferences on the Minas
political elite for governor, it is unlikely that the ex-UDN would have
been able to perpetually shun their ex-PSD allies.
6. Local power studies conducted in Minas Gerais and elsewhere in
Brazil by political scientists and anthropologists are in the genre of
configurative-idiographic case studies. While non-scientifically
sampled (municipalities were often chosen for study by home town
authors), they provide useful accounts of local politics, family rule,
and the effects of economic change and other factors on traditional
politics. Jose Murilo de Carvalho (1968/69), in analyzing this body of
literature collectively according to a uniform set of questions,
conferred upon these studies a systematic dimension which they lack when
their findings are considered separately.
7. This sample of 25 municlpios includes small towns from
traditional areas and large cities which received new industry and
significant population migrations in the 1970s. They are geographically
diversified as well. Half were selected to determine if oligarchical
families named by Rebelo Horta in 1956 continued to dominated their
municlpios.
Of this sample, I conducted field research in four municipios--
Curvelo, Montes Claros, Sete Lagoas, and Varginha. Each had strong
agrarian elites (cattle, dairy, and coffee, respectively); Montes
Claros, Sete Lagoas, and Varginha experienced substantial growth in the
1970s, as much as any municlpio in the state outside the metropolitian
region of Belo Horizonte. Montes Claros and Varginha did so under the
government umbrella, abetted by foreign investment. Sete Lagoas, led by
an opposition administration, industrialized with largely local capital.
In these municipios, I augmented census data with interviews of local
political and private sector leaders.
8. The MDB is disproportionately represented in local
administration in the most industrialized municipios. Heretofore, this
correlation has been interpreted as the result of a proclivity on the
part of industrial workers to vote opposition. Another possible
conclusion is that these are precisely the municfpios with the highest
levels of municipal revenue (municIpios in which revenues accruing from
the collection of the ICM-the state sales tax-originate are returned 20
percent). Thus, Contagem, the cities of the "Valley of Steel", and even
those just below the top ten, like Sete Lagoas, could "afford" an
opposition administration.
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9. In 1982 Minas governor Francelino Pereira, an ex-UDNer, sided
with the ex-PSD faction of the ARENA coalition in Varginha at the time
of the constitution of the local chapter of the PDS. When the ex-ARENA
1 faction threatened to bolt to the newly formed PP, Francelino Pereira
sent for the rebellious group, in his private jet, and informed them
personally that his response to such a desertion would be to shower the
incumbent administration, their local enemies, with even more public
works and state projects than he already had (Interview with Dr. Margal
Paiva Figueiredo, Varginha, MG, November 14, 1981). If carried out,
this would have been a certain death warrant for years to come for the
'outs'. As de facto head of the party in the state, his primary concern
was to galvanize the maximum vote total possible, and retain the
greatest number of city halls and city councils in the hands of ARENA
(then the PDS). Thus, it was important to (a) back proven winners; and
(b) even more importantly, keep the party together. Only by forcing the
intransigent ex-UDN-PR faction to continue within the PDS could this be
achieved.
10. The mayor Afranio de Avellar Marques Ferreira, elected in
1976, was the grandson of Joao Antonio de Avellar and, on the other side
of the family, Teofilo Marques Ferreira. The two, according to the
mayor himself, "ran" the municipality from 1900 to 1910. His
predecessor, Sergio Emilio Brant de Vasconcellos Costa, who was mayor
from 1972 to 1976, was the son of the former political boss of Sete
Lagoas, Emilio de Vasconcellos Costa. The elder Vasconcellos Costa was
a descendent of the legendary Joaquina de Pompeu, matriarch of several
branches of the Minas oligarchy (Rebelo Horta, 1956: 77).
11. Personal communication with Elisa Reis.
12. The old PSD faction controlled the Gazeta de Varginha; the ex-
UDN-PR alliance used as its mouthpiece the Correio do Sul. The editors
of both (Armindo Paione Sobrinho and Mariano Tarciso Campos) had served
as city councillors in Varginha representing the opposing camps:
Paione, the PSD, and Campos, the ex-UDN faction. (Campos was quite
active in municipal and party politics right up through the formation of
the local chapter of the PDS.)
This pattern of partisan ownership of television and radio stations
is typical of the interior. Such a division of the media is depicted by
C. Carvalho (1980) for Barbacena.
13. Interview with Taft Alves Ferreira, Sete Lagoas, November 9,
1981.
14. Fleischer calls it a "trampoline" in several of his works.
15. Linz (1973: 241-244) was the first to argue the difficulties
the Brazilian regime would encounter in attempting to legitimize
authoritarian rule. It lacked both traditional bases of legitimation of
authoritarian rule: a charismatic leader and corporatism. Its military
organization was bureaucratic, not headed by such a figure as Nasser;
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and the bases of corporatist rule would be difficult to achieve. Its
fascist variant was internationally discredited; the Catholic Church
would unlikely play along; and it would be difficult to harmonize a
corporatist solution with the federal structure of the country and the
traditional rule of state governors.
Mainwaring (1985: 4-5) places great emphasis upon symbols in
legitimizing regimes and attributes the Brazilian military's failure to
legitimize its rule to its failure to manipulate symbols effectively.
He argues that the military regime initially constructed almost
exclusively negative symbols--anti-Communism, anti-corruption, anti-
chaos. While attractive at first to a large part of the population,
they were intrinsically unreliable in the long run, since, once the
regime was successful at extirpating these evils, its raison d'etre
disappeared.
Shifting direction under Mdici did not appear to help. When the
regime turned to positive symbols for its legitimacy, especially the
themes of efficiency, economic growth, and national aggrandizement, it
in effect based its legitimacy on performance (rather than procedure).
When its performance declined, the regime entered into crisis.
16. Contributing to the respectable correlations between municipal
size and levels of urbanization with voting for the government ARENA is
the close coincidence of voting for ARENA in small, poor, rural
municfpios, where the MDB often had no local diret6rio -- i.e., no local
organization -- and where even if it did ballot boxes were often stuffed.
Statistical tests which examine the entire gamut of municipios may be
skewed by the strong correlation between levels of development and pro-
government voting among the numerically significant municipios at the
lower end of the population scale. Sarles' and Faria's studies for the
state of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo both demonstrate that poorer
municlpios are more likely to be in the government column. Because the
correlations are so high, we are satisfied with their findings and tend
to stop short of testing the inverse of this proposition: how
significant is the correlation between urbanization, municipal size, and
industry with voting for the opposition when the very lowest end of the
scale is omitted? Also, the direction and strength of the correlation
in Faria's data for Sao Paulo may have been accentuated by taking the
microrregiao as the unit of analysis. In clustering municipios together
geographically, political differences would tend to disappear and socio-
economic characteristics of a region to become more pronounced. Testing
variation within microrregioes might have produced a different effect.
A more promising approach for testing might be to first sample
municlpios with populations above 15,000 or 20,000, assuming that those
below this threshold are ARENA territory. They may show, as did our
small sample, that ARENA elites were able to hold many of them due to
pre-1965 political alignments.
17. In Latin America, Chile immediately springs to mind. Surveys
conducted by Eduardo Hamuy during the period of the Unidad Popular
government show upper and upper middle class identification with the
National party, and working class with the socialist and communist
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parties. Other research into working class party identification in
Chile has turned up levels roughly comparable to several European
countries.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSIONS: THE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL ELITE AND
THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY
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The process of political liberalization the regime initiated in
1974 accelerated in 1982 with the direct election of governors and then
in 1985 with the election by electoral college of a civilian opposition
candidate for president: Tancredo Neves. Following a year of mass
popular mobilization and elite bargaining, two decades of military rule
came to a close, with enough top officers prepared to exit that even the
death of the president-elect on the eve of his inauguration did not
1
impede the orderly transition from military to civilian rule.
The results of the 1982 elections were inconclusive in that neither
side could claim outright victory. Yet, they were menacing for the
traditional forces. Having won nine governorships (of a possible 22)
and legislative majorities in the most developed states including Sao
Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Parana, and Minas (Table VII-1), the opposition
claimed, government victories in more states notwithstanding, its
success in the developed regions of the country made it the "wave of the
future" (Roett, 1984: 157). Indeed, the steady advance in the
opposition vote reflected the continuing correlation in many states
between MDB support and urban residence. In state capitals such as Belo
Horizonte, the party of the traditional political elite and the
authoritarian regime, the PDS, garnered little more than one-fifth of
the popular vote. As Brazil develops further, its agriculture
modernizes, its rural areas empty, and its cities grow, will the PMDB's
prediction come to pass? Does urbanization and sustained economic
development portend the eventual eclipse of the oligarchies in Brazil?
This is the question with which this study began.
344
Table VII-1
The November 1982 Elections by Party
PDS PMDB PDT PTB PT Total
Governors(a) 13 9 1 0 0 23
Senators(b) 46 21 1 1 0 69
Federal Deputies 235 200 23 13 8 479
Electoral College
Delegates(c) 78 48 6 0 C 132
Electoral College
Composition(d) 359 269 30 14 8 680
Proportion of
Party Vote (%)(e) 41.5 44.0 6.1 4.7 3.7 100.0
(a) The PDS governor of Rondonia was appointed, thus only 12 PDS
governors were popularly elected.
(b) Includes the 44 senators elected in 1978. In the new state of
Rondonia, the PDS elected all 3 senators.
(c) Six representing the majority party in each of the 22 state
legislatures. As the PDS and the PMDB each elected 12 state deputies in
the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, this state had no electoral college
delegates.
(d) The electoral college elected the president in January 1985. All
senators and federal deputies, plus the 132 state delegates, were
eligible to participate. The eight deputies of the PT did not attend to
protest the indirect election of the president.
(e) Excludes blank and void ballots.
vote cast for the five parties.
Source: Wesson and Fleischer, 1983:
Percentage calculated for total
119.
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Table VII-1
The November 1982 Elections by Party:
(cont.)
Select States
State Governor Senate Chamber of Deputies
Sao Paulo Franco Montoro PMDB-2 PDS-18
(PMDB) PDS-1 PMDB- 28
PTB-8
PT-6
MINAS GERAIS
Rio de Janeiro
Rio Grande do
Sul
Bahia
Parana
Pernambuco
Ceara
Santa Catarina
Goias
Para
Paralba
Tancredo Neves
(PMDB)
Leonel Brizola
(PDT)
Jair Soares
(PDS)
Joao Durval
(PDS)
Jose Richa
(PMDB)
Roberto Magalhaes
(PDS)
Luiz de Gonzaga
Motta (PDS)
Espiridiao Amin
(PDS)
fris Rezende
(PMDB)
Jader Barbalho
(PMDB)
Wilson Braga
(PDS)
Espirito Santo Gerson Camata
(PMDB)
Source: Roett, 1984: 156.
PMDB- 2
PDS-1
PDS-1
PTB- 1
PDT- 1
PDS-2
PMDB- 1
PDS-3
PMDB- 3
PDS-3
PMDB- 28
PDS-26
PT-1
PDT- 15
PDS- 15
PT-1
PMDB-9
PTB-4
PMDB- 11
PDS-12
PDT-7
PDS-27
PMDB- 12
PMDB- 22
PDS-12
PDS-15
PMDB- 1 1
PDS-3 PDS-16
PMDB-4
PDS-2
PMDB- 1
PDS-8
PMDB- 8
PMDB- 2
PDS-1
PDS-2
PMDB- 1
PDS-2
PMDB- 1
PMDB- 11
PDS-5
PDS-9
PMDB-6
PDS-8
PMDB-4
PDS-2
PMDB- 1
PMDB-5
PDS-4
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The Survival of Traditional Elites
The incomplete and uneven modernization of advanced industrial
societies implies that politics nowhere moves along a linear path of
2
development. The pattern of development of Minas Gerais demonstrates,
moreover, that economic change might leave largely intact the political
interests and power of traditional oligarchies. Our analysis suggests
that traditional elites may survive urbanization and industrialization
when these modernizing processes bring the population into greater
contact with an interventionist state controlled by traditional elites.
The importance of the agricultural product and agricultural employment
to national and regional economies, and rural life, may conduce
oligarchical rule, but they are by no means essential to its survival.
In an earlier period, Brazilian regional oligarchies did benefit from a
highly inegalitarian distribution of land and wealth. They still do, by
and large. Yet, even during the Old Republic, traditional elites,
dominant as private, agriculturally-based elites, took advantage of the
blurring of the lines between public and private authority.
Constructing a more expansive and enduring power base than mere economic
resources would support, they assumed personal command of the state, and
marshalled political resources to retain this strategic asset.
Such a strategy was indeed prescient. When Minas emerged from its
relative economic stagnation, its state led the way. Today, the bases
of traditional political dominance are not found exclusively in rural
areas, nor in the private sector of the economy. They rest in control
of an economically interventionist state. State capitalism and a
reliance on foreign capital in Minas Gerais enabled the traditional
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order and traditional political domination to endure even after
industrialization of the regional economy. The nature of the class
structure engendered by state capitalist and dependent
industrialization, and particularly of those classes whose economic
interests and political behavior are commonly believed to propel
political transformation, differed from the constellation of political
and social class forces that conventional theories of industrialization
predict. The landlord and peasant classes did shrink in numbers and in
political significance with the shift of national resources from
agriculture into industry. Industrial classes, however, remained
latent. The capital-poor bourgeoisie remained outside the dynamic
sector of the economy and became dependent, economically and
politically, upon the state and state elites. The proletariat, divided
between the state and private sectors, cast its ballots for the
opposition but was too small and isolated to effect any broader change.
For those classes interposed between agriculture and industry--
semi-urban non-industrial labor, seasonal agricultural labor, unskilled
workers, and lower middle and lower class service sector employees--the
state sector provided part or all of their material support through
permanent and temporary employment, the provision of basic social
services (sanitation, transportation, shelter), transfer payments,
3
credit, and so forth. Economic integration into the public economy for
these groups had long-term political implications. It structured
interest representation along the same lines by which state resources
were distributed. State dependents not represented functionally,
through unions and other corporate groups or through 'bureaucratic
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rings', turned to territorial representation, and sought through
4
clientelistic networks benefits from the distributive arm of the state.
These "state clients" thus were integrated into politics under the aegis
of the traditional state elite.
Political clientelism was not new in post-1964 Brazil--it had been
used by traditional elites to deliver votes in the Old Republic and to
survive the explosion in political participation accompanying the
transition to democracy after World War II. But it became more
important and pervasive as Brazil changed from a largely agrarian
society to one industrializing under state capitalism. Clientelism was
transformed from a fundamentally private affair between lords and
peasants into a state-based system. Federal and state cabinet
portfolios and other top administrative posts brought political rewards
and conferred enormous power upon their elite occupants. With material
resources concentrated in the public sphere, controlling the state and
its distributional apparatus was as important a source of political
dominance as land ownership in an agrarian economy.
The means for securing control of the state apparatus were
primarily political. Any elite hoping to appropriate the state's
material resources, military force, aid courts has to be able to
convert the distribution of state resources to state dependents into
political support. The group best equipped to operate state clientelism
on a grand scale in Brazil was the traditional political elite. The
regional oligarchies had long dispensed state patronage through
political parties linked to the state at each level of government. The
enrichment of the public sector made more potent the political
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organizational weapon wielded by the traditional oligarchy. In Minas
Gerais, where there was a tradition of extensive political organization
and a state deeply embedded in social as well as productive sector
activities, the correlation between urbanization and opposition voting
was not as high as in other states. Even during an authoritarian regime
that excluded the vast majority of the population from participation in
political life and economic gain, administering state patronage allowed
the regional oligarchies to win electoral victories in not only small
cities and rural areas where they might be expected to poll well but
also in many mid-sized cities where they might not. In such "boom-
5
towns" as Varginha and Montes Claros, at least up to 1982, electors
returned to office the political representatives of the local
traditional elite despite rapid urban and industrial growth.
What allowed traditional political elites to avert and withstand
challenges to their positions in the state from within and outside elite
ranks, even in regimes that on the surface had different patterns of
political organization--the federal Old Republic, the centralizing
Vargas' dictatorship, the post-war 'democracy', and the bureaucratic-
authoritarian regime--was a common centralization of political power in
the executives of state and party. Even in the Old Republic, a
decentralized political system in which power was delegated to the
states, the most successful of the regional oligarchies--the Paulistas
and the Mineiros--centralized power within state borders. When power
resided in the executive and a single party elite, successful
insurrections were less commonplace. Regime changes, whatever else they
accomplished, did not alter the underlying principles of Brazilian
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politics: the concentration of power in the state executives; the
subordination of fiscally dependent municipalities to the states, and
the use of political parties as oligarchical vehicles for upholding
the power of the state elite. The traditional political elite had no
reason to oppose strengthening the state apparatus, expanding its
functions, or its centralization over the years -- as long as this elite
had access to its highest levels.
If economic modernization was insufficient to displace traditional
political elites from a commanding position in the state, then attacking
the political foundations of their power would appear to hold the
greatest promise for bringing about their demise. The bureaucratic-
authoritarian regime established in Brazil after 1964 which proposed to
alter the historical patterns of decision-making and elite participation
in Brazilian politics was believed by many to hold the potential to
deprive the regional oligarchies of their power bases in the state. To
attract foreign investment, harness hydroelectric power, develop the
Amazon, and make Brazil a great power, the military intended to get rid
of the 'corrupt' politicians who had mismanaged the economy. It planned
to forge a new hegemonic alliance of foreign and domestic entrepreneurs
and a technically competent state elite. To carry out its aims, it
attempted to centralize fiscal and political decisions beyond the reach
of the regional oligarchies in the innermost circles of the federal
state, and substitute technocratic rationality for clientelism in the
state bureaucracy. The belief that such an assault on the bastions of
oligarchical power would succeed was founded partially on the flawed
premise that political and economic decentralization, a weak state, and
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a powerful legislature are the foundations of oligarchical rule, as well
as on the accurate recognition of the critical importance of traditional
clientelism to the oligarchy. This perspective also neglected the
political obstacles to implementing the ambitious changes the regime
intended.
Some important changes did transpire, if only temporarily, in
national level politics. Policy-making was transferred to technocrats,
and the absence of direct elections for a strengthened national
executive took important decisions out of politics. Nonetheless, the
bureaucratic-authoritarian regime could have undermined the traditional
political elite only if its representatives were ejected from the
positions in the state which conferred power, if the positions they did
occupy were emasculated, or if the resource base for clientelism were
removed. Moreover, these changes would have to be irreversible. A
permanent realignment of politics on this scale would have required a
disruption of the clientelistic chain. Regional elites would have to be
circumvented, and local bosses loyal to the regional oligarchies either
purged from the sub-national governments or made allies of the federal
6
military governors.
As we have seen, however, state and local politics changed little
in bureaucratic-authoritarian Brazil. Members of the traditional
political elite continued to serve as state governors, even when these
posts were appointed. They also retained, at least on the state level,
the means with which to keep their patronage machines operational. The
centralization of revenue collection notwithstanding, state governments
continued to implement national policies and administer federal and
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state programs. Traditional political bosses who owed their allegiance
to regional oligarchies also continued to rule in thousands of
municipalities in the interior of Brazil.
At the outset of this study we raised the possibility of finding a
political system which appeared to change at the top and one whose
foundations did not change. While the survival of traditional elites in
the states alone tells us little about their national power, our
research suggests that state politics is the fulcrum of the entire
political system. Political elites have as their primary political
reference points state politics, they owe their primary political
allegiances to their state allies, especially state governors, and they
will do whatever is necessary to preserve their power bases in the
states. In fact, they often make decisions in the national sphere based
on calculations about state politics. As long as the roots of the power
of the Brazilian traditional political elite in the states and
municipalities are secure, it is difficult to conceive of major changes
in the national political landscape. State-national and state-local
linkages are the glue which hold the national political system together.
Whatever its ambitions, the military did not undo patterns of
politics ingrained in the fabric of Brazilian society for nearly a
century. For a short while during the height of military repression
(approximately 1969-1971) traditional elite influence declined while the
technocratic presence in government rose. Technocrats, however, with no
political-organizational structures of their own to substitute for
oligarchical parties, could not draw electoral gain from dispensing
state patronage, and they had no other basis upon which to organize
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consent. Unable to structure politics single-handedly, the military
could not govern without the active complicity of the regional
oligarchies. Only the traditional political elite could secure the
electoral victories needed to legitimize military rule and prevent the
radicalization of the polity and the development of class/interest based
politics. The military had little choice but to reverse course. The
power-sharing arrangement between traditional elites and technocrats in
the early years of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime finally gave
way to one in which traditional political elites reemerged as dominant.
The "restoration" of traditional elites to power in a few short years
suggests the time a regime could hope to govern without them or above
them is brief indeed. When these elite political representatives could
no longer deliver victory under the umbrella of the party of government,
moreover, the military exited, but not the traditional elite who
remained to preside over the birth of the new regime.
This study's findings suggest that the capacity of a civilian and
military technocracy for autonomous administrative action has been
grossly overstated in the development literature. In authoritarian
Brazil, because political participation was restricted to elites, state
elites could not develop political autonomy as many of their
counterparts in democratic regimes do by pitting contending societal
forces against one another. Without a political constituency, the
military-technocratic alliance required civilian allies. Lower classes
were unlikely supporters given their exclusion from the fruits of
economic growth. And enlisting the allegiance of the bourgeoisie was
rendered increasingly more difficult for the entrepreneurial state elite
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with each new state incursion into the private sector of the economy.
The leading sectors of the national bourgeoisie made plain their
opposition to the state's economic policies, and their inability to
influence (at least to their satisfaction) the processes of decision-
making in an authoritarian regime. In a highly visible campaign, they
called for the state's withdrawal from the economy and then, later, for
the liberalization of the regime. Few options were available to the
military but to turn to traditional elites.
The bureaucratic-authoritarian regime not only did not evict
oligarchical interests, it actively helped traditional political elites
retain power and position by proscribing political competition.
Authoritarianism, and the political centralization and monopoly of power
which were its defining features, established an immutable political
alignment from national executive to local city councillor which
rendered political opposition effectively futile and nearly irrational.
This feature of the regime devalued the skills and ability of a rival
political elite, perfectly capable of organizing a political party, to
challenge traditional political elites, and permitted the regional
oligarchies to monopolize state resources which underlay their
contemporary power. The traditional political elite preserved state
politics as a private contest for its members only.
The transition from authoritarian rule has created the possibility
for new forms of political organization in Brazil. By lifting the ban
on real political competition, the new regime has removed the obstacles
to political participation and autonomous local politics and laid a new
basis for competitive interest representation to supplant state
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clientelism. Will a rival political elite now emerge? Indeed, what
will be the meaning of opposition in "democratic" Brazil? This question
is particularly salient at the present time. As this investigation
draws to a close, two questions emerge: How will open political
competition affect the survival of traditional political elites? In
what direction will the traditional political elite steer Brazilian
democratization? These two questions are inextricably linked, for the
ability of the traditional political elite to shape the regime will in
turn affect its own future.
7
The Traditional Political Elite and the 'New Republic'
Students of the transition to democracy agree that of all the
relevant factors affecting the future of democracy in Brazil, perhaps
none recommends itself as strongly for study as the role of the
traditional political elite. O'Donnell (1985a: 11-13) has recognized
the capacity of an incumbent elite of an authoritarian regime to control
a transition to democracy as a critical variable in explaining the
success and direction of democratization. Werneck Vianna (1985: 31-33)
has argued that the power retained by the forces of the old regime will
to a large extent determine the outcome of the most important issues
facing Brazil in its transition to democracy: agrarian reform, strike
laws, and the definition of the political center in the party structure
and political system. Indeed, any governing elite which senses the
winds of change will usually attempt to direct them. What distinguishes
the inveterate oligarchies is their foresight to abandon in a timely
fashion decaying regimes and their ability to shape the new to their
356
advantage.
No old elite could hope to be more successful in controlling a
transition than the Brazilian. Once democratization gained momentum,
traditional elites who embraced the 1964 'Revolution' and benefited
from the authoritarian regime became strong advocates of controlled
liberalization. When the governing coalition began to crumble under the
weight of its w., corruption, personal rivalries, and petty ambitions,
many joined forces with the advocates of regime change. By situating
themselves squarely in the democratic camp, these elites won for one of
their foremost representatives, Jose Sarney, government party president
during the military regime, a place in the executive coalition, and
ultimately, by chance, the presidency.
Of all Brazil's regional oligarchies, the Mineiro stands out during
the transition for its political genius and cunning for survival. One
of Brazil's first regional elites to plot its escape from the sinking
authoritarian coalition, it proposed the realignment of forces which
made the transition possible and placed it under traditional political
elite control. The manner in which it recovered its own state base
after the 1982 elections and rescued its class nationally closes yet
another chapter of traditional elite resilience.
Politics in Minas, 1982-1985. The PMDB won the elections in Minas
Gerais in 1982. Tancredo Neves was elected governor as its
standardbearer with 45.8 percent of the vote; Itamar Franco was
reelected senator; the party elected 27 federal deputies to the 26 of
its rival, the PDS; and it captured a slim majority in the state
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Legislative Assembly -- 40 to 37, with a single representative to both
houses elected by the PT (Table VII-2). While the PDS won control of
many more city halls and city councils than the PMDB--the PDS elected
461 mayors to 247 for the PMDB, and 4662 city councillors to 2788 for
the PMDB (Table VII-3), the PMDB won the local elections in the most
important and largest cities in the state, including many mid-sized
"dike cities" into which the government had pumped considerable sums of
money precisely in order to preserve victory in the 1982 elections:
Montes Claros, Varginha, Tras Coraqoes, Governador Valadares, Teofilo
Otoni, Uberaba, Uberlandia, Juiz de Fora, Patos de Minas, and Unai, at
8
least half of which it controlled in 1976. In Barbacena, a symbol of
the persistent power of the traditional Minas oligarchy, voters for the
first time elected candidates from outside the oligarchical machines of
both the Bias Fortes and Bonifacio de Andrada families. In that city,
the PMDB won the races for mayor and vice-mayor, a majority of city
council seats (8 to 7 for the PDS), and most significantly of all, 41.6
percent of the vote in the state deputy election to a PMDB candidate
whose vote total surpassed that of the candidates of the two families
combined.
In its 1982 victory, the PMDB in Minas Gerais had only partially
and temporarily defeated the traditional political elite. Tancredo
Neves' victory was produced by a sporadic coalition of opposition and
traditional elite forces. His candidacy attracted the first wave of
defections in what was to be a progressive detachment on the part of the
oligarchy from the government coalition.
The traditional political elite in Minas Gerais was initially
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Table VII-2
Minas Gerais: 1982 State Elections
Race Votes Cast % of % of Party Seats
Turnout Vote Won
Gubernatorial:
Blank
Void
*Tancredo Neves (PMDB)
Eliseu Resende (PDS)
Sandra Starling
de Azevedo (PT)
Theotonio dos Santos
Jr. (PDT)
Senatorial:
Blank
Void
*Itamar Franco (PMDB)
Simio Viana da Cunha
Pereira (PMDB)
Joao Marques de
Vasconcelos (PDS)
Fernando Jorge
Fagundes Neto (PDS)
Joaquim Jos de
Oliveira (PT)
Wilson Carneiro
Vigidal (PDT)
459,479
147,160
2,667,595
2,424,197
113,950
11,160
658,409
176,050
2,398,361
164,100
1,174,027
1,135,095
107,099
10,400
7.9
2.5
45.8
41.6
2.0
51.1
46.5
2.2
.2
11.3
3.0
41.2
2.8
20.2
19.5
1.8
.2
.2
(44.0)
(39.7)
48.1
3.3
23.5
(51.4)
(46.3)
22.8
2.1
.2
Federal Deputy:
Blank
Void
PMDB slate
PDS slate
PT slate
PDT slate
State Deputy:
Blank
Void
PMDB slate
PDS slate
PT slate
PDT slate
Total Turnout
704,776
234,984
2,456,638
2,312,248
104,694
10,201
774,154
269,833
2,406,106
2,261,267
102,125
10,056
6,738,879 (86%)
*Elected
Source: TRE-MG, 1982.
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50.3
47.3
2.2
.2
27
26
1
12.1
4.0
42.2
39.7
1.8
.2
13.3
4.7
41.3
38.7
1.8
.2
50.4
47.3
2.1
.2
40
37
1
- -
Table VII-3
Minas Gerais: 1982 Municipal Elections
Party Mayors City Councillors Total
Candidates Elected Candidates Elected Elected
PDS ' 1382 461 15,904 4662 5123
PDT 90 -- 396 -- --
PT 138 -- 1,441 16 16
PTB- -- -- -- -
PMDB 1151 247 11,515 2788 3035
TOTAL 2761 708* 29,256 7466 8174
*The remaining 14 mayors (one from the capital and 13 from the
"estancias hidrominerais") were named by the state governor.
Source: TRE-MG.
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divided over how to approach the 1982 gubernatorial elections, the most
important political contest since the coup. While most preferred to
side with the apparent safe option, the eventual PDS nominee, some
staked their hopes for maintaining power in a liberalizing political
environment on the new "Popular Party" (PP), a primarily Minas party
(its leading officers were its founder, Tancredo Neves, Magalhaes Pinto,
and Helio Garcia) formed soon after the party reform of 1979 opened the
9
door to a multi-party system. For those abandoning the government
party who had been staunch regime allies, such as Magalhaes Pinto, the
PP provided an opportunity to jump from a sinking ship and land on
10
secure ground. For those moving from the MDB, such as Tancredo Neves,
the PP offered the possibility of putting together a winning coalition
which strict reliance on traditional MDB constituencies might not have
afforded. The PP in Minas Gerais was extremely successful at attracting
traditional oligarchs anxious to shed the baggage of the government's
economic failures (Brazil was in a deep recession in 1981-82), and an
agricultural policy unpopular with rural elites, without what for many
in 1980 was anathema -- sharing a party slate with the PMDB. Their
adherence gave the PP an impressive state-wide network of local
organizations.
This segment of the traditional political elite was soon forced to
rethink its strategy for controlling the transition. After a
government-decreed change in electoral laws doomed Neves' gubernatorial
11
ambitions as a PP candidate, he dissolved the party and instructed its
members to join or rejoin the PMDB. The merger of the two parties in
Minas Gerais and nationally was presided over by men loyal to Neves who
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placed his many supporters in a strong position in the new party.
From this organizational base Neves plucked the party's gubernatorial
nomination from Itamar Franco, the PMDB's other senator, in large part
because he was accurately perceived as the most electable candidate of
the opposition.
Within the government party, intra-elite rivalries which had been
artificially contained for 18 years were rekindled by Neves' candidacy.
How the government countered Neves' nomination set in motion the Mineiro
oligarchs' disengagement from the regime. Had the sublegenda been
utilized, competing oligarchical factions could have been accomodated:
one sublegenda would have been occupied by an ex-PSDer; one by an ex-
UDNer; and one by either a technocrat or an ex-PRer. When the
sublegenda was abandoned, however, the government could nominate only
one candidate. The choice, if left as by custom to the incumbent
13
governor, most likely would have been an ex-UDNer. The nomination of
an ex-UDNer, however, would surely have precipitated a reaction from the
embittered ex-PSD wing of the PDS who felt it was "their turn". Every
governor of the post-coup period had been an ex-UDN member with the
single exception of Ozanam Coelho who, as Aureliano Chaves' lieutenant
governor, became the state's chief executive for eight months when
14
Chaves had to resign to "run" for vice-president. The Planalto
intervened in the gubernatorial succession in Minas, nominating Eliseu
Resende, an engineer-technocrat, as the PDS's candidate in an effort to
stop UDN-PSD feuding. The government's attempted compromise failed.
Many oligarchs not satisfied with Figueiredo's gesture flocked to Neves'
camp; in Tancredo Neves they now had an alternative to the UDN and the
362
MDB -- one of their own. In the North of Minas, the sons and grandsons
of regional cattle barons threw their support behind Neves, partly to
manifest their discontent with the PDS's candidate, and partly to
protest recent agricultural policies which they guessed would not change
under a technocrat. The support the traditional political bosses
delivered to the PMDB in the cities and towns of the interior, when
combined with that mobilized by the left among a genuinely discontented
15
populace, accounted for the narrow opposition victory.
Those elements of the traditional political elite who were
instrumental to Neves' victory, who had a place in his designs for
governing, and who could further his political ambitions, profited from
his victory. His state cabinet did not differ radically from those of
his predecessors. While it did include five secretaries who rose in
16
politics through the ranks of the MDB, others traced their political
origins, and power, to pre-1964 elite parties. Although it could be
argued pre-1964 partisan attachments are more indicative of a person's
age than the residual power of the traditional political elite, the
latter interpretation gains credence in light of a pattern of reliance
on the support of traditional clienteles. Neves' appointee as secretary
of Agriculture, Arnaldo Rosa Prata, is suggestive of such a pattern: he
was elected mayor of the important Triangulo city of Uberaba in 1970
on the ARENA ticket, and he served as the president of such powerful
agrarian societies as the Brazilian Association of "Zebu" Cattle
Raisers; the Rural Society of the Minas Triangulo, and so forth.
Moreover, Neves left much of the economic decision-making machinery to
the secretaries and undersecretaries of economic departments in
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previous, state governments who for all intents and purposes had
17
masterminded economic policy in Minas during the authoritarian era.
If some traditional elites exercised sound political judgement in
supporting Neves, the leading political representatives of the
oligarchy, including many federal deputies, did not. Although the new
administration did not threaten elite interests in the policy realm,
those who had stayed with the PDS, like kingmakers Bias Fortes and
Bonifacio de Andrada, lost something important in the 1982 elections:
the control over state patronage in the cities and towns that gave them
their greatest vote totals. In Minas Gerais for at least four
governors' administrations, the "political command" (comando politico)
of a municipality, which entailed the right to make virtually every
public decision, including the appointment of all public officeholders,
had been awarded openly to the deputy from the state's majority party
who had received the most votes in that municipio. When the PDS lost
its majority, the "political command" in many cities passed to PMDB
deputies, even where old elites polled better. This blow to the
personal patronage machines of old elites was compounded by their loss
as a class of the power to make high-level federal and state
appointments in Minas. Such losses, if not recuperated, would cost
future votes and spell certain doom for the medium- and long-term
survival of the traditional political elite.
The opportunity to recover the machinery of state patronage and
secure its state-wide dominance presented itself when the old elite had
something to trade: its support for the governor in the presidential
electoral college. Tancredo Neves became the opposition's
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candidate for president once it became clear an electoral college would
18
choose Figueiredo's successor. Indeed, the opposition's decision to
participate in the electoral college was swayed by the opportunity
Neves' candidacy presented for a partisan realignment. Since PDS
electors were the clear majority in the electoral college, any
opposition candidate needed the traditional political elite to win. Of
all PMDB politicians, Neves, rooted in the oligarchy, stood the best
chance of attracting votes from the government forces. His task was
facilitated by the politically suicidal decision on the part of
President Figueiredo to permit the government party to nominate Paulo
Maluf--the governor of Sao Paulo who had more than a few enemies in high
19
places--as the party's standard-bearer. Many PDS deputies,
disgruntled with Maluf for personal reasons and genuinely apprehensive
for their own political futures of electing a president so unpopular
within the electorate, defected. Understanding the stakes and
recognizing the opportunity that uniting with the PMDB offered for
preserving their positions in the state, many political elites scrambled
to line up behind Neves to secure a place in the new order. A motley
coalition of PMDB 'radicals', PDS deserters later to become the Liberal
Front (Frente Liberal), and dissident PDS governors of the northeast
states coalesced rapidly in the months of June-September 1985 to ensure
Tancredo Neves' victory.
To secure the support of the old regime's elite, Tancredo Neves was
prepared to pay the price. In exchange for backing the candidate of the
PMDB in the electoral college, the Liberal Front of the PDS was assured
he would neither run as a representative of the "opposition" nor
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criticize the "Revolution" or the [incumbent] Figueiredo government; the
vice-presidential nominee would come from the ranks of the Liberal
Front, or, if prohibited by electoral law, be someone who supported the
'movement of April, 1964' [the coup]; and there would be an equitable
distribution of administrative posts (Istog, 7/18/84: 24, emphasis
added). For vice-president and fellow Mineiro Aureliano Chaves, Neves
even put in writing that all those who backed him would be repaid with
posts in his government (Veja, 1/16/85: 36). This promise was extracted
as a condition for not only the vice-president's support (and with it
the votes of the hedging members of the Minas PDS delegation) but also
for that of ex-president General Geisel, which was critical if a pre-
20
emptive coup were to be avoided.
While a political settlement of this magnitude could be sealed in
principle relatively easily on the national level--it was a fairly
simple matter to promise federal cabinet posts to a handful of
influential figures--in order to secure the votes of the deputies and
other delegates in the electoral college, agreements had to be hammered
out and implemented in the states. Careful, detailed, and explicit
bargaining was conducted on a state by state basis wherever such an
accord was struck. The success of these state-level negotiations hinged
on the mutually satisfactory division of state patronage between two
uneasy allies. In many states, regional presidents of the PMDB and the
FL drew up agreements stipulating explicitly which federal and state
posts would be assigned to each party's pork barrel (these posts were of
varying political worth) (Veja, 7/17/85: 20-27). Federal Deputy Oscar
Alves of Parana reported that Neves promised the Liberal Front in
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Parana, if elected, a number of federal posts in equal proportion to the
number of "frentista" votes in the electoral college. Since his group
had cast 25 percent of Neves' votes in the Parana delegation, he
calculated they were owed one-fourth of these posts in the state (Veja,
7/17/85: 26-27). Israel Pinheiro, one of the FL's founders and foremost
proponents, used the same rationale as a basis for proposing that the FL
in Minas Gerais merited a one-third participation in state government
(Estado de Minas, 9/7/83: 3).
In Minas Gerais, dissident PDS deputies held out longer and drove a
harder bargain--the "Acordo de Minas", or the "Minas Agreement". The
embryonic core of the new Liberal Front in the state agreed to support
Neves, to "put a Mineiro in the presidency", in exchange for the return
of the power of patronage they lost in the 1982 elections. According to
21
the terms of the accord, the new governor, Helio Garcia, agreed to
accept at least two members of the Liberal Front into the cabinet; the
"political command" of a municipality would be handed back to the deputy
who won a majority of the votes in that municipality, irrespective of
party; and Liberal Front federal deputies would regain another prime
source of state patronage--the right to make appointments to 72 second
and third echelon federal posts in the state (e.g. regional directors of
22
the National Housing Bank and the Brazilian Coffee Institute). The
agreement represented a unilateral victory for the traditional political
23
elite. Its members who endorsed the "Acordo" retook the leading
positions in Minas politics. Local resistance to the state-imposed
agreement was offered in vain.
The "Acordo de Minas" guaranteed Tancredo Neves' election as
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president in January 1985 in an electoral college composed of mostly old
elites from the authoritarian regime. hIis death, however, denied both
sides in Minas Gerais who had made his victory possible the rewards of
the presidency. As the news magazine Senhor (2/25/86: 43) summed it up:
A pure irony of history: the Mineiros, who
opened the authoritarian parentheses with the
bayonets of the troops commanded by General Mourao
Filho and the then governor Magalhaes Pinto, had
the glory of putting it out with the eraser of
conciliation. But there was no opportunity to taste
the pleasing flavor of power.
The Residual Power of the Traditional Political Elite, Political
Parties, and 'Trasformismo'. The political transactions which
accompanied the transition from authoritarian rule in Brazil allowed the
protagonists of the ancien regime to assume a commanding position at the
helm of the central institutions of political life in the new. In Minas
Gerais, members of the traditional political elite were returned their
primary political resources--their positions in the state and power of
political patronage. They also entered the 'democratic' era in the
leadership of nearly all potential parties of government. Most
significantly, the Minas oligarchy expropriated the PMDB. The faction
loyal to the governor emerged from the party's 1983 elections in the
state in undisputed control of the party commissions. The so-called
"Constituente" slate won all seats on the diretorio but 16 (of 71), and
all but 16 delegates and 16 alternates to the national convention (of 58
for each). In exchange for these few seats, the 'radical' group,
"Direct Elections" (Eleigoes Diretas), had to cede pivotal posts on the
Executive Commission, including that of president, to politicians the
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governor imposed who had only recently joined the party and whom many in
the PMDB found distasteful. The Estado de Minas (11/17/83) wrote of the
new Executive Commission: "The moderate wing [of the party], derived
from the PP, prevails in the party command." A PMDB deputy commented,
"If Governor Tancredo Neves is not thinking of creating a new party, as
he declared in a press conference, at least he has succeeded in making
the PMDB closer to the party of his dreams" (Estado de Minas, 11/17/83).
A few months later, national PMDB president Ulysses Guimaraes was
brought to the bargaining table to negotiate the terms of the surrender
24
of the national party to Tancredo Neves' forces as well.
Why should it matter for democratization if traditional political
elites are found in these positions of power if the rules of the game
25
have changed? If "redemocratization", or "democratization", is
understood as the road to a political system in which, in the
Schumpeterian tradition, "its most powerful collective decision-makers
are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely
compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is
eligible to vote" (Huntington, 1985: 149), then perhaps it makes little
26
or no difference. But if democracy is held to be something more, the
residual power of the traditional elite can be very consequential
indeed.
To distinguish the substance from the shadow of democracy,
O'Donnell (1985b) identified three distinct 'stages' of democratization:
(1) the consolidation of political democracy; (2) the extension of
political democracy; and (3) socioeconomic democratization. The
consolidation of political democracy is defined as civilian rule and the
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presence of Dahl's procedural minima for democracy. These minima embody
institutional guarantees--the freedom to form and join organizations,
the freedom of expression, the right to vote, eligibility for public
office, the right of political leaders to compete for support,
alternative sources of information, and free and fair elections--
required for the opportunity to formulate preferences, signify those
preferences to fellow citizens and to government by individual and
collective action, and have preferences weighted equally in the conduct
of government (Dahl, 1971: 3). The extension of political democracy
refers to "increased transparency in policy deliberation and in interest
representation". Finally, socio-economic democratization extends the
citizen principle to various public and private organizations and makes
advances in distributional equity. O'Donnell sees the consolidation of
the procedural minima as a precondition for the extension of political
democracy as well as social and economic democracy. It is hard to
disagree with such a view. But O'Donnell (1985b: 52) acknowledges that
consolidation does not necessarily enhance the prospect for democracy's
27
extension. Indeed the most appropriate political strategy to secure
the first step of consolidating civilian rule--building the broadest
possible coalition for keeping the military in its barracks--may
conflict with that best suited to achieve the transition from the first
to the second step of democratization. The extension of political
democracy may thus be traded off in the consolidation.
What are needed above all to make the passage from a consolidated
civilian regime to a full democracy are institutions capable of
'formulating' and 'signifying' (to use Dahl's language) citizen
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preferences. Without the opportunity to express citizen preferences
effectively--without interest representation for all classes and
strata--there can be no polyarchy. In democratic societies, the
institutions most capable of formulating preferences and bringing those
preferences to public attention are political parties. Parties normally
frame political issues, provide a forum for public debate, and afford
citizens the opportunity to "express their preferences" by voting for a
platform which details party positions and promised government action on
a range of issues. Not all democracies of course have parties which can
qualify as programmatic down to their local branches. But no country
can claim to have a vibrant democracy, not even a 'polyarchy', where
party positions on issues are sacrificed systematically to the
particularistic calculations of a closed elite--an oligarchy.
In Brazil, political parties have been long prevented from
representing non-elite interests--from "formulating and signifying
citizen preferences"--by the traditional political elite. They have
been used for decades as patronage machines, private weapons in intra-
oligarchical disputes. Even the exceptions to this rule, parties which
had non-elite constituents in the post-war era--the populist PTB for
example, built vertical channels of interest representation which
restricted mass access to the state. In the 1970s, the PMDB raised
hopes that it might articulate the interests of previously excluded
classes. But in the birth and rebirth of political parties accompanying
the transition, the traditional political elite regained control of the
PMDB and other parties with the best chances of coming to power, making
it unlikely that Brazilian parties could become agents of
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democratization.
Once a party like the PMDB, which had sheltered opponents to
authoritarianism and those who had suffered from it, opened its ranks to
those who had supported and profited from the military regime, it left
the excluded, popular classes without voice. Unlike in democratic
societies in which political parties realign, however infrequently, over
salient, cross-cutting issues, thereby providing electors with the
opportunity to express their preferences along a new axis of conflict in
society, in Brazil, and especially in Minas Gerais, realignment was
precipitated instead by oligarchical factionalism. The PFL differed
initially from its parent, the PDS, only in its preference for Tancredo
Neves over Paulo Maluf. Once the oligarchy fell into step with the
national realignment, its old divisions, such as the Bias versus
Andradas rivalries, were fitted into the current party system.
Traditional political elites can now be expected to block party
platforms championing policies not in their interests.
In appropriating parties that have direct access to the state,
moreover, the oligarchy can perpetuate state clientelism as the
principle which orders politics itself. In Minas Gerais, a PMDB
governor in the state house swelled the party with new recruits. Party
membership more than doubled between 1982 and the end of 984, while
that of its old rival, the PDS rose by only 44 percent (Table VII-4).
Once the party attracted much of the state oligarchy, establishing it as
more than a transient party of government, local elites and party bosses
flocked to its ranks. Anxious to join the 'ins' and not be excluded
from state resources, at least 200 mayors and local party directories
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Table VII-4
Minas Gerais: Party Membership, 1982-1985
Year PDS PDT PT PTB PMDB
1982 163,501 11,796 22,641 12,256 91,530
1983 163,007 13,656 23,872 12,390 105,125
1984(June) 189,710 17,259 30,298 16,724 151,882
1984(Sept.) 206,150 19,388 33,275 19,530 173,884
1984(Dec.) 221,298 22,692 34,883 21,406 190,939
1985(March) 235,272 27,103 36,348 24,276 199,097
Source: TRE-MG.
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changed partisan affiliation virtually overnight in mid-1985 from the
29
PDS to the PMDB. These mayors and party bosses, necessarily from
small towns that previously had no local PMDB branch, for the most part
shared little or nothing ideologically with the party's veteran national
leaders. The mayors were part of a cohort elected in 1982 that
carried on Minas Gerais' political tradition. In a survey of 387,
representing over half the total universe (n = 722) conducted by the
state Secretariat of Planning (SEPLAN, 1983), approximately 30 percent
identified themselves as fazendeiros by profession; nearly 60 percent
were from families of fazendeiros. Nearly 60 percent also had
"political tradition in the family", meaning that fathers, grandfathers,
uncles and/or brothers had participated in politics in an elected
capacity. Thirty percent had been active in politics for more than 20
years, and other 25 percent from 12 to 20 years. Only one-fifth had
entered politics within the preceding four years. Two-thirds had
previously occupied political posts. These local political bosses of
the interior, the cogs in the traditional patronage machines, will serve
the oligarchy from within the governing party in the reconstruction of
clientelistic networks.
The ready and efficient mass conversion of this traditional, rural
political elite was possible because of the extreme ideological and
programmatic weakness of parties in the state. In the same 1983 survey
of the mayors elected in Minas Gerais in 1982, 58.9 percent of the
mayors sampled attributed their victories to "personal attributes";
28.9 percent to "political tradition"; and only 8.3 percent to party
program (3.9 percent not available) (SEPLAN, 1983: 43). The infusion of
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coroneis into the PMDB in turn inevitably diluted the party's
already weak programmatic message, diminishing even further the
potential for the PMDB in government to signify citizen preferences.
The ability of the traditional political elite to control the
transition from authoritarian rule in Brazil and appropriate the
political parties does not augur well for democracy's extension.
Patterns of politics established now may become semi-permanent features
of the political landscape. In moments of transition and convulsion
there arise unique opportunities to discard the contraints of the
organizational forms inherited from previous regimes. Missed
opportunities are rarely regained. Political arrangements, once in
place, condition future political behavior and possibilities. Political
institutions are molded to suit the regime which they uphold, and state
elites and civil organizations build bridges to one another appropriate
for the immediate political environment. Individuals rise who are adept
at the political game as it is played and they use their positions to
perpetuate modes of political interaction that favor them. Political
systems, in short, carry with them the seeds of their own reproduction.
Evidence from other countries provides many examples of political
institutions that long outlive the political pacts that spawned them.
Thus the arrangements reached in moments of crisis shape the future
patterns of politics in a "democracy". At a moment of transition in
Italy in 1876, Agostino De Pretis, the newly elected prime minister,
invited opposition deputies from the Destra party to shift their votes
to the government majority in exchange for personal benefits, access to
state patronage, and the right to rule locally. The deputies, finding
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themselves newly marginalized from power and state spoils (the Destra
had controlled the Parliament since Italian unification 16 years
earlier), agreed. Unfettered in their conversion by ideological or
programmatic constraints--the parties represented only loosely knit
coalitions of elite factions--they "transformed" themselves from the
opposition into a stable part of the governing majority. For decades,
southern deputies voted with any government, regardless of program or
ideology, which supported its practice of clientelism. As Chubb (1982:
21) explains its consequences:
Trasformismo successfully eliminated any effective
opposition from the Italian Parliament. The Destra
and te Sinistra, which had contested national power
from 1860 until 1876, were molded into a single
governmental majority by the "transformist" politics
of successive prime ministers following the victory
of the Sinistra in the elections of 1876. The
organization of politics around personality and
patronage rather than ideas and practical programs
not only absorbed and neutralized the opposition but
ultimately emptied the very concept of 'party' of
any meaning beyond that of a loose congeries of
personal clienteles.
More than 100 years later, Tancredo Neves like De Pretis pursued a
strategy of trasformismo with much the same effects: immediate success
for the government majority, the elimination of opposition, and a long-
term blow to political parties as vehicles of non-elite interest
representation at precisely the moment they were most needed and held
their greatest potential to advance democratization. Political
competition had given opponents of the oligarchy in the PMDB the opening
to attack the foundations of elite power. The opposition was able to
overcome the advantage with which their adversaries had begun--the
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spoils of the pork barrel--due to the coincidence, at least in Minas
Gerais, of the unpopularity of the military regime and the winning
coalition constructed by Tancredo Neves. With a PMDB governor in the
Palacio da Liberdade, politics in principle might have been reorganized.
Clientelism could have been weakened, or more modestly perhaps,
30
redirected to support a new alignment of political forces. However
genuine the possibilities were for democratization in Minas Gerais, they
were forfeited almost before the euphoria over the electoral results had
subsided. The governor made plain his intent to govern with, not
31
against, the Minas oligarchy. Constructing a coalition sufficiently
broad to bring about a transition to civilian rule in Minas Gerais
required the participation of the political elite of the old order. Its
input into the construction of the new regime, in turn, hampered efforts
32
to extend political democracy. The transformation of the PMDB from a
quasi-social democratic party to an oligarchical vehicle, the
revitalization of traditional clientelistic networks, and the barter of
public policy for personal political gain suggest that traditional
politics survived at least the initial stages of civilian government.
While similar political transactions, negotiations for the state,
and takeovers of political parties were repeated elsewhere in Brazil
during the transition from authoritarian rule, the transition in Minas
would be significant had they not. Even if Minas politics today can no
more be equated with a single national pattern than it could in the
1945-1964 era, this state's politics are not inconsequential in national
politics, and the Minas oligarchy not one among equals. If any doubt
lingers about the ability of this state's elite to impose its
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preferences nationally, one should recall that its actions sparked every
major regime change in Brazil in this century. It helped launch the
1930 'Revolution'; its 1943 Manifesto dos Mineiros hastened the end of
the Estado Novo; it led the movement to depose President Goulart in
1964; and once again in 1984 Minas politicians accelerated the regime
change.
The strength of the Minas oligarchy has always been even greater
when combined with that of its old partner, Sao Paulo. Today, Brazil is
witnessing a return to the politics of "cafe com leite". As in the
heyday of the oligarchs, the decisions reached by the governors of
Brazil's two largest states have a decisive impact on the course of
national politics. In 1984, Tancredo Neves convinced the governor of
Sao Paulo, Franco Montoro, to agree to a Mineiro in the presidency, a
plan frustrated only by Neves' death. Ulysses Guimaraes, the Paulista
PMDB president, and Helio Garcia, governor of Minas Gerais, have already
agreed in writing that both will be candidates for the next presidential
election in 1988 (Guimaraes, who sacrificed his own presidential
ambitions to elect Tancredo Neves, acknowledges that Minas lost "its
turn" with Neves' death, but does not wish to concede outright yet
another term before he can occupy the presidency). Whomever wins the
party nomination will be supported by the other, who will become the
vice-presidential candidate on the PMDB ticket (Istoe, 1/22/86: 16).
The 'New Republic' in Brazil differ in significant ways from its
predecessor. Arbitrary military abuses of human rights have been
curbed, political rights restored to political 'undesirables',
33
censorship lifted, illiterates enfranchised, and direct elections are
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proceeding on schedule for posts of considerable importance--state
governors and the presidency. But there are also major continuities.
The new order carries over from the old not only its personnel but many
political procedures and practices as well. National cabinet posts are
still awarded to satisfy politically determined state quotas and to
bolster adherents in the states. State governors are as formidable as
ever, and in most places, are forging new political machines on the
unshaken foundations of the old. Public posts are still filled by top
bosses to maximize political returns. Party candidates are still
approached by their convention and general electors who solicit home
roof repairs and lunches for their families as payment for their votes.
Even traditional elites would agree with this characterization. Minas
governor Helio Garcia, when asked what the country's political and
administrative picture would have looked like had Eliseu Resende
defeated Tancredo Neves for governor of Minas, and Mario Andreazza
wrested the PDS presidential nomination from Paulo Maluf in 1984 and
been elected president in the electoral college -- in other words, if
the 'democratization' had not proceeded at the pace that it did --
replied: "It would look very much as it does now" (Istoe, 2/26/86: 20).
Traditional political elites can, then, fashion political
institutions to support their positions in society and preserve
traditional political arrangements. In Brazil today, political parties,
local governments, the executive-legislative relationship, electoral
codes, and interest association and representation, even if not formally
"authoritarian" are not like corresponding institutions and arrangements
in a democratic polity. They are well suited to restricting mass
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political participation and the arena of decision-making. Can
traditional political elites construct and operate an oligarchical
system in a democratic polity? If the differences between democratic
and authoritarian regimes are so subtle, and if traditional elites can
be found in positions of power in the primary institutions of political
life in both, what kind of distinction can be drawn between these two
types of regimes?
The most obvious distinguishing features of political regimes are
their formal political rules. What relative significance should these
rules be accorded, however, vis-a-vis political practice? Once before,
in Brazil's past, the Constitution framed a democracy and guaranteed
political rights. Yet, political elites of the Old Republic routinely
engaged in electoral fraud, physical intimidation, and subversion of the
judicial process (Reis, 1980). Formal rules did not ensure democracy
for all Brazilian citizens. In the Old Republic, however, democracy's
formal rules were easily bent by extra-political sources of local
domination: land dependence and private armies. In the New, economic
change has removed from local elites the stick of private power with
which they enforced loyalty to regional oligarchies. The oligarchy's
power now rests practically exclusively on the public resources with
which they can provide local political elites. These 'carrots', in
turn, derive from positions that politics itself confers upon them.
In controlling the transition from the authoritarian regime,
traditional elites have won a decisive round insthe struggle for the
political future of Brazil. Open political competition, however, may
yet allow challengers to unseat incumbent groups in the states, and even
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in the federal government. The possibility the "outs" might one day
become the "ins" creates choice and encourages local opposition to form
in the cities and the countryside. As long as the formal rules of open
political competition are secure, there is reason to hope that, in the
long-term, politics can be transformed. What changes are possible in
agrarian reform, union laws, and other pressing policy problems in
contemporary Brazil, as elsewhere, are secondary, and logical
outgrowths, of the outcome of the contest in primary arena of political
conflict, the constitution of the political system itself.
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Notes
1. Jose Sarney, the newly elected vice-president, was sworn in as
president. For an account of the events of 1984, see Veja, 1/16/85.
2. Berger and Piore (1980) have found that traditional production
units and segmented labor markets are semi-permanent features of
advanced industrial society, permitted to survive in contravention of
the 'natural laws' of capitalist development in order to distribute
economic uncertainty and reduce political instability. They argue
society can linger practically indefinitely in a peculiar transitional
stage in which traditional and modern forms of economic organization co-
exist.
3. Students of southern Italy have stressed the role of the middle
classes in particular in political clientelism. Graziano (1978: 312-
313) asserts the middle class is the most susceptible to clientelism,
and one of its main supporters. Chubb (1982: 83-110) documents well how
pervasive clientelism is among especially middle class public sector
employees, but also finds local entrepreneurs as well as the urban poor
just as dependent upon the Christian Democratic machine in Palermo
(Sicily). Our argument differs in its emphasis on popular classes.
4. Students of state capitalism have hypothesized that for those
integrated into the public sphere, interests are represented by
distinctly organized functional groups. Samuel Beer claims state
capitalism has privileged the distinct representation of organized
functional interests, unlike in liberal democracies in which functional
interests were largely channeled through parliamentary representatives
(as cited in Tarrow, 1978: 5). In other words, as social and economic
problems gravitate to the level of greatest centralization--the national
state--territorial units (cities, provinces, and regions) find their
representative function in decline. This trend is alleged to be
especially pronounced where technocrats are privileged decision-makers
(Tarrow, 1978: 6-7).
Our Brazilian case reveals two flaws in this argument. First,
while corporate groups secure wage increases and job security for those
who are formally employed and negotiate policies in the interest of
their members, they cannot negotiate effectively for those who are
'unorganizable' in the state client sector. In an authoritarian regime,
moreover, corporate groups representing popular classes may not be
effective even for their members. Group members whose corporate
channels of representation malfunction, therefore, must seek
supplemental representation from territorially-based politicians.
5. PMDB victories in many of these cities in 1982 should not be
interpreted entirely as a defeat for the traditional political elite.
While in many cases PMDB candidates indeed carried the party's message
into the elections, in others, they capitalized on the pro-Tancredo
Neves vote [ticket splitting was prohibited by the terms of the
November, 1981 electoral reform package]. Fewer conclusions still can
be drawn from later and future PMDB victories on a macro-scale.
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Guimaraes (1985: 41) aptly argued that PMDB victories in the 1985
mayoral races did not signal an advance of progressive and leftist
forces in Brazil. He saw two (or more) PMDBs in places, and "in the
majority of cities, the more conservative PMDB won".
6. Reis (1985) suggests the military attempted to do precisely
this in a small town in the Minas cerrado.
7. The "New Republic" (A Republica Nova), a phrase coined by
Tancredo Neves in his presidential campaign, has been widely used to
describe the post-1985 civilian regime.
8. Of these ten cities, Montes Claros, Varginha, Uberaba, and Juiz
de Fora were all won by ARENA in 1976. Tres Coraqoes, Teofilo Otoni,
and Unal were won by the MDB. In addition, the three 'dike cities' in the
"Valley of Steel" were opposition strongholds. Another, Pogos de
Caldas, was an estancia hidromineral and thus its mayor was appointed.
9. Party leaders were selected to submerge pre-1964 party
divisions. With Tancredo Neves (national president) from the old PSD
and Hlio Garcia (state president) and Magalhaes Pinto (honorary
national president) representing the old UDN, PP ranks would not be
restricted to members of only one of the extinct parties.
A refuge for the traditional political elite, the PP was a welcome
development to the architect of party reform, retired General Golbery de
Couto e Silva, who understood well the value of dividing the opposition.
As a last resort, if the military had to accept defeat, better to
concede to members of the traditional political elite than to the
popular classes.
10. A politician from the old PSD, he served as President Goulart's
prime minister, and was part of a minority that did not accept the
military incursion into politics. He joined the MDB in formation, and
remained with this party until its dissolution by the party reform law
in 1979.
11. Expecting to be elected governor of Minas under the then
current electoral and party systems, Tancredo Neves was understandably
dismayed when the government's November, 1981 electoral package was made
public. This electoral "reform", designed without input from PDS
politicians, was decreed by the executive, over Tancredo Neves' personal
protest, in response the congressional vote to abolish the sublegenda.
Party discipline among the government majority could not be maintained
because PDS politicians had cross-cutting interests in the sublegenda.
PDS congressmen from the Northeast wished to retain it, while PDS
representatives from the South, where this system benefited the PMDB,
did not. The latter sided with the opposition. Military intelligence
in the fall of 1981 discovered that without the sublegenda and under
standing electoral arrangements, the government was in danger of losing
the governors' races in more than a tolerable number of states.
Among its many provisions whose combined effect was to make
opposition more difficult, especially that of smaller parties, the
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"November package" banned electoral coalitions and prohibited ticket
splitting. With each party forced to nominate its own candidates for
all offices, including governor, Neves correctly reasoned he could not
win the governorship as the candidate of only the PP (i.e. without the
votes of traditional PMDB constituents and PDS voters who might
otherwise have split their ballot).
12. Helio Garcia, who oversaw the state merger, had been a member
of ARENA until 1969, when, as a federal deputy, he became disgusted with
the closing of congress. He did not run again in 1971. "Out of
politics", he was appointed by Aureliano Chaves, then governor, as
president of the state Caixa Economica in Minas Gerais, a post which he
held from 1975 to 1978. In 1979, he returned to politics under the PP
banner. He was elected lieutenant governor in 1982, and jointly served
as mayor of Belo Horizonte. Thus, the governor in 1984 had never been a
member of the MDB. Affonso Camargo, the 'bionic' senator from Parana
who presided over the national merger, was also from the PP via ARENA.
13. Indeed, Francelino Pereira openly favored Maurlcio Campos.
14. The Planalto is literally the presidential palace. In common
parlance in Brazil, it is used to signify the president and his
advisors.
15. The left's role in the campaign was important if understated.
Neves accepted the support of the left, but made no deliberate effort to
mobilize it. In fact, he preferred its potential lay dormant. Taking
for granted a PMDB victory in Belo Horizonte, he had no campaign planned
for the state capital. Soon it became clear, however, that the campaign
in the interior would be difficult: the PMDB had diretorios in only 303
cities (Estado de Minas, 11/20/83). To win, the party needed to carry
Belo Horizonte and the 50 largest cities by a wide margin. The burden
for delivering the urban vote fell to the left.
16. Luiz Otivio Valadares, Slvio de Abreu Junior, Mauricio de
Padua Souza, Ronan Tito, and Carlos Cotta were appointed to head the
Departments of Administration, Interior and Justice, Public Works, Labor
and Social Action, and Tourism and Sports (later Government and
Political Coordination after the death of Renato Azeredo). Only Cotta
detoured through the PP before rejoining the PMDB. At least once in
Neves' short term in office two were threatened with dismissal. In
August 1983, the Diario do Comercio reported: "According to an informed
source, Tancredo [Neves] is studying the possibility of returning to the
Assembleia Legislativa the deputies Luiz Otavio Valadares
(Administration), Mauricio Pdua (Public Works), and Milton Lima
(Science and Technology), in order to remove from the state legislature
the alternate deputies Jaciel Pereira and Joao Barbosa." These two
alternates belonged to the so-called "Bloco da Virada" which opposed
much of Neves' proposed legislation.
17. The three economic secretaries were Luis Rogerio de Castro
Leite (secretary of Finance); Ronaldo Costa Couto (secretary of
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Planning); and Mrcio Garcia Vilela (president of the BEMGE). All three
were tied to the PDS.
18. The opposition for some time debated how to approach the
"indirect" election for president. With a government victory a foregone
conclusion, many advocated boycotting the electoral college to be
convened to ratify the government party nominee (and presumably hand-
picked presidential successor) rather than legitimize an electoral
farce. These people galvanized public opinion in favor of direct
popular elections. A campaign for direct elections--"the most
significant popular campaign in Brazilian history" (Veja, 1/16/85: 22)--
took place in early 1984. It was highlighted by massive street
demonstrations demanding congressional passage of an amendment providing
for direct popular elections for president later that year. The
campaign won the support of even the vice-president. While the
amendment was doomed to fail from the beginning, the awakening of public
opinion accelerated the regime hange.
Never believing the congress would approve the amendment for direct
elections nor that the military onuld permit them (he called the
demonstrations "lyric"), Neves lent nominal support to the campaign
while never losing sight of his candidacy within the electoral college.
Minas Gerais was the virtually the last state, and Belo Horizonte the
last major city, to organize public demonstrations for direct elections.
According to one member of the Executive Commission of the state PMDB,
the idea of the campaign was discussed only once: a sub-committee of
three was appointed to study the idea, and two members, upon being
named, departed immediately for personal vacations. (Interview with
Roberto Martins, Belo Horizonte, August 16, 19S5.)
19. Why Figueiredo behaved so passively has been the subject of
much speculation. The reigning theory is that he, himself, wished to
stay on as president for another four year term (Veja, 1/16/85: 24-
27).
20. The fear of a coup attempt was not irrational. Security
forces had attempted in 1981 to sabotage the political opening by
planting a bomb (which exploded prematurely in the lap of a saboteur) at
the Riocentro complex in Rio de Janeiro during a public gathering on May
Day. Between August and November, 1984, once it became apparent Neves
had the votes to triumph in the electoral college, the PMDB steeled
itself for a coup. Expecting it to originate in Brasllia under the
command of General Newton Cruz, it even planned in detail a resistance.
Veja (1/16/85: 40-45) provides a full account of the events of these
months.
21. Tancredo Neves, according to Brazilian law, had to resign his
post as governor in order to run for president. Thus Helio Garcia
became governor in July 1984. Much of the negotiations for the
"Acordo" with Aureliano Chaves representing the FL fell to Garcia.
22. How the prerogatives to make these appointments were parcelled
out to the dissident deputies illustrates the persistence of traditional
385
politics. Reportedly, when deputies could not agree amongst themselves
on how to divide the spoils (different posts, of course, had different
real and relative value), Israel Pinheiro provided the solution.
Recalling how such disputes were resolved during the Estado Novo, he
suggested that they employ the method he learned from Benedito Valadares
(Vargas' interventor and later governor of Minas Gerais): the names of
each post be put on separate pieces of paper, and the deputies pull
these scraps of paper from a hat. Later, they could be traded amongst
deputies seeking to strengthen their positions in different parts of the
state (Veja, "Empregos Pblicos: Como se Loteia o Governo", 7/17/85:
26-27).
23. On each count, the traditional elite was able to impose its
preferences. Before naming two members of the Liberal Front to his
cabinet, Helio Garcia had stated publicly he would not do so (Estado de
Minas, 9/4/84), only that he would review the firings in the interior of
those primary school directors, regional school administrators, and
police chiefs who were PDS ward bosses (cabos eletorais) associated with
the FL. Secondly, the manner in which the issue of the comando politico
was resolved was an outright victory for the ex-PDS elite: the PMDB had
wanted 'proportionality' to save at least some patronage resources.
Finally, a fourth clause in the agreement called for direct elections
for mayor to be held in the state's 13 estancias hidrominerais in
November, 1985, at the same time the mayor of Belo Horizonte was to be
elected directly for the first time since 1965. The hidroestincias, or
spas, are resort or tourist cities with fountains and natural mineral
water springs which possess alleged healing properties. In these
cities, along with those designated "national security areas", mayors
were appointed rather than directly elected. (There is no satisfactory
explanation why the hidroestancias were treated in this way.) As long
as these posts were appointed by the governor and approved in the state
legislature, the majority party was assured control over them. By
having the schedule moved up, the PDS-FL dissidents hoped to recover by
direct elections at least some of what they had lost for the first time
in 1982. Thus they negotiated yet another point in their favor.
24. The command of the national PMDB was negotiated in November,
1983, prior to its ratification in the party's national convention that
December. The Unidade (Unity) group loyal to Tancredo Neves emerged
from the negotiations ahead of the Travessia group led by party
president Ulysses Guimaraes. Guimaraes ceded half the posts on the
Executive Commission and 43 percent of those on the national directory
to the Unidade group. His own Travessia received 35 percent (the
remaining 17 percent were allocated to a third Pro-partido faction
composed of independents and first time congressmen). The complexion of
the Executive Commission, too, changed. 'Radical' Francisco ("Chico")
Pinto was pushed out of his position of first vice-president by
'moderate' senator Pedro Simon. In return for retaining the presidency,
Guimaraes allowed Neves to name the party's secretary-general, the post
which controls the party's organization. Neves' choice, Affonso
Camargo, the 'bionic' senator (appointed by the president) from Parana
who had only recently joined the PMDB via the PP and ARENA, precipitated
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strong reaction from party regulars, including threats from the
Travessia rank and file to organize a resistance, to cancel the
convention, and to resign from the party. The threats were to no avail.
By all accounts, Neves by this time was in extra-official command of the
party.
25. Here we are following O'Donnell's (1985b: 8-9) useful
distinction between such countries as Uruguay and Chile which had well-
established democracies until their breakdowns in the 1970s and Peru,
the Dominican Republic, Brazil, and Argentina, which at least since the
1930s and probably never had consolidated democratic regimes. In the
former, current liberalizations represent "redemocratizations", in the
latter, "democratizations". This distinction is important because in
the latter group, of which Brazil is a member, democratic institutions
are weak or not as yet effectively existent.
26. Huntington (1985: 149) points out the inherent difficulty in
bridging the concepts of democracy as a normative ideal and one useful
for comparative political analysis. Leaning toward the latter, he
adopts Schumpeter's definition because, among other reasons, it can
incorporate the two dimensions--contestation and participation--that
Dahl sees as critical to his "realistic democracy" or "polyarchy".
Such an approach does offer the advantage of a clear yardstick by
which to measure whether a regime can meet established criteria of
democracy. This definition, however, is so broad as to encompass many
regimes which in the eyes of even an untrained observer are questionable
democracies. Does a regime with universal suffrage and regular
elections for president and congress in which the military, for
instance, exercises "behind the scenes" veto power, such as the
Brazilian, qualify as a democracy?
27. He also doubts, I think correctly, that an advance of
socioeconomic democratization is possible at the same time civilian rule
is being consolidated.
28. Dahl (1971: 3) acknowledges institutions are needed to respond
to citizen votes or "other expressions of preference" only in his third
"opportunity"--to have preferences weighted equally in the conduct of
government. In a functioning mass democracy, however, institutions,
more broadly defined, are essential before the government is poised to
take decisions.
29. Senhor (25/02/86: 43) reports that "The number of mayors who
have sought refuge in the PMDB is about four or five per month. Two
hundred mayors have submitted to [Governor Helio] Garcia's charisma."
PMDB vice-president Roberto Martins suggested that the time in which
these 200 mayors converted to the PMDB was shorter, and furthermore
that they were accompanied by entire PDS diretorios, during the
Brazilian winter (June-August) months of 1985 (Author's interview, Belo
Horizonte, August 16, 1985).
30. There were various charges levelled in 1983 and 1984 that
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Neves was attempting to do just this. Paulo Maluf (25/9/84) claimed
Neves fired 2000 public employees for political reasons when he
became governor. The accuracy of these charges, given that Maluf was
engaged in a presidential campaign with Neves, is open to serious
challenge. Deputies from the PDS made similar, if less exaggerated,
charges in late 1983.
31. Instead of supporting PMDB politicians in the interior who
were the exceptions to this rule, Neves used the spoils of the
governor's office to coopt PDS deputies. He deliberately courted PDS
politicians and even used them to isolate the left of his own party who
opposed his projects.
On one occasion in November 1983, the Legislative Assembly
approved the creation of four new Secretariats (Transportation; Sports,
Recreation, and Tourism; Culture; and Special Affairs) by a margin of
39-38. The PDS and the PT representative, Mares Guia, voted against the
measure. Other than this, there is little indication of opposition to
the governor, and less as time went on. Indeed, as indicated above in
note 16, the more significant opposition came from the "Bloco da
Virada" within the PMDB.
32. Guimaraes (1985: 38-39) has pointed out that a coalition
formed to hasten the dissolution of the old regime aims to be as broad
as possible, and thus encumbers itself as a governing coalition.
33. Sylvia Raw has pointed out that while positive, the danger
exists that enfranching illiterates might reinforce clientelistic
practices.
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APPENDIX
THE MINAS ELITE, 1956-1982
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Defining elites for the purposes of data analysis was an
appreciably easier task than defining them in a conceptually
satisfactory manner. The state elite was divided into three broad
categories: technocrats, traditional political elites, and
business/banking elites, and identification of its members according to
sub-group was based on the route followed to power. Technocrats, to be
classified as such, had to exhibit one or more of the following elements
in their backgrounds: (a) an economics degree; (b) an engineering
degree; or (c) service in the following public sector enterprises:
CEMIG, the state electric company; USIMINAS, the federal steel company
located in Minas; DER, the state highway division; and the BDMG, the
state development bank. However arbitrary or deficient these criteria
may seem, they go remarkably far in identifying members of the
technocratic elite as conventionally viewed. Falling somewhat outside
these guidelines are those professionals such as medical doctors in the
Secretariat of Health and university professors in the Secretariat of
Education, who are technocrats insofar as they gained their jobs on
other than political grounds, an important consideration when
contemplating the fate of a political class and whether or not the
political system continues to reward political party service. For the
purposes of this analysis, they were classified under the technocratic
label.
Members of the private sector who rose in private banking and
industry and commerce were the most easily distinguished. While some
officeholders had served in both political posts and the private sector,
the order of posts held was taken as the best indicator of the route to
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power. Businessmen entered public service after careers in the private
sector, and politicians joined the Boards of large corporations after
many years in elective office.
Officeholders that pursued political careers were identified as
members of the political or traditional political state elite. To
belong to the political elite, an official must have demonstrated in
his background elected (local, state, or federal) office, or membership
in the executive committee of a political party (or its local or state
branches) as the primary route to the high ranking offices included in
this study. Members of the traditional political elite, additionally,
either (a) hold a law degree (especially from the UFMG, the Federal
University of Minas Gerais); (b) list landowner (fazendeiro) as one of
their occupations; or (c) not least of all claim descent from a
"traditional [oligarchical] family" -- "traditional families" are widely
referred to in Brazil.
No minimum was placed upon the length of time an officeholders
occupied a cabinet post; discrepancies in length of tenure were
compensated for in the analysis by calculating the time (measured in
months) that a post belonged to one or the other elite group.
This study has an inherent bias away from political elites because by
Brazilian electoral law, public officials wishing to contest elective
office must resign their posts nine months before general elections to
retain their eligibility. Hence, many politicians are replaced in the
final months of a governor's term with administrators who do not intend
to seek election.
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Much of the elite data is from the archives of the Centro de
Estudos Mineiros, a research facility connected with the Federal
University of Minas Gerais. The Center's extensive holdings
on Minas elites are the product of a massive research project whose
end was to compile a dictionary of Minas elites from the Old Republic
to 1975. Among the multiple data sources used by the Center's research
staff were the records of the Arquivo Pblico de Minas Gerais,
questionnaires completed by relatives and prominent informants from the
subjects' hometowns, obituaries, personal interviews, the work of such
historians as David Fleischer, and studies of congressmen conducted in
the 1970s. The cross-checking of information already performed by the
Center's historians attests to the reliability of the data employed in
this thesis. To supplement this data, most notably for recent
officeholders but also for posts in the state banking system, I obtained
information from the secretariats and banks which these elites headed,
newspaper and magazine accounts, and the curriculum vitaes of
officeholders obtained from the governor's staff.
The data upon which this analysis was based fall into the following
categories:
I. Smmary Information
Birth: place/date
Death: place/date
Father: name/occupation
Mother: name
Civil status: (if married, to whom)
Father-in-law's occupation
Education:
--secondary (name and place of school)
--university (name and place of school, faculty, date of graduation)
--any other courses, degrees, including foreign
Occupations (no limit on number)
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Relatives in Politics: names, posts
Political Career (summary: posts, dates in office)
Local
State distinguished by executive and legislative service
Federali
Political party affiliation(s)
II. Additional Information
Elite posts held in other states
Ambassadorships
Unsuccessful candidacies
Local, state, and federal positions in political parties (also floor
leaders, whips)
If practiced law, when and where
If practiced medicine, when and where
Other private sector activity (e.g. industries owned, bank offices held)
Experience in public enterprises
Any service in a department secretary's administration such as
undersecretary, personal secretary to a secretary, division lawyer,
and so forth. The same would apply for a major's administration,
especially for Belo Horizonte.
Other appointed posts (Director of the State Press, etc.)
Judicial posts (Supreme Court judgeships)
Children (names, number)
Foreign travel (including conferences, delegations, etc.)
Publications (political, technical, and literary)
Honors, Awards (Medalha de Inconfidencia)
For Congressmen
--parliamentary commissions on which served (chairmanships)
--positions taken on monumental issues, such as adoption of the
parliamentary regime in 1961, nationalization of steel
--any distinguished service, such as introduction of important
legislation
If signed the Manifesto dos Mineiros (1943 document drafted by future
leaders of UDN protesting Vargas dictatorship)
Famous classmates (especially prevalent in the case of old UDN
politicians who attended the law school of the Federal University
of Minas Gerais)
Descent from traditional families
Courses at the Superior War College
Landholding
Elected offices in the state Legislative Assembly
All cabinet rank positions except military portfolios were included
in this study. While the analysis attempts to consider the implications
for traditional political elite persistence of the loss of the state
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security apparatus (the Department of Public Security) after 1970, the
social origins and career patterns of members of a military elite per se
were not analyzed. Other executive positions in the state judged
powerful were presidencies of state banks and the mayor of Belo
Horizonte. In the federal arena, Mineiros who occupied national cabinet
and bank positions were included in the study. The posts defined for
analysis are:
A. State Office:
Governor
Lieutenant Governor
Secretary of the Interior and Justice
Secretary of Finance
Secretary of Agriculture, Industry, Commerce, and Labor (1956-1963)
Secretary of Agriculture (1963-1982)
Secretary of Education
Secretary of Public Works
Secretary of Health
Secretary of Public Security (1956-1970)
Secretary of Administration (1963-1982)
Secretary of Government (1963-1982)
Secretary of Planning (1970-1982)
Secretary of Industry, Commerce, and Tourism (1972-1982)
Secretary of Economic Development (1964-1966)
Secretary of Science and Technology (1977-1982)
Secretary of Labor (1963-1982)
Secretary of Social Action Affairs (1964-1966)
Secretary of Rural Credit and Supply Affairs (1964-1966)
President, State Development Bank
President, Banco de Credito Real
President, Caixa Economica do Estado de Minas Gerais
President, Banco Mineiro da Produiao (1956-1967)
President, Banco Hipotecgrio e Agrrcola do Estado de Minas Gerais (1956-
1967)
President, Banco do Estado de Minas Gerais (1967-1982)
President, State Legislative Assembly
Mayor, Belo Horizonte
N. National Office:
President
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Vice-President
Head, President's Civil Cabinet
Prime Minister (1961-1962)
Minister of Justice
Minister of Foreign Relations
Minister of Finance
Minister of Transportation
Minister of Agriculture
Minister of Education and Culture
Minister of Labor and Social Security
Minister of Health
Minister of Mines and Energy
Minister of Industry and Commerce
Minister of Planning and General Coordination
Minister of the Interior
Minister of Communications
President, Bank of Brazil
President, National Economic Development Batlk
President, Chamber of Deputies
President, Senate
Elites who occupied these posts:
A. State Posts
Governor
Jose Francisco Bias Fortes
Jose de Magalhaes Pinto
Israel Pinheiro da Silva
Rondon Pacheco
Antonio Aureliano Chaves de
Mendonna
Levindo Ozanam Coelho
Francelino Pereira dos Santos
Jan. 31, 1956 - Jan. 31, 1961
Jan. 31, 1961 - Jan. 31, 1966
Jan. 31, 1966 - March 15, 1971
March 15, 1971 - March 15, 1975
March 15, 1975 - July 5, 1978
July5, 1978 - March 15, 1979
March 15, 1979 - March 15, 1983
Lieutenant Governor
Artur Bernardes Filho
Clovis Salgado da Gama
Pio Soares Canedo
Celso Porfirio de Araujo
Machado
Levindo Ozanam Coelho
Jan. 31, 1956 - Jan. 31, 1961
Jan. 31, 1961 - Jan. 31, 1966
Jan. 31, 1966 - March 15, 1971
March 15, 1971 - Sept. 13, 1974
March 15, 1975 - July 5, 1978
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Joao Marques de Vasconcellos
Secretary of the Interior (and Justice)
Jose Ribeiro Pena
Candido Martins de Oliveira
Juarez de Souza Carmo
Osvaldo Pierucetti
Rondon Pacheco
Joao Franzem de Lima
Mario Casasanta
Dilermando Rocha
Raul de Barros Fernandes
Osvaldo Pierucetti
Geraldo Martins Silveira
Manuel Taveira de Sousa
Helio Garcia
Jose Monteiro de Castro
Jose de Faria Tavares
Luiz Fernando Faria de Azevedo
Ciro Franco
Joao Franzem de Lima
Rafael Caio Nunes Coelho
Expedito de Faria Tavares
Bonifacio Jose Tarm de Andrada
Elias de Souza Carmo
Denio Moreira de Carvalho
Lourival Brasil Filho
Jan. 31, 1956 - July 29, 1958
July 29, 1958 - March 13, 1959
March 13, 1959 - Jan. 30, 1961
Jan. 31, 1961 - April 19, 1961
April 19, 1961 - May 28, 962
May 28, 1962 - Jan. 8, 1963
Jan. 8, 1963 - March 31, 1963
April 2, 1963 - May 21, 1963
May 21, 1963 - Jan. 3, 1964
Feb. 26, 1964 - Sept. 30, 1964
Oct. 1, 1964 - Dec. 8, 1964
Dec. 9, 1964 - July 1, 1965
July 1, 1965 - Aug. 5, 1965
Aug. 5, 1965 - Nov. 16, 1965
Nov. 19, 1965 - Dec. 22, 1965
Jan. 31, 1966 - Aug. 11, 1966
Aug. 12, 1966 - April 25, 1967
April 25, 1967 - March 14, 1971
March 15, 1971 - Feb 23, 1973
March 2, 1973 - March 15, 1975
March 15, 1975 - May 15, 1978
May 15, 1978 - March 15, 1979
March 15, 1979 - Feb. 15, 1982
Feb. 16, 1982 -
Secretary of Finance
Tristao Ferreira da Cunha
Tancredo de Almeida Neves
Jose Bolivar Drumond
Olavo Bilac Pereira Pinto
Darcy Bessone de Oliveira
Andrade
Jose Monteiro de Castro
Antonio de Pdua Rocha Diniz
Jose Maria Alkmim
Miguel Augusto Gongalves de
Souza
Domingos de Carvalho Mendanha
Guilherme Machado
Joao Ewenton Quadros
Celso Cordeiro Machado
Jan. 31,
July 18,
June 28,
Jan. 31,
1956
1958
1960
1961
- June 30, 1958
- June 28, 1960
- Jan. 30, 1961
- May 29, 1962
May 29, 1962 - Jan. 2, 1963
Jan. 8, 1963 - Dec. 30, 1963
Dec. 30, 1963 - March 30, 1964
March 30, 1964 - April 16, 1964
May 4, 1964 - July 1, 1965
July 1, 1965 - Aug. 9, 1965
Aug. 9, 1965 - Jan. 30, 1966
Jan. 31, 1966 - May 6, 1966
May 6, 1966 - Sept. 2, 1966
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March 15, 1979 -
Jofre Gongalves Souza
Ovidio Xavier de Abreu
Luiz Claudio de Almeida
Magalhaes
Fernando Antonio Roquete Reis
Lucio de Souza Assumpgao
Joao Camilo Pena
Marcio Manoel Garcia Vilela
Sept. 2, 1966 - April 14, 1967
April 14, 1967 - Jan. 13, 1970
Jan. 13, 1970 - March 14, 1971
March 15, 1971 - March 18, 1974
March 18, 1974 - March 15, 1975
March 15, 1975 - March 15, 1979
March 15, 1979 -
Secretary of Agriculture, Industry, Commerce, and Labor
Alvaro Marcllio
Abel Rafael Pinto
Paulo Salvo
Roberto Ribeiro de Oliveira
Resende
Jan. 31, 1956 - Jan. 24, 1961
Jan. 31, 1961 - Aug. 21, 1961
Sept. 14, 1961 - June 22, 1962
June 22, 1962 - Oct. 4, 1963
Secretary of Agriculture
Roberto Ribeiro de Oliveria
Resende
Jose de Alencar Carneiro
Francisco Rafael Ottoni
Teatini
Roberto Ribeiro de Oliveira
Resende
Evaristo Soares de Paula
Vitor Andrade Brito
Alysson Paulinelli
Renato SimplIcio Lopes
Agripino Abranches Viana
Gerardo Henrique Machado
Renault
Antonio Alvares da Silva
Oct. 4, 1963 - June 1, 1964
June 1, 1964 - July 1, 1965
July 2, 1965 - Sept. 13, 1965
Oct. 18, 1965 - Jan. 30, 1966
Jan. 31, 1966 - Feb. 17, 1970
March 20, 1970 - March 14, 1971
March 15, 1971 - Feb. 22, 1974
Feb. 22, 1974 - March 15, 1975
March 15, 1975 - March 15, 1979
March 15, 1979 - Feb. 15, 1982
Feb. 16, 1982
Secretary of Education
Abgar Renault
Ciro Aguiar Maciel
Oscar Dias Correa
Jose de Faria Tavares
Antonio Aureliano Chaves de
Mendonga
Jan. 31, 1956 - March 13, 1959
March 13, 1959 - Jan. 31, 1961
Jan. 31, 1961 - May 17, 1962
May 17, 1962 - Feb. 7, 1964
Feb. 7, 1964 - July 1, 1965
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Antonio Augusto de Melo
Cangado
Bonifacio Jose Tamm de Andrada
Gilberto Antunes de Almeida
Gerson de Brito Mello Bozon
Jose Maria de Alkmim
Heraclito Mourao de Miranda
Caio Benjamin Dias
Agnelo Corraa Vianna
Jose Fernandes Filho
Eugenio Klein Dutra
Paulino Ccero de Vasconcelos
Eduardo Levindo Coelho
July 1, 1965 - Aug. 11, 1965
Aug. 11, 1965 - Jan. 30, 1966
Jan. 31, 1966 - Aug. 11, 1966
Aug. 12, 1966 - Feb. 21, 1967
April 14, 1967 - Jan. 13, 1970
Jan. 13, 1970 - March 14, 1971
March 15, 1971 - March 20, 1973
April 25, 1973 - March 15, 1975
March 15, 1975 - July 6, 1978
July 6, 1978 - March 15, 1979
March 15, 1979 - (1980)
(1980)
Secretary of Public Works
Feliciano de Oliveira Pena
Belmiro Medeiros da Silva
Ulisses Marcondes Escobar
Bento Gongalves Filho
Jose Ribeiro Pena
Ademar Resende de Andrade
Temistocles Alves Barcelos
Correa
Lucio de Souza Cruz
Felisberto Neves
Antonio Aureliano Chaves de
Mendona
Jose de Lima Barcelos
Orlando de Andrade
Joaquim Roberto Leao Borges
Eduardo da Silva Bambirra
Ildeu Duarte Filho
Euler Martini Brina
Fernando Fagundes Neto
Chrispim Jacques Bias Fortes
Gilberto Antunes de Almeida
Carlos Eloy Carvalho Guimaraes
Celso Melo de Azevedo
Jan. 31, 1956 - June 30, 1958
July 18, 1958 - March 13, 1959
March 13, 1959 - May 17, 1960
June 20, 1960 - Jan. 30, 1961
Jan. 31, 1961 - Oct. 13, 1961
Oct. 13, 1961 - April 24, 1962
Aug. 20, 1962 - Jan. 8,
Jan. 8, 1963 - Jan. 30,
Jan. 31, 1963 - July 1,
July 1, 1965 - Aug. 10,
1963
1963 and
1965
1965
Oct. 10, 1965 - Jan. 30, 1966
Jan. 31, 1966 - May 29, 1968
May 29, 1968 - March 4, 1969
April 30, 1969 - Jan. 13, 1970
Jan. 13, 1970 - March 14, 1971
March 15, 1971 - March 1, 1974
March 1, 1974 - March 15, 1975
March 15, 1975 - April 20, 1975
May 6, 1975 - (1978)
(1978) - March 15, 1979
March 15, 1979 - Feb. 15, 1982
Feb. 16, 1982
Secretary of Health
Washington Ferreira Pires
Austregesilo Ribeiro de
Mendong a
Jan. 31, 1956 - Aug. 1, 1958
Oct. 7, 1958 - Jan. 30, 1961
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Roberto Ribeiro de Oliveira
Resende
Jose Pinto Machado
Ladislau Sales
Eurico Alvarenga Figueiredo
Salim Te6filo Nacur
Joao Vaz da Silva Sobrinho
Te6filo Ribeiro Pires
Austregesilo Ribeiro de
Mendonga
Enio Pinto Correa
Clovis Salgado da Gama
Fernando Megre Veloso
Dario de Faria Tavares
Francisco Gilberto Reis de
Araujo
Eduardo Levindo Coelho
Joao Valle Mauricio
Jan. 31, 1961 - June 22, 1962
June 22, 1962 - Jan. 7, 1963
Jan. 8, 1963 - April 1, 1964
May 12, 1964 - Oct. 3, 1964
Oct. 3, 1964 - June 8, 1965
June 9, 1965 - Aug. 11, 1965
Aug. 10, 1965 - Jan. 30, 1966
Jan. 31, 1966 - March 1, 1966 and
March 3, 1966 - Aug. 11, 1966
Nov. 4, 1966 - April 19, 1967
April 19, 1967 - March 14, 1971
March 15, 1971 - March 15, 1975
March 15, 1975 - May 15, 1978
May 15, 1978 - March 15, 1979
March 15, 1979 - (1980)
(1980)
Secretary of Public Security
Paulo Pinheiro Chagas
Paulo Pinheiro Chagas
Jose Ribeiro Pena
Celso Porfirio de Araujo
Machado
Jose de Faria Tavares
Mauro da Silva Gouvea
Caio Mario da Silva Pereira
Jose Monteiro de Castro
Gilberto Alves da Silva
Dolabela
Manoel Taveira de Souza
Jose Monteiro de Castro
Crispim Jacques Bias Fortes
Joaquim Ferreira Gongalves
May 15, 1956 - July 6, 1957
July 8, 1957 - June 30, 1958
July 29, 1958 - Dec. 29, 1959
Dec. 29, 1959 - Jan. 30, 1961
Jan. 31, 1961 - May 17, 1962
May 22, 1962 - Jan. 2, 1963
Jan. 11, 1963 - Jan. 16, 1964
Jan. 16, 1964 - July 1, 1965
July
Aug.
Nov.
Jan.
Aug.
1, 1965 - Aug. 9, 1965
9, 1965 - Sept. 13, i965
16, 1965 - Jan. 30, 1966
31, 1966 - Aug. 11, 1966
12, 1966 - Jan. 16, 1970
Secretary of Administration
Paulo Neves de Carvalho
Glaura Vasques de Miranda
Paulo Neves de Carvalho
Hugo Aguiar
Raimundo Nonato de Castro
Francisco Bilac Moreira Pinto
Raimundo Nonato de Castro
Oct. 15, 1963 - July 1, 1965
July 1, 1965 - Nov. 17, 1965
Nov. 19, 1965 - Jan. 30, 1966
Jan. 31, 1966 - Aug. 11, 1966
Aug. 12, 1966 - April 18, 1967
April 18, 1967 - Jan. 13, 1970
Jan. 13, 1970 - March 20, 1970
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Domingos de Carvalho Mendanha
Jose Gomes Domingues
Lourival Brasil
Jose Antonio Vasconcelos Costa
Jose Machado Sobrinho
Morvan Acaiaba de Resende
March 20, 1970 - March 14, 1971
March 15, 1971 - March 15, 1975
March 15, 1975 - May 15, 1978
May 15, 1978 - March 15, 1979
March 15, 1979 - Feb. 15, 1982
Feb. 16, 1982 -
Secretary of Government
Jose Aparecido de Oliveira
Roberto Ribeiro de Oliveria
Resende
Constantino Dutra do Amaral
Miguel Augusto Gongalves de
Souza
Murilo Paulino Badaro
Jose Pereira de Faria
Raul Bernardo Nelson de Senna
Jose Mesquita Lara
Abilio Machado Filho
Marcio Manoel Garcia Vilela
Eduardo Levindo Coelho
Humberto de Almeida
Oct. 15, 1963 - March 9, 1964
May 29, 1964 - July 1, 1965
July 2, 1965 - Aug. 9, 1965
Aug. 9, 1965 - Jan. 30, 1966
Jan. 31, 1966 - Aug. 11, 1966
Aug. 12, 1966 - May 26, 1967
May 26, 1967 - Jan. 12, 1970
Feb. 15, 1971 - March 14, 1971
March 15, 1971 - March 15, 1975
March 15, 1975 - July 6, 1978
July 6, 1978 - March 14, 1979
March 15, 1979
Secretary of Planning
Vitor Andrade Brito*
Raimundo Nonato de Castro
Paulo Jose de Lima Vieira
Paulo Valadares Versiani
Caldeira
Paulo Camilo de Oliveira Penna
Helio Braz de Oliveira Marques
Paulo Roberto Haddad
June 5, 1969 - March 20, 1970
March 20, 1970 - March 14, 1971
March 15, 1971 - Oct. 29, 1973
Oct. 29, 1973 - March 15, 1975
March 15, 1975 - Sept. 28, 1976
Nov. 18, 1976 - March 15, 1979
March 15, 1979
*Served from May 30, 1967; formally ratified as secretary on June 5,
1969
Secretary of Industry, Commerce, and Tourism
Francisco Antonio de Noronha Nov. 3, 1972 -
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Luiz Verano
Fernando Fagundes Neto
Marcio Manoel Garcia Vilela
Jose Romualdo Cangado Bahia
March 15, 1975 - April 30, 1975
April 20, 1975 - May 15, 1978
May 15, 1978 - March 15, 1979
March 15, 1979
Secretary of Economic Development
Celso de Melo Azevedo
Darcy Bessone de Oliveira
Andrade
Jose Cabral
Jarbas Nogueira de Medeiros
Silva
Luiz Gonzaga de Sousa Lima
Jan. 28, 1964 - Aug. 20, 1964
Aug. 20, 1964 - July 1, 1965
July 2, 1965 - Aug. 9, 1965
Aug. 10, 1965 - Jan. 30, 1966
Jan. 31, 1966 - April 20, 1966
Secretary of Science and Technology
Jose Israel Vargas
Fernando Fagundes Neto
Helio Machado
(1977) - March 15, 1979
March 15, 1979 - Feb. 15, 1982
Feb. 16, 1982
Secretary of Labor*
Edgar Godoy da Mata Machado
Paulo Antunes
Jenner Jose de Araujo
Arcelio Santim
Euclides Pereira Cintra
Agnelo Correa Viana
Geraldo Sardinha Pinto
Cicero Dumont
Ruy da Costa Val
Mario Assad
Joao Bello de Oliveira Filho
Joao Pedro Gustin
Oct. 7, 1963 - April 6, 1964
May 6, 1964 - July 1, 1965
July 2, 1965 - Sept. 28, 1965
Sept. 28, 1965
Jan. 31, 1966 - Aug. 11, 1966
Aug. 12, 1966 - July 31, 1967
May 2, 1969 - March 14, 1971
March 15, 1971 - May 14, 1974
May 24, 1974 - March 15, 1975
March 15, 1975 - May 15, 1978
June 5, 1978 - March 15, 1979
March 15, 1979
Secretary of Social Action Affairs*
Milton Soares Campos April 6, 1964 - Aug. 10, 1965
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Wilson Chaves
Sebastiao Navarro Vieira
Aug. 10, 1965 - Jan. 30, 1966
Jan. 31, 1966 - Aug. 11, 1966
*Department of Labor and Popular Culture incorporated Department of
Social Affairs on Oct. 14, 1966
Secretary for Rural Credit and Supply Affairs
Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco
Anfbal Teixeira de Souza
Jorge Ferraz
Feliciano de Oliveira
Vitor Andrade Brito
April 6, 1964 - April 20, 1965
April 20, 1965 - Aug. 9, 1965
Aug. 10, 1965 - Jan. 30, 1966
Jan. 31, 1966 - Aug. 11, 1966
Aug. 12, 1966 - Oct. 14, 1966
President, State Development Bank
Obregon de Carvalho
Paulo Camillo de Oliveira
Penna
Nansen Araujo
Jose Monte Verne Rodarte
Hindemburgo Chateaubriand
Pereira Diniz
Silviano Cangado de Azevedo
Lucio de Souza Assumpgao
Marco Tulio Felicio da Silva
Abilio dos Santos
Luiz Anibal de Lima Fernandes
Sept. 21, 1962 - March 5, 1963
March 6, 1963 - Jan. 28, 1966
Jan. 29, 1966 - March 15, 1966
March 16, 1966 - Jan. 16, 1967
Jan. 17, 1967 - Sept. 15, 1970
Sept. 16, 1970 - March 21, 1971
March 22, 1971 - April 3, 1974
April 4, 1974 - March 20, 1975
March 21, 1975
President, Banco de Credito Real
Joel de Paiva Cortes
Oswaldo Pierucetti
Jose Tostes de Alvarenga Filho
Joao Ewenton Quadros
MaurIcio Chagas Bicalho
Paulo Abgrcio Baptista de
Oliveira
Bolivar Carvalho
Paulo de Oliveira Naves
Miguel Augusto Gongalves de
Souza
1954 - 1961
1961 - 1965
1965 - 1966
1966 - 1967
March 2, 1970 - April 28, 1971
April 29, 1971 - April 30, 1974
May 9, 1974 - April 23, 1975
April 23, 1975
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Antonio Ferreira Alvares da
Silva
President, Caixa Economica do Estado de Minas Gerais
Hermelindo Paixao
Alvaro Batista de Oliveria
Elias de Souza Carmo
Milton Salles
Nylton Moreira Velloso
Milton Costa
Paulo Veiga Sales
Jose Rezende Ribeiro
Helio Carvalho Garcia
Feud Farhat
Julio Arnoldo Laender
March 14, 1955 -
Feb. 16, 1961
Sept. 3, 1963
April 15, 1971
March 20, 1975 - May 15, 1978
President, Banco Mineiro da Produrao*
Joao Ewenton Quadros
Jose Ribeiro Penna
Paulo Macedo Gontijo
Paulo Veiga Salles
Maurlcio Chagas Bicalho
Sept. 29, 1951 - Dec. 19, 1961
Dec. 19, 1961 - July 1, 1965
July 1, 1965 - May 12, 1966
April 27, 1966 - Jan. 3, 1967
March 3, 1967 - Aug. 30, 1967
President, Banco Hipotecario e Agrlcola do Estado de Minas Gerais*
Edson Alvares da Silva
Vicente de Arauijo
Joviano Rodrigues de Moraes
Jardim
Mauricio Chagas Bicalho
April 29, 1951 - Oct. 16, 1961
Dec. 19, 1961 - Feb. 5, 1965
April 28, 1966 - Jan. 3, 1967
Jan. 3, 1967 - Aug. 30, 1967
President, Banco do Estado de Minas Gerais*
Mauricio Chagas Bicalho
Joao Ewenton Quadros
Paulo Abercio Baptista de
Oliveira
Angelo Amaury Stabile
Sept. 1, 1967 - Nov. 14, 1967
Nov. 14, 1967 - Dec. 22, 1969
Dec. 22, 1969 - March 19, 1970
March 19, 1970 - April 23, 1971
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Jose Cabral
Mauro Thibau
Armando Terra Caldeira
Alysson Paulinelli
April 23, 1971 - June 6, 1972
June 6, 1972 - Jan. 28, 1974
Jan. 28, 1974 - Feb. 22, 1978
*The Banco Mineira da Produgao and the Banco Hipotecario e Agricola de
Minas Gerais merged on August 31, 1967, to form the new Banco do Estado
de Minas Gerais (BEMGE).
President, State Legislative Assembly
Jose Augusto Ferreira Filho
Francisco de Castro Pires
Junior
Pio Soares Canedo
Walthon de Andrade Goulart
Jorge Vargas
Bonifacio Jose Tamm de
Andrada
Manoel da Silva Costa
Orlando de Andrade
Homero Santos
Expedito de Faria Tavares
Rafael Caio Nunes Coelho
Joao de Araujo Ferraz
Antonio Soares Dias
Joao Carlos Ribeiro de Navarro
Jose Santana de Vasconcellos
Moreira
1956, 1957,
1961
1962
1963,
1965
1966
1967,
1969
1970
1971,
1973,
1975,
1977,
1979,
1958, 1959, 1960
1964
1968
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1981, 1982
Mayor, Belo Horizonte
Celso Melo de Azevedo
Amintas de Barros
Jorge Carone Filho
Oswaldo Pierucetti
Luiz Gonzaga de Sousa Lima*
Oswaldo Pierucetti*
Luiz Verano*
Mauricio de Freitas Teixeira
Campos*
Feb.l, 1955 - Jan. 31, 1959
Jan. 31, 1959 - Jan. 31, 1963
Jan. 31, 1963 - Jan. 31, 1965
Jan. 31, 1965 - Jan. 31, 1967
Jan. 31, 1967 - March 18, 1971
March 18, 1971 -
April 9, 1975 -
April 4, 1979 -
*appointed
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B. National Posts
President
Juscelino Kubitschek de
Oliveira Jan. 31, 1956 - March 31, 1961
Vice-President
Jose Maria Alkmim
Pedro Aleixo
Antonio Aureliano Chaves de
Mendonga
April 15, 1964 - March 15, 1967
March 15, 1967 - October 14, 1969
March 15, 1979 - March 15, 1983
Prime Minister (also President, Council of Ministers)*
Tancredo de Almeida Neves approx. Sept. 1961 - July, 1962
*Following the resignation of Jnio Quadros as President in 1961, the
military set as a condition for permitting Vice-President Joao Goulart
(whom top military officers considered too radical) to assume the
presidency the adoption of a parliamentary system of government, with
the express intention to dilute the strength of the office of
president. The presidential system was restored in January, 1963.
Head, President's Civil Cabinet
Victor Nunes Leal
Jose Sette Camara Filho
Oswaldo Maia Penido
Darcy Ribeiro
Rondon Pacheco
Nov. 5, 1956 - Aug. 10, 1959
Aug. 10, 1959 - April 27, 1960
April 27, 1960 - Sept. 22, 1960
June 18, 1963 - April 2, 1964
March 15, 1967 - Oct. 30, 1969
Minister of Finance
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Jose Maria Alkmim
Lucas Lopes
Walter Moreira Salles
Francisco Clementino de San
Tiago Dantas
Jan. 1956 - June, 1958
June 25, 1958 - June 3, 1959
Sept. 9, 1961 - Sept. 14, 1962
approx. 1963 - April 1, 1964
Minister of Industry and Commerce
Allyrio de Salles Coelho
Artur da Silva Bernardes
Filho
Joao Camilo Penna
(Kubitschek government)
(Janio Quadros government - 1961)
(Figueiredo government)
Minister of Foreign Relations
Francisco Negrao de Lima
Afonso Arinos de Mello Franco
Francisco Clementino San
Tiago Dantas
Jose de Magalhaes Pinto
(Kubitschek government)
1961
(Goulart, presidential regime)
March 17, 1967 - October 14, 1969
Minister of Justice
Tancredo de Almeida Neves
Milton Soares Campos
Carlos Medeiros Silva
Ibrahim Abi-Ackel
Sept. 8, 1961 - Oct. 13, 1961
1964 - 1965
July 19, 1966 - March 15, 1967
(Figueiredo government)
Minister of Transportation
Eliseu Resende (Figueiredo government)
Minister of Education and Culture
Abgar Renault
Clovis Salgado da Gama
Nov. 24, 1955 - Jan. 31, 1956
Jan. 31, 1956 - July 1, 1960
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Pedro Paulo Penido
Clovis Salgado da Gama
Darcy Ribeiro
Pedro Aleixo
July 1, 1960 - Oct. 18, 1960
Oct. 18, 1960 - Jan. 31. 1961
Sept. 18, 1962 - Jan. 23, 1963
Jan. 10, 1966 - June 30, 1966
Minister of Labor and Social Security
Joao Pinheiro Netto Sept. 18, 1962 - Dec. 6, 1962
Minister of Mines and Energy
Gabriel de Rezende Passos
Mauro Thibau
Sept. 11, 1961 - June 18, 1962
April 17, 1964 - March 15, 1967
Minister of Health
Paulo Pinheiro Chagas
Francisco de Paula Rocha
Lagoa
1963
Nov. 1969 - June, 1972
Minister of Agriculture
Alysson Paulinelli March 15, 1974 -
Minister of Public Works
Lucas Lopes
Presidents, Chamber of Deputies
Carlos Coimbra da Luz
Olavo Bilac Pereira Pinto
Adauto Lucio Cardoso
Jose Bonificio Lafayette de
Nov. 14, 1955 - Jan. 31, 1956
Feb. 3, 1955 - Nov. 11, 1955
Feb. 24, 1965 - March 1, 1966
March 2, 1966 - Nov. 28, 1966
Feb. 23, 1968 - Dec. 13, 1968 and
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Andrada
Gerardo Freire da Silva
Oct. 22, 1969 - March 29, 1970
March 30, 1970 - Feb. 2, 1971
President, Bank of Brazil
Sebastiao Paes de Almeida
Maurlcio Chagas Bicalho
Nilo Medina Coeli
Feb. 16, 1956 - June 3, 1959
June 3, 1959 - June 1, 1960
July 22, 1963 - March 31, 1964
President, National Economic Development Bank
Lucas Lopes
Tancredo de Almeida Neves
Feb. 1956 -
1957 - 1958
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